The History of the 9th (Scottish) Division 1914-1919 [British Army]

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THE HISTORY OF THE
9TH (SCOTTISH) DIVISION

1914-1919

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THE HISTORY OF THE
9ru (SCOTTISH) DIVISION

IQI4-1919

By JOHN EWING, M.C.

BREVET-MAJOR, LATE 6TH K.O.S.B.

INTRODUCTION BY
FIELD-MARSHAL LORD PLUMER
G.C.B., G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O.

WITH COLOURED AND OTHER ILLUSTRATIONS
AND MAPS

LONDON
JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET, W.
1921

Ge ‘ LARRY
Ietig yseack PY OF CALIFORNTL

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TO THE CHILDREN
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IN THE 9TH (SCOTTISH) DIVISION

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INTRODUCTION

By FIELD-MARSHAL LORD PLUMER,
G.C.B., G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O.

I HAVE been asked, as Commander of the Second
Army, to write a short introduction to the history of
the work of the Ninth (Scottish) Division during the
Great War.

The Division served in other armies and under
other Army Commanders, and they could, and I know
would, bear testimony similar to mine as to the value
of the services of the Division; but it happened that
for a considerable period in the early days of the
Campaign and in the glorious final advance it was in
the Second Army, and presumably on that account the
invitation was made to me.

First of the new formations organised by Lord
Kitchener in 1914, the Division was one of the earliest
to proceed to France in 1915, and from that time till
the conclusion of operations in 1918 there was hardly
a phase of the war or an important action in which
they did not take a prominent part.

Composed as they were of troops drawn from
the land which has from time immemorial been famous
for its fighting men, they were later in the campaign
supplemented and strengthened by soldiers from South
Africa, and the combination proved, as it was bound
to be, irresistible.

Fortunate in their Divisional Generals, their sub-

ordinate leaders and their staffs, the Division was
vii

vill INTRODUCTION

always one which could be relied on to carry out
successfully any duties entrusted to them if it was
humanly possible to do so, and any Corps or Army
Commander to whom they might be allotted considered
himself fortunate in having them under his command.

I hope this history will be widely read.

It is a record of a wonderful development of
fighting efficiency steadily maintained throughout four
very strenuous years.

It is a fine illustration of the determination and
dogged pertinacity which we are all proud to know
were the characteristics of the troops of the British
Empire throughout, and which undoubtedly won
the war.

It points the moral of what can be accomplished
by a body of men who never recognised defeat, and
to whom any temporary failure was merely an incentive
to further effort.

Those who served in the Division can feel that
they are handing down to their descendants as a
legacy of imperishable fame a record of achievements
worthy of the glorious traditions of their forefathers
and of the regiment whose name they bore.

With troops such as fought in the Ninth Division,
however prolonged the struggle may be, there never
can be any doubt of the ultimate issue.

Puumer, F.- AZ,

Late Commander, Second Army, B.ELF.

Matta, 17th October 1920.

PREFACE

Tuis story has been compiled from Battalion, Brigade,
and Divisional diaries, supplemented by the narratives
of individual officers, and, it is hoped, will prove a
record of interest to all who served or were connected
with the Ninth Division.

To the numerous officers of the Division who have
assisted me by their suggestions and criticisms and
by the loan of documents, I take this opportunity of
expressing my deep sense of gratitude. My sincere
thanks are due also to the Staff of the Historical
Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence for the
ready courtesy with which they placed at my disposal
every facility for consulting documents and maps.

To the following officers for constant and ungrudg-
ing help I am particularly indebted,

Captain W. Y. Darling,
Lieut.-Colonel P. A. V. Stewart,
Lieut.-Colonel T. C. Mudie,
Major W. Lumsden,

and to my wife for most valuable assistance both in the
compilation of the narrative and in the correction of
proofs.
J. EWING.
Epinpurou,
Qctoher 1920.

Note.—The titles of infantry battalions are given in full in the Order
of Battle, Appendix I., but to save space in the narrative the word
“battalion” has been omitted, ey., the 11th Bn. The Royal Scots is referred
to as the 11th Royal Scots.

With the exception of Loos all battles are described from right to left.

ix

CONTENTS

CHAPTER I
ARMS AND THE MAN
' Aucust 1914 To May 1915

The Outbreak of War— Lord Kitchener— ‘** The First Hundred Thousand ”
— Composition of the Division — one The a s penne
10th May 1915, : , : 1

PAGE

CHAPTER II

FIRST EXPERIENCES IN FRANCE
May 1915 to SerremBer 1915

Move of Division to France, May 1915—Instruction in Trench Duties—
Bombing and Bombs— Visit by Field-Marshal Sir J. D. P. French—
Festubert—Training near Busnes—Vermelles—General reasons for
Battle of Loos—The Plan of Battle—Importance of Gas—Task of the
Ninth Division—Duties of the Staff—Major-General Landon's Plan—
Objectives — Preparations — Assembly Trenches — Communication
Trenches—Artillery—Machine-Guns and Trench Mortars— Arrange-
ments for Gas—Smoke— R.E. Pioneers, Tools— Medical Arrangements
—Communications—Equipment of the Men _.. ; . 12

CHAPTER III
: BATTLE OF LOOS
25TsH To 28TH SEPTEMBER 1915

Terrain— Preliminary Bombardment, 21st to 24th Sept. — Action of
28th Brigade—Action of 6th K.O.S.B.—Action of 10th H.L.I.
—Second Attack of 28th Brigade — Reasons for Failure of
Attack—Action of 26th Brigade—Action of 7th Seaforths— Action
of 5th Camerons—The Supporting Battalions—Situation east of
Fosse 8—Position of 26th Brigade, 9 a.m., 25th Sept.—Action of
2th Brigade—Pekin Trench evacuated — Situation on evening of 25th
Sept.—Relief of 26th Brigade— Withdrawal of 27th Brigade— Situation
on morni.g of 26th Sept.—Lo s of Fosse 8, 27th Sept.— Evacuation
of Fosse Alley—Counter-Attack by 26th Reena ne of the
Division—Comments on the Battle ; ; : . 82

xi

Xi

CONTENTS

CHAPTER IV

THE SALIENT AND “PLUG STREET”
Ocroser 1915 tro May 1916

Concentration of Division near Bethune— Major-General W. T. Furse and

Esprit de Corps—New Commanders— Move to the Salient—Mud—The
Reign of the Second Lieutenant—The Ninth Division School— The
Trenches—Sappers and Infantry— Artillery Retaliation Tariff— Mining
—A.S.C. and Transport—Formation of Machine-Gun Companies
—Gas Attack, 19th Dec.—Rest and Training—Ploegsteert Wood—
llth Royal Scots Raided—The G.O.C. and the Offensive Spirit—
Sniping and Machine-Guns—Changes in Command— Artillery and
Trench Mortars—Break up of the 28th Brigade— Arrival of the South

African Brigade— Relief of the Division

CHAPTER V

THE CAPTURE OF BERNAFAY WOOD, AND THE BATTLES
FOR TRONES WOOD

Juty 1916

Rest and Training—Move to Somme Area—Traffic of the Hinterland—

Summary of Events, 1915 to 1916—Reasons for Battle of the Somme
-— Nature of the Somme Battlefield—The Policy of Attrition— Attitude
of Enemy—Movements and Preparations of the Division prior to the
Battle— Work: of the R.F.C.—Weather, Preliminary Bombardment.
and Dispositions of XIII. Corps—Events of Ist July—27th Brigade
Relieves 90th Brigade, 2nd to 3rd July—Capture of Bernafay Wood.
3rd July—The Fight for ‘Trones Wood—Orders tor the Attack on
Longueval and Delville Wood—The Plans of General Furse— Brigade
Arrangements—Artillery Arrangements . ’ é

CHAPTER VI

LONGUEVAL AND DELVILLE WOOD
JULY 1916

The Assembly—Action of 26th Brigade, 14th July—Action of 27th

Brigade, 14th July—News at D.H.Q.—The Fight for Longueval,
14th July—Attack on Waterlot Farm, 14th July—Situation on
evening of 14th July—South Africans Capture Delville Wood, 15th
July—The Fight for Longueval, 15th July—Attack on Waterlot Farm,
15th July—Situation on evening of 15th July—The Fight for
Longueval, 16th July—Situation on evening of 16th July—The
Fight for Longueval, 17th July—Waterlot Farm occupied, 17th July
—Situation on evening of 17th July—Attack of 76th Brigade on
Longueval, 18th July—Great German Counter-Attack, 18th July—
Counter-Attack by 26th Brigade, 18th July—Situation after 6.15 p.m.,
18th July—Events of 19th July—Relief of the Division— Work of the
R.A.M.C.—Work of the Sappers and Pioneers—The A.S.C. and
‘Transport —Comments on the Battle : : .

PAOR

61

84

109

CONTENTS xiii

CHAPTER VII

THE BUTTE DE WARLENCOURT
Ocroser 1916

Rest and Reorganisation—The Vimy Ridge—The Trenches, Aug. and
Sept. 1916—Sniping and Raids—Concentration in III. Corps Area,
Oct. 1916—Summary of events in the East during summer of 1916—
Nature of the country near the Butte de Warlencourt—Plans for
Operation, 12th Oct. 1916—Action of 7th Seaforths, 12th Oct.—Action
of S.A. Brigade, 12th Oct.—Comments on the Action of the 12th Oct.
~Capture of The Pimple, 15th Oct.—Plans for Operation, 18th Oct.
—Action of 5th Camerons, 18th ( ct.—Action of 1st S.A.I., 18th Oct.
—Second Attack by S.A. Brigade, 18th Oct.—Events, 19th Oct.—
Relief of 26th and S.A. Brigades by 27th Brigade, 19th to 20th Oct.
—Events, 20th Oct.—Relief of Division, 25th Oct.—Difficulties of the
R.A.M.C.—Comments on Action . ‘ é .

PAGE

143

CHAPTER VIII

ARRAS
NovemBER )916 to Aprit 1917

Promotion of Brig.-General Scrase-Dickins, 21st Oct. 1916—Promotion
of Brig.-General Ritchie, 4th Dec. 1916—General Furse appointed
M.G.O., 1st Dec. 1916—General Lukin appointed G.O.C.—New C.Os.
—The Bomb and the Rifle—Arras—The Trenches—Ninth Division
School—Training and Pamphlets—Life in the Sector — Raid by the 9th
Scottish Rifles, 14th Feb. 1917.—Other Raids—Changes in the Line
—Plans of Allies for 1917—Preparations for the Offensive—Task of
XVII. Corps—Task of Ninth Division—Artillery Arrangements—
Brig.-General Tudor and Smoke—The Barrage—Our Air Supremacy
Challenged—The Training of the Men— Daylight Reconnaissance by
the 11th Royal Scots, 21st March 1917—Formations for Attack - 169

CHAPTER IX

THE BATTLES OF ARRAS
Tax Acrions or 9rH Aprit, 121TH APRIL, 3RD May, 51rn June 1917

Preliminary Bombardment, 5th to 9th April 1917—The Attack on the
Black Line, 9th April 1917—The Attack on the Blue Line, 9th April
1917—The Attack on the Brown Line, 9th April 1917—Comments on
the Action of the 9th April—The Attack on Greenland Hill, 12th
April 1917—Action of the South African Brigade, 12th April 1917—
Action of the 27th Brigade, } 2th April 1917—Comments on the Action
of the 12th April—Action of the 3rd May 1917—Action of the 26th
Brigade, 3rd May 1917— Action of the 27th Brigade, 3rd May 1917—
Comments on the Action of the 3rd May—Action of the 5th June 1917
—The Division leaves the Arras Sector, June 1917 : ; . 193

Xlv

CONTENTS

CHAPTER X

PASSCHENDAKELE, 1917
ACTIONS OF THE 20TH SEPTEMBER AND THE 12TH OCTOBER

Rest and Training—Move to the Somme, 25th July 1917—Description of

Sector—Events of August 1917—A Suggested Attack— The Passchen-
dacle Campaign—Von Armin's System of Defence—The ‘* Pill-boxes ”
—Description of country near Frezenberg, Sept. 1917— Objectives of
the Division— Preparations for the Battle, Sept. 1917—Action of 27th
Brigade, 20th Sept. 1917 — Action of the South African Brigade, 20th
Sept. 1917—Death of Brig.-General Maxwell, 21st Sept. 1917—
Comments on the Action of the 20th Sept. 1917—Training—Objectives
for the 12th October 1917—Action of the 12th Oct. 1917—Comments
on the Action of the 12th Oct. 1917—Relief of the Division, 24th
Oct. 1917 : ; . , ‘ ‘

CHAPTER XI
PREPARATIONS FOR DEFENCE
Octosrr 1917 To 21st Marcu 1918

Réle of the Division in 1917—Situation at close of 1917—Move to the

Coast, Oct. to Nov.—Division Transferred to Somme Area, Dec.—
Training, Feb. 1918—9th Machine-Gun Battalion Formed—General
Lukin leaves the Division, March 1918—The Ninth’s Sector—The
Forward Zone—The Battle Zone—The Rear Zone—The Scheme of
Defence—The Enemy's Intentions—Ludendorff’s Plan

CHAPTER XII

GERMANY’S SUPREME EFFORT
: 2isr ro 29TH Marcy 1918

Hostile Bombardment, 21st March—Loss of Gauche Wood, 2lst March—

Loss of Chapel Hill, 21st March—South Africans Recapture Chapel
Hill, 21st March—Retreat to the Battle Zone, 21st March—The 22nd
March—Loss of Chapel Hill, 22nd March— Withdrawal to Brown and
Green Lines, 22nd March—Retirement of the South African Brigade,
22nd March—Retirement of the Highland Brigade, 22nd March—The
Boundary Question, 22nd March—Retreat to East of Moislains, 23rd
March— Orders for Retreat to Ridge west of Bouchavesnes, 23rd
March—The Retreat, 23rd March—Events, 23rd to 24th March—
Retreat of the Lowland Brigade, 24th March—The Last Stand of the
South Africans, 24th March—Retreat of the Highland Brigade, 24th
March—Comments on the Fighting of the 24th March—VII. Corps
Transferred to Third Army, 25th March—Events, 25th March—
Events, 26th March ~ Events, 27th March—Relief of Division, 27th to
28th March — Work of the R.A.M.C. — Work of the A.S.C. —
Comments on the Action of the Ninth—The Division ** Mentioned” .

PAGE

219

246

260

CONTENTS xv

CHAPTER XIiIl

THE GERMAN OFFENSIVE IN FLANDERS
Aprit 1918
PAGE

Failure of German thrust against Amiens—General Tudor Appointed
G.0.C., 28th March—Division in Line near Wytschaete, April—
Nature of the Defences—German Attack, 10th April—Counter-Attack
of the South Africans at Messines, 10th April—German Attack, 11th
April—Events, 12th to 15th April—Retreat to the Corps Line, 15th to
16th April—Germans Capture Wytschaete, 16th April—Counter-Attack
of Seaforths at Wytschaete, 16th April—Events, 17th to 24th April
—German Attack, 25th April—Action of the 12th Royal Scots
and 6th K.O.S.B., 25th April—Work of the Machine-Gunners,
25th April—Action of Seaforths and Camerons, 25th April—Relief
of Division, 26th April—Comments on the Fighting. ; . 292

CHAPTER XIV

METEREN AND HOEGENACKER RIDGE
May To SEpremMBeER 1918

Moral of the Troops—The Press—Review of Situation at end of April,
1918—The Division at Meteren, May—Nature of the country and the
Defences—Events, 25th May to 19th July—Preparations for an Attack
on Meteren—A Series of Mishaps—Action of South African Brigade,
19th July—Action of Highland Brigade, 19th July—Remarks on the
Operation—Brig.-General Kennedy leaves the Division, 27th July—
Events, 25th July to 18th August—Plans for Capture of Hoegenacker
Ridge — Capture of Hoegenacker Ridge, 18th August — Relief of
Division, 25th August — South Africans leave the Division, 13th
Sept. — Newfoundlanders join the Division— Failure of German
designs in France—The * Turn of the Tide "— Preparations for Attack
on 28th Sept.—Objectives of the Division . : P . 317

CHAPTER XV

FROM YPRES TO LEDEGHEM
28TH SxgpremBerR To 14TH Ocroser 1918

Passchendaele Ridge carried, 28th Sept.—Capture of Becelaere—Situation
at close of 28th Sept.—Orders for Advance on 29th Sept.—Action of
the 28h Brigade, 29th Sept.—The Camerons join in, 29th Sept.—
Action of the 27th Brigade, 29th Sept.—Situation at close of 29th
Sept.—Events, 80th Sept.—Orders for Advance on lst Oct.—The
Capture of Ledeghem and Rolleghem Cappelle, Ist Oct.—The German
Counter-Stroke, Ist Oct.—The Work of the Gunners, Ist Oct.—
Remarks on Action of 1st Oct.—Summary of German defeats in
other parts of the Line, Sept. to Oct.—Objectives for 14th Oct., 1918
~—Obstacles to our Advance—The Assembly, 13th to 14th : . 839

Xvi CONTENTS

CHAPTER XVI
FROM LEDEGHEM TO THE SCHELDT
147m Ocrosrr to 27TH OcroneR 1918

Action of the 14th Oct.—Fine work of the Gunners, 14th Oct.—Plans for
Renewal of Advance, 15th Oct.—Action of 27th Brigade, 15th Oct.—
Plans for crossing the Lys, 16th Oct. — K.O.S.B. cross the Lys,
16th to 17th Oct.—Events, 17th Oct.—Result of the Operations in
Flanders—Objectives for 20th Oct.— Preparation for crossing the Lys
—The crossing of the Lys, 19th to 20th Oct.— Action of the 20th Oct.
— Events, 21st Oct.—Action of the 22nd Oct.—Capture of Ooteghem-
Ingoyghem Ridge, 25th Oct.—Relief of Division, 27th Oct.—Com-
ments on Operations since 28th Sept. ‘ ;

CHAPTER XVII
CONCLUSION
28tH Ocroner 1918 to 15TH Marcu 1919

Events leading up to the Armistice, 11th Nov. 1918—The March to the
Bridgehead—The Division in Germany—End of the Ninth Division,
15th March 19!9—Value of the Administrative and Supply Services —
The Work of **Q” Branch—The Ordnance i calc he Padres

—The Co-operative Spirit : ; ,
APPENDICES
I. Taste sHowinc Ornper or Batre or THE Ninta (Scoriisi)
Division : . : ‘ , , ‘ ‘
Il. Tanre sHOWwING THE PERIODS SPENT IN THE LinE ‘ : .

III. List or ComMANDERS AND STAFF
IV. CasvaLtiEs or THE Nintn Division
V. Victrorra Cross Awarps ; , : :

VI. Summary or Work bone BY Saprens AND Pionerrs IN Prevara-
TION FOR THE BatTLeE oF ARKAS

VII. List snowinc Marertat Issuep anxnp Satvep ny THE ORDNANCE
DEPARTMENT

VIII. DivisronaL Instrrures anp CANTEENS

INDEX

Mars j

PAGE

382

397
400
402
409
410

413

415
416

419
437

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

LANDSCAPES

From Water-colour Sketches by Captain F. E. Hodge, late R.F.A,

' Menin Gate, Ypres .
Festubert
Loos . ; : : ‘ : , :
Lawrence Farm (Sketch of his Battalion H.Q. by

Lieut.-Col. the Right Hon. Winston 8. Churchill)
Ploegsteert Wood . : ; ‘ ‘
Delville Wood
Ablain St Nazaire, Notre pane aa Vimy Ridge
Butte de Warlencourt °

Arras (view in the town), West Gate

Arras (view outside town), battle front, a 1917
Havrincourt
Zonnebeke from the aeessuhere Ridge
St Julien, Artillery H.Q. “ Pill-box ”
Nieuport Bains, looking towards German Lines .
Gonnelieu from Gouzeaucourt
Wytschaete, from Vierstraat
Kemmel and Ypres from the Frezenberg Ridge :
Meteren ‘
“ Pill-box” near Pei iei
Ingoyghem and Ooteghem, “The Last Ridge”

PORTRAITS

Major-General G. H. Thesiger, C.B., C.M.G.
Lieut.-General Sir W. T. Furse, K. C. B., D.S.O.

Major-General Sir H. T. Lukin, K.C.B., C.M.G., D.S.0. :

Major-General H. H. Tudor, C.B., C.M.G.

xvii

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LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

MAPS

At End of Book
Loos.

. The Somme, Longueval, and Delville Wood.
. The Butte de Warlencourt, October 1916.

Arras: Action of 9th April 1917.
Arras : Actions of 12th April to 5th June 1917,

. Passchendaele: Action near Frezenberg, 20th September 1917.
. Passchendaele: Action near St Julien, 12th October 1917.

. The Retreat on the Somme, March 1918.

. Wytschaete and Kemmel, April 1918.

. Meteren and Hoegenacker: July and August 1918.

. The Final Advance, September to October 1918.

HISTORY OF THE NINTH (SCOTTISH)
DIVISION

CHAPTER I
ARMS AND THE MAN

Avueustr 1914 To May 1915

THE great European War that broke out in 1914 was
the inevitable result of the conditions that moulded
the nineteenth century. In many respects the history
of the century had disappointed the high hopes with
which the period opened. The overthrow of Napoleon’s
hegemony in 1814 imposed on his conquerors the
task of effecting the settlement of Europe, and it was
expected that the chief Powers would grasp the
Opportunity to settle all questions that had _ been
4 source of friction, and especially to satisfy those
nationalist aspirations which had been the most potent
factor in contributing to the defeat of Napoleon. It was
even hoped that an attempt would be made to realise
the brotherhood of man in some sort of federation.

In all these respects the work accomplished by
the Congress, which met at Vienna in 1814, fell short
of expectations. The chief statesmen of the Powers
‘ad been the foremost opponents of the French Revolu-
tion, and they had little sympathy with the nationalist
Sentiment that found its most vigorous expression in
Germany, Italy, and Poland. Moreover, the political

1

2 THE OUTBREAK OF WAR [aucusT

ambitions and interests of the allies required the most
delicate handling, if Europe was to be saved from
another war. Thus the Eastern Question, the cause
of considerable uneasiness throughout the century,
never came within the consideration of the Congress.
No attempt was made to express the unity of Europe

in any form of federation, unless the Holy Alliance be |

accepted as an effort to achieve that end. Above all,
the necessity of satisfying the political interests of the
various members of the alliance, in many cases already
arranged by treaties, caused nationahst aspirations to
be neglected, and in some cases flagrantly disregarded,
as in the arrangements affecting Belgium, Italy, and
Norway. Thus Nationalism could only be developed
in opposition to the Vienna Settlement and only by
war could its aims be realised. In consequence the
development of nationalities, which is the notable fact
of the century, was accompanied by the assertion of
military force, and the freedom of nations went hand
in hand with militarism. What had been won by the
sword was maintained by the same means, and towards
the close of the nineteenth century Europe formed an
armed camp, each nation supporting a huge armament,
which drained its resources but which it dared not
diminish lest it should fall a prey to a more powerful
neighbour.

With Europe thus constituted every question that
revealed rivalries and differences was a peril, and there
was no influence so baneful as that exercised by the
Eastern Question. On more than one occasion it caused
the gravest anxiety to the Chancelleries of Europe, and
war was averted mainly by reason of the comparative
equality of the opposing groups formed by the chief
states. In the last quarter of the century the pre-
dominance of Germany was the governing factor in

1914] THE OUTBREAK OF WAR 3

the situation. She built up an alliance of the Central
European states and her influence displaced that of
Russia in Constantinople. . The full scope of her
ambitions was not realised in this country, but it
was vaguely felt that they were not compatible with
the interests of the British Empire. Certain definite
events showed that German policy, though not actively
hostile, was unfriendly to us. She seized the oppor-
tunity created by the Jameson Raid to fling the first
open challenge to British power, and one of the
principal results of the Boer War was the creation of
the German Fleet, which could only have been intended
as a weapon against Britain. In other directions the
Claims and threats of Germany constituted a constant
danger to the peace of the world. She picked quarrels
with France over Morocco in 1904 and 1911, and openly
made preparations to support Austria against Russia
in 1907. Her increasing truculence in foreign affairs
ultimately forced Britain, France, and Russia into a
close agreement in order to safeguard their interests.

The occasion of war was the assassination of the
Austrian Archduke Francis Ferdinand in the streets
of Serajevo on the 28th June 1914. But the emotions
aroused by this despicable crime would never have
led to war had it not been for the determination of
Germany to bring matters to a crisis. Her designs in
the Balkans and Asia Minor largely depended upon
the cordial co-operation of Austria, of which she could,
be certain only while the Emperor Francis Joseph was
alive. In 1914 he was already over eighty years of
age, and it was advisable to turn to account the quarrel
between Serbia and Austria caused by the Serajevo
murder,

The nature of her ties with France and Russia as
Well as the invasion of Belgium by German forces

4 | LORD KITCHENER [ AUGUST

compelled Britain to take arms against Germany. No
other course was possible. The significant and gratify-
ing feature of our intervention was the unanimity with
which general opinion supported the Government, and
very few protested against the obligations that honour
required the nation to undertake.

The war formed by far the most exacting test to
which the democracy of Britain had yet been subjected.
The last great European War had been waged by
Britain under an aristocracy, which, despite many mis-
takes, had ultimately achieved victory by steadfast and
unquenchable courage. There were many, especially
those of the type who, like Thucydides, doubted the
ability of a democracy to govern an Empire, who feared
that the resolute spirit of Pitt and Castlereagh had
vanished, and that the country would take refuge in
ignoble neutrality. But all fears and doubts were dis-
solved by the manner in which the nation as a whole
took up the gage that the Kaiser had thrown, and the
course of the struggle showed that the Empire possessed
in full measure the more robust qualities it had shown
under royal and aristocratic rule, though before victory
was achieved it had surrendered all power to a small
oligarchy, and allowed itself to be subjected to a degree
of compulsion and restraint that had not been contem-
plated when hostilities began.

It was fortunate that the name and services of Lord
Kitchener were at the disposal of his country, for no
other man enjoyed to such an unusual degree the trust
and esteem of his compatriots. He was universally
recognised as the man pre-eminently fitted to lead the
nation in its hour of peril, and his perspicacity and
sanity of judgment inspired general confidence. It is
difficult to overestimate the sobering and steadying
influence that his personality exercised throughout the

1914] “THE FIRST HUNDRED THOUSAND” 5

land. Perhaps more quickly than any other man he
grasped the gravity of the situation, and his first speech
as Secretary of State for War warned the people of
Britain that the conflict would not be the short, sharp
affair many expected it to be.

All available resources for war were immediately
employed. The small but extremely efficient Regular
Army, at once transported to France, played no incon-
siderable part in checking the first onrush of the
German armies, while the Navy swept the seas and
bottled up the hostile fleet in its harbours. But our
Regular land forces, amounting to little more than.
_ 150,000 men, were a scanty and inadequate contribution
to the titanic contest that; was raging in Europe, and
Lord Kitchener asked the civilian population to furnish
fresh armies, His appeal was answered with magnifi-
cent alacrity; recruiting offices, which were opened
in every large town in the United Kingdom, were
besieged by volunteers and the staff had to work day
and night to cope with the rush.

The pick of the nation offered itself for service.
Youth, which had hitherto satisfied in sport and
athletics its craving for adventure, was attracted rather
than repelled by the novelty and danger of war, and
young men in thousands left workshops, offices, and
universities to join the Colours. Others, not so
humerous, were drawn from the class of casual
labourers, and they cheerfully submitted themselves
to a routine more irksome though more wholesome
than any to which they had been accustomed. There
Was a minority of more mature men who, having en-
visaged the situation, bravely sacrificed their prospects
on the altar of duty. The standard of physique was
exceptionally high, and many who afterwards passed
the tests with ease were rejected in the early months

6 COMPOSITION OF THE NINTH DIVISION [avevustr

of the war. After selection the “First Hundred
Thousand,” the salt of their race, were sent to the
various battalion depots, and then on to the training
camps near Salisbury Plain.

One of the first divisions formed from the New
Armies was the Ninth (Scottish) Division, and its
composition was as follows :—

G.O.C.—Major-General C. J. Mackenzie, C.B.
G.S.O.I.—Lieut.-Colonel C. H. pz Roucemont, M.V.O.
A.A. & Q.M.G.—Colonel A. V. Payne.

26TH (HIGHLAND) BRIGADE.

Brig.-General—H. R. Kelham, C.B.
B.M.—Capt. H. W. B. Thorp.
8th Bn. The Black Watch ae as High- Commanded by
landers) . - Lieut.-Col. Lord Sempill.

7th Bn. Seaforth Highlanders (Ross- ),.
shire Buffs, The Duke of Albany’s) \Lieut.-Col. W. T. Gaisford.

8th Bn. The Gordon Highlanders - Lieut.-Col. G. Staunton.

5th Bn. The Queen’s Own Cameron eran D. W. Cameron
Highlanders of Lochiel.

27TH INFANTRY BRIGADE.

Brig.-General—W. Scott Moncrieff.
B.M.—Capt. A. I. R. Glasfurd.

11th Bn. The Royal Scots . Lieut.-Col. H. H. B. Dyson.

12th Bn. The Royal Scots ‘ . Lieut.-Col. G. G. Loch.

6th Bn. The Royal Scots Fusiliers . Lieut.-Col. H. H. Northey.

10th Bn. Princess Louise’s (Argyll & /{Lieut.-Col. A. F. Mackenzie,
Sutherland Highlanders) . : M.V.O.

28tH INFANTRY BRIGADE.

Brig.-General—S. W. Scrase-Dickins.
B.M.—Captain C. J. B. Hay.
6th Bn. The King’s Own Scottish {Lieut.-Col. H.D.N. Maclean,
Borderers . ; D.S.O.
9th Bn. The Scottish Rifles (Cainéronians) Lieut.-Col. A. C. Northey.
10th Bn. The Highland Light Infantry ae — J. C. Grahame,
llth Bn. The Highland Light Infantry Lieut.-Col. H. C. Fergusson.

1914] COMPOSITION OF ‘THE NINTH DIVISION 7

ROYAL FIELD ARTILLERY.

C.R.A.—Brig.-General E. H. Armitage, C.B.

B.M.—Captain K. P. Ferguson.
Commanded by

50th Brigade, R.F.A. . , . Lieut.-Col. A. C. Bailward.
Slst Brigade, R.F.A. . : . Lieut.-Col. A. H. Carter.

52nd Brigade, R.F.A. . . Lieut.-Col. F. W. Boteler.
d3rd Brigade, R.F.A. . ; . Lieut.-Col. C. N. Simpson.

The first three brigades had four 18-pounder guns and
the 53rd Brigade four 4°5 howitzers, and each brigade
had a B.A.C.

THE ROYAL ENGINEERS.

C.R.E.—Lieut.-Colonel H. A. A. Livingstone, C.M.G.

63rd Field Company . : . Capt. C. Doucet.

64th Field Company. : . Capt. W. E. Francis.

90th Field Company. . Major C. S. Montefiore.
PIONEERS.

The 9th Bn. Seaforth Highlanders (Ross-shire Buffs, The Duke of
Albany’s)—Lieut.-Col. T. Fetherstonhaugh.

THE ROYAL ARMY MEDICAL CORPS.
A.D.M.S.—Colonel C. Cree. _

2ith Field Ambulance . : . Lieut.-Col. O. W. A. Elsner.
- 28th Field Ambulance . : . Lieut.-Col. W. E. Hardy.
29th Field Ambulance . , . Lieut.-Col. F. R. Buswell.

ARMY SERVICE CORPS.!

9th Divisional Train—Major R. P. Crawley, M.V.O.
9th Divisional Supply Column, Motor

Transport . Major Dugmore.
104th Company : : . Major H. MacDougal.
ae company : . ; aes _ . King.
mpany : . Capt. F. K. Norman.
107th Company : : . Capt. C. de M. Hutcheson.

_' An A.S.C. Company was attached to each brigade: the 104th to the
divisional troops, the 105th to the 26th, the 106th to the 27th, and the
107th to the 28th Brigade.

The divisional train was responsible for arranging matters of supply
between the Division and the Corps concerned. The task of the supply
column was to work between the railhead and the divisional A.S.C. and it

8 TRAINING [ocTroBER

In addition to these units the Division was equipped
with Ordnance and Veterinary Sections, D.A.D.O.S.
being Major J. S. Brogden, and the A.D.V.S. Major
W. H. Nicol. There were also a battery of R.G.A.,
a company of Cyclists, and a squadron of the Glasgow
Yeomanry. |

During the period of training several changes in
command occurred. General Mackenzie went to France
in October 1914 and was succeeded by Major-General
Sir C. Fergusson, who had commanded the Fifth Division
in the original Expeditionary Force. In March 1915
Sir C. Fergusson crossed to France to take over the II.
Corps and his successor was Major-General H. J. S.
Landon. In the 26th Brigade Brig.-General E. St G.
Grogan, C.B., succeeded Brig.-General Kelham on the
16th November, while Lieut.-Colonel Harry Wright,
D.S.O., a veteran of the famous Kandahar march, took
over the command of the Gordons in February 1915;
in the 27th Brigade, Brig.-General C. D. Bruce suc-
ceeded Brig.-General Scott Moncrieff in January, and
Lieut.-Col. R. C. Dundas was appointed to the command
of the 11th Royal Scots in October. Changes occurred
also amongst the Gunners and the Sappers, and by the
time the Ninth was ready to cross the Channel the
50th Brigade was commanded by Lieut.-Col. C. C. van
Straubenzee, the 52nd by Lieut.-Col. A. M. Perreau,
and the 58rd by Lieut.-Col. K. K. Knapp, while the
63rd Field Company was commanded by Major L. W. 8.
Oldham, and the 64th by Major G. R. Hearn.

After the various units were organised, training’ was
formed part of the Division until 1917 when supply columns became Corps
troops. The Battalion Quartermaster drew the supplies for his unit from
the company attached to his brigade.

1 The best account of life and training in the Division is contained in

the well-known volume, Zhe irst Hundred Thousand, by Ian Hay, who
was an officer in the 10th Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders.

a

1914] TRAINING 9

carried on with the utmost vigour. An average of
eight hours a day was spent in fitting the men for the
grim business of war; it was a heavy strain but their
keenness and excellent physique enabled them to
undergo the hardships without a murmur. The
difficulties at this early stage were enormous owing to
scarcity of instructors and lack of stores, clothing, and
arms, but there was a sprinkling of Regular officers
and N.C.Os., and with their skilled assistance the
several units soon reached a very creditable state of
efficiency.

The problems regarding stores and clothing were
solved comparatively quickly, but at first the men in
their civilian clothes with various types of headgear
presented an appearance more ludicrous than martial.
The training was on lines identical with those of the
old army and a similar syllabus was carried out with
satisfactory results. The hardest lot fell to the young
recently commissioned officers; they went through
exactly the same routine as the men but they were also
obliged to spend their spare time learning their par-
ticular duties as officers. The parsimonious scrutiny to
which in peace times all army estimates had been
subjected now showed its crippling effects. The
manual dealing with tactics and strategy, Mield Service
Regulations, was excellent in its statement of general
principles but it did not give a young officer, unfamiliar
with military terms, much assistance in such a matter
as the handling of a platoon. In this respect the
German Army was much better equipped than ours and
possessed numerous pamphlets for the guidance of
Junior and non-commissioned officers in their profession.
The war revealed the need of similar assistance for the
British Army and a spate of unofficial publications
flooded the book-shops, but none were as good or as

10 TRAINING [may

useful as the official pamphlets, notably S.S. 143 and
S.S. 135, which unfortunately did not appear until
the war had been long in progress. The lack of such
guidance in 1914 was almost as serious as the scarcity
of munitions and added enormously to the difficulties of
training. |

The course of training was naturally affected by
experience of the war and lectures by officers from
France were followed with the closest attention. The
siting of trenches gave rise to a keen controversy which
raged for a considerable time; some held that they
should be dug on the forward slopes of a hill, others
that they should be on the reverse slope. But the
experience of France showed that such niceties and
distinctions were really unimportant and could he
disregarded, since men dug in only where the enemy
allowed them to do so. The infantry devoted much
time to musketry and digging, and as a fair proportion
of the men were miners the Division became very
proficient in the rapid excavation of trenches. |

As the weeks passed the troops were gradually
taken through the various stages necessary for efficiency,
and training by units was followed by field manceuvres
in which the whole Division took part. Reviews and
route marches were always welcome as a change from
the ordinary routine and the divisional field days in
March and April were an agreeable as well as a useful
exercise. sprit de corps had taken firm root in the
several formations, and each unit, after the fashion of
all British soldiers, considered itself the salt of the
army. The divisional esprit de corps had not yet
attained the fierce intensity that was afterwards to
distinguish the Ninth; that resulted later from the
ordeal of battle, but a good start in the right direction
had been maicle.

Lae

(2. kof.

1915] THE KING’S MESSAGE ll

After eight months of incessant and strenuous
training the men were fit and eager for active service
and instructions for a move to France were daily
expected. But in 1915 spring had passed into early
summer before the orders were’ received. With them
came a rousing exhortation from H.M. King George..V.
on the 10th May :—

‘“ Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers, and Men of
the Ninth (Scottish) Division,

“You are about to join your comrades at the Front
in bringing to a successful end this relentless war of
more than nine months’ duration. Your prompt
patriotic answer to the Nation’s call to arms will never
be forgotten. The keen exertions of all ranks during
the period of training have brought you to a state of
efficiency not unworthy of my Regular Army. I am
confident that in the field you will nobly uphold the
traditions of the fine regiments whose names you bear.
Ever since your enrolment I have closely watched the
growth and steady progress of all units. I shall
continue to follow with interest the fortunes of your
Division. In bidding you farewell I pray God may
bless you in all your undertakings.”

CHAPTER II
FIRST EXPERIENCES IN FRANCE

May 1915 to Sepremser 1915

ALL units had practised entraining, and the move
to France was accomplished without a hitch. The
artillery were the first to go, the advance parties leav-
ing Bordon on 8th May; the infantry brigades left in
order of priority, beginning with the 26th on the 10th
May. Vehicles, animals, and transport crossed from
Southampton to Havre, and the infantry from Folke-
stone to Boulogne. By the 15th May the whole Division
was concentrated around the pleasant and important
little town of St Omer. It had the distinction of being
the first division of the New Armies to reach France.
After spending two days near St Omer, the Division
marched to billets south of Bailleul, the average
march for each unit being 15 miles. G.H.Q. were
established at the Chateau le Nieppe; the 26th Brigade
was at Bailleul; the 27th at Noote Boom; and the 28th
at Outtersteene. Arrangements were quickly made to
train the various branches in trench warfare. All the
field artillery brigades, except half of the 51st R.F.A.,
were attached to the Sixth Division for instruction.
The 9th Heavy Battery went over to the III. Corps,
and from this moment ceased to be a corporate part of
the Division. Similarly the infantry received their first

experiences of trench duties under the Sixth Division,
12

MAY 1915] BOMBING AND BOMBS 13

and spent a spell in the line near Armentiéres by
brigades at a time. The 27th Brigade moved into the
front line on the evening of the 20th May; it was
relieved on the 22nd by the 28th, and it in turn on the
24th by the 26th Brigade, which remained in the line
till the 26th. Sappers were employed by the III.
Corps in improving the second line defences near
Armentiéres, and the infantry soon realised that they
were expected to be as useful with the shovel as they
were with the rifle. On the 27th May the 26th Brigade
proceeded to Nieppe and Armentiéres “under the
tactical orders of the Sixth Division”; this fine phrase
simply meant that the men had to work on trenches
and strong points.

Meantime the Division received constant instruction
in bombing. When the opposing trenches lay near
each other, it was dangerous for a man to show himself
above the surface, and a method had to be discovered
by which hostile positions could be attacked without
the aggressors having to expose themselves to rifle or
machine-gun fire. The only weapon that could fulfil
this purpose was the bomb. In the hands of deter-
mined men it was a useful and valuable weapon, and
against-a vigilant and stubborn enemy it was sometimes
the only means by which progress could be made.
In 1915 and the early part of 1916 there were few
men on either side who were not pugnacious, but the
trouble was that when troops became stale with months
of underground warfare, the bomb fight tended to result
in a stationary conflict, no serious effort being made to
gain any ground. In 1915, however, there was no
staleness, the chief difficulties being the large variety
of bombs and the multiplicity of names that each
bomb possessed. Most of them were worked by a
time fuse, but the stick hand-grenade exploded on

14. - BOMBING AND BOMBS [May

percussion and was a weapon probably more dangerous
to the thrower and his comrades than to the enemy.
The Mills No. 5 Bomb, which afterwards became the
standard one used by the British Army, was exploded
by a time fuse of five seconds; but more common at
that time was the Bethune Bomb, which was the one
chiefly used by the Division at Loos. With all these
varieties the average man could throw between 20
and 30 yards. For a longer distance, rifle-grenades,
that is bombs fired from rifles, had a range up to
about 200 yards. Heavier bombs could be thrown
by trench mortars, of which there were at first
numerous types, and several kinds of catapults were
used. An imposing-looking engine was the West
Spring Gun. It could hurl a bomb about 400 yards,
but required eight men to work it, and needed an
enormous emplacement, which a _ hostile aeroplane
would have had little trouble in spotting. It threw up
the bomb a tremendous height into the air; if a cricket
ball were substituted for the bomb, that gun would
form an excellent contrivance for giving cricketers
practice in catching. The trench mortars in use at
the time had all the same defect: they were cumber-
some, and could not be quickly brought into action.
Many hours were devoted to the training of the
men in the art of bomb-throwing, and factories for
making bombs were started by the Sappers. Unfor-
tunately on the 27th May a deplorable accident caused
considerable loss of life. A factory at Nieppe Station
was blown up, and Lieut.-Col. Uniacke, the A.A. and
Q.M.G., who was riding past at the time, was killed.
Six officers and 4 men were wounded, and 7 men
killed. Every reasonable precaution had been taken
by the Sappers in charge, and the explosion was
probably due to the instability of the explosive.

1915] VISIT BY SIR J. D. P. FRENCH 15

While the Division was still near Bailleul, it was
visited by Sir John French who inspected the 27th
and 28th Brigades on the 29th May. Near the end of
the month the 26th Brigade received a new Commander,
Brig.-General Grogan’ returning to England and his
place being taken by Brig.-General A. B. Ritchie,
C.M.G., on 30th May. By the 2nd June all detach-
ments had received some slight experience of the
trenches. On the 6th, the Division marched by night
to training grounds near Busnes where D.H.Q. were
installed, and till the 25th, traiming was carried on
vigorously, particular attention being paid to bombing.
On the 16th, speculations on the possibility of the
Ninth taking part in a battle were aroused by it being
placed under readiness to move at two hours’ notice.
This order was due to an unsuccessful engagement
carried out by the British Army near Festubert, but
the Division was not required and training continued
without interruption.

On the 26th June orders were received to relieve
the Seventh Division in the line near Festubert, and
accordingly the 26th and the 27th Brigades took
over the front line on the nights of the 1st and 2nd
July. The 28th was in reserve. This was the first
occasion on which the Division was responsible for
a section of the front line, which it held east of
Festubert until 18th August, and during this period
all ranks became acquainted with the trials of trench
warfare.

The advantage of ground was with the enemy.
Occupying the ridge east of Festubert the Germans
were able to control their artillery fire by direct
observation. The weakest point in our line was

1 This was the result of an order issued by G.H.Q. fixing an age limit
for Brigadiers.

C

16 FESTU BERT [JUNE

“The Orchard,” a sharp salient, which was held at
tremendous cost and risk; and it was here that the
Division had most of its casualties, as the enemy
kept it constantly under fire from artillery and
trench mortars. Our artillery could do little at that
-time to help the infantry. For every shell that we
had the Germans had ten, and each attempt to
retaliate resulted in a fiercer and heavier bombard-
ment. Until our gunners were supplied with enough
material to enable them to compete with the enemy,
the best policy was to refrain from annoying him.
The infantry particularly disliked the feeble efforts
at retaliation by our artillery because they alone felt
the consequences. For a similar reason all trench
mortar officers’ were unpopular. When a mortar was
fired that particular section of trench was drenched by
the enemy with “ Minnies.”* It was therefore natural
for the garrison to treat trench mortars and their
teams with disapproval if not hostility, and it was
usually only by stealth that the T.M. officer was
able to fire at all.

Another part of our line to which the enemy paid
considerable attention was an old trench lying between
the front and support trenches, known as the “Old
German Line.” We did not occupy it on account of
its stench and filth, but the Germans believed that
we did, and persistently shelled it. They were
encouraged in their error. A few men were sent to
light fires in this trench, and after they had performed
their task they withdrew in haste; for as soon as
the enemy observed the smoke rising, he commenced
to shell vigorously. No one was known voluntarily

1 See The First Hundred Thousand, yp. 280.

2 “Minnie,” the popular name for German Trench Mortars, from
Minenwerfer.

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1915] FESTUBERT 17

to enter this trench except the Prince of Wales, who
used to prowl round it in search of souvenirs. He paid
a number of visits’ to the line while we held it, and
his natural daring must often have caused his escort
the keenest anxiety. It was not safe to go up to
the forward saps in daylight, but His Royal Highness
insisted on doing so, and he also took a photograph
of a wounded man who was being carried down from
one of them. |

In spite of the immense preponderance that the
enemy enjoyed in artillery, the men found in the
life more of interest than of peril. Patrolling was
a new form of enterprise that appealed to the bolder
spirits. 2nd Lieut. Bellamy of the 11th Royal Scots
took over a patrol of three men in broad daylight on
the 5th June, and on reconnoitring found that the
enemy had constructed a new trench. On the
13th June, 2nd Lieut. Murray of the 12th Royal Scots
stalked a German patrol and shot one man; and on
the same night Corporal Morrison of the 6th Royal
Scots Fusiliers frightened away a working-party and
brought back a chevaux de frise. Even the common-
places of trench life had at this time the spice
of novelty, but an incident that happened to Sergeant
J. M‘Hardy, of the machine-gun section of the 8th
Black Watch, was certainly unusual as well as
whimsical. This N.C.O. had just hung up his kilt
in the trenches to dry when the back blast of a
shell blew it over the parapet towards the enemy’s
lines. The unfortunate man had to go kiltless until
dusk, when he hopped over and recovered his garment.
On the 8th July, the Divisional area was visited by

1 On one occasion no horse was provided to take the Prince up to the

trenches. He, therefore, borrowed one belonging to the machine-gun officer
of the 27th Brigade, and it was afterwards known as “ Trince.”

18 TRAINING NEAR BUSNES [aucusT

Lord Kitchener, who inspected the 26th Brigade,
at that time in reserve, and detachments of the Ninth
between Locon and Hinges.

On the 18th August the Division was relieved by the
Seventh, and moved to the training area near Busnes,
where D.H.Q. were established. On the next day
it was again visited by Lord Kitchener, who inspected
it in a big field, and he expressed himself as highly
pleased. From this date till the end of the month
training was carried on continuously, and the men
were frequently practised in issuing rapidly from their
own trenches and attacking another line. These
manoeuvres raised hopes that they would soon be
tested in an important battle.

The whole Division was anxious for a fight. It
had now been more than three months in France,
and had become thoroughly acquainted with the
ordinary routine of trench warfare. Life had turned
out to be much less trying than most of the men had
imagined, for casualties had been comparatively few,
and there had been no thrills. It was always un-
pleasant, of course, when the trenches were pounded,
but these periods were only occasional and seldom
of long duration. It was not the danger, but the
drabness of trench life that worried the men, who
found that the outstanding features of this kind of
warfare were hard work and discomfort. The latter
however they were compelled to get rid of as soon
as possible, and most of them quickly became skilled
in constructing habitable and cosy dugouts. The
trivial round was one of constant toil, and cleanliness
was insisted on more as a necessity than as a virtue.
The chief strain was due to the interruption of sleep;
for the exigencies of trench duties made it impossible
for anyone to sleep for more than a few hours at a time.

1915] GENERAL REASONS FOR BATTLE OF LOOS 19

Above all, the men felt that the reputation of the
Ninth could not be solidly, established without a battle.
They yielded to none in their admiration of the magnifi-
cent feats accomplished by the grand regiments of the
line, which had borne the first shock of the German
hordes; but they were anxious to show that they were
both fit and ready to take their place with the regulars.
The fierce test of action was needed to reveal the worth
of the Division, and every man hoped that it would not
be long delayed.

It soon came. When on the 2nd September the
Ninth took over from the First Division the trenches
east of Vermelles, the men had reached the scene of
their first battle.

The plan of a large operation had been adumbrated
at the beginning of August, but had it depended on the
situation on the Western Front it is doubtful if any
important enterprise would have been attempted. The
costly failure of the joint British and French offensive
in May proved that the Western Allies had not yet
accumulated the preponderance in artillery necessary
to secure the superiority of fire that was essential for
success. Both in numbers and in quality the allied
infantry surpassed that of the enemy, but the German
defences were skilfully selected, strongly fortified, and
powerfully supported by artillery.

Events on the Eastern Front, however, rendered it
imperative to create a diversion. The summer was a
period of disaster for the Russian Armies; they had
been out-generalled and were retiring rapidly before
the vast German and Austrian forces, which, focussing
on Warsaw, had made those gigantic outflanking move-
ments that had ended in the capture of that city. It
was feared that the fate of Petrograd hung in the
balance. The Western Allies therefore decided to

20 THE PLAN OF BATTLE [sEPr.

help the hard-pressed Russians by an attack on a large
scale, which might bring some tangible gains, and
would at least compel Germany to transfer forces to
the West and thus weaken her offensive in the East.

The general scheme drawn up by the High Com-
mands of the Allied Forces reflected their hopes rather
than their expectations. The French Tenth Army and
the I. and IV. Corps of the British Army were to
advance due east in the direction of Valenciennes; at
the same time the French main attack was to be made
from Champagne on Maubeuge. If these enterprises
were successful, the victorious forces would join hands
about Valenciennes and Maubeuge, thus cutting off
all the enemy within the salient, Rheims—-Royon and
Arras.

The plan was too ambitious. The reluctance of
the British leaders to undertake a premature operation
was perfectly justified, and when they committed them-
selves to an attack, they ought to have limited them-
selves to a scheme proportionate to their resources.
It is therefore impossible to condone the reckless
optimism that shaped the plans for the Battle of Loos.
They revealed a disposition to underrate the adversary.
The lessons of the German failures at Ypres, of the
battles at Hill 60, and of the Allied offensive in May
were ignored. If an attack had to be made, it should
have been confined to the capture of tactical points
within a limited objective. A break-through was
then impossible. The experience of the war and the
resources at the disposal of Sir John French did not
justify the attempt in 1915, and the presumptions of
the Higher Command were shattered by the facts of.
the battle.

The task of the First Army was to pierce the first
and second lines of the German defences from Haisnes

1915] TASK OF THE I. AND IV. CORPS 21

in the north to Hulluch in the south; then, after
capturing Meurchin and Pont 4 Vendin, to move
rapidly on Carvin, and so protect the left flank of the
French Army. The northern part of the operation was
to be carried out by the I. Corps, the southern part
by the IV. Corps. In order to give this enterprise
every chance of success, subsidiary attacks were to be
made on other parts of the British front to prevent the
enemy from reinforcing the main point of attack.

Conscious of its weakness in artillery material, the
British Command hoped to compass the demoralisation
of the foe by a discharge of gas along the front of the
principal onslaught. This was the first occasion on
which the British Army used gas,’ and it was hoped
that its effect would so paralyse the defenders that
the assaulting troops would be able to secure with
little resistance the German second line in spite of
the wire that was too far distant for the artillery
to cut.

The task of forming the northern defensive flank *
of this attack was entrusted to the Ninth Division,
which, after carrying the line Railway Work—Fosse
No. 8-Haisnes, was to push on to Douvrin. Similarly,
the southern division of the IV. Corps was to form
a defensive flank facing south near Loos. If these
flanks were secured and consolidated, it was expected
that the intermediate divisions of the I. and IV.

1 So completely was the chance of success considered to depend upon
the use of gas that the attack was to be cancelled if the wind was un-
favourable ; instead, a minor operation was to be carried out by the
7th Seaforths against the HoHENZOLLERN REDOUBT.

2 On the left of the Ninth the Second Division had to carry out two
operations: first, to capture the Givenchy salient, and second, and more
important, to attack the German front line trenches and then move on
Auchy. Should the latter attack succeed, the Second Division was to form
the defensive flank of the Army as far as Haisnes, from which point it was
to be carried on by the Ninth Division.

22 TASK OF THE I. AND IV. CORPS [SEPT.

Corps, supported by the XI., would be able to force
their way between these flanks as far as the Deule
Canal, and even farther if the resistance of the enemy
was negligible.

There was a gap between the right of the British
forces and the left of the Tenth French Army. In
this area lay the colliery district of Lens, consisting of
masses of miners’ cottages, pits, and slag heaps, admir-
ably adapted for an obstinate and protracted defence.
During the French offensive north of Arras in May
and June advance had been slow and losses heavy,
owing to the stubborn opposition of the Germans
posted in the villages of Carency, Givenchy, and
Souchez. The Lens area afforded even greater advan-
tages to the defenders, and it was decided that the
French and British forces should work round the south
and north of the town and join hands to the east of it.

An operation of importance involves an enormous
amount of hard work and anxiety for all branches of
the Staff, from G.H.Q. down to brigades. The Staff?
is the brain of the Army, and its function is to supply
everything—from bombs to operation orders. It consists
of two distinct branches: the A. and Q. branch, which
is responsible for discipline, procuring supplies, and
making arrangements for the comfort of the troops
in such matters as billets and baths; and the G. branch,

1 It is common knowledge that at military concert parties the Staff
shared with the Sergeant-Major and the Quartermaster the distinction of
being the chief butt of the witticisms of the troupe. This is due partly to
the British soldier’s inveterate love of “chaff,” and partly to the fact that
the duties of the Staff officer, particularly in the higher formations, secured
him comparative immunity from danger.’ The average infantryman was
too much occupied with the ordinary details of his daily task ever to give
any thought to the harassing and important duties that the Staff had to
perform. Occasionally, of course, the latter made a bad slip. During the
Battle of Arras, for example, a battalion in the 27th Brigade received a
message to the effect that sacks for bayonet training were available! Such
blunders were naturally cherished by the Regimental officer.

1915] OBJECTIVES OF NINTH DIVISION 23

which is concerned with training and operations. For
success, the best devised plan depends greatly upon the
care with which details are worked out. The actual
attack is made by the infantry. Upon the dash and
gallantry of the soldiers and the initiative and resource
of the subordinate commanders, the Higher Command
has to rely for the consummation of its hopes ; but the
arduous task of the infantry is considerably eased if
the preliminary preparations are the best possible from
the resources at the disposal of the Staff. Good Staff
work consists in eliminating chance and hazard and in
strengthening assurance of success.

The frontage on which the Ninth Division was to
assault was 1600 yards. On the 16th August, the
G.O.C., Major-General Landon, held a conference, when
the proposed operations were discussed. It was
decided to assault with two brigades, each with two
battalions in the front line, the 26th on the right
and the 28th on the left, with the 27th in reserve.

The objectives of the 26th Brigade were, first, the
Hohenzollern Redoubt, Fosse Trench and Dump
Trench; and second, a line on the east side of Fosse
8 through the Three Cabarets to the Corons de
Pekin (first objective). Should this task be accom-
plished, the brigade was to go on to the neighbourhood
of Pekin Trench (second objective). If at this stage the
line was prolonged to the north by the 28th Brigade and
the Second Division, the 26th and 28th were to advance
east on Douvrin. Should, however, the Second Division
fail, these brigades were to attack Haisnes and form
a defensive flank facing north-east.

On the left, the 28th Brigade had first to secure the
Railway line from the Corons de Marons to the junction
of Les Briques and Train Alley (first objective), and then
advance to its second objective in the neighbourhood

24 OBJECTIVES OF NINTH DIVISION [SEPr.

of Pekin Trench. The further action of the brigade
depended upon the progress of the Second Division.

The 27th Brigade was to be in reserve some 2000
and 2800 yards in rear of the front line. Its role
was either to support the attempt on Fosse 8, or if
that was successful, to move on to Haisnes and
Douvrin. Battalion commanders were given a free
hand as to the formations to be adopted, subject to
the proviso that each unit was to be in three lines.

The date of battle, after several postponements, was
eventually fixed for the 25th September.

The task of the Division in its first important
engagement was not an easy one. In the excitement
of battle even the best of soldiers are liable to go astray
if they are required to change direction at any time
during the advance. For this reason it is desirable
that objectives should be allotted so that it is possible
for the assailing troops to advance at right angles to
their position of assembly. In the present case the
advance in a north-easterly direction up to the line
of the Fosse fulfilled these conditions, but from this
point the Ninth was required to swing east and con-
verge on a narrower front. Fortunately the difficulties
of this operation were diminished by the presence of
such conspicuous landmarks as the villages of Haisnes,
Cité St Elie and Douvrin, but it was nevertheless an
extremely complicated one for an untried division to
undertake.

The Ninth took over the line east of Vermelles on
the 2nd September, and arrangements had to be made
at once so that all preparations would be completed
before the battle. The front trenches, as taken over
from the First Division, were too far from the German
line to be suitable for the forward assembly trenches.
The First Division had projected an attack on the

1915] PREPARATIONS FOR LOOS 25

Hohenzollern Redoubt, and for that purpose had
pushed forward a number of blind saps. Our first
intention was to join up the blinded sap-heads by a
parallel, and open them up just before the onset; but
as gas was to be used, the saps were opened up at
once and then joined by new fire trenches. This was
accomplished in one night, each battalion digging
350 yards, thus bringing our front trenches within
150 yards of the German line. In addition, a support
line was made in the rear, with numerous short com-
munication trenches running back to the old front line,
with the result that it was possible to accommodate the
whole Division in the trench system.

As it was imperative to regulate the traffic with
a view to preventing congestion on the day of attack,
special communication trenches were prepared for the
wounded. For each of the attacking brigades two
communication trenches were allotted, one to be used
for “up” traffic, the other for ‘‘down,” and to diminish
the chance of confusion, each was labelled and marked.
On the capture of the enemy front line, these communi-
cation trenches were to be connected with it; and, to
save time and labour, blinded saps were run forward
90 yards and more. In all, about 12,000 yards of
trenches were dug before the battle.

The chances of success largely depended upon the
ability of the artillery to demolish the enemy’s defences.
Until the moment of the assault the artillery were
under the orders of the Corps. Unfortunately the
heavy guns at the disposal of the Corps were few in
number, there being only twenty 6-inch Howitzers
and twelve of higher calibre.

The infantry attack was to be preceded by a four
days’ bombardment. The 18-pounders had to cut the
wire along the enemy’s front. Known and suspected

26 ARTILLERY PREPARATIONS [SEPT.

strong points were to be shelled; and during night,
paths, roads, communication trenches, houses, and_all
places where the enemy was likely to collect, were to be
kept under fire. In the work of sweeping approaches,
machine-guns were to co-operate with the artillery. The
preliminary bombardment was arranged for the 21st
September, its object being to pulverise the German
fortifications and to demoralise the defenders. Only
in this way could the neutralisation of the hostile
rifle and machine-gun fire necessary for an attack
by infantry be secured. In order to keep the Germans
uncertain of the exact time of the assault, two
feint attacks were arranged. At noon on the 2ist.
September, the 26th Brigade was to induce the
garrison of the Hohenzollern Redoubt to man its
parapets by preparations that seemed to indicate an
immediate attack; thereupon the German trenches
were to be shelled with shrapnel. A similar operation
against Madagascar Trench was to be undertaken by
the 28th Brigade on the third day of the bombardment.

The orders for the artillery were issued on the
20th September. On the morning of the battle, first
the enemy front line system, then Pekin Trench, and
the Three Cabarets were to be shelled for ten minutes,
In the following ten minutes the artillery fire was to
be brought back to the front line for five minutes; it
was then to move east and remain for thirty minutes
in the vicinity of Pekin Trench between Haisnes and
Cité St Elie. The great proportion of shell used was
shrapnel; H.E. was limited and was used chiefly by the
heavy artillery.

The control of its own artillery reverted to the
Division at the moment of the assault. In order that
no opportunity might be lost in the event of a rapid
success, two batteries were earmarked to follow up

1915] MACHINE-GUNS AND TRENCH MORTARS 27

the infantry. These were to be taken out of their
emplacements on the night of the 24th, and kept
limbered-up ready to advance at a moment's notice.
Forward positions for these guns and observation posts
were reconnoitred from a study of the map and of the
country from Annequin Fosse; and three roads were
prepared and bridged where they crossed the trenches.
Other bridges were to be carried by the batteries to
enable them to cross captured trenches. One brigade
of artillery was affiliated to each of the assaulting
infantry brigades and the remainder was kept under
the immediate control of Brig.-General Armitage.

The effect of machine-guns and trench mortars
depends chiefly on the resource of the team
commanders. Each of the infantry battalions had
four machine-guns, while fourteen were distributed
in rear of the front line to co-operate with the artillery.
Five minutes after the commencement of the bombard-
ment, these guns were to open intensive fire on hostile
communication trenches for thirty minutes. During
night they were to play on enemy communication
trenches, and on the wire to prevent the Germans
repairing the gaps cut by the artillery fire. On the
day of the attack they were to open intensive fire
five minutes after the beginning of the bombardment
for fifteen minutes; they were then to fire deliberately
for ten minutes, thereafter resuming intensive fire for
other ten.

On the right of the Division an important rdle was
assigned to the trench mortars. Between the Ninth
and the Seventh Divisions was an interval of 200 yards ;
and to cover this gap 2-inch trench mortars and 2-inch
Stokes mortars were to fire smoke-bombs to prevent
the enemy in Big Willie from enfilading the left of
the Seventh. It was realised that the most formidable

28 GAS ARRANGEMENTS [SEPT.

task had been allotted to the 26th Brigade and arrange-
ments were made for one 2-inch mortar, one battery
of 14-inch mortars, and one Stokes gun to go forward
with it. :

The discharge of gas formed an essential part of
the scheme of the British Army; and its effects were
expected to make up for deficiency in artillery material.’
The Germans were known to have safeguards against
gas, but it was hoped that they would be taken by
surprise, and that the fumes would be rolling over their
lines before they had time to don their helmets. At
the worst, it was expected that the discomfort of
wearing the helmets would impair the efficiency of
their troops and partly demoralise them.

The gas was to be discharged from cylinders, each
weighing from 130 to 160 lbs., and emplacements were
made to accommodate twelve at intervals of 25 yards
along the front of the Division. The work of carrying
up and fixing the cylinders in position was a heavy
business. They were brought by train to a siding east
of Bethune, where the road ran alongside the railway,
and at night they were transferred to lorries, each of
which carried about thirty. The lorries were then
driven to Cambrai and Vermelles, where they were met
by carrying parties, which conveyed the cylinders to the
front line.

These parties were organised in groups of thirty-
six men for every twelve cylinders, and each group was

1 The effect of the German gas attack in May had produced a powerful
impression upon both the army and the public. Since that time the
energies and experiments of British scientists and doctors had provided the
army with an efficient protection consisting of a chemicalised canvas bag
with two gas-proof openings for the eyes. In the event of an attack this
bag was pulled over the head, its loose ends being tucked in round the
neck and covered up by the tunic so that the gas found no aperture to
evade the chemical barrier.

1915] | GAS ARRANGEMENTS 29

commanded by an officer. The work was unpopular as
well as arduous, for the men had little liking for gas
and none cared to handle anything connected with it.
The cylinders had to be carried for more than 2000
yards up long and winding communication trenches,
and when the weather was wet the heavy burden
of the men was aggravated by the difficulty of main-
taining their balance on the slippery duck-boards.
Occasionally shelled areas had to be traversed, an
anxious period for any party with cylinders. To ease
the work as far as possible, the communication trenches
up which the men had to travel were marked by white
arrows, and kept clear of unnecessary traffic. Fortun-
ately the weather was favourable. If it had been other-
wise, this weight could scarcely have been managed by
three men. Altogether 4000 men were employed in
the transference of 1200 cylinders. When these were
fixed in their emplacements the infantry had no further
responsibility concerning them, for they were then
under the care of the Special Gas Company, R.E., which
was to discharge the gas on the day of the assault.

In addition to the cylinders, each emplacement -had
four triple and eight single smoke-candles. These were
to be lit by the infantry, and used alternatively with the
gas, so that the period of discharge for smoke and gas
would extend to forty minutes, as it was known that
the enemy had, as a protection against gas, oxygen
cylinders which lasted for only thirty minutes. Two
minutes before the infantry left the front line, all gas
was to be turned off and the smoke thickened by
means of triple candles to form a screen behind which
the infantry could form up and advance.

One Field Company, R.E., and one company of the
9th Seaforths (Pioneers) were attached to each brigade
for the rapid consolidation of captured positions, and

30 MEDICAL AID POSTS [sepr.

the digging of new communication trenches. Thus,
the 90th Field Company, R.E. and “B” Company, 9th
Seaforth Highlanders, were attached to the 26th
Brigade, the 63rd R.E. and “D” Company, 9th Seaforth
Highlanders, to the 28th, and the 64th R.E. and
“C” Company, 9th Seaforth Highlanders, to the 27th.
Supplies of ammunition, stores, and tools were placed
at intervals along the whole front and, as far as
possible, these dumps were made at the junction of
the “up traffic” communication trenches, and the
support line. As the bomb was to be the principal
weapon of the infantry after the first stages of the
attack, numbers of special bomb depots were formed.
In addition to 8.A.A., picks and shovels, water, medical
stores, and rations were placed in the forward dumps.

Medical Aid Posts were arranged at convenient
points. In order to effect the evacuation of the wounded
from the forward areas with the utmost speed, each
brigade dug one communication trench for wounded
only. These trenches were wider than the _ usual
communication trench, the corners being rounded off,
so that stretchers could be carried with comparatively
little inconvenience. A loop was made leading off
them, about 2000 yards in rear, and in each loop was
a dressing station in a dug-out about the size of an
ordinary room. Serious cases were to be brought
round the loop, dressed, and then passed out at the
farther end into the communication trench. Walking
cases were expected to go straight on without passing
through the loop.

The maintenance of communication was a most
important matter, and every conceivable means, ranging
from the pigeon to the human being, was to be used.
The ordinary connection by telephone was to be
established as far as possible, and visual stations,

1915] COMMUNICATIONS 31

from which messages could be transmitted by flag or
lamp, were to be set up as well as pigeon stations.
Between the battalion commander and his company
commanders the medium was the runner, the most
reliable of all means of communication. The Division
had one wireless set, which was worked by four men,
and this was attached to the 26th Brigade H.Q.

The question of the men’s equipment for battle
was important. A heavy weight would retard progress
and exhaust their strength, yet it was necessary to
supply them with sufficient material to consolidate
their gains and to enable them to beat off enemy
counter-attacks. Accordingly packs were dumped, the
men going into action with haversacks only, and each
one carrying two empty sand-bags, and all, except
bombers, signallers, and runners, were to be supplied
with 200 rounds of ammunition. Owing to the use
of gas, the men on the morning of the attack were
to wear their gas helmets like a cap.

All these preparations were satisfactorily accom-
plished by the evening of the 24th September. During
this period of strain, the health of Major-General
Landon broke down, and on the 8th September he
returned to England and was succeeded by Major-
General G. H. Thesiger, C.B., C.M.G. The G.S.O.I.
was Lieut.-Col. S. E. Hollond, who joined the Division
at the beginning of September, and the A.A. and
Q.M.G. was Lieut.-Col. A. A. M‘Hardy.

CHAPTER 'III
BATTLE OF LOOS!
25TH To 28TH SepremMBer 1915

THE terrain, which was the scene of the Division’s first
battle, included the feature of greatest tactical import-
ance on the front of the British attack. The general
advantage of ground and observation was held by the
enemy. East of Vermelles a railway, which ran north-
east to join up with the railway connecting Bethune
and La Bassée, screened the country west of it from
German observation, except from their highest posts at
Fosse 8 and the Tower Bridge at Loos, which over-
looked the British lines except right down in the
Vermelles valley. East of the railway the country
was very open and the only trees were those that
fringed the Hulluch road; the whole country bore a
close resemblance to Salisbury Plain or the moors
of Linlithgow, with mine-heads and slag-heaps dotted
about. East of Vermelles, the country ran nearly
flat to a slight but important crest, then falling to a
shallow dip where the trenches faced each other, rose
again through the German trenches to another crest
about 700 yards west of Cité St Elie. This crest
concealed the second line of the enemy from ground
observation.

The main front lines of the British and the enemy

1 See Map.

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1915] PRELIMINARY BOMBARDMENT 33

were about 500 yards apart and between them jutted
out in a south-west direction from the northern part
of the German front line the maze of trenches and
fortifications known as the Hohenzollern Redoubt.
Direct communication between the Redoubt and the
main line, which was here known as Dump Trench
and Fosse Trench, was secured by two communication
trenches, named: North Face and South Face, running
from north-east to south-west. Two trenches, Big
Willie and Little Willie, running respectively east and
north, protected the fluiks of the Redoubt. But the
chief features of the enemy’s defences were Fosse 8
and the Dump—an accumulation of débris, which is a
familiar sight in all mining areas—and from these
points the enemy could look right up the valley that
was the scene of the British attack. Of eyual import-
ance was the Double Crassier on the extreme right
which, with the Fosse and the Dump, formed the key
of the whole tactical position, and until they were
captured and held, guns could not be brought up to
give close support to the infantry in any advance
beyond the first system of trenches. If nothing
more was secured, the operation would amply justify
itself.

On the 21st September the preliminary bombard-
ment commencéd at 7 a.M., and in reply the German
artillery fired little beyond their usual. At noon on the
same day, the first of the feint attacks was made, when
the 26th Brigade opposite the Hohenzollern Redoubt
opened two minutes’ rapid fire with rifles and machine-
guns on Big and Little Willie. In addition, the men
did all that was possible to make the foe believe that
an attack on the Redoubt was imminent; bayonets
were shown over the parapet, dummies were moved
about, the men shouted, and pipes and bugles sounded

34 PRELIMINARY BOMBARDMENT [sEPr. 25

the charge. This demonstration caused the Germans’
to man their parapet, and as our artillery deluged their
front trenches with shrapnel five minutes after noon,
it was believed* that heavy losses had been inflicted
on the garrison. During the third and fourth days
of the bombardment, the reply of the German artillery
became more rapid and intense. When on the 23rd
an operation, similar to that carried out by the 26th
Brigade two days previously, was made by the 28th
Brigade against Little Willie and Madagascar Trench,
it was noticed that the enemy heavily shelled our
reserve trenches. At night infantry patrols were sent
out to ascertain the effect of our artillery fire on
the German wire, and their reports showed that
numerous gaps had been made, but unfortunately on
the front of the 28th Brigade patrols failed to examine
the enemy’s wire.* This was largely due to the desire
to save the men from being exposed to our own
artillery fire; but the omission had lamentable conse-
quences. Not till the small hours of the 25th was
the hour of zero communicated to the battalions. As
the wind was favourable, the main operation was to
be undertaken. Zero was fixed for 5.50 a.M., and
forty minutes after zero the infantry were to leave
the trenches.

At 5.50 a.m. our artillery opened, and gas and
smoke were discharged along the whole front. The

1 Those opposite the Ninth Division belonged to the One hundred and
seventeenth Division.

2? Under the circumstances there could be nothing stronger than
“belief”; it was impossible to go to the German lines to find out how
many had been killed or wounded.

3 The wire was fairly well cut by the 18-pounders wherever it was
possible to observe it, but the stretch opposite the front of the 28th
Brigade was invisible from any point on our side. It was, therefore, the
more essential that the result of the artillery fire in this part should have
been ascertained by patrols.

1915] ACTION OF 28tn BRIGADE 35

scene had a. terrible grandeur, and the combination
of gun-fire, gas, and smoke produced a wonderful
effect of mingled whites, greys, yellows, and browns.

On the left of the Division, Brig.-General Scrase-
Dickins arranged to attack with the 6th K.O.8.B. on
the right and the 10th H.L.I. on the left. These were
supported respectively by the 11th H.L.I. and the 9th
Scottish Rifles, and they held the front line till the
evening before the 25th, when their places were taken
by the attacking battalions; the 63rd Field Coy. R.E.
and “‘D” Coy. 9th Seaforths also took up their assembly
positions that night. Unfortunately the arrangements
of the brigade were upset at the last moment by the
Second Division taking over a portion of its line, the
28th Brigade being left with only one communication
trench for the passage of troops and for “up” and
“down” traffic. Ten minutes after the crash of our
guns had announced the hour of zero, the German
counter-bombardment fell on the front and communi-
cation trenches; the supporting companies and _ bat-
talions, which were moving up from the rear trenches
to the front, suffered serious losses, which included
Lieut.-Colonel H. D. N. Maclean, D.S.O., and his
adjutant, Captain Keith of the 6th K.O.S.B.

At 6.30 am. the 6th K.O.S.B. and 10th H.L.1.
left our front line and advanced in three lines against
the German trenches. On the right, the leading com-
panies of the K.O.S.B., now commanded by Major
Hosley, pressed forward, at first without suffering
very severely. Major Hosley was wounded on the
parapet but refused to go back, and insisted on lead-
ing his battalion forward. The wind unfortunately
was fitful and was not strong enough to carry on the
gas, so the leading companies lay down until it had
moved on. As soon as the two supporting companies

36 ACTION OF 28Tx BRIGADE ([sEPr. 25

crossed our front parapet, they came under a withering
rifle and machine-gun fire, but in spite of many casualties
they continued to push on and became mingled with
the leading companies. More conspicuous now than
the crash of the guns was the menacing and ominous
‘“rat-tat” of the enemy machine-guns, and when the
K.O.8.B. resumed their advance, officers and men were
mown down by a terrible fire, to which they could not
reply. Nevertheless the survivors pressed on with
magnificent determination, but the German wire was
found to be virtually intact. In front of the enemy’s
line was a covered trench crammed with stakes and
barbed wire and as soon as the foremost men stepped
on the top covering, they fell through and became
entangled amongst the wire. The air teemed with
bullets, and the survivors, impotent to advance but
too stubborn to retreat, had very heavy losses. The
battalion was now leaderless. Of the 19 officers who
went into action, 12 were killed and 7 wounded, and
as a consequence the brigade received no news from
the battalion during the morning. It is believed that
a few men, favoured by incredible luck, forced their way
into the German front trench, but being unsupported
they eventually fell back and reached our original front
line during the night.

The 10th H.L.I. on the left of the brigade had no
better fortune. As the wind was too weak to carry the
gas forward from our trenches, many of the men were
suffering from the effects of it when they left the front
line. At the very start the ranks of the battalion
were thinned by a storm of shell, rifle and machine-gun
fire, a considerable number being killed and wounded
on the parapet. With fine courage the men pushed on
but were unable to penetrate the enemy’s wire, which
had been scarcely damaged. Before vicious machine-

1915] SECOND ATTACK OF 28TH BRIGADE 37

gun fire from Madagascar Trench, Railway Work, and
Mad Point, the attack melted away, and most. of the
survivors struggled back to the trenches from which
they had set out, none having broken through the
German wire. The losses in officers and men were
exceptionally severe; Lieut.-Colonel Grahame was
gassed and his adjutant killed. As the whole signal-
ling staff of Battalion H.Q. had been knocked out by
a shell, Brigade H.Q. were without definite news of the
disaster until noon, when Major H. C. Stuart reported
in person.

In war, no news invariably means bad news, and
consequently during the early hours of the attack
suspense and anxiety reigned at Brigade H.Q. The
gloomy forebodings with which the absence of informa-
tion had filled the minds of Brig.-General Scrase-
Dickins and his staff were deepened by a message,
received from the 9th Scottish Rifles at 8.15 a.m., that
the 10th H.L.I. were asking for reinforcements. As
it was also known at 7.50 a.m. that the attack of the
Second Division on the left had failed, there was no
longer any reason to doubt that the brigade had experi-
enced a serious check. Anxiety about the situation on
the front of the 28th Brigade had an unsettling effect
on the plans of the Division. The 26th on the right
had in the meantime made good progress, but General
Thesiger hesitated to support it with the full strength
of the 27th until he had definite information concerning
his left brigade. At 9.10 a.M., however, the Division
learned from a telephone message that the attack of the
28th Brigade had been repulsed.

Since this check exposed the 26th Brigade to the
chance of a counter-attack from the north, the left
brigade was ordered to launch another attack, and
after a thirty minutes’ artillery bombardment the 11th

38 REASONS FOR FAILURE [sEPT. 25

H.L.I. on the right and the 9th Scottish Rifles on the
left advanced against the enemy’s lines at 12.15 p.m.
But the bombardment was not sufficiently heavy to
demolish the German strong points, and the only
effect of the hopeless gallantry of the “Rifles” and
the H.L.I. was greatly to increase the enormous losses
of the brigade. The attack was swept away by the
enemy's rifle and machine-gun fire. As the result of
these two attacks the 28th Brigade had lost about two-
thirds of its effective strength and the great majority
of its officers had been killed or wounded. It was
now unfit for further action and was withdrawn to its
original line, which it was barely strong enough to hold
effectively.

The primary cause of the repulse was the failure of
the artillery to cut the enemy’s wire. During the
preliminary bombardment that wire ought to have been
examined nightly by patrols, and the neglect to do so
was a cardinal blunder for which the brigade had to
pay a heavy price. The extravagant hopes entertained
of the power of gas to demoralise the enemy had been
rudely shattered; it was a hindrance and not a help,
and its baneful effects were confined to our own men.
In face of uncut wire and the enemy’s intact defences
the attack could be no more than a forlorn hope,
although with well-nigh incredible courage the men
did all that men could do to achieve the impossible.
It was a failure, but one that shed lustre on the men
that failed.

The second attack was an offence against a well-
understood military principle. that was too often
neglected in the warfare in France. When men have
failed in an attack, it is generally futile to send other
men to make another attack in the same way; it
encourages the defenders and doubles the losses of

1915] ACTION OF 26TH BRIGADE 39

the assailants. The hope of smashing, by an artillery
bombardment of thirty minutes, defences that had
remained intact after four days’ bombardment, betrayed
an almost unbelievable optimism. The most feasible
way was to send a part of the 27th Brigade to follow
behind the 26th, and attack the enemy in Madagascar
Trench from the south. But if no units of the 27th
Brigade were available, it would have been wiser to send
round some of the 11th H.L.I. and 9th Scottish Rifles to
the Dump, from which point they could have assaulted
the German positions from flank and rear. Persistence
in a frontal attack showed a serious lack of flexibility
in the Higher Command in making use of the resources
of the Division.

On the front of the right brigade, Brig.-General
Ritchie decided to attack with the 7th Seaforths on
the right and the 5th Camerons on the left; these
were supported respectively by the 8th Gordons and
8th Black Watch. The task of the leading battalions
was to secure the first objective, which included the
Hohenzollern Redoubt, the German main trench beyond
it, and Fosse 8 with the Three Cabarets and the Corons
de Pekin. When this was accomplished the Gordons
and the Black Watch were to pass through, and, swing-
ing in a south-easterly direction, capture the second
objective. The assembly of the brigade and the units
attached, the 90th R.E., ‘““B” Coy. 9th Seaforths, and the
trench mortar batteries, was completed on the evening of
the 24th without a hitch, the two assaulting battalions
being in position in the front and support trenches, and
the support battalions in the reserve trenches.

The period prior to an attack is always a trying
time, and the men welcomed the crash of guns that
announced the hour of zero. At the same moment the
gas and smoke were discharged, and the 2-inch trench

40 ACTION OF 7rx SEAFORTHS [sEPr. 25

mortars smothered Big Willie and the South Face of the
Hohenzollern Redoubt with phosphorous smoke-balls.

At 6.29 a.m. the assaulting battalions jumped
out of their trenches, and were marshalled for the
assault in front of our own wire, screened by the
smoke from the candles. This had the effect of
steadying the men and allowed the advance to be
made without confusion or disorder.

Between Fosse 8 and the Redoubt there was a
hog-back ridge; the Seaforths and the Camerons
advanced south and north of it respectively. At the
very beginning the former lost touch with the latter,
who were delayed for ten minutes by gas hanging
in the front trenches. The Seaforths made straight
for the Hohenzollern Redoubt, suffering consider-
able losses from rifle and machine-gun fire from the
right flank, and captured the southern portion of it
after a brisk fight, in which a good many officers were
killed or wounded. Then the battalion bombed its way
up the communication trenches to the German main
trench, and without waiting for the Camerons, pushed
forward past Fosse 8, clearing all the miners’ cottages
and seizing the Three Cabarets. At this point the
battalion, after being reorganised, lined the Corons
Trench immediately east of Fosse 8 about 7.30 A.M.
A few of the men slightly lost direction and wandered
up the trench that led from the Corons to the ridge in
front of Cité St Elie and Haisnes, The battalion had
accomplished its job in very fine style and in good time.

On their left the Camerons had a ghastly experience.
When, after a ten minutes’ wait to allow the gas to
pass on, the men began to advance, they were shot
down by a galling fire from the left, the first two
lines of the battalion being almost annihilated. To
cross that fatal field was a task that even the stoutest

1915] ACTION OF 5txa CAMERONS 41

of men might have shirked without shame. But the
Camerons were inspired by a compelling sense of
duty, and undeterred by the fear or spectacle of
death, they made of danger the spring-board of a
leaping hardihood. With superb heroism they pressed
doggedly through the fatal zone, where lay the
greater part of the battalion. Nothing but death
could stop such men. After capturing the Redoubt
they moved on to Fosse 8 and, having made their way
through the miners’ cottages, halted at the north
edge of the Corons de Pekin about 7.45 a.m. The
Camerons had reached their objective, but at a
terrible cost; of the 800 men and 20 officers who
crossed our line, only 2 officers and 70 men were
left. It was a thrilling feat of arms, which men
of the 5th Camerons will ever remember, and the
very story of which served to inspire future drafts
with the courage of the glorious dead.

Thus by 8 a.m. the Seaforths and Camerons had
established themselves on the east of Fosse 8, and
the men began to consolidate their positions. But
there was a gap between the battalions, and the
troops were heavily shelled from the Cemetery that
lay south of Auchy.

Meantime the supporting battalions were advancing
rapidly. At 6.30 a.m. the Gordons and Black Watch
moved up from their positions in the reserve line to
the front trenches. They crossed our parapet at 7 A.M.,
and with praiseworthy steadiness pressed through the
hostile barrage, which was falling on our front line,
The Black Watch lost greatly through heavy machine-
gun fire from the north, their gallant C.O., Lieut.-
Colonel Lord Sempill, being badly wounded. The
Gordons, on reaching the Redoubt, took prisoner a
number of Germans who had concealed themselves

42 8rtH GORDONS AND 8rx BLACK WATCH _[szpr. 25

in shelter when the Seaforths passed over. At
Dump Trench the Black Watch had a sharp fight
with some of the enemy, who had been overlooked
by the Camerons, and captured a number of prisoners.
On their right a party of the Gordons bombed down
to the Window in the German main trench, in order
to clear the front for the Seventh Division.

After passing the main trench the bulk of the
Black Watch, instead of swinging to the south-east,
pushed on through the Corons and came into line
between the Seaforths and Camerons beyond the
miners’ cottages. The remainder of the battalion,
roughly about a company, went on with the Gordons,
who at 7.40 a.m. moved down Fosse Trench and then
diverted their attack in an easterly direction on Cité
St Elie and Haisnes. They carried and went over
Fosse Alley and reached Pekin Trench a few hundred
yards short of Haisnes soon after 8 A.m., but they
had lost many of their number and could go no
farther. The enemy’s resistance was far from being
broken and the advance had been made under con-
tinuous shell and machine-gun. fire. Haisnes was
at that time lightly held and would have fallen to
fresh troops, but by the time the leading ranks of the
27th Brigade arrived the village had been strongly
reinforced.

Farther west and to the left rear of the Gordons,
the Black Watch and the Seaforths made an attempt
to advance towards Pekin Alley, but a German
battery, situated about 1000 yards east of the Cabarets,
and flanked by machine-guns, inflicted considerable
casualties and pinned the men down to their trenches,
This ill-starred effort cost the Seaforths their leader,
Lieut.-Colonel Gaisford being killed. The situation of
the 26th Brigade was not a happy one. It was clear,

1915] SITUATION EAST OF FOSSE 8 43

as the ordeal of the Camerons and Black Watch had
foreboded, that the attack of the 28th Brigade had
failed. It was necessary to consolidate the line in
front of Fosse 8, and to safeguard the left flank ; but
under the continuous and accurate shell fire of the enemy,
it was practically impossible to accomplish any work.
The trenches were in an appalling mess, having been
terribly smashed by our artillery; Corons Alley was
particularly bad, since the enemy had flooded it before
retiring. About 9.30 a.m. the brigade received some
welcome artillery support, when the battery commanded
by Major C. W. W. McLean moved into position
south-west of the Fosse and opened fire on the
Cemetery, Cemetery Alley, and Lone Farm in turn.

At 9 a.M. the position of the 26th Brigade was
as follows: the Seaforths, Black Watch, and Camerons
held the trenches east of Fosse 8 from Fosse Alley to
the north end of the Corons de Pekin, and to guard
the left flank, a small party was posted at the Railway
crossing. Additional protection was afforded by the
machine-guns of the Camerons, which were posted
at Little Willie, and commanded the ground on the
left of the brigade. The enemy was in strength
in Pekin Alley, Cemetery Alley, Lone Farm, and
Madagascar Trench. About 600 yards to the right
front, the remnants of the Gordons and some Black
Watch were established in Pekin Trench, not far from
Haisnes. Unsupported on either flank, and exposed
to a murderous fire, the position of this garrison was
most precarious, and could only be maintained with
the help of the 27th Brigade.

On the evening of the 24th September, the battalions
of the 27th Brigade were assembled in reserve trenches.
From this position to the front line there were two
routes, by the communication trenches termed Railway

44 ACTION OF 271TH BRIGADE [sEPr. 25

Alley and Fountain Alley. Previous reconnaissance
had shown that the time required to reach the front
line by these routes was 1 and 14 hours respectively,
and the move of the brigade was arranged to enable it
to reach the front trenches as soon as they were
vacated by the 26th Brigade. Butall the previous plans
made for the regulation of traffic in the communication
trenches broke down during the action, and the men
of the 27th found their advance checked by carrying
parties, stragglers, and returning wounded. The average
progress seemed to be about 30 yards every 20 minutes,
and there were many long halts. Not only were the
men exhausted by this tedious and tiring passage, but
they suffered heavily from the enemy’s shell-fire. It
would have kept the men fresher, and would probably
have saved casualties, if the battalions had moved out
of the trenches and advanced across the open.

The first battalion to cross the front line was
the 12th Royal Scots. It should have been followed
by the 11th Royal Scots, but this battalion was
seriously delayed in the trenches, and the 10th Argylls
were the second battalion to pass the line. The
order of battalions, however, as arranged by the
brigade, was restored during the advance, the Argylls
halting to allow the 11th Royal Scots to get into
their proper position. Under orders from General
Thesiger, the 6th Royal Scots Fusiliers were kept back
in the front trenches owing to the failure of the 28th
Brigade. On entering “No Man’s Land,” the 27th
Brigade came under intense rifle and machine-gun fire
from Cité St Elie, and from north-east of the Fosse.
About 11 a.m. the 11th and 12th Royal Scots passed
through the Gordons and advanced on Haisnes, but
they were scourged by terrific rifle and machine-gun
fire, and could make progress only by short, sharp

1915] ACTION OF 271TH BRIGADE 45

rushes. A few men penetrated into the outskirts of
the village, but they could not maintain their position,
and were forced to withdraw. Till the evening, the
survivors of the Royal Scots lay out in the open about
300 yards east of Pekin Trench, and in the afternoon
the situation of the Royal Scots and men of the Seventh
Division on their right became intolerable. They were
numbed by cold and rain and suffered grievously from
the enfilade fire which the enemy directed on them
from Haisnes, so at 4 p.M. the men were withdrawn
to the line of Pekin Trench on the right of the
Gordons.

The Argylls, who followed close behind the Royal
Scots, established themselves in Fosse Alley. Observ-
ing that the left flank of the men in Pekin Trench
was exposed, they sent forward a company to protect
it, but it was held up by unbroken barbed wire, and,
after the company commander had been shot down
while trying to cut it, the remainder fell back on Fosse
Alley. Haisnes was now strongly held by the enemy,
and there was little chance of taking it without strong
artillery support. Brig.-General Bruce received orders
at 3.30 P.M. to secure the village, and, leaving instruc-
tions for the 6th Royal Scots Fusiliers to follow on,
he left Central Boyau and went forward to Fosse Alley
to reconnoitre the position. As both Haisnes and Cité
St Elie were strongly garrisoned by the enemy, and as
his brigade had been very heavily punished, he con-
sidered that an attack’ on Haisnes was out of the
question. The decision was sound. Even if the village
had been captured, the strength of the Division would
have been too dissipated to offer any chance of effective
defence against a resolute attack.

1 Brig.-General Bruce sent back by the machine-gun officer of his
brigade an important account of the situation to Brig.-General Ritchie.

46 PEKIN TRENCH EVACUATED [sEPr. 35

The presence of Brig.-General Bruce steadied the
garrison of Pekin Trench, and under his direction two
companies of the Royal Scots Fusiliers were sent
forward to support the Royal Scots by occupying the
trench on their left. The position at Pekin Trench,
however, needed more reinforcements than Brig.-General
Bruce had at his command in order to make it secure,
and the small garrison had a very bad time. The men
were exposed to a continuous and merciless fire, and
the trenches were full of dead, dying, and wounded.
To add to their misery rain fell heavily, the rifles
became clogged with mud and could not be fired, and
the fuse-lighters of the Bethune bombs were so damp
that it was impossible to ignite them.

The initiative now rested with the enemy,’ whose
numbers were being hourly augmented, and numerous
bombing attacks were made on the garrison. Against
the most desperate odds a brilliant defence was made.
““C” Company of the Gordons, under Captain J. E.
Adamson, beat off three powerful and determined attacks
from the railway and the village; but with diminishing
numbers and want of food, water, ammunition and
bombs, it was not possible for it to hold on indefi-
nitely. The great majority of the officers were dead
or wounded, and most of the bombers had become
casualties. The men could do no more, and during .
the late afternoon and evening the Gordons retired to
Fosse Alley, but here their right flank was attacked
by German bombers from Cité St Elie, and they were
compelled to fall back on our front line.

The position of the Royal Scots in Pekin Trench
became untenable when the Gordons were forced back,

1 In the course of the battle the Germans brought up the 2nd Guards
Reserve Division, the 10th Bavarian Regiment, and a battalion of the
123rd Division.

1915] PEKIN TRENCH EVACUATED 47

and the longer they held on the more dangerous
became the situation; for both flanks were exposed,
and the enemy was becoming more confident and
ageressive. The Germans with abundance of bombs
made numerous attacks against the Royal Scots, so
to avoid being surrounded, the garrison fell back to
Fosse Alley in the evening. After organising the
remnants of his brigade along Fosse Alley and
satisfying himself that it was in touch with the Seventh
Division on the right, Brig.-General Bruce established his
H.Q. in the Quarries. This was an unfortunate choice,
for though he was now in close touch with the Seventh
Division he was too far away for General Thesiger to
get quickly into communication with him.

Meantime the main body of the 26th Brigade
maintained its position. In spite of rain and a
deluge of shells, the sappers of the 90th Coy. R.E,,
assisted by infantry and pioneers, rapidly improved the
trenches and made them stronger for defence. The
behaviour of the men was beyond all praise; their
dogged endurance and marvellous cheerfulness raised
them above the misery of their surroundings. The
sappers were always ready to lend a hand to the
infantry whenever the enemy counter-attacked, and
when the shelling became too severe for any work to
be done, they gave invaluable aid by manning the
trenches on the flanks of the infantry. More effective
artillery support was now available for the harassed
brigade. At 10.30 a.m. No. 7 Mountain Battery
R.G.A. came into action near Fosse 8 and engaged
targets near the Railway and Les Briques; while the
Whole of the 52nd Brigade R.F.A. and one Howitzer
battery under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Perreaux,
were in action south-west of the Dump by 4.30 P.M.

When darkness fell on the field of battle, the

E

48 EVENING SITUATION, 25rh SEPTEMBER _[sepr.

situation of the Division was as follows: Though the
28th Brigade had been bloodily repulsed, the 26th had
captured and was holding the Dump and Fosse 8.
The bulk of the brigade held a line east of the Fosse,
and this line was extended to the south by the 27th
Brigade, which held Fosse Alley and was in touch with
the Seventh Division on the right. The task now
before the Division was to convert the captured
trenches into strong defensive positions and to link
them up with our original front line. But the enemy
was bent on preventing any work being done, and the
difficulties were enormous, owing partly to scarcity of
tools and material, and partly to the downpour of
shells. In spite of these drawbacks and the constant
counter-attacks that frequently interrupted digging,
the trenches were considerably strengthened and were
protected: by wire placed 50 yards in front of them by
the sappers and the infantry. Equally emulous in
toil and heroism were the pioneers of “B” Coy. 9th
Seaforth Highlanders, who laboured hard to complete
the two communication trenches from the front line
to the Hohenzollern Redoubt. This task was not
finished until the forenoon of the 26th, for the men
had frequently to drop their tools and drive back
bombing parties of Germans who were working up
Little Willie. The achievement of the 9th Seaforths
was a shining example of pluck and endurance, and
they were as notable for their fighting as for the value
and quality of their work.

Counter-attack is the soul of defence, and it was
clear that the Germans were preparing to make a big
effort to regain Fosse 8 and the Dump. The issue of
the battle hung on the fate of these two places, and all
that could be done was done to strengthen our hold
on them. But the enemy knew the whole ground

1915] THE HIGHLANDERS RELIEVED 49

thoroughly and having no longer fear of attack farther
north, could draw largely on his reserves to make a
strong thrust. The defenders were weary and
exhausted, and the Corps decided to relieve the 26th
Brigade by fresh troops from the 73rd Brigade of the
Twenty-fourth Division.

Accordingly in the evening of the 25th the leading
troops of the 73rd Brigade, under their own brigadier
who received his orders from General Thesiger, arrived
in the neighbourhood of the Fosse. The relief was
carried out like any ordinary one, and the defence of
the Fosse was taken over by three battalions. The
Sussex Regiment held from the junction of Slag and
Fosse Alleys to the north end of the Fosse, and this
line was continued by the Royal Fusiliers, who held
from the left of the Sussex Regiment through the
Corons. The Northamptons, whose task it was to
protect the left flank, held a line from the north end
of the Fosse along Corons Alley and thence down the
North Face of the Redoubt. The relief was a lengthy
business, owing partly to the guides being uncertain of
their position in the dark, and partly to the fact that
this was the first acquaintance of the 73rd Brigade with
trenches, and it was not till the early hours of the
26th that the last men of the Highland Brigade
were relieved. Just after the Sussex Regiment had
taken over the trenches from the Seaforths and Black
Watch, the enemy made a strong counter-attack and
gained a footing in the line, but on learning what had
happened, the Highlanders at once turned back and
delivering a resolute bayonet charge drove the enemy
out. After being relieved, the remnants of the 26th
Brigade returned to our original front line trenches,
where they were reorganised. The six batteries of
R.F.A., which, under Lieut.-Colonel Perreaux had

50 WITHDRAWAL OF 271rn BRIGADE _[seEpr. 26

rendered invaluable support to the 26th Brigade, were
withdrawn during the night, as their exposed position,
when daylight came, would have meant annihilation.

The difficulty of defending the Fosse was
increased by the withdrawal of the 27th Brigade
during the evening. It is fairly certain that the
brigade could not have been in close touch’ with
the Seventh Division, for the Germans, making good
use of their knowledge of the ground, penetrated
during the night between the Ninth and Seventh
Divisions and attacked and captured the Quarries
from the rear. To the Seventh Division this attack
came as a complete surprise, and amongst the prisoners
was Brig.-General Bruce, while Captain Buchan, his
brigade major, was killed. This untoward event
exposed the right flank of the garrison in Fosse Alley,
and enemy bombers, forcing their way up the trench
from the south, compelled the 27th Brigade, now
commanded by Lieut.-Colonel Loch, to withdraw to
its original front line trenches.

The task entrusted to the 73rd Brigade was one
of great responsibility. For seasoned troops, the hold-
ing of the Fosse was not a very difficult matter. It
commanded a field of fire for at least 500 yards, and
there were not many trenches to block against enemy
bombers. But the 73rd was composed of raw troops— .
they had recently arrived from England, and, moreover,
they were exhausted by their long march from near
St Omer. The enemy’s pressure was maintained
chiefly by means of bombing attacks, but none of

1 There is a good deal of obscurity as to what actually happened, but
as the front of the Quarries had been wired by the sappers of the Seventh
Division, and as troops of the Seventh Division were still holding out in
the east of the Quarries when the western portions were in the hands of
the enemy, it is certain that the Germans could have effected a lodgment
only from the rear.

1915] MORNING SITUATION, 26Ts SEPTEMBER 51

the men of the 73rd Brigade had ever thrown a
bomb; few knew how to use one, and all felt an
exaggerated respect for a weapon about which they
knew so little. Moreover, they carried only 120 rounds
of ammunition per man, and they were short of food,
water, and tools. These deficiencies could not readily
be repaired, for it was hazardous and difficult to
carry up supplies to those in the front line through
the shell-swept zone between the MHohenzollern
Redoubt and the Fosse. The most urgent task of
the brigade was to protect the right flank of the
Fosse, and two companies of the Middlesex Regiment
were sent to hold Big Willie and Slag Alley.

At 6 oclock on the morning of the 26th all three
brigades of the Division were in our original front line
trenches, and Fosse 8 and the Hohenzollern Redoubt
were garrisoned by the 73rd Brigade. During the
night our artillery maintained a constant fire on
Madagascar and Les Briques Trenches, and on
Cemetery Alley and Pekin Alley, and efforts were
made to strengthen the defences of Fosse 8, and
open up communications. The 63rd R.E. with great
difficulty dug a trench from the front of the left brigade
to the corner of Little Willie ; it was completed by the
27th, and was held by bombers of the H.L.I.

The chief cause of anxiety to General Thesiger
was the gap between the 73rd Brigade and the
Seventh Division. At 9.45 a.m., therefore, he
ordered the 27th Brigade to reoccupy and _ hold
Dump Trench, and this was done in the afternoon
of the 26th. As our command of the right flank,
however, was threatened by the Germans occupying
the Quarries, it was decided to drive them out. The
Seventh Division was to assault the Quarries, and
the 6th Royal Scots Fusiliers, who were placed

52 ATTACKS ON THE QUARRIES [sEpr. 27

under the orders of the 73rd Brigade for the purpose,
were to co-operate by bombing down Fosse Alley.
This operation was eventually arranged for 4.30 P.M.
Meantime, the 73rd had been severely punished, but
though it became slightly unsteady under the cease-
less shell-fire, it clung to its position during the whole
of the 26th.

Our attack on the Quarries was repulsed, the
Seventh Division gaining only a foothold in the
south-east corner. The 6th Royal Scots Fusiliers
made their way along Fosse Alley without opposition,
but it was too risky to press on until the Seventh
Division had captured the Quarries. Another attack
was ordered by the Corps, when the Ninth Division
was to secure Fosse Alley and join up with the Seventh
Division at the Quarries. The operation, which was
carried out at 2.30 a.m. on the 27th, was unsuccessful,
for although the Royal Scots Fusiliers, supported by
the Argylls in Fosse Alley, reached Point 45, the
Seventh Division failed to overcome the resistance of
the Germans in the Quarries.

The unsteadiness of the 73rd Brigade on the
afternoon of the 26th was a source of great uneasiness
to General Thesiger and his staff, and at 5.30 a.m. he
moved up to the Fosse to ascertain the exact state of
affairs. Early in the morning some of the defenders
of the Fosse began to retire, and a telephone message
from the 26th Brigade, received at 6.15 a.M., stated that
a few men of the 73rd were leaving their positions, and
that support was urgently required. The ordeal had
been too severe for untried troops. During the 26th
they had held the Fosse against many attacks, but the
constant storm of shot and shell to which they were
exposed, and the general misery of their surroundings,
aggravated by the thick drizzle of a grey September

[Maull ¢ Fox.

MAJOR-GENERAL G. H. THESIGER, C.B., C.M.G.

1915] LOSS OF FOSSE 8 53

dawn, weakened their power of defence.’ Before the
German attacks they gave way, and for a time it
seemed that the Hohenzollern Redoubt would be lost
as well as the Fosse. It was here that the gallant
General Thesiger, who had gone forward to reconnoitre
the position in person, was killed. He belonged to a
well-known military family, and, though his career with
the Ninth had been brief, he had proved himself a
sterling and able commander, and his death at the
crisis of the battle was a serious calamity.

The situation was saved by men of the 26th
Brigade; 70 of the Black Watch and 30 Camerons
were sent up to the Redoubt about 10 a.m. This
party rallied the remaining defenders, and checked the
German advance after stubborn and prolonged bombing
fights. The enemy made strenuous efforts to reach the
Redoubt from Little Willie, and heavy bombing went on
there all day. For his heroic bravery in one of these
encounters, Corporal James Dalgleish Pollock of the
Camerons was awarded the V.C. When the enemy
bombers in superior numbers were storming a way into
the Redoubt from Little Willie, Corporal Pollock
Jumped out of the trench, and, bombing the Germans
from above, forced them to retreat. For an hour he
maintained his position though exposed to a hail of
bullets, and did not retire until he had been severely
wounded.

Reserves were at once sent up to meet the danger,
and the divisional mounted troops were placed under
Brig.-General Ritchie. At the same time, the artillery
shelled Madagascar Trench, Mad Point, Cemetery
Alley, and Lone Farm. A brigade of the Twenty-

1 The gallant record of the Twenty-fourth Division in the war after

the Battle of Loos is a sufficient proof, if any were necded, that the failure
of the 73rd Brigade at Loos was entirely due to inexperience.

54 EVACUATION OF FOSSE ALLEY [SEPr. 27

eighth Division was ordered by the Corps to relieve the
73rd Brigade, which the Corps still believed to be in
possession of the Fosse. Small parties of the 73rd
held their positions in the Fosse up to noon; but, long
before that hour, the enemy had penetrated the
defences, and was even attacking the Redoubt.

On the right of the Division the 27th Brigade
maintained its position in Fosse Alley for a considerable
time, and at 5 a.m. an attempt of the enemy to rush
the trench was easily repulsed by rifle and machine-gun
fire. The weak point of the line was on the extreme
right, where it was exposed to a flank attack by the
Germans from the Quarries and Cité St Elie. From
9 a.m. the Royal Scots Fusiliers were engaged in a
continuous and furious bomb fight, and supplies of
bombs were passed to them as quickly as they could
be brought from the dumps. On the left the Argylls
sent up a machine-gun’ to support the Sussex Regiment
of the 73rd Brigade. When the 73rd withdrew from
the Fosse, the position of the garrison in Fosse Alley
became hopeless. The Argylls and the Fusiliers were
now attacked not only from the flanks but from the
rear, and it was imperative for them to withdraw before
they were surrounded. It was a model retirement.
The men never wavered or showed any inclination
to retreat until ordered to do so, and their well-directed
rapid fire inflicted numerous casualties on the enemy.
Under a devastating hail of bullets they faced about to
stem the hostile advances on the word of command.
Closely followed by the Germans, the Argylls and the
Scots Fusiliers withdrew to Dump Trench, which their
pursuers did not venture to attack. The operation
reflected the greatest credit on all concerned. After

1 The machine-gun team never yielded a yard ; the gun was destroyed
by shell-fire, and all the members of the team were killed or wounded.

1915] COUNTER-ATTACK BY THE 26TH BRIGADE 55

Dump Trench was reached, many of the men went
back to bring in their comrades who had been wounded.
Lieut.-Colonel Mackenzie of the Argylls was hit during
the retreat, and Private M‘Fadyen with great gallantry
went out and brought him in, though previously several
men had been wounded in the same attempt.

When the Corps was informed of the loss of Fosse 8,
it ordered the 85th Brigade (Twenty-eighth Division) to
advance immediately and counter-attack across the
open. But this brigade was delayed while coming up,
and at 3 p.m. the 26th was ordered to counter-attack
the Fosse at once. All the troops of the brigade had
been continuously engaged, and most of the men were
leg-weary and tired out by the exertions of the last
two days. Its total strength now mustered less than 600
bayonets, and there were few officers left. Nevertheless
a very gallant charge was made over ground pitted by
bullets and shrapnel; the men reached the West Face
of the Hohenzollern Redoubt, but beyond this they
could make no further progress. From Mad Point and
Madagascar Trench the approaches to Fosse 8 were
swept by rifle and machine-gun fire under which no
man could move and live; and the enemy’s artillery,
posted near Auchy, drenched the Redoubt with
shrapnel. But although the Highlanders failed to cap-
ture Fosse 8, their arrival saved the Hohenzollern, and
put new spirit into the officers and men of the 73rd
Brigade. The onslaughts of the enemy against the
Redoubt were definitely checked, and he was driven
back to Fosse 8.

By 8 p.m. the 85th Brigade had arrived. One
battalion was in Big Willie, two companies held the
West Face of Hohenzollern, one battalion was moving
up Central Boyau on Little Willie, and one was still at
Vermelles. The remnants of the 26th Brigade and

56 RELIEF OF THE DIVISION [sEPT. 28

some of the 27th were holding Hohenzollern with part
of the 73rd. Portions of the 27th were also in Dump
Trench and our original front line. The enemy’s bom-
bardment was still intense, and to avoid casualties it
was decided to withdraw the 73rd Brigade and the
26th and 27th Brigades of the Ninth Division. At
midnight, therefore, the 26th went back to the old
reserve trenches, and the 27th to its old assembly
positions; on the 28th both brigades were drawn back
to the neighbourhood of Bethune. The 28th Brigade,
which ever since the 25th September had been engaged
in clearing trenches and burying the dead, was not
relieved until the 29th, on which date it joined the
rest of the Division at Bethune. The artillery, which
remained in the line covering the Twenty-eighth Division
until its own artillery arrived, were relieved on the Ist
October. Brig.-General Armitage received a letter
from Major-General Bulfin thanking him for the
efficient support of his batteries.

The active part of the Division in the battle ended
on the 27th September. No battle of the war has
excited so much controversy as Loos; it has been
claimed as a victory and deplored as a defeat. Defeat
means not merely the loss of or the failure to secure
definite tactical and strategical gains, but also, and
chiefly, the decline of the men’s moral. This was
emphatically not the case with the men of the Ninth
Division. Even the bald narratives of the action as
described in the battalion diaries reveal a note of
triumph. The moral of the troops of the 28th Brigade,
even after disaster, remained unshaken, and many men
of the H.L.I. joined in with the Camerons at the Fosse.
The capture of the Dump and Fosse 8 by the Highland
Brigade will rank as one of the finest feats of arms ever
performed by the Division, and the glorious counter-

1915] COMMENTS ON THE BATTLE 57

attack on the 27th September was the best evidence
that up to the end of the battle the Highlanders never
lost heart. If the work of the 27th Brigade was less
conspicuous, its several battalions had fought with great.
courage and tenacity, and the defence of Fosse Alley
by the Argylls and the Scots Fusiliers, besides taking
heavy toll of the enemy, prevented him from using his
full strength in an attack on the Redoubt. When the
Division was withdrawn from the conflict it had solidly
established its reputation as a first-rate fighting division.
From the men’s point of view the main thing achieved
was that they had measured themselves against the
Germans at their best and had proved themselves the
better men, and this was perhaps the chief result of the
battle for the New Armies. In future actions, the men
always entered into the fray with the consciousness of
superiority that is the fundamental basis of moral.
At the same time, it would be idle to deny that the
resistance of the enemy had shown both gallantry and
resource, and the small number of prisoners * taken was
a sufficient indication that the foe’s courage had not
been shaken by the preliminary bombardment. The
losses of the Germans on the first day were probably
less than ours, as their front defences were held chiefly
by machine-guns, and most of their field-guns’ had
been withdrawn in time. Their counter-attack was
admirably organised and was carried out with skill and
determination, though it was during this phase of the
battle that they suffered their most serious losses.
The general feeling of the Division, however, was
that if there had been more artillery to support it, and

1 Five officers and 168 other ranks were captured by the Division.

? Two German guns were left near the cottages at the Fosse. After
dark on the 26th B/50 Battery took two limbers up to the cottages and
brought back one of the guns ; the other could not be found.

58 COMMENTS ON THE BATTLE [SEPr.

better arrangements to reinforce it or relieve it with
fresh troops, a heavy disaster would have been inflicted
on the enemy. Under the circumstances, it had accom-
plished as much as was possible. When the Second
Division, which could not have been expected to get
forward without the aid of gas, was paralysed by the
failure of the gas, the attainment of all the Ninth’s
objectives became impossible. Auchy on the left
bristled with machine-guns, housed numerous batteries,
and was a position of such commanding strength that
any attempt to advance far beyond the Fosse became
a forlorn hope. How formidable the obstacles were
may best be judged by the inability later of such
divisions as the Twenty-eighth, Guards, and Forty-sixth
to make any impression on the hostile defences.

It was the first action of the Division and it was
inevitable that mistakes should be made, but most of
them were venial. Not enough consideration had
been given to the necessity of guarding the rifles
against bad weather, and the Bethune bomb was use-
less in damp. It also proved a misfortune to allot
a complete company of the R.E. to each brigade;
owing to the failure of the attack on the left, the
63rd Field Coy. R.E. had no definite task to carry
through, and it was impossible to withdraw it, as
it had become involved in the fighting. The trench
mortar teams attached to the 26th Brigade had a sorry
time. The team of the 2-inch mortars were all knocked
out, and though two 14-inch mortars reached Fosse 8
they could find no targets, and the two officers in
command were killed. These mortars were too un-
wieldy to carry forward, and as matters turned out,
it would have been better if they had been used
on the left to mask the fire from the Railway Work
with smoke-bombs. It is possible that if this had

1915] COMMENTS ON THE BATTLE 59

been done, the assault of the 28th Brigade would have
succeeded.

Perhaps the most deplorable feature of the battle
was the comparative breakdown of the medical
arrangements for the evacuation of the wounded from
the forward areas. Many of them lay out not for
hours but for days, and not a few shocking and
pathetic sights were to be seen between Hohenzollern
and Pekin Trench. This was entirely due to lack of
staff. Doctors and regimental stretcher-bearers worked
with the greatest heroism to bring in the wounded,
but they were too few, and many of them were shot
down. In a big engagement, especially in trench
warfare, the staff of stretcher-bearers should be
enormously increased if the wounded are to be
expeditiously and satisfactorily evacuated. The im-
portance of this cannot be over-estimated, because
nothing so depresses a man as the fear that if injured
he will be left out to die. The memory of such scenes
as were too common at Loos lingered with the survivors,
and remained after other impressions had become faint.

Most of the battle arrangements were beyond the
control of the Division. The use of gas on its front
did more harm than good, and there is no evidence
to show that it affected the enemy in the least. One
of the results of Loos was to give “smoke” a bad
name, since in several cases it had caused a serious loss
of direction. This, however, was not the case with
the Ninth Division. The only complaint of the
26th Brigade was that the wind was hardly strong
enough to carry the smoke ahead It formed an
effective screen for the infantry, and, in the opinion
of the Seaforths, it saved them many casualties.

Strategically and tactically the results of the battle
were disappointing. The Germans received a severe

60 COMMENTS ON THE BATTLE [SEpr. 1915

fright, but their system of defence, based on mutually
supporting strong points garrisoned mainly by machine-
gun crews, answered its purpose by delaying our
advance sufficiently long to enable them to bring up
reserves with which they counter-attacked our troops
weary and spent through the strain of battle. These
counter-attacks did not deprive us of all our gains, but
the vexatious effects of our failure to keep Fosse 8 and
the Dump soon became manifest ; for the Loos salient,
which had been won in the south, could not be held
easily or economically, since from these points the
enemy commanded the only valley where we could
establish satisfactory artillery positions to support the
front line. The employment of new divisions that had
not been given an opportunity of completing their
training by a spell of trench warfare was unfair to the
men, and indicated unsound judgment on the part of
the Higher Command. But, indeed, the operation was
on a scale too big for the resources at the disposal of
the British Field-Marshal.

The battle, however, takes rank as one of the
most important of the war. The lessons deduced
from it laid down the lines upon which British tactics
and strategy were based until the end of 1917.
Unbalanced optimism gave place to calculated—perhaps
exaggerated—caution; an immediate break through
was given up as impracticable, and the British forces
sought to wear down the enemy and to achieve victory
largely by weight of numbers and artillery.

CHAPTER IV
THE SALIENT AND “PLUG STREET”
Octosprer 1915 ro May 1916

It was a sadly battered Division that concentrated near
Bethune. Caked in mud, unshaven, and unkempt,
with tunics tattered and filthy after three days of
continuous exposure, the men showed none of the
‘“‘spick and span” appearance that it is the pride and
custom of the British soldier to present. But they
were in high spirits and full of confidence, and their
exploits were rewarded with a flattering message’
from General Gough, the Commander of the I.
Corps. The losses’ of the Division had been exception-
ally heavy, and most serious were the casualties amongst
the senior officers. The divisional commander had
been killed, and out of the 12 infantry C.Os. only 4
remained; grave losses also occurred amongst majors

1 “Qn leaving the I. Corps, the G.O.C. wishes to tell the Ninth
Division that he thinks their conduct in the assault on the German lines
was beyond all praise, and no words can express the value of their
gallantry and self-sacrifice to our country.

“They showed during the heavy fighting not only great dash and
courage, but endurance and discipline, and the highest qualities of a
soldier.

‘¢ He can only wish them the best of all fortune in their future efforts,
and he is sure that they will maintain the high standard as soldiers and
men that they have already reached.”—(Order from I. Corps, dated
30th September 1915.)

2 See Appendix IV.

61

62 GENERAL FURSE [ocr.

and captains.’ There is no factor more useful in the
difficult task of reorganisation than the experienced
control of senior officers ; but this work in most of the
battalions had to be undertaken by second lieutenants
with little experience, and no automatic knowledge of
how things should be done.

The Division was most fortunate in its new Com-
mander. Major-General W. T. Furse, C.B., D.S.O., was
an officer of proved ability, energy, and imagination.
Under his vigorous direction reorganisation was rapidly
completed, and deficiencies in stores and equipment were
made up. He thoroughly understood that a division
was a unit and not a mere congeries of battalions,
batteries, and field companies, and he realised that the
battle from which the Ninth had recently emerged
offered a grand opportunity for fostering and stimulating
esprit de corps. ‘‘The Ninth (Scottish) Division ” soon
became a name in which every soldier in it took an
intense and jealous pride; each man believed that he
belonged to the best unit in the best division in the
best army in the world. Such a spirit is not to be
despised ; it inspires a corporate heroism that is greater
than the bravery of any individual, and even the
meanest is roused to triumyh over his natural timidity
rather than allow the glory of his division to be
tarnished. No man took a more conspicuous part
in building up and encouraging this spirit than
General Furse.

For most of the battalions new leaders had to be

1 Killed and Wounded (exclusive of subalterns).

6th K.O.S.B. . . .« lost9 9th Scottish Rifles . . lost6
8th Black Watch a ee 11th Royal Scots a ee
7th Seaforth Highlanders . ,, 8 10th HUE. .. : Scaggs cd
8th Gordon Highlanders . ,, 8 Pith ; 345.3 : : & 45 0a
6th Royal Scots Fusiliers . ,, 8 12th Royal Scots : -. iy Ss
5th Cameron Highlanders. ,, 7 10th A.& S. H. . an ee

LiguT.-GENERAL SIR

W.

‘ys

FURSE,

Fac

7
page 62.

Digitized by Google

1915] : NEW COMMANDERS 63

found. The only C.Os. who remained with the Divi-
sion were Lieut.-Colonel Cameron of Lochiel of the
Camerons, Lieut.-Colonel Loch of the 12th Royal Scots,
Lieut.-Colonel Northey of the 9th Scottish Rifles, and
Lieut.-Colonel Fergusson of the 11th H.L.I. During
the next few months the following Commanders were
appointed—

8th Black Watch— 26TH BRIGADE.

Lieut.-Colonel G. B. Duff of the Camerons, from the end of
December 1915 to March 1916.

Major Sir George Abercromby, from March 1916 to April 1916.

Lieut.-Colonel G. W. E. Gordon, from 9th April to 20th
September 1916.

Tth Seaforth Highlanders—

Major C. P. M. Burn, from 5th October to 16th December 1915.
Lieut.-Colonel F. J. Marshall, from 16th December 1915 to
15th April 1916.

Lieut.-Colonel J. Kennedy, D.S.O., from 2nd May to 5th
August 1916.
8th Gordon Highlanders—

Lieut.-Colonel A. D. Greenhill-Gardyne, from 27th October
1915 to March 1916. 7

27TH BRIGADE.
Brig.-General W. H. Walshe, to 17th March 1916.
Brig.-General G. F. Trotter, C.M.G., D.S.O., M.V.O., to May
1916.
Ith Royal Scots—

Lieut.-Colonel W. D. Croft, from 4th December 1915.

6th Royal Scots Fusiliers —

Major J. H. Dutton, D.S.O., to 8th January 1916.
Lieut.-Colonel The Right Hon. Winston Churchill, to May 1916.

10th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders—

Lieut.-Colonel H. Pelham Burn, D.S.O., from 10th December
1915 to April 1916.

F

64 MOVE TO THE SALIENT [ocr.

28TH BRIGADE.
6th King’s Own Scottish Borderers—

Lieut.-Colonel J. C. W. Connell, D.S.O., from 4th December
1915.

10th Highland Light Infantry—

Lieut.-Colonel H. C. Stuart, D.S.O., to 6th January 1916.
Lieut.-Colonel Grahame, D.S.O., from 6th January 1916.

llth Highland Light Infantry—
Lieut.-Colonel R. F. Forbes, January to May 1916.

In the Sappers, Lieut.-Colonel Livingstone had been wounded,
and the new C.R.E. was Lieut.-Colonel Carpenter.

The Division had barely time to scrape off the
mud before it was ordered on the 29th September to
proceed north to join the V. Corps in the Salient.’
The move was carried through partly by route march
and partly by rail. On the 8rd October, D.H.Q. were
established at Hooggraaf, about two miles south of
Poperinghe, and on the morning of the 5th the 26th
and 27th Brigades relieved the Seventeenth Division
in the trenches near Hill 60. The line taken over
by the Ninth lay south of Zillebeke, and extended
from north of Hill 60 to a point south of the Ypres-
Comines Canal near Oosthoek. The enemy’s line ran
along the higher ground, and the distance between
the British and the German trenches varied from 25
to 400 yards. The salient feature on our front was
The Bluff, which rose steeply from the ground on the
north side of the Canal and completely dominated
the sector.

During the three months that the Division remained
in the salient it passed a time of almost unmitigated

1 There were many salients in the British line, but “The Salient” was
Ypres,

1915] MUD 65

gloom and discomfort. As the days shortened and
winter came on, hardly a day passed without rain, and
mud was lord and sovereign over all. It seemed to
suck away a man’s vitality and enthusiasm, and even
a short march involved an expenditure of physical
energy out of all proportion to the distance traversed.
The whole of Flanders, engulfed in mud, had the
aspect of an enormous swamp; and the leaden skies,
in a sombre rain- grey monotint, were in harmony
with the drab-coloured earth. Even the roads were
ankle-deep in glutinous mud, and the constant traffic
was often checked by stoppages caused by particularly
bad parts. Thus the passage of the infantry to and
from the trenches was like a feverish nightmare; for
the men had to march about ten miles through clinging
mire along roads choked with transport, and often
shelled. The rest huts at Dickebusch and Canada Huts
were dismal and repellent shelters; they were swept
by draughts, and through their leaky roofs the rain
dripped down on the disconsolate inmates. The area
round them was one vast sea of mud, where it was
impossible for a unit to carry out any training worth the
name. Without constant training there is a tendency
for discipline to be relaxed, and a man who is allowed
to loll about as he pleases is apt to lose all smartness
in himself and pride in his unit. As far as possible,
everything was done to maintain strict discipline, and
the A. & Q. department worked its hardest to secure
baths for the men and clean changes of clothing, but
in spite of this the rest huts were more demoralising
than the front line, where the strictest trench disci-
pline was upheld and where there was constant work
to do.

This period was notable as the reign of the second
lieutenant. For over a month every company in the

66 THE NINTH DIVISION SCHOOL [ocr.

26th Brigade was commanded by one;:’and this
was the case with most of the other battalions. At.
first this undoubtedly rendered the task of General
Furse more difficult, since youth and gallantry do
not form a complete substitute for knowledge and
experience; but the apprenticeship and training in
responsibility, which these months brought to the young
officers, supplied him with a large body of keen,
confident, and efficient leaders who were later to
demonstrate their value at the Battle of the Somme.

The divisional commander was quick to make the
most of his opportunities, and he resolved to fortify
youth and keenness with knowledge and practice. On
the 7th November he opened the Ninth Division School
at Poperinghe, which served a double purpose in
promoting training and in encouraging esprit de corps.
_ By this means not only did the officers gain a real
knowledge of their manifold duties, which it was
impossible for them to acquire amongst the swamps at.
Dickebusch and Canada Huts, but also the company
officers of one unit were brought into contact with
those of other units, and thus mutual understanding
and sympathy were created. The first commandant
of the school was Lieut.-Colonel Loch who was
assisted by Captain Drew, the adjutant of the 5th
Camerons, and the instruction was both theoretical
and practical. It is impossible to over-estimate the
value of this school in increasing the efficiency of the
Division.

Certainly the safest and in many ways the most
desirable place during these winter months was the
front line system. A battalion spent four days in the
front line trenches, four days in support, and four in
rest at Dickebusch or Canada Huts. The support
positions had most of the discomfort without any of

1915] THE TRENCHES - 67

the safety’ of the front line; they had little protection
and were frequently shelled, many casualties being
suffered. The most perilous spot on the route to the
front liné was Ypres. No man of British blood could
walk through it without feeling a deep thrill of awe
and reverence as he gazed on the ruins of the beautiful
town, the name of which will ever be associated with
the most heroic and imperishable feat of British valour
and endurance. But it was no place to linger in; it
formed a nexus of roads, and virtually the whole of the
traffic between the trenches and the back areas had to
pass through it. Hence it was constantly shelled by
the enemy, and any body of men that succeeded in
passing through it without loss was extremely fortunate.
After the toilsome march, the trenches seemed a verit-
able haven of refuge. They were in fact partly trenches
and partly breastworks; for it was impossible to dig
to any depth, since water was quickly reached, and the
parapets had to be raised high above the level of the
ground to protect the men from enemy bullets. The
high parapets made the line unpleasantly conspicuous,
for they formed an easy mark for the enemy’s trench
mortars and artillery, which had numerous posts for
observation.

Between October and December the Division was
gradually shifted from the south to the east of
Zillebeke. The line taken over from the Seventeenth
Division was held until the night of the 15th October,
when the 27th Brigade on the right was relieved by the
72nd Brigade of the Twenty-fourth Division. On the
day preceding the relief the Argylls had a tragic mishap.
At 4 a.m. on the 15th the Germans exploded a mine

1 When the front trenches lay near each other, the artillery, in order to
avoid hitting their own people, fired generally on the enemy’s support and
rear trenches '

68 THE TRENCHES [ocr.

about 25 yards in front of a trench not far from The
Bluff. The explosion was very violent, and although
the front trenches had been cleared in view of the
known existence of hostile mines on this part of the
line, heavy casualties were suffered in the support
and communication trenches, 15 being killed and 50
wounded. On the same morning at 1.30 a.m. the
enemy blew a small mine just outside the trenches
held by the Camerons, who had 5 killed and wounded.
During the night of the 16th/17th October the 28th
Brigade took over the part of the line held by the
7th Brigade on the left of the 26th; this brought the
northern limit of the Division to a point just east of
Armagh Wood. A further rearrangement took place
on the nights of the 8th/9th and 9th/10th November
when the 27th Brigade took over the front line trenches
east of Sanctuary Wood, which at that time still pre-
sented the appearance of a wood and was full of thick
undergrowth.

These alterations brought changes in _ position
without any in conditions, for all along the front the
trenches were in a very bad state and could be main-
tained in tolerable order only by constant labour. After
a shower of rain (and it always seemed to rain in
the salient), there was the common story of dug-outs
collapsed and parapets fallen in. At the best of times
the trenches were ankle-deep in water; pumps were
used, but they effected only a temporary improvement,
because there was no place to which the water could be
drained. Long thigh gum-boots were issued to the
men, and these helped to keep their feet dry, though
they could not make them warm. In spite of whale-oil
and anti-frostbite grease, it is not surprising that many
were evacuated to hospital suffering from trench feet.
Want of sleep, perpetual cold, filth, and wet were the

1915] SAPPERS AND INFANTRY 69

ordinary features of life; notwithstanding the coats of
goatskin that were issued it was impossible for the men
to keep warm. During a man’s short spell of sleep his
feet became numb, and he was forced to get out of his
shelter and stamp in order to restore circulation; and
when he was awake he had to squelch about continually
in mud, which plastered everything up to his head.

The sappers and pioneers did their utmost to
improve matters, but as regards getting rid of the
water their efforts were as the labours of Sisyphus.
They revetted the trenches, made dug-outs, improved
and kept in repair a light railway, which was used for
bringing up rations and engineering materials, but more
could have been done if the infantry had co-operated
whole-heartedly with the sappers. The latter were
a comparatively small body of skilled men, and they
were supplied with working parties from the infantry.
The infantryman, however, believed that he was
doing not his own job but the sapper’s, and he
did as little as possible unless there was someone
standing over him. This was the attitude not merely
of N.C.Os. and privates, but of many officers, and
in this respect there was a striking contrast to the
German Army, where the private was taught to realise
that in working under a sapper he was working
for himself. It would have been well if the British
soldier had been taught the same lesson from the
beginning of his training. As it was, the work
accomplished by an infantry party depended largely
upon the infantry officer who was in charge of it, and
too often he considered it the proper thing to let his
men do as little as possible.

The position held by the Division from near The
Bluff north of the Canal to Sanctuary Wood was about
5000 yards in length, which was a long line for a

70 A “RETALIATION TARIFF” [Nov.

weak! division to hold. Most of the units were
still far below strength, and when parties left the
front line to bring up rations, the trenches appeared
deserted. The line was commanded by the enemy
along the entire front, and, lying in a salient, it was
shelled from all sides. Any movement east of Ypres
was impossible except after dark, and one dared not
show a head in Zillebeke during the day. At some
points the lines were so close that they could not
be safely shelled except by trench mortars. At one
part on the front of the 27th Brigade, where the
trenches were only about 20 yards apart, the enemy
occupied a position known as the “Birdcage.” It
was a wooden framework with wire netting and a
‘ trap-door in the top. Whenever he was peevish, he
opened the trap-door and heaved out a bomb, shutting
the door after him. This contrivance was hit by a
trench mortar on the 23rd November, but the Germans
at- once repaired it; however, it was blown to atoms
five days later by a mine. The enemy had more guns
and more ammunition, but a resolute effort was made
by General Furse to dispute his artillery superiority
by means of a “Retaliation Tariff.”* Whenever the
enemy bombarded a part of our lines he was subjected
to a bombardment of greater severity ; this encouraged
the infantry and stimulated the gunners, but failed to
silence the Germans. Occasional bombardments also
took place at such times as the enemy was suspected
to be involved in a relief.

Even more than the shelling the men disliked the
constant mining that was being carried on along the

1 That is, in numbers.
2 For each trench mortar bomb. . 1 salvo of 18-pounder H.E.
ie enemy torpedo . . . 2salvos . 5
and 2 4-5-inch howitzers.
- enemy 5:9shell. . . 18-inch shell.

1915] MINING 71

front. In this, as in artillery, the Germans were the
masters, though our tunnellers, with a view to cheering
the infantry, declared that they controlled the situa-
tion. Except for the Argylls no serious casualties
were suffered from mining, but the men in the front
system of trenches lived in a constant state of
suspense. This was reflected in the reports of sentries, ©
and never a day passed without some one saying
that he heard “subterranean noises, probably enemy
mining.”’ Undoubtedly our miners had an anxious
and harassing time. On the night of the 30th
November, having heard noises, they sent out a
listening post, which came upon some mine cases
and broke into a hostile gallery. The tunnelling
subaltern and one of his corporals entered it, and
though they met some Germans succeeded in firing
a charge and destroying the gallery.

Under the most dismal and depressing conditions
the work of the A.S.C. and transport was beyond
all praise. This was probably the most trying period
in the whole war for them, yet in spite of casualties
and delays caused by mud and bad roads, they never
failed to deliver the rations. Every night they had
to run the gauntlet through Ypres, fully conscious that
a torrent of shells might descend upon them at any
moment. The wear and tear on wagons and limbers
was enormous, and numerous losses were’ suffered
both in personnel and horses. Throughout the winter
the excellence and regularity of the rations did more
than anything to keep the men in good heart.

1 Noises, alleged to be German mining on the Corps’ front, were
actually traced to (a) revetting, (b) sentries stamping their feet, (c) rats
burrowing on the parapet, (d) a loose beam or branch blown by the wind, (e)
running water, (/) the beat of a man’s own heart, (g) a half-dead fly buzzing

at the bottom of a hole (this was taken for a machine drill), and (2) actual
mining.

72 FORMATION OF MACHINE-GUN COMPANIES [DEc.

Before the Division was relieved from the salient
an important change was made throughout the whole
Army as regards machine-guns. Prior to the war the
importance of machine-gun fire had not been realised
by our Army, and consequently we neither had enough
of them nor knew how to make the best tactical use
of those we had. The type employed was the Vickers,
of which two, and later four, were issued to each
battalion, but the gun was a heavy weapon for
infantry to handle, and required a high standard of
special training. Since 1915 a new and lighter
machine-gun, the Lewis, was being introduced; it
was more easily carried, and it was possible for an
average man to master it after a fortnight’s instruc-
tion. Moreover, it was cooled by air and could be
fired from a very light mounting; indeed an expert
could fire it without any mounting at all. It
was an admirable weapon for infantry, and when
issued there was no need for battalions to have
their own Vickers Guns. In fact the advantage of
using the latter under brigade control had been
apparent even before the Battle of Loos, and all
brigades in the Division had appointed brigade
machine-gun officers. At Loos, all the infantry
battalions had at least two Lewis Guns and some
had four, but on the 30th November the establishment
was fixed at four per battalion, that is, one per
company. On the same date the Vickers Gun
detachments were formed into machine-gun companies,
one company being attached to each brigade, and each
company consisted of four sections, with two machine-
guns per section.’

On the 7th December, the welcome news was
received that the Ninth was to be relieved by the

1 The machine-gun was reckoned to be equivalent to thirty rifles.

1915] GAS ATTACK 73

Fiftieth Division before the end of the month. The
tidings were greeted with unfeigned joy. Though
the men had borne the mud and discomfort with
wonderful stoicism, they loathed the salient and were
glad to leave it... It was undoubtedly the worst and
most disagreeable spell of trench life that the Division
experienced during the war. Even after the troops had
been heavily punished in the Battle of the Somme,
many of the men declared that they would rather go
through another such battle than return to the salient
under the conditions that prevailed in the winter of
1915.

The first to leave were the divisional mounted
troops, who departed for the II. Corps’ area on
the 12th December. But before the last battalions
were relieved on the 20th, they experienced a new
alarm. Ever since we had entered the salient there
were rumours that the enemy intended to make a gas
attack, and on the 14th December information was
received from the Corps that the Germans were pre-
paring one on the front of the Second Army. Next
day, therefore, the artillery proceeded to pound their
front parapets in case they should have installed
cylinders. During the small hours of the 19th our
whole front was subjected to an exceptionally heavy
bombardment, and it was clear that the long threatened
gas attack was at last being delivered. Clouds of gas
drifted as far back as D.H.Q., but the enemy did not
follow up with an infantry attack, for the artillery
were ready and proceeded to shell the adversary’s
trenches without delay. The main enemy effort was

' Even under the most damping circumstances the men maintained a
sense of humour. A platoon commander of the 12th Royal Scots on
asking a man, standing in a water-logged trench, how he liked his
surroundings, received the unexpected reply—“ Weel, sir, this is no like
Sauchiehall Street.”

74 REST AND TRAINING [DEc.

made to the north of the Division, but in no case did
he find the. defenders unprepared. As if disappointed
at the frustration of his designs, he shelled the whole
divisional area with vindictive violence throughout the
19th and the 20th, and several casualties were caused
among the outgoing and incoming battalions. On the
20th the whole of the Division was relieved except
the artillery, the last of which departed on the 22nd.

From the 20th December 1915 till the 26th January
1916, the Division enjoyed a welcome and needed
respite from trench warfare, and General Furse made
the most of the time to bring it up to concert-pitch.
After a long term in the line, when there are few
opportunities for training, a man is inclined to become
slack; further, trench life is bad for the fcet, and
several route marches are necessary to bring the
men into good condition. The Division, except the
artillery, was now in billets round Merris, where
D.H.Q. were established. The land was pleasant and
undulating, and was covered with numerous cosy and
cheery farms, a striking contrast to the mud flats
of Flanders. The artillery were stationed at the
Artillery Training Camp at Watten, where they under-
went a vigorous course.

Cleanliness was the first essential; excellent baths
were available and also clean clothing. Then followed
smartening-up drill, and each brigade was inspected
in turn by the Corps Commander in route marching.
It was now that the Ninth began to reap the fruits
of the Divisional School that had been established
at Poperinghe. General Furse held frequent confer-
ences with his brigadiers and battalion commanders,
in order to ensure that the training should be carried
out on useful and uniform lines. A high average
standard was aimed at in bombing and in rifle shooting

1915] PLOEGSTEERT WOOD 75

and when the men returned to the line their bearing,
efficiency, and moral left little to be desired. Yet the
time was not all spent in work, the average amount
of training being about five hours per day. Football
matches were played daily, and the Divisional Band
and the Concert Party—“ The Thistles”—provided a
welcome entertainment during the evenings. The
type of football played was, of course, Association.
There was one thrilling Rugby match between the
officers of the 28th Brigade and those of the 26th,
and a stirring game ended in a draw. It was during
this period of rest and training that the Right Hon.
Winston Churchill arrived to take over the Command
of the 6th Royal Scots Fusiliers at the beginning of
January 1916.

On its next visit to the trenches, the Division
experienced one of its most enjoyable times in France.
On the 24th January 1916, it commenced the relief
of the Twenty-fifth Division in the Ploegsteert area,
and this was completed by the 31st. D.H.Q were
established at Nieppe, but were transferred on the
13th February to Steenwerck on account of shelling.
The front trenches lay east of Ploegsteert Wood ; they
were in comparatively good condition and reliefs could
be carried out in daylight. There were excellent billets
for the battalions and brigades in reserve, where a
considerable amount of training could be carried on.
In order that battalions should always occupy the
same trenches, and so learn everything about them, the
28th Brigade held always one part of the line, while
the 27th and 26th relieved each other in the same
trenches. Six days “in” and six days “out” was the
rule for each unit.

From the end of January till the end of ‘ia 1916,
the Ninth held the same line, which was one of the

76 PLOEGSTEERT WOOD [sAN. TO MAY

most pleasant areas along the British front. There was
constant work to be done, but the results of labour
were soon apparent. The trenches were firmly revetted,
numerous fire-steps were built, and the communication
trenches were kept in good order. In addition, many
dug-outs were made and several concrete emplacements
for machine-guns constructed, and on leaving the area
both sappers and infantry could claim that they had
handed over model trenches.

The advent of spring and the peaceful aspect of
the cultivated country combined to render everyone
cheerful. In this sector the astonishing hardihood of
the old French farmers was seen at its best. They
used to plough fields almost up to the front line.
When shelled, they unharnessed the horses and went
back to their farms without accelerating their pace in
the slightest, but as soon as the firing ceased, they
calmly resumed ploughing as if nothing out of the
way had occurred. Ploegsteert Wood itself was a
charming spot. As the days lengthened and spring
advanced, the wood presented an arcadian appearance.
April was a halcyon month. The very huts nestling
among the trees, bourgeoning into a beautiful foliage,
seemed to fit in with the brightness of their surround-
ings, and the songs of thousands of birds made one feel
at times that the war had ceased to be.

Life was not altogether a picnic, however. The
wood itself was intermittently shelled by the enemy,
and the trenches were occasionally subjected to heavy
bombardments. The worst experience fell to the 11th
Royal Scots. Near their trenches the German position
protruded in a salient, which was known to our men as
the “ Birdcage,” on account of the tangle of wire with
which it was protected. Mining operations were
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1916] THE G.O.C. AND THE OFFENSIVE SPIRIT 77

supplied large working parties for the purpose. But
the enemy must have discovered that there was a mine,
and he determined to destroy it. On the evening of
the 13th May the position held by the Royal Scots was
violently shelled and trench mortared, and shortly after,
the Germans came over in three parties of 20 each.
Some of them succeeded in entering our trenches, but
the Royal Scots, though dazed by the severity of the
bombardment, put up a splendid resistance. Captain
Henry with a small party made an immediate counter-
attack, and after a lively scuffle expelled the enemy.
The Royal Scots losses, due mainly to the hostile
barrage, were 16 killed, 61 wounded, and 8 missing.
The Germans, who were the 104th Saxons, left 10
corpses in our trenches, and had failed in their attempt
to destroy the mine-shaft.

General Furse strove to foster the offensive spirit
throughout the Division, so sections were known as
“fighting” sections, to impress upon each man that his
principal duty was to fight. He exhorted all the
battalions to make “No Man’s Land” “ Ninth Division
Land,” and the men did their utmost to carry out his
instructions. Every night the area in front of the
battalions in the line was actively and persistently
patrolled. But this was not enough for the G.O.C.;
he wanted the men to secure prisoners; ‘Corpses are
more important than acres” was his constant injunction.
Though the raids engineered in this sector were not
successful, the experience gained helped later to make
it one of the finest raiding divisions in the Army; it
was learning to walk, and was learning rapidly. All
ranks realised and never forgot that on taking over
trenches it was not their job to sit still and wait for
things to happen, but to devise enterprises to worry the
enemy aS much as possible. The Ninth was never

78 AN ABORTIVE RAID [MARCH

happy until it felt that: it had established ascendency
over the enemy opposite it.

With this intention, a minor operation was under-
taken by the “Rifles” on the 1st March. The scheme
was carried out at 11 p.m. A small party went out
with Bangalore torpedoes,’ which they placed in the
enemy's wire and exploded. Then dummies, which
had been fixed in ““No Man’s Land,” were worked by
string from the front trenches so as to present the
appearance of troops moving forward. At the same
time, the enemy’s lines were raked by rifle and machine-
gun fire, trench mortars and rifle grenades, and by
shells from the artillery. Only two casualties were
suffered by the “Rifles,” and as it was probable
that the Germans manned their parapets on hearing
the explosion and seeing the dummies moving, it is
likely that their losses were much heavier. A more
ambitious raiding scheme was attempted by the Argylls
on the night of the 25th/26th March. At 1.52 a.m.
‘two Bangalore torpedoes were placed under the
enemy’s wire, and a party of 2 officers and 30 men
left the trenches ready to enter the German line after
the explosion had cleared a gap. The torpedoes were
fired at 2 a.M., but the raiding party slightly lost
direction and missed the gap. The failure was really
due to inexperience and insufficient preparations.

If the Division was disappointed with the result of
its raids, it had every reason to be pleased with its
success in sniping. When it first took over the line,
the German snipers held the upper hand. But the
sniping officers in each battalion vied with one another

1 The Bangalore torpedo presented the appearance of a drain pipe. It
was filled with ammonal and fired with a fuse. It was most effective in
clearing a gap in wire, and could be made any size by joining several
sections together.-

1916] SNIPING 79

in ingenious devices to gain the advantage over the
enemy, and before the Division left the sector our
snipers were distinctly on top. In every intelligence
report from the front line battalions several hits were
claimed by the snipers. It was while in this area that
the machine-gun companies commenced the practice of |
indirect fire.’ This was carried out nightly, in order to
sweep the roads and places which the Germans were
likely to use at night. Here, too, air fights came to be
of frequent occurrence, and excited the greatest interest
among the men. One day a hostile plane received
a direct hit through the engine and crashed down in —
our lines; there cannot have been many occasions
during the war when an anti-aircraft gun was so
conspicuously successful.

The favourite amusement of the artillery was firing
at German observation posts. At Les Ecluses a tall
factory chimney that overlooked our lines was the chief
target, but for a long time defied our gunners, and the
German observers had become so confident that they
were seen one morning shaking dust out of a carpet or
something of that nature over the top of the stalk.
This was very exasperating, but our gunners had the
best of it when the observation post was knocked out
by the third round of a 12-inch Howitzer, which landed
at the base of the chimney.

Hitherto the headgear worn by the men was the
Balmoral. It had a touch of the picturesque, but it
offered no protection against shrapnel. The steel
helmet now made its appearance; it was much
heavier, and at first required some knack to balance
it properly. For a time the men wore it only on
compulsion and preferred to use it as a washing basin

1 Targets were selected from the map, the guns being sited according
to the estimated distance,

G

80 ARTILLERY AND TRENCH MORTARS _[apzit

or a soup bowl, but it became more popular when its
manifold advantages in protecting the head, not only
from shell splinters but from knocks against overhead
traverses and the woodwork of dug-outs, were realised.
In the course of a few months a man came to regard
the steel helmet as one of his best friends.

A few changes in command took place during this
period. Lieut.-Colonel Pelham Burn was transferred
to the Gordons, and his place in the Argylls was taken
by Lieut.-Colonel W. J. B. Tweedie. Lieut.-Colonel
Loch, C.M.G., was promoted to a brigade in the Fifty-
sixth Division, and he was succeeded by Lieut.-Colonel
H. L. Budge. Lieut.-Colonel Cameron of Lochiel,
whose health had broken down, had to give up the
command of the Camerons to Lieut.-Colonel Duff.
The most important change was in the artillery. On
1st February 1916 Brig.-General H. H. Tudor, C.M.G.,
succeeded Brig.-General E. H. Armitage, C.B., in the
command of the Divisional Artillery. He was destined
to influence profoundly the work of the Division by his
use of the guns.

In April 1916 three batteries, D/50, D/51, and
D/52, were taken away from their own brigades and
formed into the 53rd Brigade R.F.A., which was
composed entirely of 18-pounders. Thus, in the spring
of 1916, the Ninth Divisional Artillery consisted of the
50th, 51st, and 52nd Brigades, each with three 18-
pounder batteries and one Howitzer battery, and the
53rd with three 18-pounder batteries. All batteries
were on a four-gun basis. About May the Brigade
Ammunition Columns of the 50th, 51st, and 52nd
Brigades were broken up or absorbed into the Divisional
Ammunition Column, so that the reorganised D.A.C.
consisted of No. 1, No. 2, and No. 3 sections, and “B”
echelon. In addition, the organisation of trench mortars

1916] REORGANISATION 81

was placed on a mgre satisfactory basis. The weapon
to be used by the infantry was the Stokes Mortar, a
mobile and easily managed gun with an ingenious,
quick-firing device, which enabled it to fire 30 shells
a minute. The shell was a particularly deadly one,
and made a most menacing and terrifying sound on
explosion. In each brigade, Stokes Mortar Batteries
were organised from personnel drawn from each
battalion with the purpose—thoroughly attained—of
encouraging the entity and esprit of the brigade.
Heavier mortars than the Stokes were to be worked by
the artillery, and on the 8th March 1916 the 9th T.M.
Brigade, of three batteries, was formed. Before this
date there had been one T.M. Battery, called the 41st
T.M.B., manned by men from the R.G.A. and from
the Seaforth Pioneers. At first the brigade had three
types of mortar, the 14-inch, 2-inch, and 3.7-inch, but,
after a few months, only the 2-inch mortar was used.
In April 1916 a heavy mortar, the 9.45-inch, popularly
known as “The Flying Pig,” was introduced, and the
Vj9 Heavy Trench Mortar Battery was formed to
work it.

The period of rest and training, the comparatively
pleasant interlude of trench life, and the resourceful
and vigorous control of General Furse all combined
to make the whole Division a happy family. Each
man in it swore by “The Ninth”; and this was the
finest tribute to the efficiency of the G.O.C.’s leadership.
It was, therefore, with consternation that the news was
received on the 16th March that the brigades were to
be reorganised. The inherent clannishness of the Scot
revolted at the idea of friends being taken away and
of strangers coming in. But the reorganisation was
made necessary, not by the malicious indifference
of G.H.Q., but by the dearth of recruits. Scotland

82 SOUTH AFRICAN BRIGADE [may

had raised more service battalions than it was possible
to find drafts for under the voluntary system, and
it was necessary to amalgamate several of them.
The battalions marked out by G.H.Q. to leave the
Division by the 6th May were the 8th Gordons, the 6th
Royal Scots Fusiliers, and the 10th and 11th H.LI.
The arrangement also meant the break-up of the
28th Brigade. This was intensely disliked, but it was
recognised as inevitable. The knowledge that these
old friends were leaving to join the famous Fifteenth
Scottish Division helped to reconcile the Ninth to the
change. On the 4th May it was announced that the
mounted troops were also to be withdrawn. To take
the place of the Gordons in the 26th Brigade, the
Argylls were transferred from the 27th; the 6th
K.O.S.B. and the 9th Scottish Rifles replaced the Royal
Scots Fusiliers, and the Argylls in the 27th Brigade.
The South African Brigade had its own Field Ambu-
lance, and the 29th Field Ambulance consequently left
the Division. Brig.-General Scrase-Dickins was retained
by an accident, which deprived the 27th Brigade of
Brig.-General G. F. Trotter who fell from his horse
and broke his arm.

The place of the 28th was filled by the South
African Brigade, most of whose members had already
seen service in Egypt. Nothing much was known
about them in the Division except that they were the
pick of South Africa, and that was saying a great deal.
The brigade was commanded by Brig.-General H. T.
Lukin, C.M.G., D.S.O., and consisted of the 1st, 2nd,
3rd, and 4th South African battalions; the last-named,
being the South African Scottish, wore the kilt of the
Atholl tartan. They were commanded respectively by
Lieut.-Colonel F. G. Dawson, C.M.G., Lieut. -Colonel
W. E. C. Tanner, C.M.G., Lieut.-Colonel E. F.

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1916] RELIEF OF THE DIVISION 83

Thackeray, C.M.G., and Lieut.-Colonel F. A. Jones,
C.M.G., D.S.O. Brig.-General Lukin reported at
D.H.Q. on the 22nd April, and on the following day
the 2nd and 3rd battalions joined the Division. On
the 29th the whole brigade was inspected by Sir
Douglas Haig, near Steenwerck. Its appearance. was
very impressive, and even the most fastidious critic
was bound to admit that the South Africans were an
exceptionally fine body of men. From the 6th May
they took over the trenches lately occupied by the
28th Brigade, and the men rapidly became acquainted
with the conditions of warfare on the Western Front.
From the first it was apparent that their standard of
discipline was very high, and their critical Scottish
comrades realised that the Division had been greatly
honoured in having such a doughty brigade attached
to it. |

The stay of the Division near Ploegsteert soon
drew to a close. On the 20th May instructions were
received from the Corps that it was to be relieved by
the Forty-first Division before the 1st June. The
relief was commenced on the 27th May, and completed ©
on the 30th. Thus ended a most agreeable experience
of trench duty, and all who have survived since that
date will ever cherish happy recollections of Ploegsteert
Wood.

CHAPTER V

THE CAPTURE OF BERNAFAY WOOD, AND THE
BATTLES FOR TRONES WOOD

Juty 1916

AFTER leaving the Ploegsteert area the Division was
concentrated in billets near Bomy, where D.H.Q.
were established. The men were in the best of spirits,
and training and recreation were carried on with
vigour and keenness, while the glory of the summer
and the genial weather raised the usual hopes that
the year would see the end of the war. The Division
had recaptured all the enthusiasm that had animated
it on landing in France, and in addition it had behind
it a year’s experience of warfare. The sojourn near
Bomy was shorter than had been expected, and the
design of the G.O.C. to hold a horse show on the
13th and a Divisional Field Day on the 14th June
had to be abandoned. This cancellation of the horse
show was a huge disappointment; every unit had
taken extensive trouble to prove that it had the best
turned out transport in the Division, but the men were
able at least to console themselves with the know-
ledge that their transport and horses were in first-
rate condition.

Orders were received by the Division on the 11th
that it was to join the XIII. Corps,’ commanded

1 The XIII. Corps was under the Fourth Army, commanded by General
Sir H. Rawlinson, K.C.B.
84

JUNE 1916] THE SOMME HINTERLAND 85

by Lieut.-General Sir W. H. Congreve, V.C., and
that the move was to take place by rail on the
16th. These, however, were followed by instructions
commanding the Division to move on the 13th,
and on that date the entrainment of units was
commenced. Two days later the Division was con-
centrated near Vaux-en-Amienois where D.H.Q. were
established.

It was obvious to the dullest man that the Division
was intended to take part in some business, more
enterprising than the mere holding of a section of
trenches. The whole hinterland behind the trenches
was a hive of industry and traffic. Swarms of troops
from every part of the kingdom were to be seen in
every village; at night the roads groaned with the
passage of guns of all sizes and of transport carrying
every conceivable variety of material, and the whole
countryside was covered with dumps containing R.E.
material, bombs, shells, and stores of all kinds.
Hospitals and aerodromes formed additional villages
in the district. The back areas of the Somme in the
summer of 1916 were the busiest centres of activity
in the whole world. It was a wonderful exhibition
of the resources of the British Empire, and a visible
proof of the diligence with which workers at home
had applied themselves to the manufacture of muni-
tions of war. It was not a feverish bustle that one
witnessed, but a steady and systematic application
of labour; every movement was directed by an
organisation that was not surpassed by any other
nation in the war. The whole of the work performed
by Britain in its administrative arrangements has
probably never been appreciated at its full value.
It had a most heartening effect on all who saw it,
and gave the men an inspiring confidence in the

86 SUMMARY OF EVENTS, 1915-1916 [JUNE

determination and ability of the Allies to achieve a
complete victory.

All this industry and all these preparations were
the obvious prelude to a great battle, and on the
15th June the Division received from the Corps
instructions for the attack that was to be made. The
XIII. Corps was on the right flank of the British
army, and its plan was to assault with two divisions,
the Thirtieth on the right and the Eighteenth on the
left, with the Ninth Division in reserve.

A feeling of optimism buoyed up both civilians
and soldiers, though the events of 1915 had completely
shattered the sanguine expectations aroused by the
victory of the Marne. The Russians had been driven
from Poland and had suffered a smashing defeat, from
which they never fully recovered, though a censored
press had represented the rout rather as a Russian
triumph than as a German victory. That disaster,
which was falsely believed in this country to harden
the purpose of the great Slav Power, caused Russians
to interpret the comparative inactivity of the Western
Powers as a selfish neglect of her interests, and to
detest the Government that had callously thrown
into the slaughter men without arms or equipment.
The brutal incompetence of the Russian bureaucracy
was revealed in all its nakedness, and inspired the
loathing and contempt that led eventually to its
downfall. The tale of disaster did not end here;
for Von Mackensen, assisted by the crafty and
calculating treachery of Bulgaria, drove the Serbs
from their country and all but secured Greece in the
Teutonic net. The Salonica expedition, though it failed
to render any service to Serbia prevented Greece
from joining the enemy. In the East, British prestige
suffered two damaging shocks; the Dardanelles project

1916] REASONS FOR BATTLE 87

ended in failure, and the Mesopotamian expedition,
after a promising beginning, resulted in the surrender
of a British force at Kut in April 1916.

The only offset against these misfortunes was the
entry of Italy into the war in May 1915, but from
the first her armies were employed solely on exclusively
Italian interests. The offensive against Trieste, even
if successful, could not have exerted a decisive influence
on the course of the war, nor did it prevent Austria
from using the larger portion of her forces in the East
against Russia. Nevertheless a general feeling pre-
vailed that our misfortunes had been due more to
bad luck than to bad management, and on the principle
that the dawn succeeds the darkest hour, 1916 was
expected to prove as glorious as 1915 had _ been
disappointing. More men were now in the field,
and the supply of high explosives, which some
thought to be more important than generalship, had
been greatly increased. The poster of the most
blatant of British weeklies, with the glaring inscription,
“©1916. Thank God!” accurately reflected the mind
of the average man.

Thus the time seemed ripe for an action by the
British forces on a big scale. The great German
offensive against Verdun in April had been watched
with feverish interest both in this country and in
France. The first five days of that assault brought
the enemy within measurable distance of his objective.
It was feared that the famous fortress would fall into
his hands, and hasty critics denounced the supine
inactivity of the British armies. But at that time the
preparations of Sir Douglas Haig were not completed,
and a premature counter-attack would only have served
the interests of the enemy. As it turned out, the
defenders of Verdun, under the masterly generalship

—-88 REASONS FOR BATTLE [JUNE

of Pétain, worked out their own salvation. The
German thrust was stopped, but even at the end of
June large forces still menaced the fortress, and it
was necessary that the British forces, stronger and
better prepared than they had ever been, should do
something to take the strain off their gallant ally.

Events in other theatres of war seemed also to call
for immediate action. The attack by the Austrians
in the Trentino in May threatened such serious conse-
quences for Italy, that Russia, which appeared to have
recovered from her defeat, was compelled to launch
her offensive in the month of June. The brilliant
successes of General Brussilov brought immediate
relief to the armies of Italy, though they did not lessen
the German pressure on Verdun. It was, therefore,
sound policy to strike at the enemy, not merely to
relieve Verdun, but also to assist our Allies in the other
theatres of war by preventing the enemy from transfer-
ring troops from the West to other fronts.

The other object of the British Commander-in-
Chief' was to wear down the strength of the enemy
by a steady offensive. The choice of the battlefield
was governed by the fact that the British armies were
not sufficiently numerous to take the offensive on a
large scale without the co-operation of the French,
and the district selected was therefore in Picardy,
where the two armies joined.

Picardy was one of the most delightful spots in
France. Here there were none of the grimy coal-pits
and slag-heaps that had figured so prominently in the
Battle of Loos. This was the agricultural part of
France, with wide open and rolling country, in
which there was hardly a fence to be seen. The

1 Sir Douglas Haig succeeded Sir John French as Commander-in-Chief
in December 1915.

ee

1916] THE SOMME BATTLEFIELD 89

numerous small villages that broke the fields seldom
contained more than a few hundred inhabitants. On
the battle front the prominent feature was the extensive
ridge running from Thiepval to Combles, with alternate
spurs and valleys thrown out to the south-west. This
ridge, which afforded the enemy magnificent observation
over the British trenches and hinterland, was the main
watershed of the high ground that stretched from the
valley of the Somme in a north-easterly direction to
the low-lying ground between Lens and Cambrai.
Beyond this were the plains of Douai. On the western
side the slopes, steep and rugged, were a formidable
obstacle, but towards the north-east, the ridge fell in
a gradual slope, rising again to a gentle ridge on the
farther side of Bapaume. Beyond this second ridge,
which was about a hundred feet lower than the main
one, the country, broad and undulating, offered no great
difficulty to an army that had won its way to it. But
stiff fighting would be necessary to reach this, because
these ridges formed the buttress that shielded the great
railway centres of Cambrai and Douai. A feature of the
terrain, especially in the south, was the large number
of woods thick with summer foliage and carpeted with
a dense undergrowth that made progress, except by
means of the small paths running through them, all
but impossible. These woods played an important part
in the battle.

The main object of Sir Douglas Haig is indicated
by his description of the Somme campaign as the
“wearing-out battle.” It is more commonly referred
to as the policy of attrition, and under that name
has been subjected to a good deal of criticism. But
there is no question that the policy was based upon
sound military principles that could not be neglected.
The basis of good generalship is to wear down the

90 THE POLICY OF ATTRITION [JUNE

enemy, force him to absorb his reserves and then smash
him with fresh troops, and the Somme was intended
to carry out this programme as far as possible.

The method adopted by Sir Douglas Haig to achieve
his object was the result of the experience of Loos. On
that occasion the Allies had grasped at more than they
were able to hold, so it was now decided to carry on
the advance by limited stages in order that the
infantry, without being unduly exhausted and still
within the supporting range of their artillery, would
be able without great difficulty to parry the hostile
counter-stroke. It was expected that a methodical
advance on these lines, always adequately supported
by powerful and efficient artillery, would eat into the
enemy’s strength and at the same time be carried out
at a light cost.

“What we have, we hold” might be said to be
the keynote of the limited objective method. It was
solid and substantial rather than brilliant and inspiring,
and it had certain defects which became clear in the
course of the battle. It encouraged the infantry to
depend so completely upon the artillery, that the
tendency of the former was to lack confidence when
unassisted by the latter. This led to a decline of
initiative, which was further emphasised by the very
fact that the objective was limited. Though the troops
were exhorted to lose no opportunities of exploiting
success, it was only natural for them to consider that
they had done all that was wanted when they had
accomplished the definite task assigned to them. Un-
doubtedly many opportunities were lost, as the Germans
noted with thankfulness, and places, which we could
have had for the mere trouble of walking up to them,
fell into our hands later only after desperate and
Sanguinary fighting.

1916] THE POLICY OF ATTRITION 91

Moreover, after the first shock, the element of
surprise was lost, as the terrain once selected was
fixed, and the enemy was able to fathom our plans
and arrange his defence accordingly. The periods
between the stages of our advance gave him valuable
time in which to reorganise his forces and strengthen
his fortifications. With the enemy's moral high and his
forces well trained and disciplined, the cost of progress
was bound in any case to be heavy; but with the
limited objective system, it was probably heavier than
it would have been under a more flexible and elastic
one. It is possible, too, that the method of proceeding
by slow stages caused us to miss the chance of dealing
a paralysing blow.

Prudence is a virtue in military matters as in other
things, but excess of prudence is not without danger,
especially in the case of coalitions, The exaggerated
caution of Marshal Daun in the Seven Years’ War is
both an example and a warning. If at that time the
continuance of the Austrian coalition could have been
guaranteed, Daun’s tactics would have led to the
humiliation and probable dismemberment of Prussia ;
but before they had time to work their effect the
defection of Russia ruined all the hopes of Austria.
The general tendency is for coalitions to be weakened
rather than strengthened by time, and this should be
taken into consideration even in military affairs.

It can easily be seen that the task of Sir Douglas
Haig was not a light one, and two substantial reasons
weighed him strongly to the side of caution; he was
conscious that his margin of numerical superiority’ was
small, and he had a suspicion * that his armies had not

1 In July 1916 the strength of the British Army in France was 660,000.
Despatches, p. 19. |
2 Despatches, p. 19, para. 2, line 5.

92 ATTITUDE OF THE ENEMY [JUNE

yet developed the efficiency essential for the carrying
out of a campaign with far distant objectives.

On the eve of the battle the attitude of the Germans
was one of assured confidence. From the high ground
they occupied to the south of Arras they could not
fail to detect the signs of an imminent offensive, and
though the preliminary bombardment, which commenced
on the 25th June, was supplemented by artillery
demonstrations at Ypres and Arras, they had realised
that the great attack would take place in the Somme,
and in this district their defences were the strongest
on the whole battle front. For eighteen months
there had been no operation of any magnitude in
the sector, and the enemy was given time to make
his defences as perfect as they could be made. The
front line trenches were protected with broad belts of
‘ wire entanglements, which had to be swept away
before the attackers could come to grips with the
defenders, and numerous and elaborate dug-outs had
been constructed to protect the garrison during a
bombardment. Most of these shelters went down into
the earth for at least thirty feet, and some were so
strong that even the most powerful shell could not
penetrate them. While such shelters are excellent
for protection, they have special dangers of their own.
To one in a deep dug-out the noise of a bombardment
overhead has a peculiarly sinister and terrifying sound ;
even a shell that bursts a hundred yards away seems
to fall at his door. In such a case a man who thinks
more of his own skin than of his duty is loth to leave
his refuge, and there were many instances during the
battle of enemy garrisons being trapped in their
dug-outs before they had time to man their parapets.
The Germans had also erected skilfully concealed
machine-gun posts, strengthened by concrete, and they

1916] PREPARATIONS FOR BATTLE 93

had several similarly protected posts for snipers.
It was therefore with good reason that the Germans
believed their positions to be impregnable.

As the time for battle drew near, the Division was
moved closer to the front line, and on the 23rd it
was concentrated near Corbie, where D.H.Q. were
established. All the sappers and pioneers were busy
on roads and dumps. Numerous conferences in
connection with the battle were held by the G.O.C.
On the next day the Ninth moved to Etinehem, and
on the 27th to Grovetown, a city of dumps.

The Division was not to take part in the first day of
battle, but it was instructed to be ready to do so when
called upon. The A. & Q. Staff worked continuously to
supply the men with all that was necessary for the
fight. Two hundred rounds of 8.A.A. per man were
carried, except in the case of signallers, orderlies, and
Lewis Gunners. The establishment of Lewis Guns per
battalion had been doubled, each company having
two and for the carriage of these weapons hand-carts
had been issued, but they were of little use except
in fine weather and on good roads. It was decided
by G.H.Q. that each battalion should have a nucleus
of officers for reorganisation; 20 were to go into the
battle, and the remainder, including the second in
command, was to be left at the First Line Transport.
To simplify reorganisation during the engagement,
each company wore shoulder bands of a distinctive
colour. For the carriage of stores, such as Stokes
shells, machine-gun ammunition, R.E. Stores, and tools,
parties were formed in each brigade from its several
units.

The most scrupulous care was given to the question

; "A Company wore red; B Company, yellow; C Company, blue; D
Company, green,

94 WORK OF THE R.E.C. [JUNE

of communications. These form the nerve system of
the military body, and if they do not work properly the
whole machine is thrown out of gear, and delay in the
transmission of messages may lead to the chance of
a victory being missed. Communications had not been
good at Loos, but the development and extension of
the functions of the aeroplane opened up a new and
more rapid means of communication. Men were to
carry flares, which when lit on the objective would
indicate to an observer from the air the general line
reached by the troops, and special machines, known as
contact aeroplanes and distinguished by streamers, were
allotted the task of maintaining communication with
the infantry. Should it be impossible to light the flares
on account of damp or other causes, the men were to
indicate their position by flashing mirrors. In addition,
a code of signals was arranged between a battalion
H.Q. and the aeroplanes, the messages from the
battalion being signalled by means of ground signalling
sheets. Further, to allow observers in the rear to
distinguish our men from the enemy, each man wore
on his back a square of yellow cloth or metal disc,
which was attached to the flap of the haversack.

An enormous advantage possessed by the British on
the eve of the offensive was the command of the air.
At no time during the war were the signs of our air
superiority so obvious to the infantry as in the summer
of 1916. The passage of an enemy plane over our lines
was then an event. The Germans were virtually
confined to the observation they secured from their
possession of the higher ground, and even the extra
observation they got by means of their balloons was
denied them. On the first day of the preliminary
bombardment our planes crossed the German lines
and swooped down on their balloons, which dis-

1916] THE PRELIMINARY BOMBARDMENT 95

appeared in wisps of flame as they were hit. The
enemy was practically blinded.

The assault was to be made on the 29th June.
To prevent the date being conveyed to the enemy
this was known and spoken of as “Z” day, and
the days prior to the battle were designated by the
corresponding letters of the alphabet. Thus the 25th
June, on which date the preliminary bombardment
commenced, was “V” day. During the last week of
June the weather was bad, and zero was wisely post-
poned until the 1st July. Thick ribbons of mist floated
over the landscape and rendered the work of the Flying
Corps exceptionally difficult. Until the 27th June
there were frequent and heavy showers of rain, and
Grovetown became a sea of mud, but on the following
day the sun shone from a cloudless sky, and a typical
French summer day ushered in the greatest battle
fought in history up to that time.

The bombardment that fell on the German lines
was of an intensity far exceeding that at Loos, and to
the distant observer their positions seemed to be shot
into the air. The bursts of our shells resembled the
smoke from an endless row of factory chimneys,
stretching north and south, and through the fountains
of smoke one could see sods of earth and fragments
of timber leaping upwards. For six days the ground
throbbed under the unceasing cannonade, and the
nights, gleaming with the flashes of thousands of guns,
were almost as bright as the days. In this bombard-
ment the guns of the Ninth Division contributed their
share, for they were in action with the artillery of the
Fighteenth and Thirtieth Divisions. During all this
period the enemy’s artillery was extraordinarily quiet,
as if reserving itself for the final attack.

On the 30th June the dispositions of the XIII.

H

96 EVENTS OF Isr JULY [sULY

Corps were as follows: North of the Peronne road lay
the infantry of the Thirtieth and Eighteenth Divisions
assembled ready for the attack next morning. The
battle H.Q. of the Ninth Division were at Grovetown,
in which were also concentrated two companies of the
9th Seaforths and the South African Brigade, which
had attached to it the 64th Field Coy. R.E., and the 28th
Machine-Gun Company. The 27th Brigade, supple-
mented by the 90th R.E. and “C” Company of the
9th Seaforths was in Billon Valley, Copse Valley, and
Trigger Wood Valley. The 26th Brigade, with the
63rd R.E. and “ A” Company of the 9th Seaforths, was
in Grovetown and Celestins Wood. The Corps Cavalry
Regiment, the 19th Motor Machine-Gun Battery, and
a Corps Cyclist Battalion were also under the orders
of the Division, the first being at Grovetown and the
latter two at Vaux.

On the morning of the Ist July the frenzied
intensity of the bombardment heralded the moment
of attack, and at 7.30 a.m. the British troops left their
trenches and advanced on the German lines. For the
Ninth, lying in reserve, the day was one of feverish
suspense. Messages received showed that matters
were going well on the front of the XIII. Corps,
but it was rumoured that a serious check had been
experienced farther north. By nightfall the position
was fairly definitely known. In front of Thiepval,
Beaumont Hamel, and Serre, our advance had been
completely checked, but farther south the attack had
met with a success that exceeded expectations. The
objectives of the Thirtieth and Eighteenth Divisions,
Montauban and the spur on which it stood, had been
captured without much difficulty and with slight loss.

On the evening of the 1st July the 27th Brigade
placed two battalions, the 12th Royal Scots and the

1916] 27TH BRIGADE AT MONTAUBAN 97

6th K.O.S.B., at the disposal of the Eighteenth Division
for working and digging. The enemy’s artillery, now
active, heavily shelled the garrisons of the captured >
positions, and on the 2nd July the Ninth Division
was instructed to relieve the 90th Brigade (Thirtieth
Division), which was holding Montauban. This task
was entrusted to the 27th Brigade, and the South
African Brigade was ordered to occupy the positions
held by the former as soon as they were vacated. The
relief began at 10 P.m., but owing to the congestion of
the trenches and the unfamiliarity of the guides with
the captured positions, it was not completed until 3 a.m.
on the 3rd July. The 11th Royal Scots held the east
and the 9th Scottish Rifles the west of Montauban,
with the 6th K.O.8.B. and the 12th Royal Scots in
support and reserve; their task was to consolidate
and strengthen the defences of the village. The 90th
Brigade had reported that the Germans were occupying
Montauban Alley from the point where it was cut by the
road from the village to Bazentin-le-Grand. This was
too near for safety, and at 5 a.m. bombing parties from
the 11th Royal Scots and 9th Scottish Rifles worked
their way along the trench as far as Triangle Post,
which they garrisoned. During the day this position
was consolidated, new trenches were sited and com-
menced, and dumps were formed. All day the village
and trenches held by the brigade were incessantly
shelled.

At 3 p.m. on the same afternoon the brigade was
ordered by the Thirtieth Division to capture and
consolidate Bernafay Wood, about 500 yards east and
north-east of Montauban. Between the British posi-
tions and the German second line system at Longueval
and Delville Wood lay the two densely-foliaged woods
known as Bernafay and Trones. These had to be

98 THE CAPTURE OF BERNAFAY WOOD _[sury 3

cleared before the attack could be resumed, and, but
for the check imposed by the limited objective, would in
all probability have fallen to our troops on the first day.
Brig.-General Scrase-Dickins arranged for the operation
to be carried out by the 6th K.O.S.B. on the right,
and the 12th Royal Scots on the left. The attacking
battalions formed up, each on a company front, in
Chimney Trench and the falling ground to the south-
west of it. “B” Company of the 12th Royal Scots
was to clear Montauban Alley from Triangle Post
to the north-west corner of the wood. After a
ten-minutes’ bombardment the battalions attacked at
9 p.M., and the whole wood, as well as the trench
between it and Triangle Post, was captured after a
feeble resistance. Four field-guns and one machine-
gun were taken by the 12th Royal Scots, and one
machine-gun by the 6th K.O.S.B., while about 12
of the enemy were killed and 7 taken prisoners. The
assailants had the greatest difficulty in maintaining
direction owing to the darkness and the dense under-
growth of the wood, consequently, when its eastern
margin was reached, there was some confusion of units,
and the consolidation of positions previously selected
was delayed. After the capture of Bernafay, the
K.0O.8.B. held the southern and eastern sides of the
perimeter, and the 12th Royal Scots the remaining
post. .

The wood had been an easy place to take ; it proved
a costly one to hold. At 6 a.m. on the 4th July a
violent hostile bombardment opened, and continued
for six hours. The shelling was particularly severe in
the portion of the wood lying south of the railway
line, and the majority of the K.O.S.B. in this area
had to be withdrawn farther within the wood. The
work of consolidation was totally interrupted, and

1916] BERNAFAY WOOD 99

casualties were heavy, the K.O.S.B. losing over 150
killed and wounded. By noon, however, all our
original positions were reoccupied, and the work of
consolidation was carried on with vigour. ‘“D” Company
of the 12th Royal Scots, under Lieut. H. Crowden,
constructed a keep in the centre of the wood, a highly
creditable piece of work, because it was no light task
to dig in a soil through which tentacles of undergrowth
ran in all directions. Every day Bernafay Wood and
Montauban were plastered with shells from the enemy’s
artillery. The ploughed-up village became a heap of
brick-dust and rubble, and the wood, which before its
capture had been so thick that the rays of the sun
could not penetrate it, became so thinned-out that one
could see through it from end to end. During one of
these bombardments the battalion H.Q. of the K.0.S.B.
were hit; the Adjutant, Lieutenant Wright, was killed,
and Lieut.-Colonel Connell had a very narrow escape.
On the 5th July the garrison was reduced by the
withdrawal of a company of the K.O.8S.B. to Oxford
Copse, and a company of the “Rifles” was also
moved back from Montauban Alley to the same place.
The lines between brigade and battalions were often
broken by shell-fire, and the work of the linesmen in
repairing and maintaining them deserved the highest
praise.

On the night of the 4th/5th July the remainder of
the Thirtieth Division was relieved by the Ninth. The
South Africans took over from the 89th Brigade in the
Glatz sector, and the Highland Brigade moved up to the
positions vacated by the South Africans. The Ninth
was now the right flank division of the British Army.
The Ist and 4th Regiments of the South Africans
held the line from the junction with the French to
Briqueterie Trench on the east of Montauban, with

100 THE FIGHT FOR TRONES WOOD [s0LY

the 3rd and 2nd Regiments in support and reserve
respectively. It was still necessary for the British to
clear the pear-shaped wood of Trones. The first attack
was carried out on the 8th July by the Thirtieth
Division, and from that date till the 14th the wood
was the scene of a bitter conflict, in which it changed
hands repeatedly. Trones was a particularly difficult
place to take, as it was commanded from Longueval
and from the Maltz Horn Ridge. Every possible
assistance was rendered by the Ninth Division. On
the night of the 6th/7th, the 27th Brigade sent out
a patrol, which established a post in Longueval Alley
only 300 yards from Trones Wood, while on the
morning of the attack the artillery pounded the
southern fringe of Longueval and the neighbouring
trenches, and the 12th Royal Scots from Bernafay
Wood covered the left flank of the Thirtieth Division
with machine-gun fire. During this operation a plucky
exploit was performed by Private J. Stevenson of
the 12th Royal Scots. Having located a German
sniper, he engaged him with his Lewis Gun; _ he
advanced across the open, and having fired off all his
ammunition sat down and cleaned his rifle until more
could be obtained. He was wounded in both arms,
but nevertheless when one of his comrades was hit,
he went about 600 yards to bring up a stretcher for
him. The Thirtieth Division took Trones Wood, but
by the end of the day had lost it all to a hostile
counter-attack, except the south-west corner and Maltz
Horn Trench.

On the night of the 8th July the 27th Brigade was
relieved, and moved down to its old position in Billon
Valley. The Third Division on the left took over the
portion of Montauban Alley lying to the west of the
Montauban - Longueval road; the Highland Brigade

1916] THE FIGHT FOR TRONES WOOD 101

occupied the trenches in front of Montauban, and the
South Africans Bernafay Wood with their 4th Regiment.
The 6th K.O.S.B., who had held the worst shelled
portion of the wood, lost in five days 16 officers and
300 other ranks.

The attack on Trones was resumed at 3 a.m. next
morning, but at the end of the day the position was
exactly as it had been on the 8th. The 90th Brigade,
which made the assault, was sadly battered, and a com-
pany of the 4th Regiment of the South Africans moved
up at 9 P.M. to the south-west corner of the wood to its
support. In addition a platoon from the same battalion
reinforced the garrison of the Briqueterie, and the 3rd
Regiment was ordered to be ready to support the 90th
Brigade ‘at ten minutes’ notice. The attack was con-
tinued on the 10th without any gain, the Germans
recapturing what they had lost by a well-timed counter-
attack. On the same date the advanced post held
by the Ninth in Longueval Alley was supported by
the establishment of several intermediate posts. The
Sanguinary assaults on Trones Wood had no bétter
fortune on the 11th, an attempt of a South African
detachment to aid the Thirtieth Division by bombing up
Longueval Alley to the apex of the wood being checked
by machine-gun fire. During the counter-barrage of the
enemy Lieut.-Colonel Jones of the 4th Regiment South
Africans was killed, and the command of the battalion
was taken over by Major D. M. MacLeod.

The unsatisfactory result of the fighting in Trones
Wood affected disastrously the plans of the Corps for
an attack on the enemy’s second system of defences.
Every day gained by the enemy added to his strength.
On the 7th July the Division had received instructions
for operations to be undertaken against Longueval and
Delville Wood on the 10th, but the original scheme pre-

102 LONGUEVAL [sULY

supposed the capture of Trones Wood, consequently
the date had to be postponed and the arrangements
modified. The task of the XIII. Corps was probably
the toughest on the whole front. It was to secure the
ridge running from Waterlot Farm to Bazentin-le-
Grand, and the key of this ridge, Longueval and Delville
Wood, fell to the lot of the Ninth. The flanks of its
attack were to be protected on the left by the Third
Division and on the right by the Eighteenth, which
was to clear Trones Wood. The great difficulty lay
in the fact that the position of the XIII. Corps was
already a salient, and that success would intensify it.
The ground, moreover, was vital to the enemy, and he
held it with seasoned troops.’ The operation was of
first-rate importance, since the possession of the high
ground near Longueval was the pivot of Sir Douglas
Haig’s immediate plans ; it facilitated an attack on High
Wood in the north, and it was an essential preliminary
to an advance on Ginchy and Guillemont.

General Furse had foreseen the task that he would

be called upon to perform. From Bernafay Wood the
- ground rose up to the height on which stood Longueval.
The southern position of the village stood open to the
view, but the northern part, intersected by numerous
orchards, baffled scrutiny by disappearing into the
shelter of Delville Wood.

Longueval lay along three roads whose junctions
formed the centre or main square of the village. From
this point one road ran north to meet the path midway
between High Wood and Flers; the second? ran south-
west, skirting the western margin of Bernafay Wood ;
and the third led in a south-easterly direction into

1 These were the 16th Bavarian Regiment and the 6th Bavarian Reserve

Regiment of the Tenth Bavarian Division.
3 Where it entered the village, this road was known as Pall Mall.

1916] PLANS FOR 141s JULY 108

Guillemont. The northern road was marked on our
maps as North Street. From the square a street
branched off westwards towards Bazentin - le - Grand,
which was known as Clarges Street; on the eastern
side where it ran into a grassy ride, practically bisecting
Delville Wood, it was named Princes Street. Parallel
to Clarges Street, and about 300 yards north of it, lay
Duke Street. These, bounded on the west by Pont
Street and on the east by Piccadilly, formed a rectangle.
Between Piccadilly and North Street clustered the
orchards of Longueval. The enemy’s front trenches
ran along the south of the village, and then turned off
towards the south-east, past Waterlot Farm along the
western outskirts of Guillemont. His rear defences
lay in the hamlet and beyond the northern perimeter
of the wood.

Ever since the Ninth Division had been in the line,
the whole area in front of the German trenches had
been constantly patrolled. The brigadiers had been
warned of what was to take place, and the whole
Division was ready for the battle, so that when the final
instructions were issued by the Corps on the 12th
July only details required attention.

At 3.30 p.m. on the same afternoon the G.O.C. met
his brigadiers and explained his plans. The attack
was to be carried out by the 26th Brigade on the right,
and the 27th on the left, and for each there were three
objectives. The first for both was the capture of the
enemy's front and support trenches near Longueval.
The second task of the Highlanders was to secure the
village south of the line Clarges Street—Princes Street,
and the western edge of Delville Wood south of Princes
Street; that of the 27th Brigade to take the greater
part of Longueval lying north of Clarges Street. Then
the 26th, in order to safeguard the right flank, was to

104 MEASURES OF GENERAL FURSE [suLy

secure the German system of defences between the
village and Waterlot Farm inclusive, while the 27th
was to clear the northern outskirts of Longueval and
the western margin of Delville Wood adjoining that
portion of the village. If these objectives were taken
easily, both brigades were to go on and occupy the
whole of the wood.

It was realised that the Germans were expecting
an attack. To keep them in uncertainty as to the
exact time of the onslaught, their lines were heavily
shelled every morning by the artillery, and to gain the
full advantage of surprise, what was virtually a night
attack was planned. The British Army might be un-
imaginative and unenterprising in strategy, but it was
bold and audacious in the use of tactical expedients.
A night attack demands the most careful arrangements
by the Staff and a high standard of discipline on the
part of the troops engaged. Zero was 3.25 A.M. on
the morning of the 14th July. This early hour made
the question of assembly one of more than ordinary
difficulty, but the G.O.C. had his scheme prepared.
The ground in front of our lines had been thoroughly
reconnoitred by patrols, and during the night a strong
line of scouts was to go up the crest of the rise in
front of the enemy’s trenches. These men were to
be supported by Lewis Gun detachments, and the
exposed right wing was to be protected against an
attack from Trones Wood by a chain of posts, which
the Highland Brigade was to establish in 9:2-inch
shell holes, previously made for this purpose by the
artillery along the crest line of the spur running
from Longueval to Bernafay Wood. Under cover of
this force the attacking brigades were to form up
their leading battalions in their waves of attack on
the south-west slopes of the plateau. The whole

1916] BRIGADE ARRANGEMENTS 105

assembly was to be completed half an hour before
zero.

On receipt of their instructions Brig.-General
Ritchie and Brig.-General Scrase-Dickins arranged
their dispositions. The former decided to attack
with the Black Watch and Argylls in front, the
Seaforths in support, and three companies of the
Camerons in reserve. The Black Watch and the
Argylls were to be on a two company front, each
company being in open column of platoons with 70
yards between platoons. Thus each battalion was
to be in eight waves. The supporting battalion had
the same formation, and the fourth company of the
Camerons was to carry’ for the brigade. Two sections
of the 26th Machine-Gun Company were to follow
the 7th Seaforths, the rest of the company being
in brigade reserve. One section of the L.T.M.B.
was to follow the two attacking battalions, the
remainder being under the control of the brigade.
The Black Watch and the Argylls were to secure the
first and second objectives, and the Seaforths the
third. .

Brig.-General Scrase-Dickins had the 11th Royal
Scots and the 9th Scottish Rifles in front, and the
12th Royal Scots in support. The 6th K.O.S.B.
carried for the brigade. Both attacking battalions
had four companies in the front line, each company
being in column of platoons with the requisite 70
yards’ distance between platoons; thus each battalion
was in four waves. The supporting battalion was
in the same formation. Two Vickers machine-guns
were to accompany each of the leading battalions, one

‘ During an engagement it was necessary to keep the infantry
adequately supplied with ammunition, bombs, engineering material,
rations, and water, so parties were always detailed to carry up these stores.

106 ARTILLERY ARRANGEMENTS [suLY

section followed the 12th Royal Scots, and two
sections were in brigade reserve. The first objective
was to be taken by the leading battalions, the second
by the 12th and 11th Royal Scots, and the third by
the 12th Royal Scots. |

The reliefs necessitated by these arrangements were
carried out on the night of the 12th/13th. The 55th
Brigade of the Eighteenth Division relieved the South
African Brigade in the portion of Bernafay Wood lying
south of the Carnoy-Guillemont railway. The 27th
relieved the 76th Brigade of the Third Division in
Montauban Alley from the Montauban—Longueval road
to the Montauban—Bazentin-le-Grand road (exclusive).
On the right of the Ninth the Thirtieth Division was
relieved by the Eighteenth.

The artillery arrangements employed for the attack
on Longueval had exceptional interest; for they were
destined to give the Ninth a distinctive place among
the divisions of the British Army. Brig.-General
Tudor’s main problem was created by Delville Wood.
As our experience of Bernafay had already demon-
strated, shrapnel shells, by hitting the branches and
trunks of trees burst prematurely, and were as
dangerous to our own infantry as to the enemy. The
C.R.A. now resolved to carry out a plan that he
had long borne in mind. The artillery bombardment
-preparatory for the attack was to commence five
minutes before zero; the customary shrapnel was
used, but after three minutes H.E. shell only. This
was a notable change from the ordinary method. The
H.E. had delay action, so that even if a tree was
hit by it the shell would complete its trajectory
before bursting.

In another respect, the Ninth resolved to adopt a
method commonly used by the French and already

1916] THE “CREEPING BARRAGE” 107

employed by several British divisions, on the Ist July.
Up to this battle all the attacks of the British Army
had been preceded by a violent preliminary bombard-
ment, and before the infantry advanced the artillery
lifted well behind the enemy’s trenches. The device
known as the ‘creeping barrage”’ was a logical
development in the work of the artillery, since
successive lines of defence had to be accounted for.
The gunners were to support the infantry throughout
the advance by shelling each successive portion of the
enemy’s line just in front of the oncoming troops.
This would give the Germans less time to have their
machine-guns ready and would enable the attackers
to get to grips with them before their guns could be
brought into action. For the attack on the 14th July,
the rate of the barrage was to be 50 yards every
one and a half minutes, and sheltered by this advancing
wall of fire the infantry were to carry on the assault.

The full artillery programme consisted of eight
separate barrages.* The first five continued from

‘The “creeping barrage” does not creep—it really jumps. At

Longueval the line of the barrage moved forward 50 yards at a bound.
To a distant observer, however, the barrage did seem to creep forward,
hence the name.

During this Somme Battle the use of the creeping barrage became
universal by the British Army in all its attacks. Shrapnel was generally
used, but the Ninth Division, having taken to H.E. and having found it
successful, stuck to it. Which was the better of the two was controversial
to the end of the war. In the Ninth the opinion was that the H.E. barrage
had greater moral effect, was easier to follow, and did not throw such a
strain on the artillery that the setting of fuses for a shrapnel barrage

neceasitated,

* Ist Barrage . . 6§ minutes till Zero.
2nd_sés, : : ; Zero » 2.-5 minutes.
3rd, : ; . Z.-5mins. ,, Z.-45 ,,
4th : ; . 24.-4 , 4 Z.-1-30.
bth =, ; ; . 4.-1.30. ,, Z-2.
6th ss, : : . Z.-%. » Z.- 230.
7th = . 2-230. , Z.-3-9.
8th i, : : Zi-3BD = ven one

108 BARRAGE PROGRAMME [suLy 1916

five minutes before zero until two hours after it, by
which time the whole of Longueval was expected |
to be in our hands. All this time the defences round
Waterlot Farm were to be kept under fire, and the
attack on the farm was to be made under cover of
the sixth barrage, which was to open two hours after
zero. The remaining barrages were intended to cover
the assault on Delville Wood.

CHAPTER VI
LONGUEVAL AND DELVILLE WOOD
Juty 1916

Nor the least anxious part of the forthcoming battle
was the assembly of the troops during the night of the
13th/14th July, for it was an audacious enterprise to
form up in the darkness a large body of men within
easy distance of the German lines, since the least
suspicion of the manceuvre by the enemy was bound
to lead to a dreadful catastrophe. The deepest silence
was essential, and the operation was partly cloaked by
the artillery, which throughout the night bombarded
the village and the wood. The assembly was a great
triumph of organisation for the Staff of the two
brigades, and a proof of the high discipline of the
men. The arrangements of the brigades differed
slightly, but were equally successful in their results.
The 26th Brigade assembled on the northern slopes
of Caterpillar Valley, with its left resting on the path
leading from Montauban to Longueval. After the
covering party, consisting of four platoons with two
Lewis Guns, had taken post on the crest of the
plateau, the brigade major, Major Drew, with the
adjutants of the Black Watch and Argylls and forty
markers, went out to mark off the ground. The plan
was to work from the left of each battalion. The left
markers of the Black Watch moved up the Bernafay-
Longueval road, and the left of the Argylls up the

109

110 THE ASSEMBLY [suLy

Montauban-—Longueval path. Sixteen markers of the
former, commencing from the rear, were posted in
pairs at 70 yards’ distance along the first of these
roads. When this was accomplished, the front couple
had reached a point about 500 yards from the enemy’s
front line. As each pair was posted, one man moved
off at right angles with a tape about 150 yards long,
and thus fixed the right of .his wave or platoon.
In the same fashion those of the Argylls were placed
in position. Then at 12.25 a.m. the battalions, by
companies in single file, moved out to line up on the
markers, and as each platoon reached its left marker
it wheeled to the right and fixed bayonets. The
assembly of the brigade was effected without sound
or hitch by 3 a.m. While the markers were being
posted there was considerable shelling of the assembly
area, but fortunately it died down before the arrival
of the battalions. Owing to shelling, however, and
sniping from Trones Wood it was found necessary
slightly to contract the right of the Black Watch.
The assembly area of the 27th Brigade was on
the immediate left of that of the 26th. About
10 p.m. the platoon that formed the covering party
pushed forward to the northern slopes of Caterpillar
Valley, and an hour later Major Teacher, the brigade
major, with one officer and two N.C.Qs. of the 90th
Field Coy. R.E. moved out to place the tapes for
the battalions. In this case the plan was to work
from the centre. On a compass bearing, previously
taken by Major Teacher, the first tape, 50 yards long,
was laid, and others were placed in prolongation of the
first. When completed the centre tape extended to a
distance of 1000 yards, the work having taken forty-five
minutes. Then the front tape was laid off at right angles,
the flanks of each battalion being thus fixed. This was

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1916] THE ASSEMBLY 111

checked by an officer from each of the attacking
battalions, who paced for 1000 yards along the
roads that marked the flanks of the brigade. When
the tapes were in position, the right and left markers
for each unit were posted.

The battalions assembled in the southern portion
of the valley at 12.30 a.m., each being in mass, in single
rank, on a front of 225 yards. At 1.45 a.m. the 11th
Royal Scots moved along the centre tape to their final
position, and were followed by the 9th Scottish Rifles
and the 12th Royal Scots. Though there was inter-
mittent shelling, there were only five casualties, but
these included Lieut.-Colonel H. L. Budge of the
12th Royal Scots, who was killed by a shell fragment
as his battalion was passing through the west side of
Montauban; the command of the battalion was then
taken over by Captain J. E. MacPherson. The assembly
was completed at 2.45 A.M.

The Division, by the satisfactory conclusion of this
difficult operation deserved all the high praise’ that it
received from the G.O.C. and General Congreve.

1 “Ninth Division Special Order of the Day, dated 15/7/16.

“1, The Corps Commander has asked me to tell the members of my staff,
the brigadiers and their staffs, and all regimental officers, N.C.Os.
and men, that in his opinion the Ninth Division carried out a very
difficult feat of arms yesterday finely, that the assembly by night
of a Corps within assaulting distance of the entrenched lines of an
active enemy, could only be effected by divisions in which the
staff work and the discipline were alike perfect, and that he is
grateful to all. This is indeed high praise from such a soldier, and
I need not say how proud I am to be allowed to convey such praise
to the Ninth Division.

“9. For myself, I can only say with the deepest gratitude that you have
once more proved to me what a glorious Division I have the great
honour to command. However good the staff work and however
good the leading, it would be impossible to win success against
such an enemy unless every officer, N.C.O. and man was ready at
all times to do more than his duty. On this I can always rely in
the Ninth Division.—W. T. Forse.”

I

112 ACTION OF 26rx BRIGADE, 14rx JULY _[suny

At 3.20 a.m., when the light was just sufficient for
one to distinguish friend from foe, the first barrage
opened, and the leading waves moved as close to it as
they could safely go. Five minutes later, on the hour
of zero, the whole line moved forward to the attack.

On the right, Brig.-General Ritchie’s men made on
the whole very satisfactory progress. Most trouble
was experienced by the Black Watch, whose right
company encountered a stubborn resistance from
a machine-gun nest on the south-east corner of
Longueval. This post was covered by the fire of two
field-guns in the south-west corner of Delville Wood,
which were later withdrawn, and owing to the confined
space in which they had to manceuvre the Black Watch
were unable to get to grips with the garrison of the
post, which held out until late in the afternoon. With
this exception the objectives allotted to the battalion
were taken by 10 A.M. At one time the leading men
took up a position along Buchanan Street, a ride
branching off Princes Street at right angles to the
south of the wood, but this line could not be maintained
as the left flank was in the air. At noon the line held
by the battalion ran from the main square of the village
north of the church and then south-east to within 100
yards of the west corner of South Street, the path skirt-
ing the southern edge of Delville Wood. Patrols were
immediately pushed forward, but during the afternoon
stiff resistance was experienced, and the patrols became
standing picquets on the edge of the wood.

The Argylls, on the left of the Black Watch, met
with complete success. The leading companies kept
close to the barrage, leaving the supporting companies
to clear the enemy’s front trenches. The 11th Royal
Scots on the left being delayed by uncut wire,
“C” Company of the Argylls in left support came to

1916] ACTION OF 271tH BRIGADE, 14th JULY 113

their assistance by bombing to the north. This
company killed at least 100 of the foe, and drove
others along the front of the 27th Brigade. In this
lively action a machine-gun was captured, a well-aimed
bomb accounting for the whole team. The other
companies of the Argyllis in their impetuous eagerness
ran into our barrage and suffered some casualties.
Then until the barrage lifted the men lay down in
shell-holes, while a piper played the regimental march.
When the advance was resumed Clarges Street was
reached without much resistance, and the battalion,
having cleared the houses on the west side of the main
street, commenced to consolidate.

Waterlot Farm and its defences had still to be taken
before the job of the brigade was accomplished.

The left brigade was equally successful in securing
its first objective. The first task, the capture of the
enemy's front defences, was straightforward. Unfortun-
ately on the front of the 11th Royal Scots delay was
caused by wire, and gaps were cut by hand with very
great difficulty, owing to machine-gun fire; but the
battalion’s Lewis Guns rendered great service by
keeping down the enemy’s fire, while a platoon of
“A” Company, finding a gap in the right flank, went
through and bombed down the opposite trenches.
Lieut.-Colonel Croft’s men rapidly effected the capture
of this objective, though they had much stern fighting,
and a party of 63 Germans was rounded up and taken
Prisoner by 2nd Lieuts. Turner and Fleming after a
Combined bombing attack, in which the battalion Lewis
Guns, skilfully handled by Lieut. Winchester, played
@ noteworthy part.

Lieut.-Colonel Fulton! with the “Rifles” had an

" Lieut.-Colonel Fulton took over the command of the 9th Scottish
fles in March 1916.

114 27TH BRIGADE CHECKED, 14TH JULY [suLy

easier passage. The proffered resistance was rapidly
overcome, and a company of the battalion, by bombing
along the German trenches to the north, assisted the
progress of the right battalion of the Third Division,
which had been stopped by uncut wire. Many of
the enemy were killed, and 80 were captured.

Thus by 4.15 a.m. the brigade had gained the whole
of the first objective, but the second phase was more
complicated. The 11th Royal Scots, which had been
the right battalion, at this point became the left, and
were to take Duke Street from its junction with
Piccadilly to its junction with Pont Street. The 12th
Royal Scots passed through the 11th on the first
objective, and, wheeling to the east, advanced against
the village. The death of Lieut.-Colonel Budge proved
a great misfortune; for the task of the battalion, to
secure Longueval from the corner of Duke Street and
Piccadilly to a point on Princes Street on the fringe
of Delville Wood, was one of extraordinary difficulty.
The left battalion made good progress, and dug in on
a line south of Duke Street; but the right battalion,
coming under very heavy machine-gun fire and accurate
sniping from a post in the orchards and from Piccadilly,
was compelled to dig in on a line facing east, with its
right flank on Clarges Street in touch with the Argylls,
and its left in touch with the right of the 11th Royal
Scots.

Thus the advance of the 27th Brigade was brought to
a standstill before the second objective had been reached.

At first the working of the communications between
D.H.Q. and the leading infantry was all that could be
desired. In spite of the incessant shelling, messages
came in quickly, and General Furse was able to keep
in close touch with his attacking brigades. Thus, on
learning that the 11th Royal Scots and the right

—— ee
eS ee

1916] IMPORTANCE OF LONGUEVAL 115

battalion of the Third Division had been checked by
undamaged wire, he sent out directions for the 26th
Brigade to assist the 27th, which in turn was to help
the Third Division. As a consequence, the advance
was maintained practically without a halt. At 5.5 a.m.
the G.O.C. learned that Brig.-General Ritchie’s brigade
had secured its first two objectives, and an hour later
that the left brigade had captured everything except
the north of Longueval. When at 6.29 a.m. he was
informed that the whole of the village was held by the
27th Brigade, he had every reason to be jubilant.

Unfortunately the information was inaccurate, as
a message at 7.20 a.m. made clear. General Furse
knew that the check to the 12th Royal Scots was a
most serious matter. The possession of the Longueval
plateau was the key to the operations against High
Wood in the north, and if the village was not taken,
the plans of Sir Douglas Haig would be thrown out
of gear. Moreover, it was from Longueval that the
attack on Delville Wood was to be launched; without
it the operation would be more intricate. The crisis
demanded decisive action, and the G.O.C. placed
the Ist South African Regiment under the orders of
Brig.-General Scrase-Dickins, who was instructed to
make every effort to clear the village. General Furse
was also keenly concerned about Waterlot Farm, which
had yet to be taken by the Highland Brigade, since
its capture was the necessary preliminary to an attack
on Guillemont. JRealising that the 26th and 27th
Brigades had been heavily punished, he warned Brig.-
General Lukin that his brigade would be required to
take Delville Wood.

When the advance of the 12th Royal Scots was
checked, 2nd Lieut. A. Noble, now the most senior
officer on the spot, held a conference of the surviving

116 LONGUEVAL, 141 JULY [soy

officers. It was decided to make another attempt with
two companies, and they moved forward at 7 a.m., but
did not get beyond Piccadilly. At 8.30 a.m. another
effort was made by the battalion from the line of
Clarges Street. Three sections with a Lewis Gun tried
to force their way up North Street by rushing from
house to house, but, after progressing fifty yards,
they were brought to a halt by machine-gun fire and
withdrew to the shelter of a barricade, which had
been erected at the junction of North Street and Clarges
Street.

At 8.48 a.m. Brig.-General Scrase-Dickins received
orders from General Furse. These were that the
village was to be bombarded, and that the brigade
was to make another attack at 10.30 a.m. But the
communications in front were not so satisfactory, and,
owing to the delay in the transmission of instructions,
the attack was not launched until 1! a.m. To supple-
ment the artillery, Stokes Guns bombarded the orchard
area, concentrating on suspected machine-gun posts, but
the assault from the line of Clarges Street was again
defeated.

It was clear that the northern part of Longueval
could not be cleared by a casual or haphazard attack.
The enclosed nature of the oblong of orchards made
it difficult to locate the enemy’s posts with certainty,
and the artillery were handicapped by the want of
a post from which to observe the fire. The problem
was in fact more intricate than was realised at the
time. The battering that the village had received from
our guns had only been sufficient to convert it into
a stronghold of immense strength. Amidst the jagged
and tumbled masonry the defenders had numerous
well- protected. corners from which they could fire
without being detected, and the oblong was full

- -_—_ a crentgeenlcelcren eel

1916] LONGUEVAL, 14TH JULY 117

of shelters where the garrison could take refuge
from the fire of field-guns. The whole area needed
to be pulverised by heavy shells, as General Furse
soon realised. Against infantry alone the place was
virtually impregnable, since the scope for manceuvring
was limited and all approaches were swept by the
fire of the defenders. Such was the task that Brig.-
General Scrase-Dickins was asked to accomplish.

The 1st South African Infantry bore the brunt of
the next attack. Lieut.-Colonel Dawson’s men had
moved up to the line of Clarges Street through heavy
shell-fire without a casualty. From noon till 2 p.m. the
northern part of the village was bombarded, but, as
it was believed that isolated parties of the 12th Royal
Scots were in the village, the shelling was directed
chiefly on the wood to the east of it. Then followed
a great deal of confused fighting in which, by the
nature of the ground, the South Africans were split
into a number of detached groups. Such reports
as reached Brigade H.Q. were so vague that it was
impossible to act upon them, and it was not till
10.44 p.m. that the position of the South Africans
was known. At that time one company was in
Piccadilly, immediately south of Duke Street; another
was trying to work round from Piccadilly to North
Street; a third was in reserve at the south-east corner
of the village; and nothing certain was known of the
remaining company, which was believed to be on the
east side of North Street. That night at 10.50 P.M.
Brig.-General Scrase - Dickins urged Lieut.-Colonel
Dawson not to relax his efforts and to endeavour to
clear the whole of the village before dawn, in order
that the attack on Delville Wood might be delivered
from it.

While the left brigade was engaged in sanguinary

118 WATERLOT FARM, 14rH JULY [suLY

conflicts among the orchards of Longueval, the High-
land Brigade was endeavouring to capture Waterlot
Farm. This work had been allotted to the 7th
Seaforths, who were in Montauban Alley when the
battle commenced. As_ Lieut.-Colonel Kennedy
expected the enemy’s counter-barrage to fall on
Montauban Alley, he arranged that his men should
follow as close as possible behind the Black Watch in
order to escape it, and thus the whole battalion
avoided the shelling except one platoon, which suffered
severely. Advancing on the heels of the Black Watch
the leading company entered the German front line
and passed along behind the wire in a north-easterly
direction. The next two companies consolidated the
enemy's front line and a support line, while the fourth
followed in support of the leading company. The
Seaforths, finding the Black Watch held up by the
machine-gun post at the south-east corner of
Longueval, attempted to outflank it by working along
Dover Street and Down Street on the south of the
village, but they were stopped by hostile fire from
Waterlot Farm. In spite of repeated efforts the
post held out, for the ground was all in favour of the
defenders,

At 2 p.m. Brig. - General Ritchie ordered the
Camerons to move up from Montauban. They were
to assist in clearing the village, co-operate in the
assault on the post that was holding up the Black
Watch and Seaforths, and push on to Waterlot Farm.
Under drenching shell-fire the Camerons marched up
by companies to the village, the outskirts of which
they reached at 4 p.m. Before dark one company
cleared the houses just north of Clarges Street and a
building immediately north of Princes Street, known
as the Hospice; another company, in co-operation

1916] SITUATION, NIGHT OF 141TH JULY 119

with the Black Watch and Seaforths, at last accounted
for the post on the south-east of the village, which fell
to a converging attack, the garrison being bayoneted
and three machine-guns being captured. A third
company and a company of Seaforths then pressed on
towards Waterlot Farm, and in spite of severe machine-
gun fire and accurate sniping a good deal of progress
was made. The main body took up a position just west
of the farm, while a party of the Seaforths advanced
down Longueval Alley until they came in touch
with the Eighteenth Division, which had done great
work that day by capturing the whole of Trones
Wood.

After a day of strenuous fighting, in which many
losses had been sustained, the Division had just failed
to win complete success. The enemy still held the
north of Longueval and Waterlot Farm, and Delville
Wood still remained to be taken. At midnight the
position was as follows: The Argyllis held all the
south and south-west of lLongueval, with lines
established in Clarges Street, Sloane Street, and the
old German front line from the Windmill to Pall
Mall; the Black Watch were in a semicircle round
the north-east corner of the central square, and
occupied also a line 300 yards long, parallel to and
50 yards south of Princes Street; three companies
of the Seaforths held the old German front line on
the right of the Argylls; the remaining company and
three companies of the Camerons were in Longueval
Alley as far as Trones Wood, just west of Waterlot
Farm. On the left the 12th Royal Scots were con-
solidating along the line of Piccadilly, the 11th Royal
Scots occupied Duke Street up to Pont Street, and
the 9th Scottish Rifles were in the old German support
line on the left of the 11th Royal Scots. The 6th

120 DELVILLE WOOD [suLy 15

K.0.8.B. had not been involved in the fighting, but
their work in carrying up stores of all kinds under
continuous shell-fire had been of the greatest value.

That evening the G.O.C.. met his brigadiers in
Montauban, and discussed with them the operations to
be carried out on the following day. The 27th Brigade
was to continue its attack on Longueval, and the 26th
on Waterlot Farm. Delville Wood was to be assaulted
by the South African Brigade under cover of a creeping
H.E. barrage. This attack was arranged for 5 a.M.,
and, should the 27th fail to secure the village during
the night, was to be delivered from the south-west.

Delville Wood, in the shape of a rough pentagonal,
overshadowed the village of Longueval. It was divided
into a northern and southern portion by the grassy
ride known as Princes Street. From this ride towards
the north, and at right angles to it, ran auxiliary
paths named Strand, Regent Street, and Bond Street ;
in the opposite direction similar pathways, Buchanan
Street, Campbell Street, and King Street, led to the
southern margin. About 200 yards south of Princes
Street and parallel to it was the ride called Rotten
Row. |

The execution of the attack was entrusted by Brig.-
General Lukin to Lieut.-Colonel Tanner. The forces
available were the 2nd and 3rd and two companies
of the 4th South African Infantry. Of the remainder
of the brigade the 1st Regiment was involved in the
fighting in Longueval, and two companies of the 4th
were to assist the 26th Brigade against Waterlot
Farm.

The assailants moved up from Montauban before
dawn. Patrols having reported the enemy to be still
in possession of the village, the South Africans
assembled in a trench on the south-west corner of

1916] DELVILLE CAPTURED, 15tn JULY 121

Delville. All the wood south of Princes Street
was cleared in two hours, the only strong resistance
coming from isolated snipers. In the eastern portion
138 prisoners, including 3 officers, and one machine-gun
were captured, but the most difficult part remained to
be accomplished. Owing to the situation in Longueval,
Lieut.-Colonel Tanner decided to clear the northern
portion from the east as far as the Strand, and this
work was entrusted to three companies of the 2nd
South African Infantry. The resistance was sur-
prisingly weak, the garrison having been thinned out
on account of the shelling to which the wood was
persistently subjected. The chief obstacle was the
wood itself. The profligate undergrowth and the
tangle of trees and branches brought down by our
artillery-fire rendered the laborious work of penetrating
it most exhausting. When at length the perspiring and
breathless South Africans reached the margin, the
enemy's artillery opened a fierce bombardment on the
whole place, and rifle and machine-gun fire prevented
progress beyond the perimeter.

Shortly. after 2 p.m. that afternoon Lieut.-Colonel
Tanner was able to report that he had taken the whole
of Delville Wood except the north-west corner. The
problem now was how to hold our gains. In ordinary
circumstances small posts with machine-guns would
have been the least costly and the most effective
method ; for Bernafay had shown that for large bodies
of men a wood is only a death-trap. But it was
impossible to do this. The wood was 159 acres in
extent, and part of it was held by the enemy. More-
over, the Germans were exceptionally well situated for
a counter-attack. They were able to direct an accurate
fire on the wood from their batteries in the north, east,
and south-east ; their trenches lay round its perimeter

122 _ DELVILLE WooD [suzy 15

and commanded all its approaches ; and the possession
of Longueval ensured them a covered approach when-
ever they chose to deliver their stroke. Under these
circumstances a strong garrison and constant vigilance
were essential. |

After the posts were established along the peri-
meter, the most urgent matter was the provision of
shelter for the troops. A _ plentiful supply of tools
had been carried up by the South Africans, and it was
impressed upon the men that notwithstanding their
weariness there could be no rest until trenches had
been dug. But they had grasped the situation; it
was only too obvious that their lives depended upon
the speed with which they could dig themselves in.
But the spendthrift undergrowth and tangled roots
that crawled profusely in the soil of Delville Wood
were hard to cut, and while the men toiled they were
harried unceasingly by shell and machine-gun fire. An
attempt to wire the edge of the wood was frustrated
by a counter-attack, which men of the 10th Bavarian
_ Division delivered against the north-east corner about
3 pM. ‘This attack was easily repulsed by rifle-fire,
but the situation was critical, and between 12.45 p.m.
and 1.15 p.m. reports from the 26th Brigade and the
52nd Brigade R.F.A. having stated that the Germans
were massing on the north-west of the wood, the

artillery put a protective barrage round it. In spite’

of this the foe made persistent attempts to drive the
South Africans from the perimeter, but all attacks were
defeated with loss by the 2nd South African Infantry,
and by 4.40 p.m. the enemy drew off. The heavy
casualty list of the South Africans was due mainly to
shell-fire.

General Furse gave instructions that the utmost
efforts should be made to strengthen the defences

1916] LONGUEVAL, 15tx JULY 123

during the night, and a company of the Seaforths
(Pioneers) was sent up to wire the wood. In a remark-
ably short time numerous trenches were dug by the
garrison, for a man works with a will when his life is
at stake. Arrangements were also made to send up
large supplies of stores and ammunition. Six and a half
companies were posted round the perimeter with three
in support. The western portion of Princes Street was
held by a half company of the 2nd South African
Infantry, and two companies of the ist formed a
defensive flank on the side of the village. The H.Q.
of Lieut.-Colonel Tanner were at the junction of Princes
Street and Buchanan Street.

Meanwhile Longueval defied all assaults. Throughout
the night of the 14th/15th the 1st South African Infantry
had been engaged in a grim house-to-house combat
without making headway, and the 12th Royal Scots
were called on to make another attack. After a
preliminary bombardment of the oblong by the artillery
and the Stokes mortars, they moved forward at 8 A.M.,
when a desperate and plucky effort was made to clear
the village. For a time progress was made, and
word reached D.H.Q. that the whole of the village
was in our hands. The report was wrong. Two
sections of the Royal Scots worked up North Street,
moving from house to house, each of which was secured
only after a stern bombing fight. Small garrisons were
left in three houses, and the party reached more than
midway to Duke Street. At the same time another
section tried to penetrate the orchards from the west,
but failed to get beyond Piccadilly. The first party
on venturing into the open was subjected to heavy fire
from concealed machine-guns and compelled to retire
to the shelter of the houses; even the posts that had
been established in the houses could not be maintained,

124 WATERLOT FARM, 15ru JULY [suLy

for the garrisons were shelled out and forced to
withdraw. If doggedness and grit could have won
Longueval, the 12th Royal Scots would have had it.
Undaunted by their previous reverses, they made
another attack in the evening at 7.30. Three sections
advanced from Clarges Street, but could not get beyond
50 yards; two other sections pressing on up North
Street found the enemy alert and strongly reinforced,
and were forced back to the point from which they
had started, after inflicting severe losses by Lewis
Gun fire. The men, utterly exhausted, could do no
more.

On the 15th encouraging progress was made by
the 26th Brigade, though it failed to secure Waterlot
Farm. As soon as day broke, parties of the Seaforths
and Camerons dashed forward and succeeded in estab-
lishing themselves in enemy trenches to the east of
the farm; but, before they were able to consolidate
these positions, they were compelled to withdraw to
the northern end of Longueval Alley, owing to intense
shelling from both our own and the enemy’s artillery.
As the brigade had suffered many casualties and was
holding a widely extended line, reinforcements con-
sisting of two companies of the 4th South African
Infantry were sent to its assistance. With the support
of these two companies, two platoons of the Camerons
again attacked the farm and reached the trenches
to the east of it before noon. The captured trenches
were then taken over by the South Africans, who
commenced to consolidate, but were driven out by the
concentrated artillery-fire of the enemy. As we could
not occupy the farm, we determined to prevent the
Germans gaining access to it, and machine-guns were
posted by the 26th Brigade and by the South Africans
in Delville Wood so as to command all its approaches.

eee - La

1916] SITUATION, NIGHT OF 1lidtn JULY 125

Thus at the close of the 15th the task of the
Division had not been completed. Continuous fighting,
involving serious losses, had resulted in the capture
of all Delville Wood except the north-west corner.
The men not actually engaged in fighting were busy
consolidating positions and erecting strong points and
keeps in the southern portion of Longueval, and all
work had to be done under accurate and galling
artillery-fire. The position occupied by the Division
was peculiarly exposed to the enemy’s artillery; it
formed an elbow beyond the British line and was
open to fire from the north, south, and east. On the
night of the 15th there was a marked increase in the
enemy's shelling; a hurricane of fire swept Delville
Wood, and a fierce bombardment was concentrated on
the southern and south-western portions of Longueval.
In addition, hostile artillery searched the whole region
from our front line to the back areas, causing trouble
to our batteries and seriously interrupting the work
of the transport and of carrying parties.

Each moment as it passed increased the difficulty
of the task still to be accomplished by the Division.
It was now very weak, not only on account of its
casualties, but through exhaustion, strain, and exposure.
General Furse had not a fresh battalion under his
command. On the other hand, the foe was gaining
in strength, and he was known to be bringing up
Other troops. But an attitude of passive defence
was impossible ; there was no security in our position
until the Germans had been driven out of every part
of Longueval and Delville Wood. These two places
formed part and parcel of the same problem; with the
Clearing of the village, the enemy could not maintain

his position in the north-west corner of the wood,
and as soon as the whole of Delville was in our hands,

126 LONGUEVAL, 16TH JULY [suLy

the garrison of northern Longueval would be exposed
to an attack from three sides.

But neither operation was easy of accomplishment.
What the G.O.C. wanted—time—he could not have.
The fighting of the last two days had clearly shown
that the northern defences of the village could not be
rushed. The surest and most economical method of
clearing Longueval was to bombard it with heavy
artillery before the infantry advanced, and this had
been suggested on the 15th. The heavy artillery,
however, was not under the control of the G.O.C.,,
and the insistence of the Corps and Army Commanders
on the need for securing the hamlet without delay
prevented the suggestion being carried into effect.
Consequently, General Furse resolved to make use of
the ground that he had gained in Delville Wood, and
he ordered a combined attack on the village and north-
west corner of the wood to be made by the 27th and
South African Brigades. The latter, after completing
the capture of the northern perimeter was to press
westwards to North Street, where it should join hands
with the former, which was to advance north and east.
This attack was to take place at 10 a.m. on the 16th,
after a preliminary bombardment by the 2-inch trench
mortars, which had been sent up to Longueval on
the night of the 14th/!5th.

The assaulting forces consisted of two companies
of the 1st South African Infantry and two of the
11th Royal Scots. The assault was made from the
line of Princes Street-Clarges Street, and was wholly
repulsed. It was notable, nevertheless, for several acts
of outstanding gallantry. During the South African
attack, a bombing party attempted to rush an enemy
post about 40 yards from our trenches. The assailants
were beaten back, and the officer in command fell

1916] A V.c. FEAT 124

wounded between the two lines. Then Private W. F.
Faulds with two comrades, ignoring the hail of bullets
from the enemy’s machine-guns, left our trench and
rescued the officer. Almost by a miracle the party
got back unscathed, except one man who was severely
wounded. Faulds, who received a V.C., performed
a similar feat two days later, when he went out for a
wounded man, picked him up, and carried him to
a dressing-station under a fire so intense that it was
believed to be impossible to bring in the wounded.
Equally shining as an example of heroism was the
work of 2nd Lieut. Turner and C.S.M. Allwright of
the 11th Royal Scots. Both crept out to some wounded
men, dressed them under a withering fire, and crawled
in with the wounded on their backs. Though desultory
fighting went on in the village all day, its only effect
was to add to the length of our casualty list.

On the 16th July the 26th Brigade was occupied
chiefly in consolidating and strengthening its defences
and in establishing posts on the west of Waterlot
Farm. Bombers and snipers crept close up to the
farm and kept the garrison continually on the alert.
Though it was held by their own snipers, the Germans
persistently shelled it throughout the day. During the
night the Seaforths were relieved in Longueval Alley
by the Eighteenth Division.

The South Africans in Delville Wood had been
woefully reduced by the furious bombardment to
which they had been subjected, and in consequence the
work of consolidation could not be carried on as far
as safety demanded. During the 16th the firing on
the wood continued, and considerable trouble was
experienced from bold enemy snipers who had remained
concealed amongst the shrubbery and undergrowth,

but these were accounted for later in the day. The
K

128 LONGUEVAL, 17rH JULY [suLY

most worrying feature of the situation was the extent
of the gaps between the posts round the perimeter,
and the task of a runner in carrying messages
along the line was nerve-racking and perilous. The
garrison was reinforced by a company of the 4th
Regiment, which was sent to the east and north-
east of the wood. All the officers and men showed
very obvious traces of strain and fatigue, and Brig.-
General Lukin asked the G.O.C. if his men could be
relieved. There were no troops in the Division who
were not exhausted, but General Furse promised that
when the whole of the village and the wood had been
captured, the South Africans in the southern portion of
Delville Wood would be relieved by the 26th Brigade.

With regard to Longueval, he decided that it must
be pounded into dust before another attack was made, so
he asked the Corps to arrange for the fire of heavy guns,
controlled by observation, to be concentrated on the
northern part of the village. The original intention was
to commence the bombardment at 4 a.m. on the 17th July.

But this scheme was frustrated by peremptory
orders from General Rawlinson, directing that the
village had to be cleared at all costs before dawn.
Urgent orders were sent to Brig.-General Scrase-
Dickins on the night of the 16th for the 6th K.O.S.B.
and two companies of the 11th Royal Scots, sup-
ported by two companies of the 1st South African
Infantry, to attack Longueval at 2 a.m. He was also
instructed to withdraw his men from the front trenches
to allow the oblong to be shelled by the heavy guns.
This bombardment was to begin at 11 p.m. on the
16th, but had to be postponed until 12.30 a.m. on the
17th, owing to the difficulty and delay in withdrawing
our infantry to a safe distance. In spite of the greatest
gallantry, the attack was beaten off. The whole virtue

1916] WATERLOT FARM TAKEN 129

of the project was lost when the heavy bombardment
lasted only for an hour and was unobserved. This
was the last effort of the 27th Brigade to capture
Longueval. During the night, the 6th K.O.S.B. and
' 11th Royal Scots were withdrawn to Talus Boise, the
“Rifles,” who had been relieved on the night of the
15th by the 8th Brigade (Third Division), taking over
the trenches of the latter.

At 9 a.M. on the 17th, Waterlot Farm was at length
captured by the 26th Brigade. After a preliminary
bombardment by artillery, the Camerons, supported by
two companies of the 4th South African Infantry,
rushed the farm, slaughtered the garrison, and pro-
ceeded to consolidate the buildings.

At the end of the day the whole Division was
completely worn out. The nights were even more
trying than the days on account of the intensity of
the German shelling, and the strain on the South
Africans, who were certain to receive the first shock
of a counter-attack, was particularly severe. During
the evening of the 17th July, Lieut.-Colonel Tanner
was wounded, and the command of the garrison passed
to Lieut.-Colonel Thackeray. That night General
Furse decided to relieve the South Africans in the
northern part of Delville, but both brigades requested
the relief to be postponed on hearing of the operation
against Longueval, which was to be carried out by the
76th Brigade of the Third Division on the morning
of the 18th. During the hours of darkness, in addi-
tion to their usual artillery-fire, the Germans poured
thousands of gas shells into the battery positions
and back areas. A determined counter - stroke was
delivered against Delville Wood from the north-west,
and the enemy penetrated as far as Buchanan Street
and Princes Street before he was driven back with

130 GERMAN ATTACK, 18TH JULY [suLY

heavy loss. Other assaults were made on the perimeter,
but all were repulsed.

Longueval was attacked at 3.45 a.m. on 18th July
by the 76th Brigade. At first, rapid progress was
made, and shortly after 8 a.M. a report was received
from the Third Division stating that it had captured
all its objectives. A company of the Seaforths and a
company of the Camerons co-operated with the Third
Division in clearing houses in the north of the village.
The enemy however still clung tenaciously to some
of his posts; when parties of the 26th and 27th
Brigades moved up to consolidate strong points in
Longueval, they were stopped by machine-gun fire
from German pockets.

The day was destined to be the most critical of the
battle. At 8 a.m. the enemy opened a tremendous
bombardment on Delville Wood and the village with
guns of all calibres, and until 7 p.m. there was no
diminution of the cannonade, which was probably the
heaviest that the Division ever experienced. The
whole earth vibrated and trembled from the impact
of thousands of ‘‘crumps.” All communications were
broken down, and for a long time General Furse was
ignorant of what was happening. Officers of his staff,
particularly Major MacNamara, took great risks in
going up to Longueval to ascertain the situation, but no
definite information as to the fate of the South Africans
could be gathered. About 2 p.m. the shelling increased
in fury. Our front trenches were obliterated, whole
sections of their occupants were annihilated, and the
Germans launched a terrific attack. For this supreme
effort they had brought up picked troops, consisting of
the 7th and 8th Divisions of the famous Magdeburg
Corps,’ commanded by Sixt von Armin.

1! This was the Corps which the old Army fought at Le Cateau in 1914.

1916] GERMAN ATTACK ON 18tTH 131

After 2 p.m. the S.O.S. signal was seen in the wood
and the village, and some of our men were noticed
dribbling back from these places. Practically all the
South Africans on the perimeter had perished, and the
few survivors, stupefied by the ferocity of the shell-
ing, fell back on Lieut.-Colonel Thackeray’s H.Q. in
Princes Street. At 3 P.M. waves of Germans poured
through the wood and the northern part of Longueval,
but now seizing their opportunity our machine-gunners
took heavy toll of the men in field-grey. Lieut.-Colonel
Thackeray’s troops performed prodigies of valour, and
in a sustained and delirious struggle the heroic defenders
baffled every effort of the foe to break their ranks. In
this grisly combat the Germans lost much valuable
time, and when they pressed on, the gallant South
Africans were still holding out.

General Furse was at Montauban when he heard
of the counter-attack. It was not a time for hesitation,
and he ordered the Argylls to advance at once and
reoccupy all the ground north and west of Regent
Street that had been evacuated. But the enemy’s
barrage along the line of Clarges Street was so thick
that it was impossible to take the men through it.

Later, at 3.30 in the afternoon, Lieut.-Colonel
Dawson received orders to collect all available men
of the Ist and 4th South African Infantry, and take
them up to the Strand and northern boundary of the
wood. With about 160 men he set off on his desperate
errand shortly after 4 pm. On the way he met
some officers, who reported that the whole of the
garrison had been virtually annihilated. Accordingly
he left his men in the old German trenches south-west
of Longueval, and went off to find out how matters
stood. Disorganised parties of men, their nerves sorely
jangled by the bombardment, were streaming south-

132 CHARGE OF 26rn BRIGADE, 181TH JULY _[sury

wards through the village. When Lieut.-Colonel
Dawson discovered that some of the South Africans
were still holding out near Buchanan Street, he took
his men into the village, and put them in trenches
just north of Dover Street on the right of the 26th
Brigade.

The crisis occurred about 6 p.m. By that time all
Longueval north of Clarges Street was lost except for
a few keeps garrisoned by Highlanders, but the gallant
resistance of these posts proved of the greatest possible
value. The enemy held all the wood outside the
area occupied by Lieut.-Colonel Thackeray and his
men, and the line of Buchanan Street which was held
by the Camerons. All day the majority of the troops
of the 26th Brigade had sheltered in the trenches south
of Clarges Street from the fiendish shelling. During
the worst spells, when nothing could be heard above
the hideous din of the screaming and crashing shells,
the men cowered into the sides of their trenches: but
though wearied and exhausted they were full of fight,
and when a short lull came they peered eagerly over
the parapet hoping for a glimpse of the enemy on whom
they might wreak vengeance for the horror of the
bombardment. If any man stood out from his fellows
that day, it was Lieut.-Colonel Gordon of the Black
Watch. By the sheer force-of his masterful personality
he controlled the situation. After a brief consultation
he and Lieut.-Colonel Kennedy of the Seaforths decided
that the time was ripe for a counter-attack. A new
line had been thrown forward along the railway that ran
from Guillemont into Longueval. Shortly before 6 P.M.
this line was reinforced by every available man from
the Highland Brigade, and the whole pressed forward
towards Delville Wood; at the same time, led by
Lieut.-Colonel Duff, the Camerons swept westwards

1916] CHARGE OF 26TH BRIGADE, 18tH JULY 133

from Buchanan Street. On clearing the main square,
the Highlanders saw the field-grey ranks of the enemy
emerging from the south-west corner of the wood. For
all who took part in that attack this was the most
thrilling moment of the war. For the space of a
single second both sides hesitated, so dramatic was
the meeting, and then from the left of the 26th line
came the rousing command, “ Forward, boys!” and
the Highlanders surged on like an irresistible wave.
The Germans wavered, fired a few shots, and bolted
into the shelter of Delville, refusing to face a force
that was less than a fourth of their own strength.
_ Carried away by the impetuosity of this magnificent
charge, many of the Highlanders heedlessly followed
the enemy far into the thicket, where many a brave
man, marked on the casualty lists as ‘‘ missing,” met
his fate in a lonely scuffle with the Germans.

It was then that the quality of control and discipline
was most needed. The whole value of the counter-
attack would have been lost if the small force had
pressed on into the wood; it would have been sur-
rounded and cut off by the overwhelming numbers of
the foe. Between them, Lieut.-Colonels Gordon and
Kennedy rallied and re-formed the men. Already they
were in danger of being outflanked and a machine-gun,
which had been missed during the rush, was taking
heavy toll of their numbers from the rear. The
Camerons, whose C.O., Lieut.-Colonel Duff, had been
severely wounded during the mélée, fell back on
Buchanan Street, and the remainder was brought back
to the line of Clarges Street and a trench to the
immediate north of the Church. This position was
firmly held, and a supporting line on the railway was
formed. The attack so carefully planned by the enemy
had been broken, and though the Highlanders had been

134 EVENING SITUATION [suLy 18

too few to recapture Delville Wood, their timely charge
had certainly maintained our grasp on the village.

All this time the South Africans had maintained
their position against prodigious odds at the corner of
Princes Street-and Buchanan Street. Lieut.-Colonel
Dawson did all that was possible to assist them; he
sent up reinforcements, ammunition, rations, and stores,
and towards midnight he went up to Lieut.-Colonel
Thackeray's H.Q. Every yard of the mangled wood
bore plain traces of the desperate fighting that it had
witnessed. ‘‘ Devil’s Wood” it was called by our men,
and that was the correct name. The South African H.Q.
were full of wounded, and there were no men available
to take them away. During the evening the remnants
of the South Africans took over Buchanan Street from
the Camerons, who were required to refnforce the
Clarges Street line. That night was a trying and anxious
time for Lieut.-Colonel Thackeray; his forces were
small in number and were utterly spent. Three times
the Germans came on in force, but were repulsed with
heavy losses.

Our hold on southern Longueval was strengthened
during the night by battalions of the 27th Brigade.
After the relief was complete, the Clarges Street
line on the left was held by the 9th Scottish Rifles,
a company of the 18th H.L.I., and a company of the
6th K.O.S.B.; three companies of the Borderers
formed a flank along Pall Mall, and the 12th Royal
Scots occupied the old German front line from Pall
Mall to the west.

By the evening of the 18th July, General Furse
had drawn up his plans for a counter-attack. . The
force to be employed consisted of the 53rd Brigade,
which had been placed under his command. After
7.30 P.M., as it was clear that the Germans occupied

1916] DIVISION RELIEVED ON 19rx 135

all the wood east of Buchanan Street and north of
Princes Street, a barrage was placed on it east and
north of these rides. The 19th Durham Light Infantry
were placed under the orders of Brig.-General Ritchie,
and were instructed to secure the southern portion
of the wood at 12.30 a.m. on the 19th July, but owing
to the shelling, the darkness, and the unfamiliarity
of the D.L.I. with the main features of the village,
this operation was postponed until 6.15 in the morning,
when the attack was delivered by the 53rd Brigade
under a H.E. barrage. Owing to delays, the infantry
did not begin to advance until 7.30 a.m., but they
succeeded in clearing the wood south of Princes
Street. In this operation the 53rd was effectively
assisted by Lieut.-Colonel Thackeray’s men, who kept
up a destructive fire on the Germans. For some
unknown reason the 53rd _ Brigade failed to relieve the
South Africans, though it was asked to do so by the
26th Brigade.

This was the last operation directed by General
Furse against Delville Wood, and on the night of
the 19th July the relief of the Division commenced.
The remnants of the 26th on relief by the 8th Brigade
(Third Division) withdrew to Carnoy, and next day
marched farther back to the sand-pits near Meaulte.
The 27th was relieved by the 95th Brigade (Fifth
Division), and moved first to Talus Boise and then
to the Citadel. On the night of the 18th all the
South Africans, except those under Lieut.-Colonel
Thackeray’s command, were withdrawn to Happy
Valley. Not until the evening of the 20th was this
valiant little detachment relieved, when Lieut.-Colonel
Thackeray with two wounded officers and 140 men
moved out to Talus Boise, rejoining next day the
fragments of the brigade at Happy Valley. With

136 WORK OF R.A.M.C. | [sULY

the exception of the artillery,’ the whole of the Division
was relieved on the morning of the 20th July, on
which date General Furse handed over the command
of the sector to the G.O.C., Third Division.

The work of all the R.A.M.C. personnel and the
regimental stretcher-bearers during the battle was
worthy of the highest commendation. The conditions,
especially from the 14th, were appalling, perpetual
and ghastly shell-fire, an unceasing stream of wounded,
and atrocious roads. In spite of all these difficulties
the casualties were evacuated with wonderful rapidity,
while the heroism and endurance of doctors and
_ stretcher-bearers were almost beyond belief. Instances
of the former squatting in shell-holes and dressing
their patients under a murderous fire were innumer-
able. But, indeed, in the ‘work of all men wearing
the Red Cross the spirit of self-sacrifice shone at its
brightest. The succouring of the wounded is an
instinct with the British soldier, and there is no case
known in the whole Army of a stretcher-bearer ever
shirking his duty. More than once in the course of
the cruel struggle, the shelling was so intense that
it seemed impossible to rescue the wounded, but
men were always ready to risk their lives (and in
many cases they lost them) to bring their comrades in.
When all -were most exhausted, the work became most
severe. From the 18th July, the arduous labour of
dressing and evacuating the cases was a continuous
strain, everyone working at the highest tension. The
wounded who were left behind, when the Division moved
out, it was beyond the power of anyone to reach;

1 The artillery remained in the line until the 27th July, during which
period it effectively supported the attacks of the Third and Second
Divisions on Longueval and Delville Wood, Brig.-General Tudor acting as
C.R.A. to both these divisions,

1916] SAPPERS, PIONEERS, AND AS.C. 137

they lay in the area recaptured by the enemy in his
counter-blow.

Throughout the action the work of the Sappers
and Pioneers reached its usual standard; no higher
praise than this could be desired. Apart from
assisting the infantry to consolidate the captured
positions and construct strong. points, they had to
keep roads in repair. Even in the summer of 1916
the roadways in the Somme area could scarcely cope
with the enormous traffic that passed over them. For
instance, the Maricourt-Montauban road, which was
constantly used, was only fit for horse transport,
though twenty tons of road metal were put on it daily
by the Division. In the forward areas, the imperturb-
able manner in which Sappers and Pioneers worked
under the heaviest fire aroused the sincere admiration
of the infantry ; they seemed to be men without nerves.
Their losses were extremely heavy, a serious matter,
as skilled men were not too numerous. The C.R.E.,
Lieut.-Colonel Barnardiston, was wounded on the 17th
July and his place was taken by Major G. R. Hearn
of the 64th Field Company.

The ordinary duties of the A.S.C. and the trans-
port were attended with considerable risk, as the
few roads were continually searched by artillery-fire.
Not a night passed without its story of narrow escapes
or of losses suffered. From the moment that the
First Line Transport left its lines with stores and
rations, the men knew that for several hours they had
to run the gauntlet. The rugged, weird beauty of
the shell-torn country, lit up fantastically by the gleam
of the belching guns, escaped the eyes of men guiding
their limbers round the edge of shell-holes and listen-
ing uneasily for the first signs of a hostile “strafe.”
In spite of the greatest skill in timing a dash through

138 COMMENTS ON THE BATTLE [suLY

the worst areas, the transport of most of the battalions
suffered grievously, especially on the nights of the
17th and 18th. The Argylls were particularly unlucky,
for on the latter date their Quartermaster, Lieut. W. R.
Weller, and their Transport Officer, 2nd Lieut. K. D.
Thomson, were killed. Throughout the whole period,
however, no battalion failed to receive its rations and
stores—a very creditable fact, considering the severity
of the fighting.

The attack on Longueval and Delville Wood will
rank as one of the greatest examples of the fine fighting
qualities of the Division. The operation was under-
taken against a brave and alert foe, and had for its
object positions that formed the pivot of the enemy’s
defensive system. The element of surprise, that made
the capture of Montauban a comparatively easy matter,
was lacking on the 14th July; the Germans expected
an onset and were prepared for it. When all these
things are considered, the marvel is that the Division
was able to accomplish as much as it did. And the full
- magnitude of the achievement was probably not realised
for some time; for not till more than a month later
were the Germans driven from their last defences in
Longueval and Delville Wood. Where failure was
recorded, as in the case of the attacks on the northern
part of the village, the melancholy roll of the killed and
wounded was the monument of the devotion with
which the men had attempted to do more than men
could do. Out of a total of barely 3000, the 27th
Brigade lost 81 officers and 2033 men, and the great
majority of the killed and missing, 569 in all, left their
bones in the blood-soaked undergrowth of the orchards
of Longueval.

But even more remarkable than the dour resolution,
with which the battle was carried on, was the extra-

1916] COMMENTS ON THE BATTLE 139

ordinary capacity for endurance displayed by the men in
holding on to their gains, In France, the most difficult
part of an attack was not the winning of an objective
but the keeping of it after it was gained. The Germans
knew all about the art of war. Their counter-stroke on
the 18th July was admirably planned and skilfully carried
out, and it was made when the Division was at its
weakest. Never did the Ninth rise to greater heights.
Here and there under a hellish bombardment a few
dazed men straggled back, but the great majority of
them stood their ground. The defence of Delville Wood
by Lieut.-Colonel Thackeray’s small band rightly takes
its place as one of the classic feats of the war. But
though less well known, the charge of the Highlanders
that saved Longueval when a serious disaster seemed
inevitable, is an achievement that ought to secure a
lasting place in our military annals. Not merely does
it illustrate the unflinching courage of the Highlanders
of the 26th Brigade, but it is a brilliant example of the
value of a prompt counter-attack boldly carried out by
even a few men against a resolute and numerous enemy,

Throughout the battle the unflagging support of the
artillery had been of the greatest assistance. The ideas
of Brig.-General Tudor had been triumphantly vindi-
cated by the events of the action, and the enthusiasm
of the infantry for the H.E. barrage was the best
justification of his methods.

In the three weeks’ fighting the Division lost 314
officers and 7303 other ranks. The figures represent
about 50 per cent. of its strength and considerably
more than that of the infantry. But it had not fought
in vain ; it had retained nearly all that it had captured,
and when it was withdrawn from the battle, it had
established its name as one of the hardest fighting
divisions in France.

140 COMMENTS ON THE BATTLE [suLy

For its work it was generously commended by
General Sir H. Rawlinson.’ But most of all the men
cherished the tribute of their own leader, General
Furse, on 21st July :—‘‘The Ninth Division is being
withdrawn from the battle line. It has played a
conspicuous and honourable part in one of the greatest
battles in the world’s history. We may all of us with
justice be proud of having served in the Division during
the past three weeks.

“From the bottom of my heart I want to thank
you all—officers, N.C.Os. and men, for all you have
done during these weeks of strenuous fighting.

“‘The demands made on all branches of the Divi-
sion have been great, and right well have they been
answered.

“The infantry, Highlanders, Lowlanders, and South
Africans, have as usual had to bear the most continuous
strain. To sustain appalling and continuous shell-fire,
to try to dig for themselves trenches amongst the fallen

' “As it will be impossible for me to speak personally to the Ninth
Division, I desire to convey to every officer, N.C.O. and man, my thanks
and congratulations for the splendid work the Division has done during
the Battle of the Somme.

“The attack and capture of the hostile second line system of defence,
and the village of Longueval on the 14th July, was a feat of arms which
will rank high amongst the best military attainments of the British Army,
whilst in the capture of Delville Wood, the gallantry, perseverance,
and determination of the South African Brigade deserves the highest
commendation.

“Not only has the fighting spirit of the infantry of the Division been
admirable, but the manner in which the divisional artillery has helped and
supported the infantry shows that a high degree of training has been
attained, and it is with regret that I am informed that the Division is to
be transferred to another army. I trust that at some future time I may
again have the honour of finding them under my command.”

H. Raw inson,
General Commanding Fourth Army.
H.Q., Fourtru Army,
25th July 1916.

1916] COMMENTS ON THE BATTLE 141

trees and through the roots of Bernafay and Delville
Woods, to suffer heavy casualties amongst their
comrades and friends, to go on day and night for a
week or more without any relief and with only snatches
of disturbed sleep, to bear all the time the stern
responsibility of being the guardians of the very pivot
of the Commander-in-Chief’s manceuvre, and to main-
tain throughout, as they have done, an uncomplaining
resolution, a cheerful bearing—for all this, we who
have had other work to do offer the infantry our whole-
hearted admiration and thanks.

‘‘And the infantry, I am sure, will be the first to
recognise the continuous assistance they have received
from the artillery, who have been working at the
highest pressure day and night since the 24th June,
and are still in the line, as also from the Engineers and
from the Pioneers, whose skilful help has always been
at hand.

‘Equally deserving our gratitude are the Surgeons
and their untiring assistants, including the Chaplains,
for the care they have given to the wounded without
thought for their own safety; and none of us will easily
forget all the difficulties overcome by the Supply and
Transport Services.

‘‘Lastly, I would thank the brigadiers and their
staffs—and the various members of my own staff—
for their zealous and efficient work, which has had so
much to say to the successes we have gained. Nor
do I forget the Signal Service—that invaluable and
hard-worked channel of orders and reports.

“We shall miss with lasting regret the many
comrades and friends we have lost, but they with you,
thank God, have won fresh honours for the Ninth
Division and success for our arms.”

When the Division left the battle line it was only

142 COMMENTS ON THE BATTLE _{suty 1916

the skeleton of what it had been on the 1st July, but
as the enemy had employed no fewer than three first-
rate divisions against it, one may assume’ that his losses
had been more numerous. This seemed to indicate
that the intentions of Sir Douglas Haig were being
fulfilled. Episodes such as the costly fighting in
Longueval were inevitable in a battle of this magnitude,
but in this case more might have been achieved with
a greater economy of lives had it not been for the
anxiety of the Fourth Army to prevent the programme
of the British Commander-in-Chief being affected by
delay. Its insistence on the necessity of securing
Longueval at once did not allow General Furse a free
hand to deal with the situation, and as it turned out,
the attempt to rush matters was a spendthrift policy,
and actually resulted in losing instead of saving time.

With the opening of the Battle of the Somme there
was a noticeable change in the attitude of the men.
They now realised the full seriousness and gravity of
the business that they had undertaken, and they no
longer entered into battle with the exuberant optimism
that had filled the men at Loos with the belief that
they could sweep away the defences of Germany at one
blow. Their confidence was unshaken and their belief
in ultimate victory assured, but if the Somme became
for the enemy a Gehenna, it was also a supreme trial
and test for the soldiers of the British Empire.

1 There can be nothing stronger than assumption. The Germans used

their divisions in battle for shorter spells than we did, and it is highly
probable that we persistently overrated their casualties.

CHAPTER VII

THE BUTTE DE WARLENCOURT
OctToser 1916

AFTER being withdrawn from the battle, the Division
was allowed a reasonable interval in which to heal |
its wounds. The last few days in the Somme area
brought a much-appreciated rest. All Picardy glowed
under a mellow sun, and in the glorious summer
weather it was no hardship to sleep in bivouacs. The
forenoons were given over to training and the replace-
ment of kit; the “Q” Branches and the Ordnance
Staffs were kept busy making good the losses in
equipment and material. In the broad lagoons of the
Somme near Bray were magnificent bathing-places, to
which the men were taken every day, and here there
was an element of danger, for the current was strong,
and a swimmer usually emerged from the river about
a hundred yards from the spot at which he had
entered.

Small drafts began to arrive to fill up gaps; all
battalions were very weak in officers, and a company
that had more than two was decidedly well off.
Fortunately most of the commanding officers had
escaped. In the 26th Brigade there were several
changes; Lieut.-Colonel Tweedie of the Argylls had

been wounded, and, though he remained at duty for
143 L

144 REST AND REORGANISATION [suLY

some time, he was obliged finally to enter hospital, and
he was succeeded by Lieut.-Colonel Kennedy of the
Seaforths on the 8rd August. Lieut.-Colonel R. Horn
was appointed C.O. of the Seaforths, and Lieut.-Colonel
H. R. Brown of the Camerons. In the 27th Brigade
the command of the 12th Royal Scots passed to Lieut.-
Colonel H. N.S. Fargus on the 23rd July. Most of
the changes occurred in the South African‘ Brigade.
The 2nd South African Infantry had lost all its senior
officers, and Major Heal of the 1st assumed command
until he was relieved at the end of August 1916 by
Lieut.-Colonel Christian from England. Major D. M.
MacLeod of the South African Scottish was wounded on
the 17th July, and his place was taken by Major D. R.
Hunt. Lieut.-Colonel Thackeray had been wounded,
but happily not seriously enough to cause his removal
to hospital.

On the 23rd July the Division left the Somme
district, and moved to the IX. Corps area, with D.H.Q.
at Pont Remy. Most of this long journey was
performed on foot under a broiling sun and over
dusty roads, so that the march was extremely fatiguing.
Two days later the Ninth was transferred to the IV.
Corps* of the First Army,* and this move brought it
into the centre of industrial France. For a few days
units were concentrated in the large mining town
of Bruay, where an enjoyable time was spent. The
men had luxurious hot-spray baths at the mines, and
changes of clothing; there were also numerous first-
rate concerts and other entertainments, where leisure
could be passed easily and agreeably. In a short
time, however, units were sent out to country billets in
the neighbourhood, where greater facilities for training

1 Commanded by Lieut.-General Sir H. Wilson.
* Commanded by General Sir C. Monro.

1916] THE VIMY RIDGE 145

were available. The 27th Brigade was particularly
fortunate, for its area included a deep quarry full of
water near Beugin, where all could indulge in bathing
and swimming.

The Division, though no unit was yet up to strength,
had almost recovered from its severe handling, when the
26th Brigade took over the trenches on the Vimy
Ridge from the Thirty-seventh Division on the evening
of the 12th August. Two nights later, the 27th Brigade
occupied the line on the left of the 26th. D.H.Q. were
established at Camblain L’Abbé, where they remained
during the period the Ninth was at Vimy Ridge. The
entire country in the divisional area was hilly and
undulating, the most prominent feature being the Vimy
Ridge, running north and south. It had been the
scene of ghastly fighting in the early summer of 1915,
and though the German lines lay along the crest of
the ridge, our men gleaned some idea of the splendid
fighting qualities that had carried their brave ally
through the demolished villages of Carency and
Souchez, and far up the western slopes. The best
blood of France had watered the whole area, and
it was with great reluctance that the French handed
over the sector to the British. One of the communi-
cation trenches had been named after a famous regiment
that had then played a proud and honourable part in
the attack, and, when rumours were afloat that the
Germans had retaken the ridge, some men of that
regiment visited the area to ascertain the position.
They were undeniably cheered and relieved to learn
that the rumours were false, and that their British
comrades kept a firm hold on all that had been
entrusted to them.

The line taken over was divided into the Berthonval.
sector on the right, and the Carency sector on the left.

146 THE TRENCHES [aucusT

In the former, the opposing trenches lay far apart—at
no point being closer than 70 yards—except for saps;
in the latter, those on the far left were almost touching
each other, and a man could throw a bomb into the
enemys trench without difficulty. The whole front
was fringed with craters, which on the left were so
numerous that they practically merged into one
another. Where the line cut them were the most
critical posts; here were the gates for an enterprising
foe eager to secure prisoners. The trenches were not
too salubrious, since many of the French dead had been
buried in their walls or floor, and the usual work
had to be done nightly and daily by infantry, sappers,
and pioneers to make them substantial. In one part
the sand-bags, full of rough pieces of chalk, had been
thrown up in such haphazard fashion that the parapets
appeared likely to collapse if aman sneezed. However,
after a few weeks hard toil there was a marked
improvement. From our position a magnificent view
extended towards the north, and it was significant of
the tendency of the British Army at this time to work
in water-tight compartments, that the division on the
left mever sent observers to our lines, and yet from
there the best observation could be had.

Though all seemed to live on the edge of acute
suspense because of the constant mining carried on
by both sides, the stay at the Vimy was singularly
uneventful. The approaches to the line were in very
good order, and reliefs were carried out in daylight. A
communication trench, cut right through the valley,
emerged on the western slopes of the ridge out of sight
of the enemy. Its official name was Cabaret Rouge,
but ‘‘The Never-ending Road,” the title given to it by
the men, was a better description, for it took one
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1916] TRENCH MORTARS 147

there was practically no shelling of the communi-
cation trenches and back roads, the transport and
carrying parties had a fairly easy and secure time. |

Matters livened up in the sector after the Divisional
Artillery’ had registered, but the enemy appeared to
be husbanding his ammunition, and contented himself
with trench-mortar bombardments. He stuck to fixed
periods. It was remarked that one could wander about
peacefully in the sector during the day except between
the hours of 2 and 4 p.m.—the time of the trench-
mortar interlude. The type used was the “rum jar”
—a huge, unwieldy shell that was thrown high into
the air—and a man was absolutely safe if he used his
eyes and wits. Sentries with whistles kept a lookout,
and when a mortar was on the way a whistle-blast
gave warning. On such occasions it was easy to
distinguish the newcomers from the old hands. On
hearing the blast the latter placidly looked up, ascer-
tained where the mortar was likely to land, and acted
accordingly ; but the former stampeded in a panic for
any sort of shelter, content so long as it would cover
their heads. Aftera few experiences, however, most men
learned to trust to their eyes and their judgment; for
no dug-out, unless it was exceptionally deep, was proof
against a trench mortar. A _ shorter “strafe” took
place in the evenings, between six and seven. The
officers of one mess, compelled to have dinner in the
open, owing to lack of accommodation, often had that
meal interrupted, and it was not an uncommon sight
to see them leave a course and rush for safety.

The disagreeable element during this period was
furnished by the weather. From the end of August

1 In September the artillery were reorganised on a basis of 6 guns per
battery, the 53rd Brigade being broken up for this purpose. The Divisional
Artillery then consisted of the 50th, 51st, and 52nd Brigades.

148 SNIPING [ auGcusT

scarcely a day passed without much rain, and thus there
was the usual constant struggle to keep the trenches
from being flooded. There was a grave suspicion, too,
that enemy mines were perilously close to our parapet.
One curious incident happened. At 10.20 a.m. on the
19th August, the enemy exploded a small mine on
the front of the 27th Brigade. Three sappers of the
90th Field Coy. were thrown into the crater caused
by the explosion, two being killed, and one buried up
to the neck in the débris. Some of the Germans were
also buried, and an informal truce was observed while
the stretcher-bearers of both sides dug out their
comrades. The G.O.C., who was going round the
line at the time, ran a narrow escape, as he: had just
passed the area affected by the explosion. There
were however more alarms than events, and casualties
were exceptionally low. The customary routine for a
battalion was twelve days in the front system, six in
brigade reserve, and six in billets in divisional reserve,
when a good deal of training could be carried on.
While the South Africans were at Frevillers on the
11th August, H.M. the King passed through the
village, and dismounting from his car, walked along
their ranks.

Apart from trench mortars, the chief thrills were
provided by sniping and raids. The prince of snipers
dwelt in the Carency sector, and was affectionately
known amongst the men as ‘‘Cuthbert.” He was a
deadly shot, and destroyed an enormous number of
our periscopes. No man dared show a finger when
Cuthbert was on duty; he was never known to miss,
so naturally he was the chief object of our snipers’
efforts. Numerous posts were erected for his benefit,
but no sooner were they ready than Cuthbert sent a
few bullets through the loopholes. At last one was

1916] ae RAIDS 149

constructed that escaped his notice. Too much success
had made him careless; he rose from his lair and
stretched his arms. That was sufficient. With his
disappearance our snipers had it all their own way.

The raids engineered in this sector met with fair
success. On two occasions parties of the 12th Royal
Scots and of the “Rifles” penetrated the hostile
lines but failed to secure prisoners; the former had
the satisfaction of killing a few Germans, but the latter
found the trenches deserted by the garrison. The
biggest capture of prisoners was made by the South
Africans. At 4 a.m. on the 14th September, 2 officers
and 60 men of the 2nd South African Infantry entered
the enemy’s trenches under cover of an artillery barrage;
they killed at least 12 and brought back 5 prisoners.
The only casualties were 2 wounded, one of whom un-
fortunately had to be left in the German lines. On
the evening of the 16th September a successful raid
was carried out by the Black Watch and Camerons,
and on this occasion the Highlanders satisfied the
desire of the G.O.C. for an identification by bringing
back a prisoner, but at least 50 had fallen victim
to their blood-lust. This last raid was carried out
under a Stokes barrage, so terrific that dozens of the
enemy were killed, and the remainder paralysed with
fright. All the Stokes Guns in the Division had been
collected for the operation, and in forty-five minutes
they fired 9000 shells, which completely obliterated
the opposing front trenches. At one time the 26th
Brigade was marked out for something more ambitious
than a raid; for the First Army desired to push the
enemy off the crest before winter set in, but the scheme
was postponed, possibly because it would have used up
troops that were needed for the Somme.

On leaving the Vimy Ridge on the 25th September

150 BACK TO THE SOMME [ocroBER

the Division, after moving first to a training area under
the Third Army, joined the III. Corps’ of the Fourth
Army, and on the 9th October the 26th and South
African Brigades relieved the Forty-seventh Division
in the line near Eaucourt L’Abbaye. The move was
made chiefly by route march over wretched roads
and in vile weather, but for a portion of the distance

buses were available. The 27th Brigade had a trying

experience. At 8 A.M. on a chill October morning,
all the men were lined up on a road near Barly, waiting
for the buses, which did not arrive until 3 o'clock in
the afternoon, with the result that units reached the
terminus in inky darkness, and some of them had then
to march a long distance to their billets.

The Lewis Gunners had a most unenviable time.
Battalions had now been supplied with 10 guns, each
with its mounting and 44 magazines, each of which
contained 49 cartridges. There were also bags with
spare parts, gloves for firing the guns when they
were hot, jackets’ for carrying them, and hyposcopes,
so that the gun could be fired without the firer being
seen. For the carriage of all this material handcarts
had been provided in June, but they proved utterly
useless except on good roads, and they imposed an
intolerable strain on the men who pulled them. All
the units altered these carts so that they could be
drawn by mules, but even so they were unsatisfactory
and broke down continually. When the Somme was
reached, so was the limit of endurance. The whole
drainage system of the country had been smashed by
months of shelling, and the roads, poor at their best,
seemed to have no bottom; the ruins of whole villages
were thrown into them, but even that never appeared

1 Commanded by Lieut.-General Pulteney.
* The gloves were occasionally used, the jackets never.

1916] EVENTS IN OTHER THEATRES 151

to make them any firmer. The battalions of the 27th
Brigade will never forget the march from Laviéville
to Mametz Wood. It was plain sailing as far as the
vicinity of Fricourt Wood. At this point the path lay
along the eastern edge of the wood, but the carts and
mules sank deep in mud, and had to be hauled out and
dragged along by the sweating and blasphemous teams.
This harassing process continued until the carts were
eventually parked in the transport lines on a tableland
on the east side of Mametz Wood. One unit found
the zig-zag path to this tableland completely blocked
by an artillery horse which had fallen and could not
be persuaded to rise. The men were tired and hungry
and not relishing the prospect of a lengthy wait, they
hauled the carts and mules one by one up the face of
a precipice and so reached the transport lines.

In other theatres the outstanding event was the
entry of Roumania on the 27th August as a belligerent
on the side of the Entente. This event, which was
greeted with boisterous and undignified jubilation in
France and Britain, was regarded as a decisive blow
to the Central European Powers, but the tribulation
that the immediate future brought upon Roumania
seemed to indicate that an exaggerated estimate had
been placed on its worth and services. The grievances
of the Roumanians in Transylvania and Hungary, the
ostensible cause of war, led logically to an invasion
of the former province; and this campaign would
have had a greater effect on the war than the narrow
aims of Italy, had it not been for the gross ineptitude
and short-sighted selfishness of Russia, whose overtures
and representations had the most weight in bringing
the little Balkan state into the field.

In 1915 Russia had been precluded from invading
Bulgaria by the neutrality of Roumania, whose territory

152 EVENTS IN OTHER THEATRES [OcToBER

interposed an obstacle and whose declaration of war
now gave her an opportunity of turning the situation
in the Balkans in favour of the Entente. But
Roumania was allowed to prosecute her campaign
single-handed, and after a few initial successes had
to meet powerful and well-equipped German fysces
under Von Falkenhayn and Von Mackensen. The
ability of Germany to send a strong army to the
Balkans was a disagreeable surprise to the Western
Allies, and showed that our offensive on the Somme
was not so menacing as official bulletins and
press accounts had led us to believe, and that our
calculations of German losses were probably greatly
over-estimated. The effect of this intervention soon
made itself felt; the Roumanians, opposed and out-
numbered, were compelled to fall back, but their
resistance was neither discreditable nor negligible,
and belated help from Russia, if generously given
and seriously intended, would have endangered the
flanks of Von Falkenhayn and perhaps have exercised
a decisive influence on the war. But only the most
grudging and limited support was given, and though
an offensive from Salonica under General Sarrail
detained three Bulgarian divisions and _ eventually
led to the recapture of Monastir, the Roumanians
were pressed back by the 10th October to the borders
of Moldavia.

More than two months had elapsed since the
Division fought at Longueval, and in this period
continuous hammering had brought the British forces
far into the enemy’s territory. The greater part of
the ridge from Thiepval to Combles was now in our
hands, and the Germans had been pushed back
to their fourth system of defences. With good
weather the speedy fall of Bapaume might be reckoned

1916] THE SOMME BATTLEFIELD 153

on. On the front taken over by us, the principal
feature was the Butte de Warlencourt, a mound of
chalk about 50 feet high, which stood at the far end
of the spur that ran from the main ridge through
Flers, and was flanked by the tree-lined Albert-
Bapaume road. North-east of this the ground sloped
into a depression, which led into the valley of the
Ancre, and beyond it lay a spur running from the
road towards Morval, on which the enemy had his
fourth position.

Behind the British front line lay the vast waste of
wilderness created by three months of savage war-
fare. Its general colour scheme was a dull uniform
grey, which changed to a dingy yellow when the sun
shone. The whole area was covered with the débris
of battle and of camps, but worst of all, from Mametz
Wood to the front line were scattered fragments of
corpses and a heavy fetid odour pervaded the
atmosphere. The work of burying the dead was a
slow process and even in Mametz Wood, which had
been in our hands for two months, the 27th Brigade
found a number of British and German dead still
uninterred. The entire area was intersected by rutted
roads, which even in fine weather could barely stand
the stupendous amount of traffic that passed over
them in a never-ending stream. Every available
man of the 27th Brigade, which was in divisional
reserve, worked daily repairing them, but all the labour
served only to keep them passably decent, and when the
weather broke down, almost superhuman efforts were
required to keep them from collapsing altogether.

_ The line held by the 26th Brigade on the right,
and the South Africans on the left, lay to the north
of the Abbey of Eaucourt. On the 7th October the
Forty-seventh Division had made an_ unsuccessful

154 PLANS FOR ATTACK ON 12rx _ [ocrosrr 12

attack, but had established posts in front of its
line. The Ninth joined up these posts and formed
them into a new front line and a starting-point for
fresh operations. These were notified on the 9th
October, and the chief object of the attack, which
was entrusted to the Ninth and Thirtieth Divisions,
was to clear the Butte de Warlencourt. The objectives
of the Ninth were two; first, Snag and Tail Trenches,
and second, the trench lying to the far side of the
Butte de Warlencourt, including the mound itself.
Zero was fixed for 2.5 p.m., and the attack was to
be covered by a creeping H.E. barrage, moving at the
rate of 50 yards a minute.’ The left flank was to
be covered by a smoke-screen, which the Fifteenth
Division was to put down between Le Sars and
Warlencourt. To deceive the foe, a ‘Chinese Attack ”?
was arranged for the 11th October.

Brig.-General Ritchie’s plan was to attack with
the 7th Seaforths, supported by two companies of
the Argylls and a section of the 26th L.T.M.B. The
former, with two companies in line, each on a two-
platoon front, was to advance in four waves. The
assault was to be supported by Vickers Guns; one
section was to follow the Seaforths, another the Argylls,
and a third was to garrison the original front and
support lines, the remaining section being in reserve.
The arrangements of Brig.-General Lukin were on
similar lines. The assault was to be made by the

1 On this occasion the 47th Divisional Artillery and two brigades of
the Ist Divisional Artillery supported the attack under the direct command
of the C.R.A. 47th Division. Brig.-General Tudor acted as C.R.A. to
General Furse. |

2 A “Chinese Attack” was not an attack ; but the artillery put down
the same sort of bombardment that was the usual prelude to an advance,
moving by lifts over the enemy’s system and then suddenly coming back

to his front line, and so catching his infantry when they were manning the
trenches to repel the expected assault.

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Yarlencourl, Vo deceive rose a Chinese Attack ”*
wis arranged for the Lith to tether,

DBiig.-General Ritch:.’s olin was to attack with
the 7th Seaforths, srrweocod Ly two companies of
rhe Arevlis and a sectiu af the 26th L.T.M.B. The
bose AGL, TWO Meee in line, each on a two-
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so tallow the Seaforths, another the Argylls,

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oonth Agtilerv 2ipoorted the attack under the direct command
oN (th Divison.) Brig.-General Tudor acted as CARLA, to)

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A Spee Stack ? was not anattack ; but the artillery put down
fi ©. ombardinent that was the usual prelude to un advanes,
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1916] FAILURE OF THE ATTACK 155

2nd South African Infantry, supported by the South
African Scottish. Each battalion was to form up
in four waves, with two waves of carriers. On the
afternoon of the 11th, the ‘Chinese Attack” caused
several hostile machine-guns to unmask their positions
and these were reported to the artillery.

Both brigades were formed up early in the after-
noon of the 12th October, apparently without arousing |
the enemy’s suspicion. In a drizzle of rain the attack
was launched. One minute after zero the enemy’
replied with a heavy barrage, which cut all the
telephone wires and broke off communication between
Brigade H.Q. and the assaulting battalions. From
that moment obscurity reigned, and for a long time
the only reports received by the Division came from the
Artillery and the Royal Flying Corps. At the early
hour of 2.34 p.m. the former announced that our men
had failed to reach the first objective, but a rumour
at 3.20 p.m. that some of our men had been seen on
the Butte and to the right of it raised hopes that the >
assailants had overcome their difficulties. Whatever
truth there was in that report, it was certain at
8.50 p.m. that the attack on the front both of the
Ninth and Thirtieth Divisions had failed, though it
was not till later that definite information was
received.

At the very start the Seaforths had suffered some
casualties by occasional shells from our own guns,
which fell into the assembly trenches, and when the
barrage became intensive the number of ‘“‘short” shells
increased. The difficulties in the way of artillery
observation were immense and as there were many
scratches of trenches that were not marked on the
map, it was not surprising that during the various

! Consisting of Bavarians of the 6th Bavarian Reserve Division.

156 FAILURE OF THE ATTACK [ocToBER 12

actions fought near the Butte the infantry frequently
complained that they were being shelled by their own
artillery. The first objective lay several hundreds of
yards from our front line, and the ground, which rose
from our position in a gentle slope, formed a magnificent
field of fire for rifles and machine-guns. The leading
waves of the Seaforths advanced in perfect order,
but they were swept away by a blast of lead. The
supporting companies of the Argylls became involved
in the disaster and a mixed party of Argylls and
Seaforths dug in on a line about 150 yards in front
of our original line. The others struggled back
to their own trenches in the course of the evening.
The new line was held and strengthened, and the
front trenches were taken over by the Argylls. The
supporting sections from the machine-gun company
and the L.T.M.B. were both knocked out by the
enemy’s barrage before they could leave the trenches.

A similar series of misfortunes fell to the lot of the
South Africans. The attack simply melted away before
the enemy’s scathing fire and the South Africans
were seriously disorganised. Not until the morning
of the 13th was the situation fully cleared up, when
it was discovered that a party of 60 with 2 officers
had dug in close to Snag Trench. It was impossible
to reach this force during daylight, but it was safely
withdrawn under cover of darkness on the night of the
13th October.

The attack broke down, because the artillery had
failed to demolish the enemy’s trenches and machine-
guns; the barrage, though heavy, was inaccurate, as
was proved by the air photographs received after the

1 This was denied by the artillery, who suggested that the shells
complained of were fired by the enemy; but many British fuses were
found in the front trenches.

1916] THE PIMPLE CAPTURED 157

action. The whole operation was a rush, and was
carried out in spite of a strong protest by General
Furse to the Corps and Army Commanders. Since
it was important that we should secure the Bapaume
Ridge before winter set in, he urged that a premature
attack which ended in failure would waste much more
time than would be expended in preparations to insure
success, and he suggested that the attack should be
postponed for twenty-four or forty-eight hours to give
his men the chance of really localising the enemy by
reconnaissance, in order that the gunners might have
no doubt whatever as to the position of our infantry
and that of the enemy.

No further operation on a big scale took place until
the 18th October. The intervening period was blessed
with good weather, and more advanced positions were
dug to form a new starting-point. In front of the
South African lines, and on the left of the Snag Trench,
was a small mound, called the Pimple, which was
believed to be occupied by the enemy, as it appeared
to be the key to the trench. Brig.-General Lukin
was instructed to send out a strong patrol to seize
this point, and on the night of the 13th October a
party of the 3rd South African Infantry went out and
reconnoitred it. It found the Pimple unoccupied, but
returned so late that there was no time before dawn
to send out a force to garrison it. However, on the
evening of the 14th October, a strong force under
Captain L. F. Sprenger, who later was wounded, went
out and captured it. No serious endeavour was made
to dispute our possession of the Pimple, but when the
South Africans moved along from it and attempted to
expel the enemy from the junction of Snag and Tail
Trenches, which was known as the Nose, they were
driven back by machine-gun fire. Later on in the

158 PLANS FOR ATTACK ON 181TuH _[ocroseEr 18

evening the Germans tried in vain to recapture the
Pimple, which was further strengthened by being
linked up with the South African lines, The position,
commanding an admirable view right up to the Butte,
formed an ideal place for machine-guns and from it
numerous losses were inflicted on enemy working-
parties.

Orders for the operation on the 18th October were
received from the Corps on the 14th, but the hope of
taking the Butte at a stride was abandoned and the
objective became the Snag Trench. On the right the
attack was to be carried on by the Thirtieth Division.
General Furse again entrusted the operation to the
26th and South African Brigades. The Camerons, with
four companies in line, each on a platoon front, were
to lead the 26th Brigade attack, supported by a com-
pany of the 8th Black Watch and a section of the
machine-gun company. The Stokes mortars were to
co-operate with the artillery in barraging the enemy’s
front line. On the left front the leading battalion
was the 1st South African Infantry, with three
companies in line, each on a platoon front, the fourth
being in support, and a company of the 3rd South
African Infantry in reserve. The hour of zero was
3.40 A.M.

By this date the fine weather had broken down and
the attack began in a deluge of rain. Early information
was received from the Camerons that they had reached
their objective, but great uncertainty prevailed for a
time as to the fate of the South Africans. It soon
became known that the left half of their attack had
been repulsed, but no news came about the right
half. At 9.30 a.m. it was learned that a few men
of the right company of the Ist South African
Infantry had joined hands with the Camerons, who

1916] + A'I’TACK OF THE CAMERONS 159

were in touch with a battalion of the Thirtieth Division
on the right. Elsewhere the assault had failed.

The Camerons, carrying out their part with great
dash, kept close to the barrage and entered the
German -trench as soon as it lifted. Except for
some machine-gun fire from the left, resistance was
slight and the garrison of the trench fled precipitately
to the Gird Line. Blocks were immediately constructed
on the right and left and held by bombers. About
fifteen minutes after the capture, the enemy counter-
attacked with bombs and forced his way in on the
right, but the Camerons, immediately retaliating, killed
a large number of the assailants and drove the
remainder off in confusion. During this action a
Stokes Gun team rendered great assistance by putting
down a barrage on the Germans.’ On the left the
Camerons got into touch with a Lewis Gun team of
the 1st South African Infantry, but could obtain
no information concerning the rest of the battalion.
In the afternoon about 300 Saxons were seen to be
massing as if for a counter-attack. At once the
8.0.58. was sent up and the men in field-grey, peppered
with bullets and shell-fire, broke up in disorder and
scrambled for shelter. Early in the evening, about
5.30 p.M., the enemy made still another attempt. A
party of them left the Gird Trench and, moving round
to the left flank, endeavoured to expel the Camerons
by a bombing attack, but the garrison had received
due warning and easily checked the onset with a Lewis
Gun. During the night a company of the 9th Seaforths
arrived and dug a communication trench from the old
front line to Snag Trench.

The Lewis Gun detachment of the South Africans

1 These were Saxons of the 40th Division, which had relieved the
Bavarians.
M

160 SOUTH AFRICANS CHECKED _[ocroser 18

on the left of the Camerons proved to be the only section
of the brigade that secured the objective. The company
on the left was held up by wire and came under a
withering machine-gun fire. All the officers having
been killed or wounded, the survivors were drawn back
to their original line. The fate of the other two
companies was wrapped in obscurity, and the bare
fact is that, with the exception of the Lewis Gun
post and a few wounded, none of them ever returned.
A wounded South African reported that his comrades
got into the German front trench, which was full of
dead and wounded, and it is probable that they reached
their objective, but, failing to recognise it as the trench
had been completely wrecked, had pushed on, only to
perish through machine-gun fire from the Butte.’ A
few stragglers made their way back later in the day,
bringing with them 19 prisoners.

On learning what had occurred, General Furse sent
instructions for another attack to be delivered at
5.45 p.m. The key of the German position was the
Nose, which was to be bombarded. The South
Africans were ordered to secure it and to establish
a block about 500 yards up the Tail, and as the
Camerons had already extended their line westwards
they were in a position to assist the attack. Owing
to continuous heavy rain conditions were appalling.
All firmness had been soaked out of the ground, which
became a sea of pewter-grey ooze, and even the lightly-
equipped runners sank with each step beyond the knees
in mud and took fully four hours to struggle over 1000
yards. The attack was entrusted to Lieut.-Colonel
Dawson. He arranged for the fourth company of his
own battalion to attack from the Pimple, while a

1 Many dead South Africans were seen in front of Snag Trench by the
27th Brigade.

1916] A GRISLY BATTLEFIELD 161

company of the 3rd South African Infantry was to
enter Snag Trench east of the Nose and attack west-
wards. The assault from the Pimple was made with
bombs, but the trench leading to the Nose dipped into
a hollow which was commanded by machine-guns from
it. Beyond this point all advance was barred to the
assailants. The second party entered Snag Trench
without difficulty and reached a point within 25 yards
of the Nose, but here the Germans were strongly posted
with three machine-guns in action and the advance
came to a halt. The South Africans then withdrew
to their original trenches, but later were ordered to
reoccupy the Snag. This was done early on the
morning of the 19th and a block was established on
the side of the Nose.

Thus in spite of considerable progress the Division
had been unable to complete the whole of its job. The
26th Brigade had done magnificently, but the Nose
had defied all the strenuous efforts of the South
Africans, whose failure had been due to no lack of
dash or determination but solely to the dreadful
conditions. Never did the Division fight on a more
grisly battlefield. The long muddy slope up to the
Butte was thickly strewn with British and German
dead, and in the more forward trenches corpses of
all units lay sprawling, wedged in by the slime that
coated them. In the open near the Snag, a long line
of men of the London Division, each on his face, was
grim evidence of a gallant charge and the accuracy of
the enemy’s machine-gun fire. Here and there a body
arrested attention by the peculiar contortion of its
attitude and served as a landmark to guide runners
on their way. The air was rank with the odour of
death. To eye, ear, and nose the whole place was
repellant and it required extraordinary strength of

162 EVENTS, 19rx OCTOBER [ocToBER

will even to appear cheerful amid such ghastly
surroundings.

For ten days the Highland and South African
Brigades had held the line and on the 18th October
the G.O.C. instructed the 27th to take over the whole
position on the night of the 19th. Before the relief
commenced the mud-covered slope was again the scene
of furious and bitter encounters. Dawn ushered in
a miserable day with torrents of rain lashing down,
and at 5.30 a.m. the Germans made a terrific assault,
using flammenwerfer. The Black Watch,’ who had
relieved the Camerons during the night, met them in
a desperate conflict. The only weapons fit for use
were bombs; rifles and machine-guns were clogged
with mud and could not be fired. The right company
easily held its own and repulsed the invaders. The
greatest danger came from the left, for on that flank the
flammenwerfer caused much havoc amongst the South
Africans, most of whom were driven out of Snag
Trench, though a few moved eastwards and joined
in with the Highlanders. At their backs followed
German bombers who inflicted heavy casualties on
the crowded troops, but a vigorous counter-attack by
men of the “red hackle” stopped the assailants and
forced them back for 40 yards. Captain Taylor of
‘‘B” Company hurried up from the support trench to
the front line, and grasping the situation made arrange-
ments for an attack. Bombing parties were organised
and bombs brought up. Fortunately 2nd Lieut. Gibson
of the L.T.M.B. had one Stokes Gun in good working
order, and under its barrage the Black Watch regained
all their trenches and had even penetrated into the South

1 Commanded by Lieut.-Colonel Sir George Abercromby since the 20th
September; Lieut.-Colonel Gordon, D.S.O., was promoted to a brigade
in the Forty-tirst Division.

1916] EVENTS, 19TH OCTOBER 163

African sector by noon. The whole of the defences
were then reorganised, but the enemy did not venture
again to tackle the Black Watch.

The South Africans had been expelled from the
Snag Trench by flammenwerfer, which had inflicted most
dreadful wounds. But the Germans had not escaped
without scathe; for in the operation they exposed
themselves to the machine-guns at the Pimple, which
quickly thinned out their ranks. After they were
compelled by the Black Watch to retire many took
refuge near the Nose, but this point was heavily
bombarded by our gunners, and large numbers leaving
the trench darted in the direction of the Butte. Few
of them reached it; they were mowed down by the
Vickers and Lewis Gun fire of the Pimple garrison,
commanded by Major Ormiston. Early in the after-
noon the South Africans sent forward a party to
reoccupy the Snag and if possible to secure the Nose.
The first part of the scheme was easily accomplished,
but the tenacious machine-gunners ensconced in the
latter stopped all further progress. For some inscrut-
able reason the wildest reports were sent back to
D.H.Q. that the Nose had been taken and that if
only more bombs could be sent up the Butte could
be captured without difficulty. Such fallacious reports
are extremely dangerous; they may lead to the useless
sacrifice of many lives. When the relief of the South
Africans began, General Furse was under the impression
that the Nose had been taken and he instructed the
27th Brigade to exploit the success.

The relief on the night of the 19th October will never
be forgotten by any officer or man of the Ninth who
took part in it. In the forenoon under a soaking
rain the units of the 27th Brigade marched first to
High Wood, and even there a man sank up to his

164 A PURGATORIAL “RELIEF” _— [ocroser 20

ankles in mud. The 6th K.O.8.B. and the 12th Royal
Scots who were to take over the left and the right
fronts had a terrible time. The trial came as soon
as the communication trenches were entered. There
seemed to be absolutely no bottom in them and the
men struggled along waist-deep in mud. Darkness had
fallen when they reached the trenches near Eaucourt
L’Abbaye and an intense hostile barrage added to
the horror. With devilish accuracy the shells pitched
near the communication trenches and many plunged
right into them. Unspeakable was the fate of any
man who was badly wounded that night; he sank
below the mire and the men in the rear pressed on
all unconscious that the welcome firmness, which
momentarily sustained them, was the body of a
comrade. Progress could be made only with the
greatest exhaustion; a yard seemed a mile. Every
now and then the men had to halt for a brief space,
resting their elbows on the sides of the trench to
prevent their whole bodies being engulfed in the mud ;
without such support it was fatal to stand still. It
was not surprising that the relief was not complete
until 6 a.M. on the 20th October.

Many horrible tales were told about that relief,
but no invention could beggar the reality. Men with
rifles and haversacks could scarcely struggle on, but
their lot was easy compared with that of Vickers
and Lewis Gun teams, whose guns had to be carried
up and also ammunition’ for them. The magazines
for the Lewis Guns were taken in buckets, like nose-
bags, each holding four. The usual weight for a

1 Here more might have been done to help the men by divisions in the
line handing over stores to those taking over. It would have saved trouble
if the ammunition for the machine-guns had been kept in sealed boxes and
handed over ; this plan was adopted later.

Fe ee Se

1916] EVENTS, 20TH OCTOBER 165

man was ‘two buckets, but that was a Herculean
load on such a night. Tales of distress reached the
battalion H.Q. and parties with ropes and spades
set out to rescue stranded men. One Lewis gunner
of the 6th K.O.S.B. was so firmly embedded beyond
the waist in mud that when he was finally extricated
with ropes both his ankles were broken. The agonies
endured by the Highlanders and South Africans were
indescribable. Parties of worn-out men coming down
from the front line threw themselves into any shell-
hole, too tired to care what happened to them, and
it was a kind cruelty that drove them to their feet
and forced them on to some safer place. Many
Highlanders discarded their kilts as being too heavy,
but indeed so glutinous was the abundant mud that it
was difficult to tell whether a man wore a kilt or not.
Some of the Black Watch dropped down exhausted
at the door of a dressing station near High Wood,
and their tunics and equipment could not be removed
in the ordinary way, but had to be hacked off them
before they could be revived.

After their purgatorial march the men of the 27th
Brigade were unfit to exploit any success, but the
situation did not allow of any such attempt as the
6th K.O.S.B. found when they reached the front
line. The enemy still held the Nose, and this was
immediately reported by Lieut.-Colonel Connell to
Brig.-General Scrase-Dickins, who immediately made
arrangements for an attack to be delivered at 4 P.M.
Until that time the Tail and the Nose were to be
bombarded and at zero the 6th K.O.S.B. were to
advance under cover of a barrage, which was to lift
50 yards every time the infantry fired a green light.
The attack was to be from Snag Trench by bombing
parties, but in the event of this being checked another

166 THE NOSE CAPTURED [ocToBER 20

was to be delivered across the open from the east by
a support company an hour later. Lieut.-Colonel
Connell supplemented these instructions by ordering the
company at the Pimple to be ready to take advantage
of these assaults. Both attacks from the east were
repulsed by the machine-guns at the Nose. During
these actions the garrison at the Pimple observing
groups of the enemy retiring from the Tail towards
the Butte, inflicted severe losses with machine-gun
fire. At the same time, 2nd Lieut. Johnson and
a few men rushed across the open, drove out the
enemy and occupied the Nose. But the company
commander, thinking that his men were too few
to hold the whole trench from the Pimple to the
Nose, evacuated the position. On hearing this, Brig.-
General Scrase-Dickins ordered the 11th Royal Scots
in support to send a company to retake the Nose
and establish a post about 500 yards up the Tail,
but before it arrived the Nose was reoccupied by the
6th K.O.S.B. Under the direction of Lieut.-Colonel
Connell, who had gone to the Pimple on learning of
the evacuation, a party of the K.O.8.B. retook the
position and joined up with the company in Snag
Trench. Later the company of the 11th Royal Scots
arrived and passed up the Tail, where it established
a post.

Thus on the night of the 20th October all the
objectives of the attack of the 18th were secured.
Till the evening of the 24th October the Division held
the line and was busy strengthening its position and
_ digging new assembly trenches for an attack on the
Butte. It was the intention of the Corps to employ
the Ninth in a battle that was arranged for the 25th
October. On General Furse’s representations this
arrangement was cancelled and the Division was

1916 | THE DIVISION RELIEVED 167

relieved late on the 24th.1 Another engagement was
indeed beyond the capacity of the men. Though
casualties were not so high, the nerve-strain and fatigue
were even greater than in July. More men were
lost from illness and exposure than from wounds and
death, and the number of cases of trench feet was
exceptionally large. Many men on being brought
back from the mud of the line took off their boots to
rub their feet, which swelled to such an extent that
they could not be inserted in the boot again.

The work of the R.A.M.C., especially from the
18th October onwards, was evilly affected by the
conditions. A man too seriously wounded to walk
was in a piteous plight; he had to wait for several
hours until men were available to carry him to a
dressing station. The usual number of men for a
stretcher is two, but eight were scarcely sufficient
at the Butte de Warlencourt. It was perhaps in-
evitable that in a place over which the tide of battle
ebbed and flowed for days and nights, a number of
wounded should have been missed. For several days
after the Ninth took over the line not a few wounded
men of the London Division, the ghastly aftermath
of an unsuccessful attack, were brought in by patrols.
Every man who could be spared was sent to help
the R.A.M.C. and the utmost efforts were made by
the Division to ensure that no wounded man was
overlooked.

The action at the Butte de Warlencourt was the
most dismal of all the operations carried out by the
Division, but it was ennobled by the great qualities
of endurance and heroism displayed by all who had
a share in it. In that waste of mud and water the

1 The artillery stayed in and supported the attack by the Fiftieth
Division on the Butte.

168 THE IMPORTANCE OF MUD [ocroBER 1916

ground captured, though small in extent, represented
no mean achievement. The Butte remained impreg-
nable, guarded by slime and weather, and it was not
till the enemy voluntarily evacuated the place that it
was entered and held by British troops. It may be
questionable if the ground gained was worth the cost,
but the mud had proved a more powerful ally of the
adversary than had been expected.

CHAPTER VIII

ARRAS

NovemBer 1916 To Aprit 1917

On the 23rd November the Division was transferred
from the Fourth to the Third Army, commanded by
Sir Edmund Allenby. Most of the training and re-
organisation was carried out in the neighbourhood of
St Pol, and during this period several important changes
in command took place. On the 21st October, while
the Ninth was still engaged at the Somme, Brig.-
General Scrase-Dickins was promoted to the command
of the Thirty-seventh Division. He had been some-
what unfortunate during his career with the Ninth.
At Loos and at Longueval his brigade had the
bad luck to run into the enemy’s defences where they
had been least damaged by artillery-fire; but these
calamities were due not to lack of foresight or leader-
ship, but to circumstances that would have similarly
affected any other brigade. The General was noted
for his Spartan routine and his extraordinary personal
bravery. He was able to subsist on less than most
men and limited himself to two meals a day. When
his brigade was in the front trenches, he paid a daily
visit to the line, and of his gallantry many stories
were current. During the fighting in July his H.Q.
at Montauban were persistently shelled, but he was
never seen to twitch a muscle or dive for shelter; not

even under the fiercest bombardment did he forego
160

170 GENERAL FURSE PROMOTED [DECEMBER

his daily tub in the open square at Montauban. His
departure was viewed with the greatest regret; for
he had been with the Ninth since its formation, and
he was loved and respected by all who served under him.
But his promotion’ was known to have been thoroughly
well earned and he took with him the congratulations
and good wishes of the Division. His successor was
Brig.-General F. A. Maxwell, V.C., who came from
the Eighteenth Division and had the distinction of
having led the battalion that took Trones Wood.

There was a change also in the Highland Brigade.
On the 4th December Brig.-General Ritchie was ap-
pointed to the command of the Sixteenth Division.
His service with the Ninth had been attended with
almost unbroken success, and both at Loos and the
Somme his men had not only shown great brilliancy
and dash in securing their objectives, but had proved
themselves to be masters of the art of counter-attack.
He was succeeded by Brig.-General J. Kennedy of
the Argylls.

On the 1st December General Furse’ was appointed
Master-General of the Ordnance. It is safe to say
that no name is more closely associated with the annals
of the Ninth Division than that of General Furse. In
the fourteen months during which he had been in
command he had succeeded in effecting that organised
co-operation which was the proof of the unity that
bound Lowlanders, Highlanders, and South Africans
into one complete whole. He loathed water-tight com-
partments and did his utmost to foster the closest inter-
course and co-operation between the various arms—

' Unfortunately long and constant strain had told on his health, and
shortly after his appointment to the Thirty-seventh Division he was
invalided to England.

2 For his services in the war General Furse received the K.C.B. in June
1917.

1916] ' ° MAJOR-GENERAL LUKIN 171

infantry, gunners, sappers, and mounted men—who only
by acting in concert could realise severally their highest
fighting efficiency. The fighting spirit had never been
absent, but in training, in trenches, and in battle, he
fostered and encouraged it until it became an instinct.
He was a reservoir of power and ideas, and he had
a natural fair for striking phrases. Anxious and alert
to increase the efficiency of his command, he was alive
to the necessity of testing all new tactical appliances,
and in his numerous conferences the principal motive
was ‘‘not fault-finding but fact-finding.” An officer
of the Division once remarked, ‘General Furse made
the Ninth Division, and the Ninth Division made
General Furse,” and there is much that is true in the
statement. The leader had every reason to be proud
of his men and the men of their leader. His appoint-
ment was viewed with both regret and gratification ;
regret, because a tried leader had gone, and gratification
because his promotion was regarded as a tribute both
to himself and to the Division. But though his con-
nection with the Ninth was officially severed, he was
able in his new capacity to render it useful service.

He was succeeded by Major-General H. T. Lukin
of the South African Brigade, the command of which
passed to Brig.-General Dawson of the Ist Regiment.
Major-General Lukin had won a great name while in
command of the South Africans, and much was expected
of him in his new position.

In the course of the next five months there were
a few changes among battalion commanders. In the
Argylls the new C.O. was Lieut.-Colonel H. G. Sotheby.
Lieut.-Colonel Connell was invalided to England after
the action of the Butte de Warlencourt, and Lieut.-
Colonel G. B. F. Smyth, who had been thrice wounded
in the war, left the Sappers of the 90th Field Company

172 ARRAS . [ DECEMBER

to command the 6th K.O.S.B. In March 1917 Lieut.-
Colonel Fargus went to England, and Lieut.-Colonel
Thorne took over the command of the 12th Royal
Scots. There were several adjustments in the South
African Brigade. Lieut.-Colonel F. H. Heal became
C.0O. of the 1st Regiment; Lieut.-Colonel Tanner
returned to the 2nd, and Lieut.-Colonel Christian took
over the command of the 4th.

The training of the men followed the usual lines,
but in one respect there was a significant change. The
bomb had proved to be a very useful weapon, but it
had been cultivated to such excess that the men were
in danger of forgetting how to use their rifles. The
rifle is the principal: weapon of the infantryman, and
practice in its use became the foundation of all our
training. The bomb was discouraged, for it had been
noted that a man with a rifle and bayonet in his hands
was more enterprising and aggressive than one with
his pockets full of bombs. About the end of the year a
more efficient protection against gas, the box respirator,
was issued and the men were drilled in the rapid
adjustment of it.

On the 5th December the Division took over the
line north and east of Arras. During the last week
of November the battalions at dusk marched along
the long, straight pavé road from St Pol and entered
the city through the majestic pylons of the Baudimont
Gate. Arras had been damaged during the German
onslaught of 1914, but since that time had been scarcely
molested. This quaint old Spanish city, well known
to artists and antiquarians, presented a harmonious
blending of the medizeval and the modern. The eye
was constantly surprised by new aspects that offered
themselves on a ramble through the streets—the old,
narrow, nubbly lanes, overlooked by ancient Hispano-

MajJor-GENERAL SIR HENRY TIMSON LUBIN, KC. BC. sGe DSO

{Face page 172

Digitized by Google

1916] ARRAS 173

Flemish houses, opening out into spacious and ordered
boulevards with modern and opulent mansions, the
commercial commodiousness of the Petite Place and
the Grande Place, and the ramparts of Vauban. The
natural centre was the two squares, Petite Place and
Grande Place, both now bordered by the ruins of
stately gabled houses and so often internnttently shelled
that they were avoided by all except sightseers and -
souvenir hunters. Near them, massive ruins suggested
a nobility and dignity of structure that the intaet
cathedral had never possessed. But the greatest
example of German vandalism was the mound of
masonry and dust that marked the site of the Hotel
de Ville, justly celebrated as a notable example of
Spanish architectural art. Arras, skirted on the north
by the River Scarpe, lay in a gentle hollow, overlooked
on the west by a semicircle of low hills, and on the
east by a ridge, which, farther north, passed into the
Vimy Ridge. From the station the railway ran east
to Douai, a branch swinging north to Lens, while
towards the south it ran into Albert. The Arras—Lens
railway and the eastern ridge were held by the enemy,
whose guns commanded the greater part of the Albert—
Arras line.

At the end of 1916 Arras seemed a city of the
dead. On the long main roads the rumble of wheels
and the clatter of hoofs were seldom heard, and the
streets were deserted except for a few soldiers and
some civilians who skulked along under the eaves of the
houses. Few parts of the town were without the scars
of war. In many houses the jumbled and disarranged
furniture told a story of panic and hurried departure ;
in some cases the outside wall had been broken by a
shell, revealing the inside of a house intact, like the
model of a doll’s house. Here and there enterprising

174 THE TRENCHES [DECEMBER

civilians ran excellent cafés, where the men could
supplement their rations at prices that were not
exorbitant. Near the station the Hotel de Commers
was the favourite rendezvous for officers.

The trenches taken over by the Division lay on the
western slopes of the eastern ridge and extended from
the south of the Scarpe as far north as Roclincourt.
The area was divided into three sectors, ‘‘I,” “J,” and
“‘K,” from south to north, and all three brigades were in
the line, the 26th in “I,” the South African in “J,”
and the 27th in “K.” This position, with certain
changes, was held by the Division until the 9th April
1917, and the long spell enabled the men to make the
trenches as perfect as they could be made. During this
time the strictest discipline was maintained and the
morning round of the battalion C.O. brought reproof or
commendation according as each company did its duty.
By 9 A.M. every man had to be washed and shaved, the
rifles clean and polished, and the trenches neat and
tidy. There was tremendous competition between the
various companies in the desire of each to better its
neighbour in the provision of comforts for the men;
hot soup and cocoa were served late at night and early
in the morning to those in the front trenches, but
perhaps the last stage of luxury was reached when
hot water was supplied for shaving.

Behind the lines the duties of the transport, located
near D.H.Q. at Duisans, were neither rough nor unduly
perilous. The busiest centre of activity was the
Divisional Tactical School, near Givenchy, under the
direction of Lieut.-Colonel Croft.’ The cult of the rifle
was assiduously inculcated, and officers and N.C.Os.
were divided into sections, which competed with one

'In Three Years with the Ninth Division Lieut.-Colonel Croft
discusses several questions of interest to C.Os.

1916] TRAINING 178

another in all forms of warlike sport. A great effort
was made to banish the deadening effects of trench
warfare, and initiative and resource were stimulated by
means of tactical schemes. Each course was wound
up with a great display, in which the whole school
carried out an attack, and the showers of Véry lights
(representing the barrage), the rattle of the rifles and
machine-guns, the line of flares, and a contact aeroplane
gave a very fair impression of a real fight.

Training, however, was not confined to the school
or the back areas. Though Arras itself was overlooked
by the enemy, there was a wide stretch of dead ground
between the city and the eastern ridge, where there were
excellent facilities for training. Near Roclincourt a
long bank provided a natural butt for Lewis Gun
practice from any range up to 300 yards, and the
valley offered ample scope for rifle-grenade instruc-
tion. More could and should have been done; but,
since the days of 1914 when everyone that could be
spared was needed to man the trenches, it had been
customary to regard trench warfare and training as
incompatible. Thus training as a rule had _ been
confined to such periods as the men spent out of the
line. As a matter of fact, battalions had often better
chances of useful practice when in the line than when
in back areas, and in 1917 the more satisfactory system
of carrying on training at all times was begun. The
vast importance of constant training as a primary factor
of efficiency had been long neglected in France, but
when the start was made development was continuous.
Though belated, the issue of pamphlets which dealt
with the action of the platoon (8.8. 143) and of the
Division (S.S. 185) in attack, was none the less
welcome. Hitherto, officers and N.C.Os. had been

guided only by the general principles stated in Field
N

176 THE WINTER OF 1916 [pEc. 1916-

Service Regulations, but the pamphlets provided illus-
trations showing the application of these principles to
actual problems. The more junior the commander, the
more desirable it was to make things clear to him by
concrete cases, and in this respect 8.8. 143 was invalu-
able. The adoption of these pamphlets ensured both a
uniformity in training and organisation throughout the
army and a practical knowledge of the methods of
dealing with the problems of actual warfare.

During the winter, which was the driest one since
the war began, the health of the men remained good.
Every precaution was taken to prevent trench feet;
each battalion in the line arranged for frequent supplies
of clean socks, and each man’s feet were rubbed daily
by the stretcher-bearers with whale-oil under the super-
vision of an officer. In January and February 1917 a
hard frost set in, the most severe since 1839, and during
this period men in the line were more comfortable than
those in Arras. There was a great scarcity of fuel,
and the strong temptation of men in windowless and
draughty billets to loot wood and furniture from empty
houses had to be sternly repressed. With the thaw
came mud and hard work, but the trenches had been
thoroughly revetted and any damage was quickly
repaired.

In November 1916 the sector was reputed to be one
of the quietest on the whole British front. ‘Even
more peaceful than the Vimy” was the remark of men
who had gone forward with working-parties, and the
experiences of the first two or three days appeared
to confirm the statement. The trenches had been
previously held by the Thirty-fifth, a Bantam division,
and were too shallow for people of ordinary stature.
If the enemy had been vindictive, he could not have
failed to snipe a number of our men, but happily he

MARCH 1917] USEFUL CO-OPERATION 177

was not bellicose and was ready to lie low, provided
he was not disturbed. In the course of a few days the
trenches were deepened, so that one could walk along
the front line without being exposed from his waist
upwards, and after the Ninth Divisional Artillery re-
heved that of the Thirty-fifth on the 28th December,
the Germans were annoyed to find that the peace of
the sector had vanished. Peevish and fretful, the foe
retaliated chiefly by means of heavy trench mortars and
lighter ones, variously known by our troops as “aerial
darts,” ‘‘pine-apples,” or ‘‘fish-tails.” Though the former
made a terrific din and flattened the trenches, they did
not cause much loss of life, but the latter were very
sinister weapons, and were fired five or six at a time,
so that, though they were visible, it was difficult to
dodge one and avoid running into another. From these
came most of our casualties, about 30 per week for each
battalion in the front line, a fairly high total for what
was regarded as a tranquil spot. The duel of hate
however was much in our favour. The enemy trench
system was divided into sectors for retaliation purposes,
and so admirable was the co-operation between our
infantry and gunners, that when a battalion was pestered
by trench mortars, it only required a single code word
such as “Dora” or “ Minnie” to be ’phoned by the
former to the latter to ensure prompt punishment for
the offending sector.

Raids were the most outstanding feature of these
months and they came to be regarded rather as a
matter of course than as an adventure. Ten raids,
the majority of them successful, were carried out
between the Ist January and the 9th April. Many
of the enemy were killed and 49 prisoners captured,
while our casualties, chiefly wounded, did not exceed
the number of the prisoners.

178 RAID BY THE “RIFLES” [pEc. 1916

By far the most notable raid was that of the
“Rifles” on the 14th February. The credit for the
scheme belonged principally to Major M. N. Forsyth,
M.C., who suggested it to Brig.-General Maxwell.
The ground selected for the operation was well
adapted for a daylight raid; it was east of Roclincourt
and, lying in a shallow dip, could not be observed
from either flank. The most painstaking care was
given to organisation and arrangements. The raiding
party, which consisted of 20 officers and 320 other
ranks under the command of Major Forsyth, was
divided into various groups, each with a special task
to perform, such as clearing dug-outs, demolition of
emplacements, blocking trenches, escorting and search-
ing prisoners, cutting wire, and evacuation of wounded.
No raider carried any identification mark either on
his tunic or in his pocket. A plan of the enemy’s
ground was mapped out behind the line, and here
men and officers had a number of rehearsals. The
general scheme was simple. After a one-minute
barrage by the artillery and trench mortars, two groups
were to leave our trenches and enter the enemy’s
system through two gaps in the wire previously cut
by trench mortars. The parties were to push rapidly
up the communication trenches bounding the area and
were to meet in the third line, shutting in all the
garrison. Other groups were to follow and clear all
the intermediate trenches and dug-outs. The whole
party after remaining for forty minutes in the German
lines was to withdraw at the end of that time through
three gaps, the third being cut during the raid. While
the raiders were busy, the artillery were to screen the
area from observation by a ‘‘box”’ barrage.

1 The barrage fell along three sides of a rectangle, screening the
infantry from the front and the flanks.

yan. 1917] RAID BY HIGHLAND BRIGADE 179

The operation met with the success’ its careful
preparations deserved. At 11 a.m. Major Forsyth
led his party across ‘“No-Man’s-Land” and entered
the opposing trenches. In the skirmish that followed
many of the enemy were killed and 43 were captured ;
2 machine-guns, 1 trench mortar, and a large number
of rifles and other material were brought back. The
slight casualties of the “Rifles,” who well earned the
praise? of the Commander-in-Chief, consisted of 2
killed, 15 wounded, and 1 missing.

All other raids, though on a smaller scale, were
marked by the same particular care in organisation.
At 3.8 P.M. on the 6th January a company of the
Black Watch, under 2nd Lieut. Proudfoot, and one
of the Argylls, under 2nd Lieut. Pardy, after a heavy
preliminary bombardment and covered by a smoke-
barrage, penetrated to the enemy’s third line and
remained in his trenches for half an hour. The whole
system was thoroughly smashed by the artillery,
and only 4 men were found above ground, of
whom 3 were killed and one was captured. The
remainder of the garrison, which according to the
prisoner consisted of 160 men, had sheltered in the
dug-outs, where the greater number must have perished
when these were demolished by Stokes shells thrown
down by the raiders. This raid was undertaken at
short notice by the Highland Brigade, and its objects
were to test the efficiency of our heavy artillery in cutting
wire, especially in front of the second and third lines,

' News from the very start was good. Brig.-General Tudor, who was
in the trenches watching the raid, was in touch with the front line by
telephone, and the only reports he received were, ‘‘ One more penny ”—‘ Two
more pennies,” etc. “ Penny” was the code word for prisoner.

2 The following message was sent by Sir Douglas Haig on the 16th :—

“Congratulate the Ninth Scottish Division, and particularly the 9th
Scottish Rifles, on the success of their raid carried out on the 14th.”

180 SIGNS OF AN OFFENSIVE [pec. 1916-

and to find out if good observation could be obtained
from the hostile trenches on to a strong point in the
enemy’s rear, known as “The Harp,” which was likely
to be a formidable obstacle to our advance during
the offensive that was being planned. These objects
were fulfilled, and the general opinion was that the
success' of the raid was due to the ‘“‘heavies.” The
Germans showed their annoyance by subjecting Arras
to a gas bombardment so intense that it has been
quoted by the gas experts as one of the heaviest con-
centrations of the war. Equal success attended dashing
raids by the South Africans on the 2nd January and
the 7th April, and by the 6th K.O.S.B. on the 11th
January. The attempts of the enemy were feeble and
half-hearted, a significant confession of nervousness and
consciousness of inferiority. Between the 6th December
and the 21st March four attempts to penetrate our
trenches were beaten off with loss.

At the beginning of March, Arras awoke to vigorous
life. After nightfall throngs of men jostled each other
in the streets of the town, and from the great main
roads rose the hum of constant traffic. In the faubourgs
and wooded fields round the city numerous batteries of
heavy guns, sinister and menacing engines of destruction,
were ready in position, and amid bosky recesses and
inviting orchards one often stumbled upon fresh em-
placements that indicated the expected arrival of many
more. The evidences’ of a projected offensive were

1 In the Ninth, however, it was thought that the principal factor was
surprise, and the raid of the “ Rifles” already referred to was undertaken
to show that a preliminary bombardment was not necessary for success.

2 At the end of January a party of the Division proceeding along the
road to Arras was accosted by a Canadian soldier. ‘ Hullo, what crowd
are you?” “Ninth Division,” was the'reply, and then came the exclama-
tion, “Huh! the scrappin’ Ninth.” The Canadian’s tone of mingled
friendship, admiration, and uneasiness betrayed more clearly than any
words his firm conviction that storm-troops were gathering for a battle.

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unmistakable, and these were confirmed by changes
on our front. Until the 14th January, the Ninth
was under the VI. Corps, but on that date it was
transferred to the XVII., commanded by Sir Charles
Fergusson. As a result, the 26th Brigade was shifted
from the right of the line to ‘“‘L” sector on the left,
which was taken over from the Third Canadian Division,
and until the 11th February the Division held the whole
of the Corps front from the Scarpe to the Arras—Lille
road. “That day the Highland Brigade and part of
the 27th were relieved by the Fifty-first Division
from Roclincourt to the Lille road. On the 24th
February the line was still further contracted when the
Thirty-fourth Division took over the rest of ““K”’ sector.
This left to the Ninth only the “I” sector extending
from the Scarpe to St Pancras Trench, lying to the
north of the Arras—Bailleul road, the stretch of front
amounting to some 1800 yards.

From the beginning of 1917 every man was hard at
work on the preparations for the great offensive that
had been planned at a conference held at the French
G.H.Q. in November 1916. The general idea was
to carry on a series of offensives on all fronts for
the purpose of “depriving the enemy of the power
of weakening any one of his fronts in order to rein-
force another.” The design of Sir Douglas Haig was to
garner the fruits of the Somme struggle by pinching
off the salient between the Scarpe and the Ancre, into
which the enemy had been pressed as a result of that
battle. With this object, a converging attack was to
be carried out by the Third Army from Arras and
the Fifth Army on the Ancre. Provided the situa-
tion remained unchanged, there was good reason to
expect that this manceuvre would inflict enormous

' Haig’s Despatches, vol. i., p. 81.

182 PLANS OF ALLIES FOR 1917 [pEc. 1916-

losses on the enemy and compel him to use up his
reserves, and thus offer a greater assurance of success
for the main object of the British Field-Marshal, which
was to secure the control of the Flanders coast-line
before the end of 1917. The attack of the Third and
Fifth Armies was to be protected by an operation
against the Vimy Ridge, which would also give us
the command of the Douai plains and might even
lead to the capture of Lens. Apart from these objects
Sir Douglas Haig had no desire to carry on a pro-
tracted fight in the neighbourhood of Arras.

These important projects were considerably modified
at the beginning of 1917. The striking power of the
British forces was sensibly diminished by the fact
that a considerable portion of the line, extending as

far south as Roye, had to be taken over from the—

French. Again the British plans were made ancillary
to those of General Nivelle, now in command of the
French armies, who had planned an ambitious cam-
paign in Champagne, and the Arras offensive was
expected to assist his schemes by pinning down a
large proportion of the German forces. Moreover,
the enemy, realising his danger in the Ancre—-Scarpe
salient, anticipated the British attack by withdrawing
from that area to new and formidable defences
(the Hindenburg Line) in front of Cambrai, on the
construction of which the Germans had worked like
beavers during the winter months. This timely retreat
largely eviscerated the hopes of the Arras campaign.
The plans of the Western Allies were marked by
compromise and strategic vacillation, and this was
particularly unfortunate, because 1917 was the period
that was expected to produce the greatest disparity
between the forces of the Entente and those of the
Central Powers in favour of the former. The principal

MARCH 1917] PLANS OF ALLIES FOR 1917 183

scheme of the British Higher Command was in-
definitely postponed, and it would probably have been
wise to replace it by another plan, which, while assuring
the support promised for the schemes of General
Nivelle, would yet offer a prize worthy of a big effort.
This end would have been fulfilled by fixing Lens, and
perhaps Douai, as the objective of the British Army.
If the former place were carried before the summer, its
possession by us would probably turn the north end of
the Drocourt switch line, and would certainly give us
control of the Douai plains and enable us to menace
La Bassée from the south. The tremendously high
moral of the British Army, stimulated greatly by the
common talk about 1917 as the year of victory,
deserved to be harnessed to ambitious and even
heroic schemes. Events in Russia also, culminating
in the Revolution while the preparations for the battle
were being carried on, seemed to demand a big effort.
It was futile to wait to see what the effect of the
Revolution would be, and it was desirable to endeavour
to affect it by events in France. An important success
at the beginning of the year would probably strengthen
the moderate elements in Russia, and preserve it as
an effective ally for the Entente. But the Passchen-
daele project, which undoubtedly held out the most
alluring prospects if successful, obsessed the British
Higher Command too much to lead to any drastic
alteration of plan. It is impossible to doubt the
cordiality and genuineness of the co-operation between
the British and the French armies, but both the
schemes and the events of 1917 demonstrated that
the strategical unity of plan necessary for success
could be secured only by a single Command directing
both forces towards a single end.

A perplexing point in the preparations for the

184 TASK OF THE NINTH [pec. 1916-

battle lay in the fact that there was no approach to
the trenches except through Arras, which was an
obvious mark for artillery. In the town reasonable
safety was provided by improving and strengthening
the system of underground vaults and catacombs, which
were capable of accommodating large bodies of troops.
It was not so easy to form roads and routes in
sufficient number to allow of a smooth distribution
of stores and munitions, but in this respect the work
of the Staff was so well performed that there was
virtually no delay or congestion. With similar atten-
tion to details of organisation, communication trenches
were dug and allotted, so that the attacking troops
could reach their assembly position without hindrance.
By the end of March the preparations on the front
of the Division were practically completed with little
interference from the enemy’s artillery, though numbers
of trench mortar emplacements were repeatedly
hit.

The role of the XVII. Corps was to capture the
enemy's third system of defences, running north from
the Scarpe at Feuchy through the Point du Jour.
After this was accomplished, a further advance was
to be made south of the Point du Jour to secure the
fourth system and the village of Fampoux. Three
divisions were to lead the assault, the Ninth on the
south, Thirty-fourth in the centre, and Fifty-first on
the north, while the Fourth was to be in reserve. On
the right of the Ninth the attack was to be carried
on by the Fifteenth Division.

The Ninth was required to take the enemy’s third
system from the Point du Jour to the Scarpe and to
consolidate a line leading from the eastern end of the
village of Athies to the Point du Jour. There were
three objectives, marked on the map as the Black,

MARCH 1917] TASK OF THE NINTH 185

Blue, and Brown Lines. From our front line the
ground rose gently to the summit of the ridge, on the
reverse side of which was the German main trench
of the first system, protected by a triple row of strong
wire, as our air photographs showed. This trench,
called Obermayer, extended to the east end of the
village St Laurent-Blangy and formed the Black Line.
From this point the ground dipped to a shallow valley
and rose again to the line of the Arras—Lens Railway
(Blue Line), which on the left ran through a deep
cutting, but towards the Scarpe went over a high
embankment. From the Railway the ground sloped
up to the plateau of the Point du Jour (Brown Line)
thickly covered with wire. The fourth objective (Green
Line), which included Fampoux, was to be secured by
the Fourth Division. The attack, to be covered by a
creeping barrage, was ultimately arranged for the 9th
April and was to be preceded by a preliminary bom-
bardment commencing on the 5th.

All three brigades, the 26th on the right, the South
African in the centre, and the 27th on the left, were
to take part, each on a frontage of approximately
600 yards. Two battalions in each brigade were to
take the first and second objectives, after which the
other two were to pass through and carry on the attack.
Four tanks were to assist the Division by helping to
clear the two villages of St Laurent-Blangy and Athies.
No battalion was to attack with its full strength. Since
the time of Loos never more than 20 officers per
battalion had gone into battle, the remainder along
with some men being left at the Transport Lines. The
pamphlet S.S. 135 laid down the proportion of men
and officers to be left out of action, so that even if
a battalion received a shattering blow in battle there
would be the nucleus of a new organisation.

186 SMOKE [pEc. 1916-

The preparations of the C.R.A. were marked by
unflagging industry and ingenuity. As the result of
months of toil, the gunners had constructed positions
that enabled the batteries to function under almost
ideal conditions. There were no natural hidden posi-
tions to serve as emplacements for the guns, so ridges
of screens were built up to conceal emplacements,
situated in such a way that of the seven’ brigades
under the command of Brig.-General Tudor only one
was more than 2000 yards from the enemy’s line.
Arrangements were also made to construct emplace-
ments in one of the forming-up trenches, so that when
the infantry advanced batteries could move up in close
support. Moreover, all the guns were virtually square
with their tasks, so that the barrage would be formed
by shells falling at right angles to the line of advance.
The R.F.A. Brigades were in St Catherine, St Nicholas,
and Roclincourt Valley.

Ingenuity and initiative were shown in the arrange-
ments for the creeping barrage, which was to be
formed by a combination of H.E. and smoke-shell.
Brig.-General Tudor had consistently upheld that a
smoke-screen offered the best form of support for
infantry, and though smoke had received a bad name
at Loos owing to men losing direction, he believed
that this was due to the fact that on that occasion
the smoke had been produced by candles and had
necessarily been started on our own parapets. If the
smoke-screen could be put down on the enemy’s line
it would guide our men instead of confusing them, while
it would still blind the enemy. At the end of 1915

1 14th Brigade R.H.A. 52nd Brigade A.F.A. (taken from the
Ninth in January).
50th ,, RFA. 23rd » A.FPA.
Sist ,, R.F.A. 20th , RFA.

32nd Brigade R.F.A.

MARCH 1917] BARRAGE ARRANGEMENTS 187

he pressed for the manufacture of smoke-shells, but
nothing was really done until General Furse took the
matter up; as a result of his importunity smoke-
shells were made, and they began to arrive in France
about the autumn of 1916. The supply was limited,
but as no other division desired them, the Ninth was
able to get the whole quantity issued to the Third
Army, about 4000 rounds. Smoke-shells were em-
ployed by the Canadians to cover their raids, and also
by Brig.-General Tudor on the 6th January to support
the raid of the Black Watch and the Argylls, but the
9th April was the first occasion on which they were
used in a creeping barrage.

Zero was to be 5.30 a.m., and at that hour the
barrage was to open 50 yards in front of the German
front line trench. Where ‘“‘ No-Man’s-Land” was 200
yards or more in extent, the assaulting troops were to
leave their trenches and form up in the open. One
minute after zero the barrage was to lift on to the
front line, where it was to remain for three minutes.
The rate of advance between lifts varied from 50 yards
every one and a half minutes to 100 yards every four
minutes. The infantry was expected to reach the
Black Line at 6.4 A.m., and the barrier fire would then
advance 300 yards beyond it, where it would remain
until 7.36 a.M., by which time the leading battalions
would be ready to resume the advance. In similar
fashion the Blue Line was to be secured by 8.13 a.M.,
and the Brown Line by 1.2 vm. At that time the
Fourth Division was to pass through and go on to
the Green Line. To prevent the enemy in the rear
seeing the creeping barrage and countering it, a distant
smoke-barrage was to be formed by two 18-pounder
batteries.

The artillery bombardment was to be supplemented

188 RICHTOFEN’S “CIRCUS” [PEBRUARY

by a trench-mortar and machine-gun barrage. Forty
2-inch and fourteen 9°45-inch mortars and twenty
machine-guns were to take part. The Division had
been vastly strengthened both in Lewis and Vickers
Guns; each battalion had now sixteen of the former,
and the arrival of the 197th Machine-Gun Company
had brought the Vickers Companies up to four. All
machine - gunners had received constant training in
indirect fire while in this sector, and during the battle
the German positions were to be drenched by showers
of machine-gun bullets. One hundred and twenty-six
18-pounders, forty-two 4°5 howitzers, and forty-seven
guns of heavier calibre were to support our attack.
While the preparations were being made, it was
noticed that the enemy’s aeroplanes had become very
enterprising and aggressive. Up to the end of 1916
scarcely one had ventured to cross our lines, but from
the first days of February there was a disquieting
change. On every clear day swarms of German
machines patrolled the air and penetrating far over
our hinterland, boldly challenged conflict with our
planes. Individual combats between the rival airmen
were of frequent occurrence, and most of those that
took place in the view of the infantry resulted in the
triumph of the enemy. The most formidable and
audacious of the hostile planes was a very fast one,
which, being painted on the underpart with a brilliant
red, was generally known as the “Red Belly.” It
seemed to be much more capable of rapid manceuvre
than any of ours, and on one occasion a single-handed
“Red Belly” broke up and put to flight a squadron
of six British planes. These German machines were
believed to belong to Von Richtofen’s ‘‘ Circus,” which
became very famous in latter days and was moved from
one point of the front to another as required ; it con-

ee —— — a

1917] GERMAN RETIREMENT 189

sisted of from 30 to 50 planes, controlled by expert
pilots. Amid these circumstances the persistence with
which our airmen in unequally equipped and inferior
machines rose daily to meet the enemy and observe
his lines, was a convincing proof of their grit and
devotion to duty. There was some hope, however,
that the conditions of July 1916 would be restored
when the new and speedy machines, which were being
manufactured in great numbers, were ready to take
the air.

The comparatively short line held by the Division
after the 24th February provided a welcome opportunity
for the training of the men on a more thorough scale
than had been possible before any previous battle.
While one brigade held the trenches, another located
in “Y” huts on the Arras-St Pol road was engaged
on work, and the third underwent a course of training
near Monchy Breton. This grrangement allowed eight
days training for each brigade in turn. From the
photographs taken by the Royal Flying Corps, the
enemys system was marked out accurately on the
training area by tapes and shallow trenches made by
ploughs, and the frequent practice that the men had
over this course gave them a very fair idea of what
they were expected to do on the 9th April. Exact
models of the ground to be attacked were moulded
in clay, and the men thus learned not merely the
character of the country, but also the names of the
German trenches.

When the preparations were nearing completion, the
unwelcome news was received that the enemy had
evacuated his positions in the Ancre-Scarpe salient.
It was feared that he would evade our blow by with-
drawing from his line in front of Arras. Rumours of
a retirement had been circulated on the 24th February,

190 RECONNAISSANCE BY liltx ROYAL SCOTS | [res.

and when the Third Division in the south reported on
the 19th March that the foe had retired from his
front line up to the Arras—Cambrai road, Sir Charles
Fergusson resolved to test his strength in front of Arras
by a daylight reconnaissance. This was entrusted to
the 11th Royal Scots. The operation was timed for
3 p.M. on the 21st March, by which hour the infantry
were assembled, but it had to be postponed for half an
hour to allow the artillery to finish their preparations.
Two or three hostile planes were hovering overhead, but
it was impossible to say if they had spotted the assembly.
A heavy German trench mortar opened fire during
this period but the damage it inflicted was insignificant.
The assailants, consisting of two companies commanded
by Lieut.-Colonel Croft, jumping over the parapet,
swept on under desultory machine-gun fire and entered
the opposing trenches. A furious and intricate conflict
ensued, and when some, Germans counter-attacked
across the open, they were shot down by the accurate
rifle-fire of the Royal Scots. When at last Lieut.-
Colonel Croft gave the signal to withdraw, his men
returned to their own line without molestation. Though
their losses—amounting to 5 officers and 70 other
ranks killed, wounded, and missing—had been heavy,
they had fulfilled their mission, and proved that the
enemy was holding his line in strength opposite the
XVII. Corps.

For the next few days Lieut.-Colonel Croft’s men
had a surfeit of thrills. At 5 a.m. on the 22nd, after
a short preliminary bombardment, the enemy dashed
across ‘‘No-Man’s-Land” and secured 3 men from
a Lewis Gun post. On the night of the 23rd, the
Royal Scots replied in kind. Lieutenant Matthews
with a small party entered the opposing trenches and
killed 4 Germans, whose outcry alarmed the garrison.

1917] FORMATIONS FOR ATTACK 191

The raiders, however, did not escape without loss, one
man being killed, another wounded, and Lieutenant
Matthews was missing. Next day sentries reported
that they saw a body believed to be that of Lieutenant
Matthews lying in the enemy’s wire, and Lieut.-Colonel
Croft issued orders for a patrol to go out after dusk and
bring it in. 2nd Lieut. Storey, mistaking the instruc-
tions, did not wait for dusk, but went out alone in full
daylight ; though fired at continuously, he was able to
crawl near enough to see that what had been taken for
a body was only a piece of sacking.

The formations adopted and practised for the attack
were the same in all three brigades. The men were to
advance in a series of waves, a wave consisting of two
lines, and each wave was to be followed by a line of
‘“‘moppers-up,” who were to clear captured trenches
and dug-outs of skulking foes, so that no damage might
be done after the leading troops had gone on. From
right to left the disposition of battalions was as follows:
7th Seaforths, Sth Black Watch, 3rd South African
Infantry, 4th South African Infantry, 12th Royal Scots,
and 6th K.O.S.B., and these were supported by the
5th Camerons, 10th Argylls, Ist South African Infantry,
2nd South African Infantry, 9th Scottish Rifles, and
11th Royal Scots. The infantry were reinforced by
the sappers, machine-gunners, and the trench mortar
batteries. The four tanks were to be assembled in the
valley just east of the Candle Factory, and the noise of
their approach was to be drowned by machine-gun fire.
The enemy’s front wire had been entirely demolished by
the 2-inch trench mortars, and constant patrolling had
prevented the gaps being repaired. This wire-cutting
feat was a great triumph for the 2-inch trench mortars ;
many people believed it was impossible for them to cut

the wire, but they did it most effectively.
7 O

192 FORMATIONS FOR ATTACK [FEB 1917

On the eve of the battle the men were in high
spirits and very confident of success. The notion of a
check was never entertained. Since the beginning of
December they had achieved a marked and increasing
ascendancy over the enemy,’ who was known to be
nervous and much perturbed as to our projects.

1 The enemy opposing us consisted of the Ist and 24th Bavarian Reserve
Divisions.

CHAPTER IX

THE BATTLES OF ARRAS

Tue Actions oF 9TH ApriL, 12TH Aprit, 3rD May,
5tH June 1917

THE preliminary bombardment of the German en-
trenched positions opened on the 5th April. Special
attention was devoted to counter-battery work, and
with the assistance of aeroplane observation and
sound - ranging devices, a great many of the hostile
guns were knocked out by direct hits. As a result,
the reply was extraordinarily weak, and though a few
shells were thrown into Arras, little damage was done.
Our ‘Chinese barrages” not only made fine spectacles,
but were most useful as the reply they provoked showed
us where the German retaliation barrage would fall.
The assembly of the Division was completed without
difficulty during the night of the 8th/9th. On the front
of the 26th and 27th Brigades the leading troops were
accommodated in the trenches, but the South Africans
made use of small craters, which had been blown by
the sappers in front of their line.

Shortly before zero all hope of a fine day was
dashed by a gentle drizzle of rain. At 5.30 A.M. our
guns opeped with a deafening crash. Overhead the
rushing steel sounded like a frenzied discord combining
the deep boom of the drum with the shrill shriek of
the whistle, and where the shells landed, the earth

198

194 ATTACK ON BLACK LINE [APRIL 9

leaped up in a mad barbaric dance. A gigantic wall
of smoke and fire lay right along the enemy’s line, and
sprays of coloured lights, shooting up from his trenches,
betokened the anxiety and distress of the garrison.
The hostile barrage was slow, and when it descended
on our front line, eight minutes after zero, it was thin
and ragged. During the first three minutes of our
barrage the leading waves took up their position for
the advance, the only trouble being on the extreme left,
where the K.O.8.B., forming up, had some casualties
through our smoke-shells falling short. With the
first lift the khaki lines pushed forward. In spite of
their training, the men had the greatest difficulty in
recognising the hostile trenches, which had been so
torn up that they hardly presented a break in the
belt sof churned-up soil that marked the devastating
path of the artillery. The only serious resistance was
encountered by the Seaforths, who stormed the Island
near Blangy and killed a number of bombers among the
rubble and cellars of Athies. Elsewhere the advance
was carried on without check. A few casualties were
inflicted by machine-guns, but the smoke-screen was
most effective, and owing to this the enemy's shooting
was very erratic. ‘The ardour of our troops could
scarcely be restrained; flushed with success, they
kept close up to the barrage and in many cases
passed through it. The Bavarians had built up a
worthy reputation during the war, but before they
had time to show fight our men were upon them.
On reaching the Black Line the Black Watch captured
the regimental commander and the adjutant of the
8th Bavarians, who had not realised that a battle was
in progress. On the left, Lieut.-Colonel Thorne of the
12th Royal Scots was killed when leading his men,
but the battalion under Major Hay was irresistible

1917} ATTACK ON BLUE LINE 195

and easily secured the Black Line. The K.O.S.B.
shot past the first objective and stopped in a sunken
road beyond it, where they found swarms of the 25th
Bavarians crouching in the dug-outs. The whole of
the Black Line was secured in the time allotted.
During the advance a few of the South Africans bore
too much to the north, but the Black Watch extended
their left flank and the boundaries between the
brigades were readjusted at the first objective.

Owing to the bad light and the obliteration of the
enemy system, the ‘“moppers” had great difficulty in
recognising the various trenches and in some cases
overran their objectives, consequently there were several
instances of Germans emerging from their shelters and
firing at the backs of our men. The most serious
mishap took place on the front of the 27th Brigade,
where a machine-gun suddenly came to life and
opened fire on a party of the 9th Seaforths who
had come up to dig a communication trench. The
men dropped their shovels, picked up their rifles, and
after killing its crew carried off the machine-gun as
a trophy. The clearing parties found the front system
full of Germans, most of whom had taken shelter either
in the dug-outs or just in the doorway, and they were
killed or taken prisoner.

The drizzle had developed into a steady downpour
while the reorganisation and arrangements for the
second advance were being carried out. The disposi-
tions of the South African and 26th Brigades remained
unchanged, but in the 27th Brigade the supporting and
leading battalions changed places. At 7.36 a.m. the
attack on the Blue Line (Arras-Lens Railway) com-
menced. The defenders had not yet recovered from their
surprise, and their resistance, considering the strength
of their position, was extremely poor, though a few

196 ATTACK ON BLUE LINE [APRIL 9

stout-hearted groups held out to the last and inflicted
casualties before they were killed. The right wing of
the 26th Brigade was held up for a time by enfilade
machine-gun fire from a post at the Railway Triangle
on the front of the Fifteenth Division. But the artillery
were prompt to assist, and, covered by an effective
smoke-screen put down by “F” Battery R.H.A. from
the Railway embankment north of the Scarpe, the
Highlanders reached the Blue Line practically without
a halt. Equally successful was the attack of the other
brigades. The South Africans lost some men from
snipers as they were struggling through the gaps in
the wire in front of the Railway cutting, but the enemy’s
machine-guns were dilatory in coming into action and
the South Africans easily accounted for them when they
reached the cutting. On the left, when the leading
battalions of the 27th Brigade advanced into the valley,
they came under hostile machine-gun and artillery-fire
from the Railway and Maison Blanche Wood. Two
of the machine-guns were rushed in the cutting, and
two others, which were holding up the advance of the
Thirty-fourth Division, were enfiladed by Lewis Guns
-and driven to earth. Of the garrison on the Railway
not one escaped ; all were killed or captured.

The four tanks allotted to the Division were very
unlucky. Two were put out of action at the start
by artillery-fire; a third broke down about 200
yards from the Railway on the front of the 27th
Brigade; and the fourth failed to reach the Railway
after the officer in charge of it was killed, but the
surprise of the enemy was so complete that there
was little need for them. South of the Scarpe a
tank did good service by helping to clear the Railway
Triangle, which had caused a great deal of trouble to
the Fifteenth Division.

1917] ATTACK ON BROWN LINE 197

During the halt on the Blue Line, the only changes
in disposition occurred in the 26th and South African
Brigades, where the Camerons, Argylls, Ist and 2nd
Regiments were placed in the lead. The four hours of
waiting were not without anxiety. An enemy aeroplane
came over our lines and as a result the German artillery
opened on the Railway, 300 yards east of which our
protective barrage was falling at that time. Fortunately
this counter-barrage did not last long, and the majority
of the leading men were already formed up some
yards east of the Railway, but for a short spell nearly
six battalions lay precariously between two fires in
a space of 300 yards. At length the final attack
began at 12.16 p.m. On the right, tough resistance
by the enemy at the Railway Triangle left us with
an exposed flank, and a quick and critical decision
had to be made whether to advance on this wing or
not. SBrig.-General Kennedy decided to press on,
and the movement was completely screened by the
smoke-curtain put down by our guns. This prudently
bold policy not merely prevented our own troops from
being checked, but materially assisted the Fifteenth
Division to capture the Railway Triangle. Elsewhere
the last vestige of resistance had disappeared with the
capture of the Blue Line, and the assault on the
Brown Line took the form of an orderly procession.
This was a happy occurrence, since the wire in front
of the Point du Jour trenches had scarcely been
damaged and was penetrated: laboriously even by
unmolested men. The spectacle of lines of men
moving steadily forward with their rifles at the slope
seemed more like a Salisbury Plain ceremonial
manceuvre than an attack in grim earnest. As the
troops pressed on, their eyes were gratified by the
sight of scores of Germans fleeing in a wild panic,

198 COMMENTS ON THE ACTION [APRIL 9

Fanned by the breath of victory and keen to grasp
all its rewards, they broke into a smart run. The
Thirty-fourth Division had been slightly delayed by
Maison Blanche Wood, and there was an awkward
space on the flank of the 11th Royal Scots, the left
battalion of the Ninth, but this was filled by a
company of the K.O.8.B. which rushed a machine-
gun at the Point du Jour, destroyed the team, and
devoured its lunch. With the capture of the Brown
Line the Division had accomplished all its tasks.

Half an hour before the commencement of the
attack on the Brown Line the leading battalions of
the Fourth Division began to arrive. As they came
down the slope of the valley from the first objective
they suffered some casualties from shell-fire. They
reached the Point du Jour—Athies line in good time,
and at 3.10 P.M. passing through the Ninth pressed on
to the Green Line, which they secured easily and
swiftly.

Success had been gained without a check and at
very small cost, and the uniform excellence of the
work performed by the several arms of the Division
was one of the noticeable features of the battle.
The Sappers, Pioneers, and R.A.M.C. toiled steadily
and efficiently. The infantry, including the wounded,
were hyperbolical in their praise of the smoke and
H.E. barrage, to which they attributed their own
slight losses and the complete surprise of the enemy.
The only criticism was that the barrage was too slow
for eager men and that there was scarcely enough
of smoke. Never at any previous time were the
men so jubilant and so confident of a speedy victory.
On that day the ground captured and the booty seized
far exceeded all that had hitherto been secured in
the same period by the British forces in France. In

1917] COMMENTS ON THE ACTION 199

all, 51 officers, 2086 other ranks, 17 field-guns and
howitzers, 24 machine-guns, and 3 trench mortars were
the spoils of the Division.

But the decisive nature of the victory was due not
so much to the surprise of the enemy as to the fore-
sight with which arrangements were made to over-
come all possible obstacles, and the readiness and
resource which the infantry showed in attacking places
outside their own area. Typical examples of the latter
were the capture by the Seaforths of the Island and
the storming of the Point du Jour by the K.O.S.B.
It was too often the tendency during the war for a
unit to keep to its own allotted task without making
any effort to help its neighbours, and the facility and
speed with which our men in this battle worked to
their flanks were very important factors in contribut-
ing to the rout of the enemy. General Furse had
repeatedly impressed on the officers of the Ninth
the necessity and advantage of assisting their neigh-
bours, and never was this practice exemplified on
a finer scale by the Division than on the 9th of
April.

It is impossible to praise too highly the forethought
shown with regard to the Railway Triangle. Brig.-
General Tudor learned just before our advance from
the Black Line was resumed, that the Fifteenth Divi-
sion was held up by the Triangle and had not won
its first objective. Realising the disastrous result
of this for the Ninth, since the enemy south of the
Scarpe would see our infantry north of the river and
would enfilade them with numerous machine-guns, he
turned on a battery, which he had standing by for
such an eventuality, to blind that enemy to our
movement. This not only enabled the Ninth to make
its advance undisturbed from the right, but further

200 COMMENTS ON THE ACTION [ APRIL 9

enabled its right brigade, after seizing the Blue Line,
to turn its machine-guns and some infantry against
the northern wing of the enemy opposing the Fifteenth
south of the river, thus combining a flank with a
frontal attack on that portion of the enemy and com-
passing his defeat and the advance of the Fifteenth
Division. Without this prearrangement the whole
fight would have been far less successful and far more
costly.

The action of the 9th April was a very great
triumph for British arms. Compared with the
gigantic advances made after August 1918, the ground
gained may seem insignificant and the number of
prisoners meagre, but the true comparison is not
with 1918 but with 1916. In 1917, as in the Somme
fighting, the moral of the Germans was high and
their resistance formidable, and there is substantial
reason for regarding, as Professor Pollard’ does, the
capture of the Vimy Ridge and the advance to
Fampoux as amongst the finest achievements of the
war. But the impetus of our attack came to
an end on the same day. It is possible that the
magnitude of the first day’s success was so much
more extensive than had been expected that the pre-
parations for supporting it lagged in arrear, and that
the Germans were able to concentrate more quickly
for the defence than we were for the renewal of the
onset. Wet weather, which figures so constantly in
Sir Douglas Haig’s despatches as the marplot of
British projects, was made chiefly responsible for our
failure to follow up our victory, but though it greatly
increased our difficulties, it is probable that ineffective
Staff work rather than weather may have been the
chief cause of our disappointment. The possession

1 A Short History of the Great War, p. 257.

1917] ATTACK ON GREENLAND HILL 201

of the Vimy Ridge, the disengagement of Arras, and
the obligation of the enemy to draw on his reserves
had largely fulfilled the intentions of the Higher
Command, but it is never satisfactory to lose chances
of exploiting success. For a time the Germans were
badly shaken, and Ludendorff admitted that the
opening of the Arras Battle caused him considerable
uneasiness. If cavalry had been available to go through
on the afternoon of the 9th April they could not have
failed to bring in many more prisoners, but they made
no advance until the 11th, and by that time it was
too late; the enemy had recovered from his fright and
had brought up reserves. Nor were there large reserves
of our infantry at hand to resume the attack at once.
The infantry had become the handmaid of the artillery,
and vexatious delays occurred until the latter could
move up their guns.

Till late in the evening of the 9th the bulk of the
Division remained in the trenches on the Brown Line,
but after all danger of a counter-attack had passed,
the battalions were withdrawn to the Blue and Black
Lines. The weather, which had shown signs of
improvement during the afternoon, utterly broke
down, and blizzards of snow and sleet swept the
ground. The wearied men spent a wretched night,
as there was not sufficient shelter for all, and many
had to lie in the open, unprotected from the drenching
sleet. The next day was spent in cleaning rifles,
replacing kit, and salvaging the battlefield. On the
11th, the Fourth Division was instructed to secure
the slopes of Greenland Hill, a small ridge lying to
the east of the village of Roeux, and the South African
Brigade was sent up to support it. The attack was
repulsed, and the Ninth was ordered to renew the
attempt the following day.

202 ATTACK ON GREENLAND HILL [apni 12

The line, which was held by the Fourth Division,
lay some distance east of the original Green Line’ and
included the village of Fampoux on the north bank of
the Scarpe. From it a number of roads ran to the
north-west and north, while the continuation of the
Main Street joined the Roeux—Gavrelle road near the
Station, close to which lay the Chemical Works of Roeux.
The Railway crossed the Scarpe south-east of Fampoux
and ran along a high embankment in a north-easterly
direction to Douai. To the south of it the Scarpe
broadened out into marshes and lagoons, which made
approach to Roeux impracticable except from the
north; beyond the Roeux-Gavrelle road the country
ascended in a gradual rise to Greenland Hill. The
line held by the enemy was the Roeux-—Gavrelle road,
and he had installed numerous machine-guns in the
Chemical Works, the Station, and an Inn about 1500
yards north of it.

The Division received orders to capture this line
from the Inn to the village of Roeux inclusive. There
were two objectives. The first, to be carried by the
South African and 27th Brigades, consisted of the
ground north of the Railway embankment, and com-
prised the Station Buildings, the Chemical Works, and
the line of the road as far as the Inn; the second,
which fell to the 26th Brigade, entailed the capture of
Mount Pleasant Wood, and the village of Roeux.
There was to be the usual creeping barrage, which,
commencing at 5 P.M., was to move forward at the rate
of 100 yards every two minutes. The orders reached
the brigades late during the night of the 11th, so that

1 The original Green Line consisted of the strongly-wired trenches
immediately west and north of Fampoux. Shortly before the attack on the
9th April the final objective was altered so as to include the hostile positions
just west of the Roeux-Gavrelle road and the village of Fampoux.

1917] A DIFFICULT ASSEMBLY 203

the time for preparation was very limited. It was
understood that all the buildings held by the enemy |
were to be demolished by the fire of the heavy guns.
The enemy’s position was reconnoitred by brigadiers
and battalion commanders on the morning of the 12th.
A reference to the map suggested that the best place
to form up was in the valley at the east end of
Fampoux. But this was found to be out of the question,
for the road lay under direct observation from the
Chemical Works and was thickly sprayed with shells
on the appearance of even the small reconnoitring party.
The South Africans, being the right brigade, had really
no choice except the village as an assembly place, but
it was eminently dangerous, since it was a favourite
target of the hostile guns. The 27th Brigade was com-
pelled to choose the German trenches immediately north
of Fampoux, which were sited on the horizon, and the
approach to which from the west had to be carefully
reconnoitred to find lines of advance that would
reduce the probability of the oncoming troops being
seen by the enemy. It was an evil position, for it
entailed the advance of the brigade for 1700 yards
down the slope into the valley in full view of the foe
on the opposite slope, but there was no alternative.
Brig-General Maxwell recognised that to screen the
movement, a barrage, with smoke if possible, would be
necessary, but he failed to get into communication with
General Lukin in time. As the barrage was to fall
along the enemy’s line at zero, the 27th Brigade had to
commence its advance from its forming-up position half
an hour before zero, so as to reach the front held by
the Fourth Division just before the barrage opened.
The action that followed was calamitous. The
firing of the heavy guns during the day never rose to
the intensity of a bombardment, and the large collection

204 THE ATTACK REPULSED [ APRIL 12

of buildings round the Station remained quite intact,
only one shell being seen to fall near the Chemical
Works. There was absolutely no chance of success
from the outset, and the uncomplaining heroism of the
men was on that account the finest feature of the
battle.

Shortly before the attack was delivered, the Division
learned from an air reconnaissance that the enemy had
dug-in to the west of the Roeux-Gavrelle road, but
this news was received too late for action to be taken,
and our barrage dropped behind the enemy’s front
trench. On the right, the 2nd and Ist South African
Regiments were in the van, with the 4th and 3rd in
support and reserve. The assembly of the brigade
in the shell-swept village of Fampoux was a costly
business, but in spite of heavy losses the men were
remarkably steady. As soon as the South Africans
emerged from the shelter of the houses their ranks
were scourged by accurate rifle and machine-gun fire,
and it was possible to advance only about 200 yards
from the positions held by the Fourth Division.

On the left the attack was carried on by the
11th and 12th Royal Scots’ and the “Rifles,” the
K.0.8.B. being in reserve. The advance of the brigade
began at 4.25 p.m., and with incredible coolness the
infantry pressed through the enemy’s barrage and
reached the line held by the Fourth Division a few
minutes before zero. At 5 p.m. our barrage opened
and was excellent, but our men were checked almost
at the start by very heavy machine-gun fire. In these
circumstances nothing could be gained by throwing the
26th Brigade into the battle and the forward troops
were accordingly withdrawn. The collection and evacua-

1 Major Sir J. Campbell commanded the 11th, and Major Macpherson
the 12th Royal Scots in this action.

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1917] COMMENTS ON THE ACTION 205

tion of the wounded proved a difficult and harassing
job, but this was accomplished before dawn through
the untiring and unselfish efforts of the infantry and
R.A.M.C.

Little can be said in defence of this battle, which
the Division fought with great reluctance. The prepara-
tions and arrangements were hurried to a culpable
degree, and though the basis of the action was under-
stood to be the bombardment of hostile machine-gun
emplacements by the Corps’ heavy artillery, the heavies
might as well have remained silent for all the assistance
they gave. Apart from the fact that the time for
reconnoitring the enemy’s position, particularly by
the artillery,’ was miserably inadequate, defeat was
practically inevitable when the 27th Brigade had to be
formed up in full view of the enemy and at a distance
of more than 1000 yards from the barrage line. Much
of the haste was undoubtedly caused by D.H.Q.’ being
too far back, the time necessary for the issue of orders
and the arrangement of preparations being thus unduly
extended. The only possibility of success lay in the
Ninth taking over the front line from the Fourth
Division on the night of the 11th, but this was not
done, because it was considered expedient to let the
worn-out men have a good night’s rest.

After the battle the Ninth was withdrawn from the
line and was concentrated in billets near Hermaville.
The high spirits of the men, which had been at fever-
pitch on the 9th, had been somewhat damped by the
events of the 12th, but a short rest served to illustrate
once more the amazing recuperative capacity of the

1 Brig.-General Tudor, who was assisting the Fourth Division, received
news of the battle so late that he had no time to reconnoitre.

7 On the 9th April D.H.Q. were at Etrun ; they moved forward to St
Nicholas only on the 12th April.

206 PLANS FOR THE 3z2p MAY > [may 3

British soldier. The South African and 27th Brigades
had been hardest hit. The weakness of the former
occasioned grave concern as its losses exceeded its
drafts, and it was clear that, if its identity was to
be preserved, it could not be available for immediate
action. More drafts were forthcoming for the 27th
Brigade, which by the end of the month was ready
for the field.

In the latter part of April strenuous fighting took
place near Roeux and the Chemical Works, both of
which, though we gained a good deal of ground,
remained in the hands of the enemy. While the South
Africans were employed on work at Arras, the other
brigades relieved the Thirty-seventh Division on the
nights of the 28th/29th and 29th/30th April. On the last
day of April the Division lost Colonel F. A. Symons,
the popular and efficient A.D.M.S., who was killed
by a shell near Athies; Colonel Elsner of the 27th
Field Ambulance was appointed his successor. There
was now a welcome change in the weather, brilliant
sunshine and warm breezes giving promise of a glorious
summer. On the 2nd May instructions were issued
for an operation on the 3rd. This was to be under-
taken with the Fourth Division on the right, the Ninth
in the centre, and the Thirty-first on the left, and the
First and Fifth Armies were also to attack. It was
believed to be of unusual importance, for on the
evening of the 2nd the Division received a message
that the battle was to be the biggest in which the
British armies had yet taken part.

The 26th Brigade, with the Camerons and Black
Watch in front, the Argylls in support, and the Sea-

' General Lukin on 18th April suggested that the South African
Brigade should be withdrawn from the Division on account of its weak-
ness and its lack of reinforcements.

1917] ACTION OF THE 3xp MAY 207

forths in reserve, was on the right; and on the left
was the 27th, with the “Rifles” and K.O.S.B. in
front, and the 11th and 12th Royal Scots in support
and reserve. In place of the South Africans the
Division was supported by the 52nd Brigade, which
was located at the Blue Line. The objectives were
the line of trenches Weed—Weak and the Biache-
Gavrelle road. The attack was to be under the
customary creeping barrage, which was to open 200
yards east of our front line and, after a pause of four
minutes, was to move forward at the rate of 100 yards
every two minutes, while a machine-gun barrage was to
keep 400 yards in advance of it. The time of zero,
3°45 a.M., was made known to the Division only a few
hours before the battle.

The position held by the enemy lay on the western
slopes of Greenland Hill and consisted of shell-holes
and stretches of trenches hastily excavated after his
defeat on the 9th April. His trenches therefore were
not of the same elaborate and formidable nature as
those he occupied on that date, but owing to their
comparative indefiniteness they offered neither a clear
target for the artillery nor an easily recognisable land-
mark for the infantry.

The night of the 2nd May was clear, with no hint
of dawn when the hour of zero approached, though by
‘the mellow sheen of the stars and the setting moon
one could see about 50 yards along a path. At 3°45
A.M. the air reverberated with the crash of thousands
of guns, their flashes forming an almost solid glow. On
striking the dry earth the shells threw up a thick cur-
tain of smoke and dust, which, owing to a north-east
wind, drifted back towards our lines. At the same time,
the Germans sent up showers of coloured lights and

rockets in a wild appeal to their artillery for assistance.
P

208 ATTACK OF 26TH BRIGADE [May 3

As a result of the darkness, intensified by dust
clouds, the attacking troops lost direction almost at
the beginning. The Germans replied immediately with
heavy machine-gun fire from trenches and organised
shell-holes, which were closer to our front line than
we expected and had escaped our barrage. The
Camerons, misled by hostile lights sent up from short
entrenched lines echeloned in depth, swung so much
to the right that they crossed the front of the 2nd Essex
Regiment (Fourth Division), who fired on them. The
Black Watch also lost cohesion and only a few groups
managed to reach the enemy’s front trench. The
Argyllis in support, who became heavily involved in the
fighting, suffered serious casualties when they moved
forward, and were subjected to persistent bombing
attacks from the vicinity of the Gavrelle—Plouvain road.
Most of them were compelled to take cover in shell-
holes, from which they gradually worked their way
back to our line. One company of this battalion,
Maintaining direction throughout, went straight to the
first objective, but being unsupported and cut off only
a few survivors managed to return. This effort was
really a brilliant performance. In a second attempt
the Black Watch succeeded in expelling the enemy
from Charlie and Cuthbert Trenches, but they were
unable to remain there owing to accurate machine-gun
fire from the Railway embankment and the Chemical
Works. When the 26th Brigade was reorganising in its
original line, German aeroplanes displayed great auda-
city ; three of them hovered persistently over our front
until one was brought down by machine-gun fire.

The task of the 27th Brigade was complicated by
the fact that the left battalion, the K.O.S.B., occupied
a position beyond the “Rifles.” Before advancing,
the former had therefore to wait for five minutes until

- — a -

1917] ATTACK OF 27rx BRIGADE 209

the latter came into line, and as a guide to the
“Rifles” a lamp was shown on the right flank of
the K.O.S.B. When at zero the “Rifles” left their
trenches they failed to pick up the lamp, which was
to guide their left, and in spite of compass-bearings the
two assaulting companies swerved to the right, with the
result that the right flank reached Cuthbert Trench
earlier than was intended. This trench, which had
been scarcely damaged, was strongly manned, and
here a stern hand-to-hand contest was waged. Some
of the ‘ Rifles” succeeded in pressing forward, but
practically none of the two leading companies returned,
the great majority being killed, wounded, or taken
prisoner. When the supporting companies attempted
to advance they came under heavy machine-gun fire
and dug themselves in 200 yards beyond the front
trench. The 11th Royal Scots, unable to see what
was happening, pushed up two companies, which joined
with the supporting companies of the “Rifles,” and
dug-in along with them. ©

The K.O.S.B. after waiting five minutes for the
arrival of the “Rifles,” went on without them,
according to orders. Three companies crossed the
enemys front trench and passed on towards the
objective. Lieut.- Colonel Smyth,’ with a view to

1 While this chapter was being written, news came of the cold-blooded
murder of this officer in the County Club, Cork, on the 17th July 1920 by
a dozen so-called patriots.

If ever a man lived who deserved a fair field and a fair fight it was
Colonel Smyth. A more gallant and honourable gentleman never lived.
As a captain in the Royal Engineers he commanded the 90th Field Coy.
R.E. in the Ninth Division till October 1916, when he was promoted to
the command of the 6th K.O.8.B. In October 1918 he commanded the
93rd Brigade in the Thirty-tirst Division as a Brig.-General.

Major-General H. H. Tudor, when given command of the Police Forces
in Ireland in June 1920, found Colonel Smyth in command again of a

Field Coy. R.E. in Ireland, and, knowing his worth, secured his appoint-
ment as one of his deputy commissioners.

210 FAILURE OF ATTACK [may 3

protecting his exposed right flank, sent out a platoon
from the remaining company to block the south end
of Wit Trench, but it was practically annihilated on
leaving the parapet, though the Lewis Gun was brought
back owing to the splendid coolness of Sergeant C.
Hawthorn. <A serious disaster had occurred, and
Lieut.-Colonel Smyth, who was badly wounded in
the shoulder, was unable to do anything to help the
three forward companies; for the front of the 27th
Brigade was swept from both flanks, and the position
here was almost hopeless unless the 26th Brigade and
the Thirty-first Division could clear the enemy in front
of them. Later Lieut.-Colonel Fulton, commanding
the “ Rifles,” and Major Hamilton of the 90th R.E.,
ignorant of the check experienced by the rear com-
panies of the ‘‘ Rifles,” went up to the right of the
K.O.8.B. in Wish Trench, and observing a party
of 50 Germans, whom they took to be prisoners
entering Wit Trench, sent an officer and two men to
bring them in. These were fired at and hit. It was
thus manifest that the enemy had reoccupied Wit
Trench and that he now interposed between us and
the three companies of the K.O.S.B. Some of these
penetrated as far as Square Wood, but their plight
was beyond hope and most of them were killed
though a few were taken prisoner.

The only tidings to reach D.H.Q. were those of
failure. Oppy on the north defied all assault, and the
Thirty - first Division was driven back and counter-
attacked by the Germans, who gained a footing in the
outskirts of Gavrelle. Accordingly at 8.39 a.m. instruc-
tions were issued that the general onset was not to
be pressed. Brig.-General Maxwell asked for artillery-
fire to be directed on the portion of Wit Trench
opposite his front, in the hope of clearing out the

1917] COMMENTS ON ACTION | 211

Germans, and so opening a way of retreat for the
men who had been cut off. Unwilling to leave troops
who had managed to advance, unsupported and cut
off, he decided to attack Wit Trench with the object
of holding it during the night to allow the K.O.S.B.
to return under cover of darkness. Accordingly one
and a half companies of the 12th Royal Scots were
ordered to undertake this operation at 8 p.M., while the
light was still good; they were to be covered on each
flank by a barrage of artillery and machine-gun fire.
These men, 150 in all, made a most determined charge,
but though a few reached Wit the attack was broken
by machine-gun fire. Only 30 of them returned, but
their noble sacrifice enabled a considerable number of
K.O.S.B., mostly from the right company, to come in.
The battle of the 3rd May showed up the training,
especially of officers, in a bad light. The customary
gallantry and keenness were exhibited in full measure,
but the high degree of training essential for efficient
leadership was absent. The difficulties of keeping
direction were undoubtedly enormous, and had they
been foreseen, would have given well-trained officers
the opportunity of overcoming them by the application
of knowledge and intelligence. But these difficulties
had to be faced by officers and N.C.Os. without
adequate warning. Word of the sudden decision of
G.H.Q. on the 2nd May to launch the attack before
instead of during daylight, as originally planned, was
received by the Division only a few hours before the
time of assault, when it was impossible to make the
necessary arrangements for maintaining direction in
the dark, and this ill-advised eleventh hour change
was largely responsible for the failure of the attack.
The battle also revealed a lamentable decline in
initiative, largely due to the excessive dependence of

212 COMMENTS ON ACTION [may 3

the infantry on the artillery, fostered by the method
of the limited objective and months of trench warfare.
After the initial check the barrage was lost, and the
men in general remained where they lay without
making any serious effort to push on. This was
strongly commented on by Brig.-General Kennedy in
his notes on the battle. In the old Regular Army the
men had been accustomed to help themselves and
others to make headway by the skilful use of their
rifles and by taking full advantage of folds in the
ground, and it was now clear that subsequent training
should be directed towards the recapture of this lost
standard.

These remarks about the Division have a similar
application as regards the attack generally. At a
prodigious sacrifice the only places of importance
carried were Fresnoy, Chérisy, and Roeux, and of
these the two latter were regained by the enemy
during the day. There was no doubt that the action
cost the assailants many times more lives than it did
the defenders. The short summary in Sir Douglas
Haig’s despatches somewhat disguises the seriousness
of the defeat, for the 3rd May was assuredly a black
day for the British Army.

The action however was fought under constraint.
The far-reaching designs of General Nivelle had fallen
short of accomplishment, and the primary function of
the British forces was to ease the pressure on the front
of their allies. The surest method of effecting this
was by means of an operation, and similar subsidiary
enterprises had been undertaken in connection with
the Battles of Loos and the Somme. But this method,
while gaining its end, has the drawback of involving
a sacrifice of men, and it is possible that the British
Army, now that it was adequately equipped with guns

1917] AIR BOMBING 213

and munitions, could have secured its object by the
employment of artillery battle preparations without
an infantry assault. In face of a vast concentration
of guns and men, an enemy, who had the hardihood to
hold his defences thinly, would expose himself to a
deadly stab, but so profound was the dejection caused
in France by the disappointment of her hopes that it
would have been folly to take risks. The restoration
of the nerve of France was worth a big sacrifice.

The Ninth remained in the line until it was relieved
by the Seventeenth Division on the nights of the
9th/10th and 10th/11th May, and was employed during
this period in improving trenches and communications.
The 27th Brigade was assisted by a composite battalion
of South Africans under Major Webber. On relief,
the Division proceeded to billets near Ruellecourt,
where it rested, drilled, and was reorganised. The
training area at Monchy Breton was visited on the
26th May by General Allenby, who presented ribbons
and decorations to officers and men.

At the end of May and beginning of June the Ninth
once more returned to the line in relief of the Fifty-first
Division. Those scenes of fierce encounters, Roeux
and the Chemical Works, were now in our hands, and
Arras was rapidly assuming a more settled and less
minatory aspect, for many of the bigger emplacements
were now empty and others showed preparations for
removal. At this time the activity and boldness of the
German aeroplanes were very marked. The bombing
of Arras and its environs, which had been occasional,
was now a regular practice; and after dusk the dove-
tailed planes of the enemy flying low over our hinterland
dropped light bombs and fired machine-guns on our
infantry and transport lines. In such enterprises our
airmen had been the pioneers, but the Germans were

214 ACTION OF THE 5ru JUNE [JUNE 5

quick to imitate them. At first, the men regarded these
new disturbances as an amusing entertainment, but as
the raiders became more proficient and expert, they
realised that a fresh and deadly terror had been added
to modern warfare, and the “purr” of the “ Albatross ”
became a signal to rush for shelter. Anti-aircraft
mountings for Lewis Guns were issued, and they
‘enabled the infantry to keep the enemy's machines at
a respectable height.

We still retained the ascendancy in artillery, but the
enemy was alert and pugnacious, and his retaliation
came almost as the echo of our practice barrages. On
the 5th June a minor operation was carried out by the
27th Brigade and the Thirty-fourth Division on its
left. The object of the former was to advance its line
up the western slopes of Greenland Hill on a front of
850 yards. It was in trenches north and south of the
Arras—Douai Railway, which divided its front into two
equal parts. Cupid Trench was to be taken north of
the Railway, and south of it the line of the sunken
road (leading from Roeux), while outposts were to be
established on a more or less undefined shell-hole line
occupied by the enemy some 200 to 250 yards beyond
the objective in each case. The advance was to be
covered by a creeping barrage, moving at the rate of 50
yards a minute, supplemented by a machine-gun barrage
and a Stokes mortar bombardment.

The battalions detailed for the operation were the
11th and 12th’ Royal Scots. The assembly was very
difficult; entry into the front system could be effected
only by night, on account of the almost continuous
artillery-fire by day between it and the rear system, and
because the traffic in the trenches, which were poor,

1 Major Macpherson was wounded in the action of the 12th April, and
the command of the battalion was taken over by Lieut.-Colonel Ritson,

1917] ATTACK OF THE ROYAL SCOTS 215

was visible to the field-grey observers. As the attack
was timed for 8 P.M., not only had the units, additional
to the ordinary garrison, to be brought up to the front
line on the night of the 4th/5th, but they had to remain
crowded in its limited accommodation throughout a
scorching day, and hidden as far as possible from the
view of hostile air patrols. The question of concealment
was of first-rate importance, since any shelling of the
congested trenches must have caused heavy loss and
would have rendered any operation difficult, if not
impossible. To provide cover for the extra men, scoops
were made in the parapets and wooden shelters were
installed ; fish-net screens were then hung in front of
each hole, and the troops were allowed to emerge one
at a time in turn from 4 a.m. till five minutes before
zero, when they turned out in full strength.

To deceive the enemy, they waited for twenty
seconds before going over the parapet. This raid ruse
was eminently successful, since the enemy, seeing no
infantry move with the barrage, took it to be a ‘‘ Chinese
Attack” and lay low. The men accordingly crossed
“No-Man’s-Land” without a casualty, though sub-
sequently there was brisk fighting, during which some
gaps in our ranks were made by the more spirited of
the defenders.

The right company of the 11th Royal Scots, on the
south of the Railway, went up the sunken road and
endeavoured to push out a strong post about 150 yards
north-east of the bend in it, but, encountering a strong
machine-gun nest, was brought to a halt. Ultimately
this post fell to a combined attack by the company,
assisted by two platoons of the reserve company,
considerable havoc being wrought among the enemy’s
garrison by volleys of rifle-grenades. The centre and
the left companies reached their objective, the shell-hole

216 ACTION OF THE ROYAL SCOTS [JUNE 5

line about 200 yards east of the sunken road, and two
platoons went on to establish forward posts. One,
moving along the Railway, pursued a body of retiring
Germans and overshot its mark, but later withdrew to
its proper position; the other, farther north, whose
function it was to mop up an organised shell-hole area
just east of the road, had been so slow in moving up
that the enemy had time to recover his nerve and
brought it to an abrupt halt, but a hberal dose of rifle-
grenades, accurately directed, put the garrison out of
action, 11 Germans being killed and 2 wounded.

North of the Railway the 12th Royal Scots attacked
on a two-company front. There was no opposition
except at the junction of Cambrian and Cupid Trenches,
where the fighting was severe, for the unit on the left,
detailed to attack Curly Trench, lost direction, and
coming behind our left occupied Cupid along with
the Royal Scots. The left company with great diffi-
culty cleared the north end of Cupid and part of Curly,
but about 70 of the enemy remained in the latter
till next day, when they were induced to surrender to
the Thirty-fourth Division, assisted by physical per-
suasion from the Royal Scots. Two advance posts were
established, one on the Railway immediately opposite
that held by the 11th Royal Scots and one farther
north.

Under cover of darkness the 9th Seaforths arrived
through a formidable barrage and dug trenches on the
captured positions, with communication trenches to
connect them with the original front line. In spite of
persistent shelling and many casualties this most
efficient battalion accomplished all its tasks. On
their return the Seaforths had to pass through a gas
barrage, and lost a number of men.

During the night the Germans made two spiritless

1917] SUCCESS OF THE OPERATION 217

thrusts against the 11th Royal Scots, but they were
easily driven off by the fire of the advanced posts. Some
of them lay out until dawn, presumably with a view to
making another attempt. At 3.30 a.m. they retired,
but by a stroke of ill-luck the barrage that had been
arranged for that hour was cancelled, and they escaped
with only the punishment that Lewis Guns and rifles
could inflict in a poor light. On the night of the 6th/7th
two further efforts at counter-attack, preceded by
artillery - fire, were made. The first was broken up
before the Germans had actually made a move, but
the second along the Railway was determined, and
succeeded in driving in the strong post on the Railway.
But its impetus was so disturbed by the accurate
shooting of the advanced posts that it failed to reach
the main line of defence. The enemy withdrew in the
early morning when our barrage came down, and the
Royal Scots reoccupied the Railway posts.

The action of the 5th June was extremely satis-
factory, for while our losses were slight, those of the
enemy were exceptionally heavy for the forces engaged.
The 11th Royal Scots considered that they had killed
more Germans in this fight than they had in any
previous engagement of the war. The barrage was
perfect, and the machine-guns and trench mortars
co-operated admirably with the infantry. Tactically,
the most noteworthy feature of the operation was the
effectiveness of rifle-grenades, when fired by volleys, in
knocking out machine-gun posts.

A little more ground was gained in the neighbour-
hood of Greenland Hill by the Division, but this
was done by peaceful penetration. Covered by the
K.O.S.B.,' a large party of the Black Watch dug a
trench to extend the line of Cuthbert and Cod south of

1 Commanded since the 3rd May by Major A. R. Innes Browne.

218 DIVISION RELIEVED [suNE 1917

the Railway before midnight on the 10th. On the 12th
and the 13th the Ninth was relieved by the Fourth
Division and marched to billets near Ruellecourt. The
Division had spent its last day in the Arras sector,
where it had experienced in almost equal measure the |
elation of triumph and the depression of defeat. Over
5000 casualties, chiefly among the infantry, had been
suffered during the months of April and May, and the
men were sorely in need of rest. There was some fear
that the Division would lose the South African Brigade,
as three fresh battalions’ had been attached to it for
instruction, but happily a prolonged stay behind the
lines enabled the South Africans to fill up their war-
worn ranks once more and take their place beside their
Scottish comrades.

1 These were the 3/10th Royal West Surrey Regiment, 3/10th Royal
West Kent Regiment, 3/10th Middlesex Regiment.

CHAPTER X
PASSCHENDAELE, 1917

AcTIoNns oF THE 20TH SEPTEMBER AND THE 12TH OcTOBER

From the 13th June till the 26th July, the best part
of the summer of 1917, the men remained out of the
line, and this unusually long and welcome rest enabled
the Division to regain its old efficiency. As it was
necessary to convince the infantry that progress was
possible even when artillery support was unavailable,
training was directed not merely to develop a high
standard of efficiency in musketry, but to foster initi-
ative and resource among the subordinate leaders.
The value of the rifle-grenade had been demonstrated
on the 5th June, and practice in its use was taught
by means of shell-hole attacks. An area of country
was cratered by the sappers to present the appearance
of a shell-torn ‘battlefield, and marks to indicate
machine-gun posts having been placed on one side
of it, the infantry advanced from the other. Under
cover of rifle-grenades, fired in volleys, riflemen and
Lewis Gun teams moved forward by rushes, till they
were able to make a converging assault from a short
distance under a final grenade barrage. This form
of training realised as nearly as possible the actual
conditions of warfare, and new men thus became

accustomed to the distracting noise of battle and
219

220 RETURN TO THE SOMME [sux

gained confidence in their own powers. A_ few
casualties were caused by “short” bursts, but no one
was seriously wounded, and the trifling cost was more
than counter-balanced by the assurance and keenness
inspired in the men.

On the 25th July the Division was transferred to
the IV. Corps, whose area embraced the devastated
country lying east of Bapaume. The completeness
and care with which the demolition had been carried
out showed how thoroughly the foe had made his
detailed preparations for retreat. Desolation reigned
everywhere, no village possessed a roofed building, and
even the trees had not escaped, their bark being
partly stripped off so that the sap would dry up.
From the rubble of ruined houses, billets and stabling
accommodation could be constructed, but food to
supplement rations could be obtained only from
canteens and consisted mainly of tinned products.

The front line was taken over from the Fifty-
eighth Division on the night of the 26th by the 26th
Brigade, the South African and 27th Brigades coming
in on its left on the 28th and 30th. The sector held
at first lay south of the Canal du Nord at Havrin-
court, but on the 4th August the 27th Brigade was
transferred from the south of the line to the north.
The country was undulating, with ridges and alternate
valleys lying north-north-east. The excavated channel
of the Canal du Nord, which after an easterly course
turned off in a northerly direction past Moeuvres,
formed the boundary between the 27th and the other
two brigades. South of the Canal the line lay on
the slopes of the spurs that ran out from Havrincourt
Wood under observation of the enemy, though the
wood itself provided a covered approach to within
1500 yards of our front line. Some of the spurs had

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1917] A QUIET SPELL . 221

originally formed part of the forest, but they had
been cleared by the enemy, who used the timber for
engineering purposes, and they were now covered with
a low thick scrub, which afforded concealment for
small groups. On the southern bank of the Canal
was a spoil heap which, as the greater part of it was
in our possession, gave us observation along our
entire front. The position was well adapted for
defence, since machine-guns, placed on a spur, could
bring flanking and cross-fire to bear on the adjoining
spurs. The trench system consisted of outpost, front,
support, and reserve lines.

On the front of the 27th Brigade, the Canal, of
which the channel was more than 50 feet below the
surface, separated friend from foe except at a spoil
heap on the west bank, which the enemy held as an
outpost to his main system. MHavrincourt village,
red-tiled and attractive in the sun, occupied a com-
manding position, while to the north-east behind the
German front line could be seen the dark cloud of
Bourlon Wood. The enemy’s defences along the
whole front were strongly entrenched and _ lavishly
wired. |

A comparatively uneventful month was passed in
this quiet spot, less discomfort being caused by the
enemy than by the unusually heavy rainfall of August.
The most active of the brigades was the 26th, and
it afforded some diversion by carrying out a number
of raids. Several posts, which the enemy held only
during the night, were located, and on the 18th August
a patrol of the 7th Seaforths, crossing the wire
guarding one of these by means of a sheet of ex-
panded metal, lay in wait for the garrison, who,
though taken unawares, put up a stiff fight. Four of
the enemy were killed or wounded and one was

222 A PLAN OF ATTACK [aucusT

taken prisoner, the casualties of the Seaforths being
one wounded and two missing. After dusk on the
same evening the Argylls sent out strong patrols,
which met with strenuous resistance ; several Germans
were killed and one was captured, while the Argylls
had two officers and eleven men wounded, and one
officer and three men missing. The object of the
patrols had been to sweep the enemy from his posi-
tion on the spoil heap, and though they failed to
accomplish this, the Germans were so shaken that
they evacuated the heap, which was found to be
clear when the Argylls made another raid on the
30th. The scope for adventure by the 27th Brigade
was necessarily limited to the hostile positions on
the west bank of the Canal, and on the 25th, 2nd
Lieut. Mosscrop with three men of the “Rifles”
entered a night post shortly after dusk and captured
one of the garrison when it arrived. The prisoner
belonged to the 89th Grenadier Regiment (17th Divi-
sion), a sturm truppen lot, and this seemed to indicate
that the enemy had aggressive designs on hand, so
the troops were warned not to relax their vigilance.
A proposal by the IV. Corps that the Division
should undertake a big raid against the main entrench-
ments of the enemy was vetoed as impracticable,
since the amount of gun-fire necessary to cut the wire
was bound to advertise our intentions. It led however
to an interesting suggestion by Brig.-General Tudor,
which he submitted to the Corps after satisfying
himself, with Brig.-General Kennedy’s help, of its
practicability on this front, and it formed the basis
of the scheme carried through in the same region
by Sir Julian Byng during the Battle of Cambrai
in November 1917. Artillery preparation, he pointed
out, could be dispensed with if tanks were employed,

1917] PASSCHENDAELE 223

and thus surprise, the value of which had been fully
grasped by the Ninth, might be obtained. The tanks,
protected by a smoke-barrage, would cut the gaps
to allow the infantry to enter the enemy’s positions,
and the probability was that the Germans would
be so completely surprised that large captures would
be made and much ground gained at a trifling cost.
The infantry were to advance towards Flesquiéres
Ridge, but half of the tanks were to wheel to the north
and roll up the German front system to the Scarpe,
the aim being not to break through in depth but to
destroy the enemy’s forces on a wide front. This,
with some modifications, was the plan carried out by
the Third Army in the following November.

But the Division was not destined to participate
in the Cambrai offensive. By the end of August it
was relieved by the Thirty-sixth (Ulster) Division,
recently engaged in the Battle of Passchendaele, and
this spot the Ninth surmised was to be its next
destination. The first sojourn was in the shell-torn
region near Achiet le Grand, where the nature of the
training gave the men a fair idea of what would be
expected of them later, and on the 12th September
the Division moved north by rail to camps between
Poperinghe and Ypres in the V. Corps’’ sector.

As already indicated, the principal campaign planned
by Sir Douglas Haig was in the north. His design
was to carry the Passchendaele Ridge and secure the
command of the Belgian coast, as this would threaten
the enemy’s communications, and at the same time
restrict appreciably his submarine warfare. But the
British Field-Marshal was favoured with little luck,
and it was not till the beginning of May, after the
failure of General Nivelle’s offensive in the Aisne, that

’ Commanded by Lieut.-General Sir E. A. Fanshawe.
Q

224 MESSINES RIDGE TAKEN [MAY-JULY

his plans were approved at a conference held in Paris
on the 4th and 5th May. This comparatively late start
proved to be a fatal handicap, and in other theatres
the rosy hopes of the beginning of the year were dis-
pelled by the tragic events in Russia. The Revolution
eliminated Russia as a German enemy, rendered the
position of Roumania practically hopeless (though in
the days of its stress it fought with admirable and
heroic resolution), and prevented General Maude from
garnering the full fruits of the fine campaign that had
resulted in the capture of Bagdad on the 11th March.
The Egyptian offensive broke down at Gaza, the
Salonica front remained stationary, and Italy, engrossed
in Trieste and Albania, was scarcely pulling her weight.
Moreover, as the Germans were cognisant of our aims,
and had made dispositions to defeat them, it was re-
grettable that G.H.Q. did not excogitate a fresh
plan, which, carried out in the same manner as the
Cambrai offensive later, would have disconcerted the
foe and led to extensive gains without a heavy sacrifice
of life.

The preliminary of the attack on Passchendaele was
the capture of the Messines-Wytschaete Ridge, which
overlooked our lines and a large portion of the hinter-
land. This was brilliantly accomplished by the Second
Army on the 7th June, the enemy’s position being
blown into the air and the ridge passing into our
hands with slight loss. The preparations for the
assault on Passchendaele were then taken in hand, but
for some yet unexplained reason the first blow was
not struck till the 31st July. During the interlude
the Germans, delivering on the 10th July an attack
against the bridgehead north-east of the Yser between
Nieuport and the coast, were so far successful that
they prevented the projected co-operation between the

1917] THE “PILL-BOXES” 225

Fourth Army and the Navy, which they dreaded above
all things.

The first assault launched by the Fifth Army
began well, and the greater part of the ridge over-
looking Ypres was stormed, but the German scheme
of defence, based on holding their forward positions
lightly, depended chiefly on counter-attack, and before
the end of the day many of our gains, including St
Julien and Westhoek, were recaptured. Above all,
the key of the enemy’s position on the Menin road
remained in his hands. On the same day the fatal
rains made their appearance, and torrential downpours
transformed the battlefield into a quagmire. The con-
tinuance of the wet weather, which made August of
1917 one of the most disastrous months in the war,
was all in favour of the Germans; it delayed our
preparations, and should indeed have led to the
abandonment of the campaign; but with the pertin-
acity of the true gambler, the British resumed the
attack on the 16th August, but made little progress
south of St Julien, the Germans defying all our efforts
in the neighbourhood of the Menin road.

The defence, which was directed by General
Sixt von Armin, who had achieved great fame as
a tactician during the battles of the Somme, was
distributed in depth. Trenches being impossible in
a swamp, the defenders were placed in the ruins
of barns and farmhouses; these, strongly concreted to
an average thickness of three feet, offered a small
mark for artillery and were proof against all except
the heaviest of our projectiles. These fortified farms,
or “‘ Pill-boxes” as they were called by the men, were
so situated that each could support its neighbour by
cross- and enfilade-fire and was a veritable fortress in
itself. They were of various sizes, according to the

226 ATTACK FORMATIONS [ SEPT.

extent of the ruins on which they were erected; some
had several apartments, and were capable of accom-
modating a whole company of men. They were
admirably adapted to break up and delay the line
of an attack, and even if they were carried and the
objective taken, the worn-out assailants would have
to meet a counter-blast from the fresh German reserves
in rear. Up to the 16th August no satisfactory means
had been found of dealing with these fortifications.

Apart from these strongholds the great problem
was how to keep rifles and machine-guns clean; on
more than one occasion our men had been forced to
give ground, because their rifle-bolts jammed owing to
mud so that the rifles could not be fired. It was also
clear that ‘ Pill-box” fighting demanded skilful leading
and resource on the part of subordinate commanders.
The series of waves, so successful in the Arras battles,
was not suitable to meet the new conditions. Accord-
ingly it was planned that the attack should be carried
out by lines of sections, each section being in file and
separated from its neighbours by about twenty yards.
This gave an opportunity of overwhelming a “ Pill-box ”
by the co-operation of the nearest sections while the
others made headway, and each part was to be cleared and
garrisoned before the sections involved continued their
advance. The plan ensured the attack being carried
on with the greatest expedition and the least fatigue,
and, provided the leadership was good, it held out
reasonable prospects of success. This was the form
of training practised in the devastated area near
Achiet le Petit, the ground being marked out by tapes
in facsimile of the actual country where the assault
was to be made.

The next phase of the Passchendaele Battle was
arranged for the 20th September, and the assembly line

1917] THE TERRAIN 227

of the Division lay along the crest of the Frezenberg
Ridge. The span of front allotted to the Ninth, fully
1500 yards in all, consisted of a number of posts placed
at intervals along a road roughly at right angles to that
on which stood the hamlet of Frezenberg. So battered
and ravaged was the country by continuous shell-fire
that no trace of the road could be discerned. From the
ridge the ground sank to the valley of the Hanebeek
stream, which trickled through the gaunt and melan-
choly remains of Hanebeek Wood and meandered
northwards past the Ypres—Roulers Railway. From
the hollow the ground rose gently to another ridge,
higher on the right where the main point was Anzac
Redoubt, and gradually sank on the left to a flat
swamp. Beyond this was another valley, covered by
the spur on which stood the ruins of the Station
and the village of Zonnebeke. The ordinary landmarks
indicated by the map did not exist; the only one
remaining that the eye could pick up without much
effort was the Ypres—Roulers Railway. All vestige of
roads had been obliterated, and even the Hanebeek
brook had ceased to flow. Its banks had been blown
in by months of relentless gun-fire and a zigzag trail of
shell-holes, rather deeper and more full of water than
the others, alone gave evidence of its former existence.
A bleaker and more repellant battlefield it is impossible
to imagine, and even the sun served only to throw into
stronger relief the dreadful ghoulishness of the land-
scape. If a personal reconnaissance was impossible,
the one safe way to gain a knowledge: of the country
was by a study of the excellent air photographs
furnished by the R.F.C. Apart from the Railway, and
to the south of it, the most prominent guide was
Hanebeek Wood, which housed a number of “ Pill-
boxes,” Clusters of these forts lay along the Railway

228 OBJECTIVES FOR 20th SEPTEMBER [SEPr.

and to the north of it, the most important being
Beck House, Borry Farm, and a strong group called
Potsdam. |

The attack was allotted to the 27th and South
African Brigades. The former had two objectives; the
first (indicated on the map as the Red Line) ran from
the eastern half of Hanebeek Wood up to Potsdam ;
the second (Green Line) was Zonnebeke Redoubt on the
ridge running north-west from Anzac Redoubt. The
6th K.O.S.B.,’ 9th Scottish Rifles,? and 12th Royal
Scots were to take the former, and then the first two
battalions were to go on to the latter. The South
Africans had three objectives ; the first (Red Line) was
in prolongation of that of the 27th Brigade; the second
included Bremen Redoubt (Yellow Line); and the third
cairied on the Green Line from the Frezenberg-—
Zonnebeke road to the Zonnebeke stream. The leading
battalions were the 3rd and 4th*® Regiments, and these
were supported by the Ist and 2nd.‘ The assault was
to be on the “Leap Frog” system; when any hostile
work was met it had to be occupied and held while the
line immediately behind the attacking one was to pass
through and carry on to the next objective. The Ninth
was flanked on the right by the Second Australian
Division and on the left by the Fifty-fifth.

There were few novices in the Ninth in the art
of mounting an attack, but Passchendaele demanded
special and anxious consideration. The enemy’s power-
ful artillery swept all the back areas and the approaches
to our line unceasingly, and roads and camps beyond

1 Now commanded by Lieut.-Colonel H. D. M. Maclean, the original
C.O. of the battalion, who returned to France in August.

2 Lieut.-Colonel W. Lumsden succeeded Lieut.-Colonel Fulton at the
end of July.

§ Commanded since April by Lieut.-Colonel Macleod.
* Temporarily commanded by Major Cochran.

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ZONNEBEKE FROM FREZENBERG

1917] BATTLE PREPARATIONS 229

the effective scope of shells were persistently bombed
by fleets of Gothas. There were no roads or communi-
cation trenches to guide troops on their way to the
front line, and along the ridges of craters zigzag routes
constructed with duckboards became a mark for hostile
gun-fire, but they could not be deserted except at the
risk of death by drowning or suffocation, which was the
melancholy fate of more than one poor man and animal.
These routes required the most careful preliminary
reconnoitring, as the chances of taking a wrong turn
were too numerous to be neglected. Casualties on the
march to the assembly area were regarded as inevitable,
and there was nothing for it but to trust to luck.
Everything was done to ensure that the wounded
would be properly attended ; numerous aid posts were
established and the staff of stretcher-bearers was
greatly increased by large parties from the infantry.
The problem of conveying stores and ammunition was
colossal, and so, in order to be independent of carrying
parties as far as possible, the men were to take rations
for forty-eight hours and extra water-bottles. Rifles
were covered with sand-bags, so that they would be
in good working order when the operation commenced,
and each man carried a spade. For dealing with the
“ Pill-boxes ” a liberal quantity of phosphorous bombs
was issued,

The attack was to be carried out after a preliminary
bombardment of twenty-four hours and under cover of
a creeping barrage. The shell commonly used in the
Second and Fifth Armies was shrapnel, and it was
due solely to the insistence of General Lukin that the
Division was given reluctant permission to use that
combination of smoke and H.E., which had given so
much satisfaction at Arras. During these weeks the
gunners had a dreadful time, for our artillery supremacy

23) ARTILLERY ARRANGEMENTS [sErT. 20

had been boldly challenged by the foe, and day and
night our battery positions were fiercely bombarded.
Hostile bombing machines played their part by night
and frequently interrupted the laborious toil of bringing
up the ammunition for the guns; hence the work
of our gunners was carried out under much greater
difficulties than usually fell to their lot. The creeping
barrage of smoke and H.E. was to open 150 yards
in front of the leading line and move at the rate of
100 yards every four minutes for the first 200 yards;
then it was to pass on to the first objective at the rate
of 100 yards every six minutes. The infantry, who were
expected to arrive at the Red Line in twenty minutes,
were to wait there for an hour, protected by barrier-fire.
On the resumption of the advance the rate of the
barrage was to be 100 yards every eight minutes, till
the final objective was reached. A searching barrage
of shrapnel was to precede the creeping one and sweep
the open country 500 yards in advance of it. The com-
bination of H.E. and smoke allowed certain refinements
to be introduced which would have been impracticable
with shrapnel. The most prominent obstacles were
kept under fire while the barrage moved on, so that
the infantry could surround them on all sides when the
fire lifted. This was most conspicuously illustrated
in the case of Hanebeek Wood, bristling with ‘“ Pill-
boxes” and machine-guns. To allow the K.O.S8.B. to
come to grips with the defenders before they could
open effective fire, Brig.-General Tudor arranged for
the barrage to be maintained on the wood, while a
lane was to be left clear for men to move up and
get to its rear; thus when the fire lifted the infantry
would be able to attack the wood simultaneously from
all sides.

Machine-guns also had an important role to play.

1917] THE ASSEMBLY 231

They were to barrage the final objective until the
infantry began their advance from the first, and then
they were to lift on to an S.O.S. line in front of the
Green Line. The machine-gun was expected to be
of great assistance in defence, and several were to be
taken up with the assaulting brigades to support them
against the expected counter-stroke.

Until the 12th September the Ninth was in camp
near Ypres, and on the 16th and 17th it relieved the
Forty-second Division on the Frezenberg Ridge, the
27th, Brigade taking over the right sector and the
South African the left. Unhappily, a deplorable
incident occurred. When the 11th Royal Scots,’ who
were conveyed to Ypres by rail, were detraining near
the Asylum, a shell landed among the men, causing
51 casualties in killed and wounded.

The responsible task of taping out the assembly
areas was satisfactorily accomplished by both brigades.
On the night of the 19th the assaulting battalions made
the purgatorial march along the slippery trench-board
tracks to the forming-up points. Heavy rain descended
for nearly three hours, but by rare good fortune the
enemy’s guns were unusually quiet and comparatively
few casualties were suffered ; this was taken as a good
omen. By 5 a.M. on the 20th the assembly of the
Division was completed.

At zero the light was perfect, being sufficient for the
assailants to distinguish their objectives, but rendering
them only dimly visible to the enemy. Under a first-
rate barrage the leading lines advanced, one company of
the K.O.S.B. halting near the west margin of Hanebeek
Wood, which appeared like a gigantic furnace shooting

'! Lieut.-Colonel Croft was proimoted to the command of a brigade a few

days before the battle, and the battalion was now commanded by Lieut.-
Colonel Sir J. Campbell.

232 ATTACK OF 271uH BRIGADE [sEPr. 20

up blazing roots and trunks to an enormous height.
To the left of it another company, advancing along a
lane flanked by two walls of smoke and fire, took up
a position on the rear, having intercepted and killed
on the way a party of Germans who were moving up
to reinforce their comrades in the wood. When the
barrage lifted the wood was rushed from front and rear,
and the terrifying combination of lusty Australians and
dour Scotsmen was invincible. The Germans were
allowed no time to bring their machme-guns into
action, and the wood yielded up four machine-guns
and about 50 prisoners. Our casualties were few
and were caused chiefly by rifle-fire and by our own
shrapnel which was used on the right flank of the
wood.

On the flank of the K.O.S.B. the right company
of the “Rifles” encountered very feeble opposition
and reached the first objective in good time, but the
left company, being seriously delayed by machine-gun
fire from a ‘“Pill-box” on the Railway, gained the
objective only in time to go forward with the advance
to the Green Line.

The Railway line was a formidable fortress, as it was
defended by several strong “ Pill-boxes,” R1, R2, R38,
R4, and R5, and was flanked by the fire of the Potsdam
group on the left. A company of the 12th Royal
Scots was detailed to seize the “R” “ Pill-boxes” up
to the first objective, but its onrush was checked at
the outset by bombs and machine-gun fire from RI,
so Lieut.-Colonel Ritson sent up two platoons from
his reserve company to attack it from the south. This
manceuvre, attracting the attention of the enemy, gave
the platoons on the Railway the opportunity of rushing
the ‘“ Pill-box” and overcoming the garrison, of whom
40 were taken and three machine-guns. This practi-

1917] AN OBSTINATE “ PILL-BOX” 233

cally ended the resistance on the Railway, and the
right company of the Royal Scots soon arrived at the
Red Line. The task of the left company was to
capture “A” and Potsdam. The defenders of the
former were wideawake, and their raking machine-
gun fire made the assailants very uncomfortable, but
Captain Reynolds and six men managed to move close
up to the ‘“ Pill-box,” where they were safe from the
hostile fire. They tried to put a Mills bomb through
the loophole, but this the garrison blocked with a
pack while still keeping the machine-gun firing. There
was a real danger of the attack in this sector being
held up by the obstinate “Pill-box”; but Captain
Reynolds, showing extraordinary bravery and resource,
under a storm of lead contrived to squeeze a phosphorous
bomb past the obstruction through the loop-hole; the
explosion set the place on fire and smoked out the
garrison, who immediately surrendered, 7 prisoners
and two machine-guns being the result of this lively
episode.

At Potsdam two machine-guns were in action in
the open. While two platoons of the Royal Scots
made a frontal assault, a third, assisted by some South
Africans, attacked from the north, and another platoon
from the south. Before this converging onslaught the
defenders were overpowered, and 70 prisoners and two
machine-guns were captured.

During the pause on the first objective the K.O.S.B.
and the right companies of the ‘“ Rifles” reorganised
their forces. In each case the supporting companies
had now to lead the attack, but as the right supporting
company of the K.O.S.B. had already suffered severely
from the enemy’s barrage, Lieut.-Colonel Maclean was
obliged to put his whole battalion in the front line,
and he asked Lieut.-Colonel Sir John Campbell to

234 SUCCESS OF 271Tx BRIGADE [sEPr. 20

support him with two companies of the 11th Royal
Scots. On the left, Lieut.-Colonel Lumsden, owing
to the late arrival of his left companies, resolved to
swing his right companies towards the Railway, and
to keep in touch with the K.O.S.B. by means of one
platoon.

The operations against the Green Line caused very
little trouble. The K.O.S.B. encountered one machine-
gun in a shell-hole right out in the open, but the men
worked round it and bayoneted the team. At the
Zonnebeke Redoubt the enemy made no show of a
fight, and 40 prisoners were taken. Equally swift
progress was made by the “Rifles.” The two left
companies, moving up rapidly, caught up the barrage
and joined in the action; except for slight opposition
from two ‘“ Pill-boxes” all was plain sailing.

Brig.-General Maxwell, who reached the Green
Line just after its capture, selected the line to be
consolidated, and this was done by improving shell-
holes and then forming short lengths of trench by
connecting them up. The workers were covered by
a number of advanced posts, each with a Lewis Gun,
but the enemy made no attempt at a counter-stroke.
At the same time half of the men cleaned their rifles
while the others kept guard, and machine-gun sections
arrived and took up positions. While the consolidation
was in progress a hostile aeroplane, flying low up and
down our line, roughly indicated the position to the
German gunners who sent over a few shells.

On the South African front the Red Line was
carried almost without a check, and the 4th Regiment
on the left entered Borry Farm, isolated in the same
manner as Hanebeek Wood, and Beck House, before
the Germans had time to resist. The only trouble
was on the right, where the 3rd Regiment sustained

1917] ATTACK OF SOUTH AFRICANS 235

several casualties from Potsdam, but an assault by
Captain Sprenger with a few men materially assisted
the 12th Royal Scots to overcome this stronghold.
At the first objective the supporting battalions took
the lead, and at 7 a.m. the Ist and 2nd Regiments
moved against the Yellow and Green Lines. The
former reached its objective without opposition, but
the latter had to fight nearly every yard of the way.
From Waterend House, Tulip Cottages, and Hill 37,
all in the area of the Fifty-fifth Division, machine-
gun fire scourged the flank of the South Africans, and
created a gap between them and the troops on the
left. When the 2nd Regiment eventually carried
Zevencote and Bremen Redoubt, a defensive flank
was thrown out on the south bank of the Zonnebeke |
stream, and the garrison of Mitchell’s Farm was
augmented. So heavy had been the losses of the
South Africans that they had to be reinforced by
the Camerons. Late in the evening the Fifty-fifth
Division succeeded in clearing Hill 37, and thus
closed the gap between it and the South Africans.

At the fall of night all the objectives of the
Division had been secured and consolidated. <A
counter-thrust was expected and even hoped for,
but it did not come. A terrific barrage along our
line about 5 p.m. seemed to be the prelude to an on-
slaught, and our men, surging forward out of the
shelled zone, peered eagerly into the mist for a sight
' of the field- grey foemen, but all attempts of the
enemy to mass were broken up by our artillery-fire.
So accurate and stupendous was our barrage that it
seemed like a solid, impenetrable barrier.

The nature of the fighting lent itself to individual
exploits, and two V.C’s. were given to the Division, one
being awarded to Captain Reynolds and the other to

236 BRIG.-GENERAL MAXWELL KILLED [sepr. 21

Lance-Corporal W. H. Hewitt of the 2nd South African
Regiment. He tackled a “Pill-box” single-handed,
and on attempting to enter the doorway was severely
wounded by the defenders; undaunted, he crawled to
a loophole, and though wounded again pushed a
bomb through the embrasure, the explosion of which
dislodged the Germans. Numerous feats of a similar
nature were performed by the men of all battalions,
and the excellent understanding between the members
of sections was a source of legitimate gratification to
all responsible for the training of the men.

The line captured was held by the Division until
the 24th September. The ‘ Pill-boxes” provided a
welcome shelter during the fierce gusts of artillery-
fire; but their interiors were disgustingly squalid, and
the floors were a foot or more under water. The
Argylls and Camerons relieved the 2nd and ist
South African Regiments on the left, while the
“Rifles” and K.O.S.B. held the right front. During
this period there were violent storms of artillery-fire
but there was no infantry action.

A deep gloom was cast over the whole Division
by the news of the death of Brig.-General Maxwell
on the 21st. Since taking over the command of the
27th Brigade in October 1916 he had been one of
the outstanding personalities in the Ninth. Daring
to a fault, he was a soldier with real gifts of general-
ship, and it was a sad calamity that death prevented
his brilliant talents receiving fuller scope in a higher
command. He was one from whose manner and
bearing all plucked courage and confidence; in the
glamour of his presence, his unfailing courtesy, and
the opulence of his ideas lay the secret of the love
and respect with which he was regarded by all his
subordinates. Too great a disregard of personal

1917] COMMENTS ON ACTION 237

danger led to his death; in his anxiety to ascertain
that all was right on his front he exposed himself
freely, and was shot by a sniper at 40 yards’ range.
His habitual hardihood had been a constant source
of anxiety to his staff, but it was one of the qualities
that raised him above criticism in the eyes of the
men. Courage begets courage, and within a few
weeks of his coming Brig.-General Maxwell had made
the 27th one of the finest fighting brigades in France.
His spirit lived among the men after his death, and
his teaching and training remained a fount of inspira-
tion to all ranks of the 27th Brigade.

The action of the 20th September was one of the
most satisfactory in which the Ninth took part.
Though the number’ of prisoners taken was not large
and the space of ground gained inconsiderable, the
operation was the first to reap satisfactory results
against Von Armin’s system of defence, and it en-
couraged the Higher Command to continue the
campaign in spite of the lateness of the season.
Communications throughout the battle had been
wonderfully good, and though telephone wires could
be maintained only with difficulty on account of shell-
fire, messages were received by means of pigeons,
lamps, and runners. The arrangements of the
R.A.M.C. were effective and adequate, and the extra
stretcher-bearers furnished by the infantry enabled
the wounded to be rapidly evacuated from the for-
ward areas. The H.E. and smoke-barrage required
no justification in the eyes of the Ninth, but its
success attracted the attention of higher authorities
and led to its being employed by the Third and
Fifty-ninth Divisions in the engagement of the 26th
September.

' 32 officers, 312 other ranks.

238 BAD WEATHER [ocr. 12

| On the 24th September after being relieved by
the Third Division, the Ninth moved to Arneke and
neighbouring villages, where the men were practised
for their next engagement, which, if all went well, was
expected to bring us near Westroosebeke. The new
leader of the 27th Brigade was Brig.-General Croft,
who was recalled from the brigade to which he had
been appointed just before the September battle. As
C.O. of the 11th Royal Scots he had been with the
Division since December 1915, and no man was
more likely to keep the high standard which his
predecessor had set. MRealising the value of a
distinctive name, he caused his brigade to be known
by the term “Lowland” as well as by its number.
The spell of good weather that set in during the latter
part of September did not last, and rain fell almost
continuously from the 6th October onwards. On the
5th the Division was ordered to concentrate in the
area of the XVIII. Corps,’ and under the most de-
pressing conditions it was transferred to the vicinity
of Brake Camp, the infantry arriving late on the night
of the 9th. For many of the men there was no shelter
from the rain, and bivouacs and tents had to be hastily
erected on the sodden ground. No camps in the
whole British line were more dismal than those round
Ypres, sloppy with mud and persistently bombed by
the enemy's aeroplanes. So serious were the effects
of bombing that all tents and horse lines were encircled
by ramparts of earth to localise the explosions. On the
night of the 10th/11th the Highland Brigade relieved
the 144th (Forty-eighth Division) in the line near
Poelcapelle, and the Ninth received orders for an

attack on the 12th October. |
The scene of battle was the low, flat country

' Commanded by General Sir Ivor Maxse

1917] OBJECTIVES FOR 12TH OCTOBER 239

near the northern end of the Passchendaele Ridge.
Along the left boundary of the Division ran the
Lekkerboterbeek stream, and though the whole area
was studded with fortified farms and houses, there
were no clear landmarks. Since the 20th September
performance had lagged far behind programme, and
Westroosebeke lay beyond our immediate grasp. There
were three objectives’ ; the first two (the Yellow Dotted
and the Blue Dotted Lines) were to be taken by the
Highland Brigade, and the final one (the Dotted Purple
Line) by the Lowland. The leading battalions of the
26th, the Black Watch’ and Argylls, each on a two-
company front, were to capture a subsidiary objective
(Green Line) and the Yellow Dotted Line, after which
the Seaforths and Camerons’® were to pass through
and go on to the Blue Dotted Line, while the final
attack was allotted by Brig.-General Croft to the 12th *
and 11th Royal Scots. The assault was on a very
wide frontage for a brigade, and necessitated consider-
able gaps between sections. The barrage was to move
at the rate of 100 yards every eight minutes, with
a pause on the first and second objectives, and 16
Vickers Guns were to form a machine-gun barrage
and were also to support the infantry with covering-
fire. On the flanks of the Ninth the attack was to be
carried on by the New Zealand Division on the right
and the Eighteenth Division on the left. Zero was
0.39 A.M.

About midnight on the 11th, the weather broke
down completely, and the march of the battalions of the
27th Brigade under torrents of rain alony the slippery

1 See Map.
2 Commanded by Lieut.-Colonel R. W. Hadow since September.
3 Commanded since the beginning of October by Lieut.-Colonel
A. G. M. M. Crichton.
4 Commanded in this action by Major Scott.
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1917] ACTION OF 'THE 121 OCTOBER _ 241

Scots, following close behind, became mingled with
the Seaforths. There was some opposition from Inch
Houses, and in numerous cases clusters of Germans
offered resistance until they were taken in flank; in one
case two of our sergeants, both of whom had been
wounded, charged a group of nine and killed every one.
Small parties of our men were seen in the dim light to
pass Banff Houses and Source Trench, and some may
even have reached Source Farm and Vat Cottages. A
mixed body of Black Watch, Seaforths, and Royal Scots
entered the eastern end of Wallemolen, but being
heavily enfiladed from both flanks had to fall back on
the Cemetery—Inch Houses line.

On the left, matters were even worse ; for the ground
in some places was impassable, and as a consequence
the Argylls were unable to keep pace with the barrage.
The right company and its supporting company main-
tained direction, but the others swung to the left and
some of the men, crossing the Lekkerboterbeek, so
churned up by shell-fire that it was unrecognisable,
entered the sector of the Eighteenth Division. On the
right a “Pill-box” near the front line stopped the
leading company and held up the whole advance, with
the result that parties from the rear battalions, the

Camerons, 11th Royal Scots, and 6th K.O.S.B.' became
involved in the firing-line. A combined assault by men
of all units on the ‘ Pill-box,” the occupants of which
had shown the white flag but continued firing, eventu-
ally mastered the defence, the garrison being killed and
four machine-guns captured. But by this time the
barrage was far ahead, the troops were exhausted and
disorganised, and the leading ranks were able to proceed
only 150 yards or so from the “ Pill-box,” where they
consolidated a line of shell-holes. The men of the left

1 Commanded in this action by Major A. N. Innes Browne.

242 FAILURE OF ATTACK [ocr. 12

company who crossed the Lekkerboterbeek advanced
for some 80 yards, but were stopped by machine-gun
fire from Beek and Meunier Houses. The left rear
company, which could make no headway, formed a
defensive flank and gained touch with the Eighteenth
Division on its old front line.

Except on the extreme right the advance had come
to a halt about 100 yards from the starting-point.
The New Zealanders on our right flank had made some
progress, but the Eighteenth Division, as was the case
with our left battalion, had been handicapped by the
spongy nature of the ground and was back in its original
position. Several unfortunate men had been drowned
in the deep, water-filled shell-holes, and rifles and
machine-guns were clogged with slime. The barrage
having gone far ahead, nothing was to be gained by
persisting in the attack, and the line taken up by the
Ninth at the close of the battle ran from the Cemetery
near Wallemolen in front of Inch Houses, thence to
Oxford Houses and back to our original front system.
Though the 26th and 27th Machine-gun Companies had
been roughly handled during the action, they were able
to provide efficient protection for the position now held.

During the night the front was reorganised in three
sectors; the right, garrisoned by the 12th Royal
Scots, the Seaforths and Black Watch, the centre held
by the Camerons and Argylls with the “Rifles” in
support, and the left occupied by the 11th Royal Scots
and K.O.S.B. Patrols were sent out during the dark
hours with orders to join up with the leading men of
the Black Watch, who had been seen near Source Farm,
but not until next day was touch established with a few
of them in Source Trench, and these were relieved
during the night of the 13th/14th. On the same night
the South Africans took over the whole of the front,

‘x

1917] COMMENTS ON ACTION 243

and the 26th and 27th Brigades were withdrawn from
the line.

Rain and mud constitute the chief explanation for
the failure of the Division in this battle, which should
not have been fought; no man could progress at more
than a snail’s pace, and sheer exhaustion was a factor
more potent than the enemy in bringing the advance to
a standstill. The breakdown in communications was
understandable and largely unavoidable, since the
pigeons were unable to fly against the strong wind
that prevailed, and the men who had charge of the
messenger dogs all became casualties. The barrage was
not up to the usual standard of the Divisional Artillery,
but its lack of density and its raggedness were due
to the short period that had elapsed since the last
action and to the weather. Many of the guns stuck in
the mud, all the men were dead-beat, and Brig.-General
Tudor could not get the quantity of the smoke-shells
he wanted. Since the horses could not leave the roads,
it was only by means of light railways that field-guns
could be brought into action off the roads and supplied
with ammunition. The Sappers, under Lieut.-Colonel
Hearn, always a strong advocate of the light railway,
gave the greatest possible assistance to the gunners
by constructing a very useful railway system east of
Springfield.

Serious errors were undoubtedly committed by the
infantry, but when officers and men were engaged in
a long and cruel struggle against ineluctable conditions,
cool leadership could scarcely be expected. As on the
3rd May, there was a deplorable loss of direction at
the very start leading to confusion of units, but at the
same time the vast length of the attacking frontage—
1500 yards for two battalions—with wide gaps between
each section, and the absence of conspicuous landmarks

244 COMMENTS ON ACTION [ocr.

made the maintenance of direction a difficult matter.
Leadership, marked more by valour than by discretion,
caused an unnecessary number of battalions to be
involved in wasteful and confused fighting. If the
mixing up of the supporting and leading units of the
26th Brigade can be understood and condoned, it was
none the less regrettable, but there was less reason for
throwing the battalions of the 27th into the fight. Of
battalion commanders Lieut.-Colonel Lumsden alone,
seeing that the attack of the 26th Brigade had been
checked, kept his men back, and the net result of
over-zealous leading was that General Lukin, instead
of a brigade, had only one battalion intact. But even
in this respect there was some excuse. It was at least
a venial fault that officers and men refused to accept
a check without making a desperate effort, and Lieut.-
Colonel Sir J. Campbell and Major Innes Browne
regarded our line as unsatisfactory, if not untenable,
while the ‘“‘ Pill-box” that caused the left of the attack
so much trouble remained in the hands of the Germans.
Possibly heroism on a grander scale has never been
shown than in the brutal fighting on the foul quag-
mires of Flanders. Often neck-deep in mud, the
men floundered forward until their overtaxed limbs
could no longer support them, and to wrest victory
under such appalling conditions was a task beyond
the power of man.

Few people at Passchendaele had a more thankless
and trying time than the Sappers and personnel of the
R.A.M.C. The former were constantly engaged in
maintaining the shelled duckboard tracks, making
plank roads, repairing paths and constructing shelters
and tramways. Three hundred infantry had _ been
attached to the latter for stretcher-bearing ; they were
all needed, and it was only by sheer hard work and much

1917] RELIEF OF DIVISION 245

e

nervous strain that the wounded were satisfactorily
evacuated from the dreary swamps of Passchendaele.

The line was held by the Division until the 24th
October and during this time the hostile artillery
periodically barraged the back areas and approaches,
causing serious losses to reliefs and working-parties
between St Julien and the front trenches. A great
deal of material was carried up to the front for the
Sixty-third (Naval) Division and many yards of cable
were buried to ensure a rapid and reliable signal
service. Advance posts were thrown out by the 27th
Brigade, and the assembly areas for the Sixty-third
Division were marked by tape. On the 22nd a feint
attack in our sector, carried out by men of the XVIII.
Corps Cyclist Battalion who manipulated dummy figures,
assisted the Eighteenth Division in bringing its position
into line with that of the Ninth. On the 24th the
27th was relieved by the 188th Brigade (Sixty-third
Division) and the Ninth’ was concentrated in the
various camps near Ypres.

1 On leaving the Fifth Army the Division received the following
message from General Sir Hubert Gough :—

“The Ninth Division has fought splendidly while it has been in the
Fifth Army and maintained the great reputation of the Scottish Divisions
in France. The Division achieved a very notable success on 20th
September and played a gallant part during the severe fighting of 12th
October. In spite of the casualties sustained and the demands made upon
the men’s endurance during the past six weeks, the Division’s moral
remains as high as ever. Well done, everybody !”

CHAPTER XI
PREPARATIONS FOR DEFENCE

OctToser 1917 To 21st Marcu 1918

THE operations of the 12th October concluded the
share of the Division in the fighting of 1917. It had
played an important part in all the big battles except
Messines and it had been too recently in action to be
employed in the operations near Cambrai, which began
in November. The Ninth was frequently engaged in
the travail of battle; its rdle during the year had been
rather that of storm troops than of mere occupants of
the line, and though this had entailed great hardships
and a heavy casualty list, some compensation had been
derived from the comparatively long interludes spent in
rest and training. Through gain and loss, hope and
fear, officers and men had shown that splendid and
invincible cheerfulness which made the Ninth so
terrible in battle. The general standard of physique
was perhaps not so high as in earlier years, but the
spirit of the Division remained as unconquerable as
ever despite the disappointing nature of the recent
operations.

The situation at the close of the year contrasted
sadly with the soaring hopes entertained at the
beginning. Russia, whose claim to be the protector

of the Balkan Slavs had been the occasion of the war,
246 °

oct, 1917] SITUATION AT CLOSE OF 1917 247

had been ignominiously driven from the field, and her
military collapse involved the sacrifice of Roumania.
Near Salonica, the Entente had been able to do little
more than hold its own, and the greater part of Serbia
was in the hands of Bulgarians. The Italians, unable
to wrest the coveted port of Trieste from the Austrians,
were in October dispersed in rout at Caporetto before
a combined army of Austrians and Germans, and the
allies in the West had hurriedly to send reinforcements
to stiffen Italy’s resistance. In Flanders the Passchen-
daele offensive dragged on beyond the limits sanctioned
by sagacity or prudence until November, and its only
result was to secure us less than five miles of ravaged
soil without effecting any important strategical gain.
The Belgian coast was still firmly controlled by the
enemy and our military efforts had signally failed to
contract his submarine campaign. Audacity and
originality, exhibited in the intelligent employment
of tanks, achieved on the 20th November our most
remarkable victory and all but led to the capture of
Cambrai, but we were either slow or unprepared to
extend our success, and what had been our greatest
triumph was counterbalanced by our gravest defeat.
Ten days later the German counter - stroke made
Cambrai secure and rent a gap in our line near
Gouzeaucourt and Gonnelieu.

Even at sea there was cause for concern. Though
the Battle of Jutland on the 30th June 1916 had
rendered the German Navy negligible, the submarine
activities of the enemy wrought serious havoc among our
merchant shipping, and compelled the British Govern-
ment to adopt a system of rationing to conserve the
food supply. Till the end of the year it was estimated
that we were losing ships faster than we could build
them, and it was not till the beginning of 1918 that

248 SITUATION AT CLOSE OF 1917 _ [wnov. 1917-

we made any real headway against the submarine
menace.

Only in Mesopotamia and Egypt had the tide of
fortune turned definitely in our favour. In the former,
General Marshall pushed our conquests far beyond
Bagdad, though it was impossible without Russian
help on his flank to make any ambitious movement
against Aleppo. General Allenby had been transferred
to Egypt in June 1917, and in a vigorous and masterly
campaign carried Gaza and gained possession of
Jerusalem before the end of the year.

But if the year ended in humility and disappoint-
ment the future was not without a gleam of hope.
The entry of America far outweighed the defection
of Russia, and gave complete assurance of ultimate
victory. Nevertheless the immediate situation was not
happy. Though American troops had taken their
place in the line by December, great numbers of
trained men could not be expected to reach the
Western Front from the United States until well on
in 1918, and it was certain that Germany would make
a supreme effort to snatch victory before their arrival.
For such an emergency the British forces in France
were perilously short of men, yet on the plea of home
defence, which was absurd while the Navy controlled
the seas, the Government retained in this country large
bodies of troops urgently needed by Sir Douglas Haig
as reinforcements. And at this juncture the British
Commander became responsible for an additional
stretch of 28 miles of front, taken over from the French
in deference to a decision of the Versailles Council
against the expressed opinion of the British military
representative.

On leaving the disagreeable and constantly bombed
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MARCH 1918] THE COAST SECTOR 249

October to the Wormhoudt area, and on the following
morning to the coast in the Nieuport sector. Here
two days later the 26th Brigade relieved the Forty-
first Division in the line. After the stress and turmoil
of the Salient the Belgian coast was a veritable haven
of rest, the only storm centre being Dunkirk, which
was nightly bombed. Even in the trenches there was
little to disturb the harmony of life, and when our
gunners In accordance with their usual practice began
to liven up matters, they were ordered by the XV.
Corps to assume a quieter attitude. Behind the lines
the broad, firm expanse of sand fringing the coast
offered ample scope not merely for the manceuvring
of troops but for such forms of recreation as polo and
football.

The sojourn in this sector, where preparations were
made for a long period of useful training, came to an
abrupt end. On the 11th November General Lukin
was informed that his command was to be transferred
to the X. Corps of the Second Army. Further orders
were received that the 9th Seaforths were to be sent
ahead of the Division, and on the 19th they moved
to the area of the VIII. Corps. After relief by the
XXXVI. French Corps, the Ninth concentrated near
Fruges. Then on the last day of the month the
Germans delivered their counter-thrust near Cambrai,
and the whole Division was hurried by rail to
Péronne. On the 3rd December it came under the
III. Corps, and two days later relieved the right
brigade of the Guards’ Division and the Second
Cavalry Division in the sector extending from Gauche
Wood to Chapel Crossing.

On its flanks were the Twenty-first Division on
the right and the Sixty-first on the left. All three
brigades were in the line, the 26th and 27th in the

250 THE NINTH AT GOUZEAUCOURT [prc. 1917-

north and south respectively, and the South African
in the centre. With feverish energy the trenches were
strengthened, improved, and protected by wire entangle-
ments. On the 15th December the Ninth came under
the control of the VII. Corps.’ Two days later, when
the fear of an immediate attack was dying away, at
a conference the brigadiers agreed that it would be a
gain to hold the sector with two brigades, allowing
the third to work and train, and it was also decided
to hold our front with an outpost line with a buffer
line running through Gouzeaucourt, while the main line
of resistance was to be the reserve system. From the
17th December there were heavy falls of snow, but
in spite of the inclement weather the enemy launched
an attack early on the morning of the 30th against the
Sixty-third Division, which had relieved the Sixty-
first on our left. After a violent barrage he broke
into its trenches, and two parties taking the position
of the Highland Brigade in the flank were repelled
_ by the Argylls only after a desperate conflict, in which
the enemy sustained heavy losses. During the after-
noon a counter-attack of the Sixty-third Division
succeeded in recapturing part of the lost trenches.
At dawn next morning the enemy shelled the 26th
Brigade with gas and H.E., but made no infantry
attack on our front, though he delivered a fruitless
assault against the left division. Fine cold weather
prevailed during the opening days of 1918, but in the
middle of January a thaw set in and our parapets
melted away in liquid snow and mud. The greatest
vigilance and alertness were maintained by both sides,
and patrols found few opportunities of effecting surprise.
Alarms still continued, and a message picked up from
the Germans seemed to indicate that an attack would
1 Commanded by Sir W. Congreve, V.C.

JAN. 1918] TRAINING 251

be made on the 19th, but nothing out of the usual
occurred until the 23rd, when an enemy patrol was
repulsed in an attempt to rush the trenches held by
the 11th Royal Scots. Towards the close of the month
the relief of the Ninth by the Thirty-ninth Division
was begun, and was completed on the first day of
February.

For almost six weeks the Division remained out
of the line, the time being spent in training and in
work on the railways and rear defences. During this
period our waning strength in man-power was respon-
sible for infantry brigades being placed on a three-
instead of a four-battalion basis, and in accordance
with this rearrangement the Argylls were sent to the
Thirty-second Division and the “Rifles” to the
Fourteenth, while the 3rd South African Regiment
was broken up and its members allocated to the
remaining battalions of the brigade. This alteration
not merely affected the strength of the Division, but
to some extent its fighting efficiency, because the new
grouping of units was one with which the British Army
was unfamiliar, and new methods of tactical handling
had to be acquired. At this time also the 9th Seaforths
were reorganised as a three-company battalion.

The training was on the old lines of the open
warfare system. It was known that the Germans
were receiving special training for a supreme effort,
and the best means of countering it was by securing
an equal efficiency. There was nothing new or original
in the methods of Ludendorff; he wished to recapture
the old flexibility in movement and method that dis-
tinguished the Germans in 1914, but had been lost
through the routine of trench warfare. An army of
the same experience as that of ‘“‘The Contemptibles”
would have had no difficulty in coping with Ludendorff’s

252 NINTH MACHINE-GUN BATTALION — [Marcu

sturm truppen, but,the New Armies of Britain through
sheer lack of opportunity for training were much
below that standard. Using picked troops the
Germans intended to press on without halting to
adjust irregularities in their line, pockets of resistance
being compelled to withdraw or surrender by the
pressure on their flanks. This method was well
known to the British Army, and was distinctly
emphasised in the manual on Infantry Training, 1914,
in which the men were told that the best way to help
a neighbour forward was to push on themselves.
Though the time was short every moment was fully
utilised, and the infantry of the Ninth had reached
a very satisfactory stage of efficiency when they returned
to the line. The artillery, now at Bray under Brig.-
General Tudor, underwent a course of training, the
value of which was soon to be shown.

On the 1st March a further reorganisation took
place with regard to machine-guns. [Each division
was equipped with a machine-gun battalion of
4 companies with 16 guns each, and the 3 com-
panies attached to the infantry brigades now formed
part of the 9th Machine-gun Battalion under Lieut.-
Colonel Chalmers. This rearrangement strengthened
the discipline of the Machine-gun Corps by the in-
troduction of senior officers, and a more intense esprit
de corps followed. It also permitted greater co-ordina-
tion and co-operation in the use of machine-guns.
There was a great increase in the number of Lewis
Guns; each battalion now possessed 36, with an addi-
tional 4 for anti-aircraft work.

At the beginning of March, General Lukin’ was
appointed to a command in England. During his

! Later General Lukin was awarded the K.C.B., an honour which gave
much gratification to the Division,

1918] THE NINTIVS SECTOR 253

period of command the Ninth had gained numerous
outstanding successes, particularly those of the 9th
April and 20th September 1917, and had developed
steadily the reputation so firmly established at Loos.
He had served with the Division for nearly two years
and had won the esteem and confidence of all ranks.
His successor was Major-General C. A. Blacklock,
who arrived on the 13th March. The Division had also
a new G.S.O.I.; Lieut.-Colonel P. A. V. Stewart, who
had served with the Ninth since March 1916, left 1t in
December 1917, and was succeeded by Lieut.-Colonel
T. C. Mudie.

On the nights of the 11th/12th and 12th/13th
March, the Ninth returned to the line in relief of the
Thirty-ninth Division. The sector extended from
about a thousand yards west of Villers-Guislain to
about the same distance north-west of Gonnelieu, and,
except that Chapel Hill was now included in the
sector of the Twenty-first Division, was the position
held before February. The hill should have been
left in the area of the Ninth because it formed
the key to the greater part of its defences.

The Ninth was on the left flank of the VII. Corps
of the Fifth Army, and on its left flank was the Forty-
seventh Division of the V. Corps of the Third Army.
Since the junction of different armies is always a
tempting mark for a hostile attack, the position of
these divisions was one of’ particular importance ;
on the haison between them depended the liaison of
the Fifth and Third Armies. Of these two armies
the former was by far the weaker; General Gough
was responsible for a front more than forty-five miles
in extent, and the forces at his disposal numbered
only 14 infantry and 3 cavalry divisions, while oppos-
ing him were 46 strong German divisions. General

254 _ NATURE OF DEFENCES [MARCH

Byng with slightly over twenty-six miles of front
had 19 divisions (11 in line and 8 in reserve). Sir
Douglas Haig probably anticipated that the heaviest
blow would fall on the Third Army, and he furnished
it with a comparatively large body of reserves. The
Fifth Army holding less vital ground had ample scope
for manceuvre and was therefore provided with fewer
troops. But the position of General Gough was not
a comfortable one, as the first shock of attack would
absorb his few reserves, and after that he would have
to rely on his neighbours for help.

The country comprised in the Ninth’s area was
undulating, with rolling downs dotted here and there,
with a few scattered woods and ruined villages. The
main tactical features were the low ridges on the east
and west of Gouzeaucourt, which joined about Chapel
Hill, one and a half miles south of the village. We
held Quentin Ridge, east of Gouzeaucourt, as far north
as Quentin Redoubt, from which point our front line
ran along the western slopes of the ridge to Fifteen
Ravine, which was the boundary between the Ninth
and Forty-seventh Divisions and the Fifth and Third
Armies.

The area was organised into three zones for
defence. The defences of the first or Forward Zone
consisted of a continuous front line supported on the
right and centre by Gauche Wood and Quentin
Redoubt, a well-wired, anti-tank field, an intermediate
line running due north from Chapel Hill, and includ-
ing the village of Gouzeaucourt, and the Red Line
stretching from Chapel Hill west of Gouzeaucourt to
Beaucamp Ridge, where it joined the second zone
defences at the Divisional boundary.

The second or Battle Zone consisted of two con-
tinuous trenches — called the Yellow System — two

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1918] NATURE OF DEFENCES 255

or three hundred yards apart, starting on Chapel
Hill and lying roughly north and south along the
ridge west of Gouzeaucourt, and a continuous trench
(the Brown Line) leading north-west from Railton
about one mile south-west of Chapel Hill. The
Brown Line was the only one which would not
be seriously compromised by the loss of Chapel Hill.
Numerous strong points had been made between the
Brown and the Yellow Systems, and the support line
of the former was in course of construction. A switch
line from the Yellow System along Revelon Ridge to
the Brown Line was begun when the blow fell, but
Revelon Farm, which was to have been in this switch,
was strongly defended and permanently garrisoned.

Behind this lay the Rear Zone. The villages of —
Heudecourt, Sorel and Fins were intended to form
centres of resistance, but their fortifications had scarcely
been commenced at the time of the attack. Beyond
these was a continuous trench, the Green Line, running
north and south through the village of Nurlu, which
formed a centre of resistance. The sector for the
defence of which the Ninth was responsible lay be-
tween the north end of Epinette Wood and the south
end of Equancourt; it was thus echeloned in rear of
the right flank of the Battle Zone. This point requires
notice; for the enemy’s penetration of the Division on
ou right on the first day of the battle, and later the
failure of the troops on our left to extend to their
southern boundary, were causes of great trouble during
the retreat.

The general scheme of defence may be summarised
thus: The men in the Forward Zone were to maintain
their ground, but no counter-attack on a large scale
was to be made to recover any part of it that might
be lost. But all the resources at the command of the

S

256 DEFENCE ARRANGEMENTS [MARCH

Division were to be engaged, if necessary, to retake
any part of the Battle Zone invaded by the enemy, and
the artillery positions were chosen primarily with a
view to the defence of the Battle Zone.

The South African Brigade’ on the right and the
26th’ on the left held our front. In each of these
one and a half battalions were detailed for defence
and local counter-attack within the Forward Zone, and
the remainder was entrusted with the defence of the
front of the Battle Zone. The 27th Brigade,*® the 9th
Seaforths, and the Divisional Engineers were in reserve.
The 11th Royal Scots were quartered in Heudecourt,
the 12th Royal Scots in Dessart Wood, and the K.O.S.B.
and the 9th Seaforths in Sorel. The Divisional Reserve
was to be ready to counter-attack within the Battle
Zone or to man the Brown System. Of the Machine-
gun Battalion, three companies were deployed in depth
in the Forward Zone and in the Yellow System, and all
guns were sited for direct fire, but where possible they
had also been given an indirect S.0.S. line. The
remaining company was in reserve at Heudecourt.
The machine-gun barrage was designed to cover the
valley between Gonnelieu and Villers-Guislain and the
ground in front of Fifteen Ravine on the extreme left.
Gun positions in the Battle Zone behind the Yellow

1 The 2nd Regiment was now commanded by Lieut.-Colonel Christian.
Lieut.-Colonel Tanner was promoted to the command of the 8th Brigade
(Third Division). ss

2 Lieut.-Colonel Horn of the 7th Seaforths took over the command of
the Army Musketry Camp on the 18th October; the battalion was com-
manded by Major P. C. Anderson during the retreat.

Lieut.-Colonel Crichton left the Camerons in March, and was succeeded
by Lieut.-Colonel J. Inglis.

3 Lieut.-Colonel Sir J. Campbell being on leave, the 11th Royal Scots
were commanded by Major A. C. Campbell during the retreat.

Lieut.-Colonel Maclean left the K.O.S.B. in October 1917, and was
succeeded by Licut.-Colonel Smyth, who returned to France at the end of
September.

1918] GERMAN PREPARATIONS 257

System had been reconnoitred, and this proved of great
value later, for guns hastily taken up to the south of
Revelon Farm on the first day of the battle did great
execution.

The Divisional Artillery, reinforced by the 65th and
130th A.F.A. Brigades, covered our sector, and the
barrage-fire of the field-guns was concentrated in front
of Gonnelieu and Villers-Guislain. Alternative and
rear positions had been prepared, and it was noted that
four batteries, which had moved into their alternative
positions during the week before the attack, were not
shelled during the German bombardment.

Concerning the intentions of the enemy there could
be no doubt. From the beginning of March fresh
indications of an impending blow were reported daily
in the Intelligence Summaries of the VII. Corps and
Fifth Army, though long before this the construction
of railways, roads, and bridges over the Canal de St
Quentin had aroused speculation. The fact that several
German divisions’ had been put in the line about the
middle of February, and taken out again at the end of
the month, presumably for a final rehearsal, seemed to
point to the middle of March as the probable time for
the beginning of the offensive. On the 12th March the
Corps Intelligence Summary stated that during the last
four days the enemy’s preparations had been extended
to the forward area and were being carried on rapidly,
noticeably north of Gonnelieu, while from the statements
of prisoners it appeared probable that the attack would
commence between the 14th and the 16th.

Up to this date all the information on which an
estimate of the enemy’s purpose could be based came

! The 18th Division, for example, after holding the Villers-Guislain-
Gonnelicu sector for fourteen days was relieved on the 3rd March by the
107th Division, a prisoner from which said that his division had undergone
intensive training for an attack and break through.

258 LUDENDORFF'’S PLAN [ MARCH

from higher authority. Not a sign of the coming thrust
could be discerned by the men holding the line. The
only suspicious circumstance lay in the failure of the
hostile artillery to retaliate after the heavy bombard-
ment carried out by our gunners at dawn every morning.
On the 13th, 14th, and 15th, our left and the right of
the Division on our left were subjected to severe gas
bombardments; but apart from this the silence of the
enemy's artillery was significant. Nothing unusual
occurred till the 16th, when an extraordinary amount
of movement was reported by our observers, and it
was noticed that our heavy artillery “shoots” caused a
surprising number of explosions.

During these days of suspense Brig.-General Tudor
was in command of the Ninth, General Blacklock having
gone on leave on the 16th. The Corps Summary for
the 19th stated that the attack was to be expected on
the 20th or 21st. It would have been impossible for
anyone to detect any trace of nervousness among our
troops, and a remark in the diary of the Highland
Brigade on the 6th March that “the enemy is supposed
to be going to attack here” reflected in its cheerful
unconcern the attitude of the men. But the strain of
waiting was beginning to tell on them physically, since
the need for unremitting vigilance and frequent “ stand-
to’s” materially curtailed the time for sleep. Hence
the stroke of the enemy was longed for more than
feared.

The German plan of attack is described in Meine
Kriegserinnerungen by Ludendorff. The enemy had
two fronts’ of attack; the northern extending from
Croisilles to Moeuvres; the southern from Villers-
Guislain to a point on the Oise near the junction of the

' The northern attack was entrusted to the 17th Army, the southern to
the 2nd and 18th Armies.

1918] LUDENDORFF'’S PLAN 259

French and British fronts. The position of the Ninth
was exceptionally complicated ; the southern half of its
area was included in the German southern front of
attack, but the northern half lay in an area comprising
the Flesquiéres salient, which projected between the
two zones of the hostile operations, and against which
it was no part of Ludendorff’s plan to push home an
attack. In addition to the northern wing of the Ninth,
the salient was held by three divisions of the V. Corps,
and provided that the pressure north and south of it
met with success, Ludendorff had good reason to
expect that the whole of the garrison would be cut off
and forced to surrender. It is important to note that
the Ninth’s line of retreat, plainly indicated on the map,
lay south-west, while the direction of the enemy’s
southern advance ran due west. Thus it was clear that,
should the German attack compel a retirement, the
Division would be in danger of being cut off, since its
line of retreat took it across the enemy’s front.

CHAPTER XII
GERMANY’S SUPREME EFFORT

21st ro 29TH Marcu 1918

Tue 21st March 1918 was big with destiny; on that
day began the battle on the issue of which depended
the fate of Germany and the world. At first the
omens seemed favourable to the enemy, for a thick
mist, hovering over ridges and valleys, allowed his
grey-clad men to leave their trenches without detection.
At 4.45 a.m. the masses of guns concentrated by
Ludendorff on the British front spoke with an ear-
splitting noise, and our lines were robed in smoke
and flame. The bombardment of the Forward Zone,
particularly on the front of the 26th Brigade, was
not exceptional, but battery areas, Dessart Wood, and
the villages of Heudecourt and Sorel were heavily
shelled. Nurlu, where General Tudor had his H.Q,,
was the special target for a high velocity gun, and as
such marked attention to a D.H.Q. was a luxury
reserved for great occasions, it served to give early
warning that the supreme crisis had arrived. Large
quantities of gas were sent over, compelling the
battalions at Heudecourt and Dessart Wood to wear
respirators for two hours. Shortly after 5 A.M.
telephonic communication between the two front
brigades and D.H.Q. was broken, the line to the 26th
260

MARCH 1918] GAUCHE WOOD LOST 261

being invariably cut immediately after repair. But
General Tudor remained in constant touch with Brig.-
General Croft at Sorel, and when the bombardment
terminated, the lines to the South African and Highland
Brigades were quickly mended. At 9.53 a.m. news
was received that German infantry had been seen
advancing on Gauche Wood and Quentin Ridge behind
a smoke-barrage, and this information was reported at
once to the VII. Corps and the S8.O.S. sent out by
wireless. |
In the sector of the Highland Brigade there was no
infantry attack ; small parties of Germans were seen to
make a show of advancing from Gonnelieu, but an
assault, if it had been intended, was prevented by our
tremendous concentration of artillery-fire on the
village. But a serious thrust was made against the
South Africans and between 8 and 9 A.M., under cover
of a smoke-screen, strong hostile parties marched
against Gauche Wood, which was garrisoned by a
company of the 2nd Regiment holding three strong
points with another in the open on the south-west side
of the wood. Captain Green, who was in command,
was assisted by two machine-guns and a section of the
brigade T.M.B. Some Germans attacked the wood
fiercely from the east, and others, screened by the fog
while threading their way through our outposts in the
north, entered it from that direction. A desperate
resistance was offered by the posts, and great rents were
ruthlessly torn in the ranks of the invaders, but yard by
yard the Germans tightened their hold. The garrisons
of two of the posts were almost completely blotted out,
but Lieut. Beviss and half a platoon hacked their way
out and dug in immediately west of the wood. Captain
Green with the men of the third post fought his way
back to join his troops near the south-west margin.

262 LOSS OF CHAPEL HILL [MARCH 21

Prodigal of life, the pursuing Germans charged in mass
at 50 yards’ range, and whole sections were shot down
by the vengeful fire of the South Africans. Brought to
a sudden halt, the assailants commenced to dig them-
selves in on the western edge; still the unerring bullets
of Captain Green’s men took heavy toll of them, and
they retired within the shelter of the wood, but even
there they found no safety, for Brig.-General Dawson,
on hearing what had happened, directed all the artillery
at his disposal to bombard it. Gauche Wood was all
that the Ninth yielded on the first day of the battle.

The first confirmation that General Tudor received
of the enemy's attack was at 11 a.m. when he
learned that German infantry were advancing between
Vaucellette Farm and Gauche Wood. Half an hour
later, he heard from the Twenty-first Division that the
farm had been lost, and from the South Africans that
the Germans were occupying the wood.

Up to noon the situation seemed to be fairly
satisfactory. To the north, the right of the Forty-
seventh Division had been unmolested, while on our
right the Twenty-first Division, according to its reports,
still held Cavalry Trench, east and south-east of Chapel
Hill. But at that time sinister tidings arrived, a
divisional observer reporting that the infantry of the
Twenty-first had withdrawn from the Hill on Revelon
Farm at 11 a.m. From noon, gnawing anxiety was the
constant companion of the Division. As we have seen,
Chapel Hill formed the southern buttress of our defence
scheme, and accordingly General Tudor ordered Brig.-
General Dawson to ascertain at once if the Hill and
Chapel crossing were still in our hands, and, if not,
to concert measures with the brigade on his right for
the reoccupation of these vital positions.

The South Africans’ commander was fully alive to the

1918] CHAPEL HILL RECAPTURED 263

seriousness of the situation, for the loss of Chapel Hill
might mean the sacrifice of his two forward battalions.
He promptly ordered the troops holding Lowland
Support (the rear trench of the Yellow System) to
turn about and face south, thus forming a defensive
flank between Chapel Hill and Revelon Farm, and this
flank he strengthened by sending forward a company of
the 2nd Regiment; it however met the enemy in the
trenches on the north slope of the hill and could make
no further progress. The task of recapturing Chapel
Hill was entrusted to a company of the South African
Scottish; at 5.30 p.m., advancing with great dash, the
men chased the Germans from the crest, took the
_ trenches on the southern and south-eastern slopes and
linked up the position with Genin Well Copse.

But farther south matters were becoming exceed-
ingly grave. The Germans bored a passage to the
vicinity of Genin Well Copse, where they were rudely
checked by the fire of a machine-gun section at Railton,
while the South African Scottish raked them with
flanking-fire, and C/51 Battery under Major Sawder
at Revelon Farm engaged them over open sights with
deadly effect. Patrols of the 11th Royal Scots entering
into the fray, dislodged the enemy's snipers from the
copse and captured an officer and 33 men.

On the afternoon of the 21st March the situation on
the front of the Ninth was satisfactory. No serious
assault, except on the right, had been made against its
entrenchments, but the Germans had in store for it
perils more desperate than those that come from
a frontal attack. So far, our main source of anxiety
was the south, where the chief shock of the onset had
been felt, but the possession of Chapel Hill, Lowland
Support, Revelon Farm, and Railton, gave reasonable
security to our flank and kept us in touch with the

264 RETREAT TO BATTLE ZONE [MARCH 21

Twenty-first Division, which, according to our patrol
reports, was holding the Brown Line south of Railton.
The ominous news in the Corps Summaries of disaster
farther south, and the fact that our line of retreat to
the Green Line, which ran south-west, was already
jeopardised by the enemy’s penetration to a depth of
fully 2000 yards on the Twenty-first Division’s front
necessarily kept the attention of General Tudor focussed .
on our right flank.

Information from the north had been reassuring,
the Forty-seventh Division having reported at 4.40 p.m.
that no alarming thrust had been made on its front.
It therefore came as a huge surprise to General Tudor
when he was ordered to withdraw his men during the
night to the Battle Zone, in order to conform with the
retreat of the V. Corps to the Red Line (a continuation
of our Yellow System). This was due to events on
the front of the Third Army, where the Germans had
scored a greater measure of success than could have
been anticipated. The loss of Doignies and the
penetration of hostile infantry as far as Beaumetz and
Morchies imperilled the Flesquiéres salient and com-
pelled General Byng to withdraw his men on the right
to Highland Ridge, and thence westwards along the
Hindenburg Line to Havrincourt and Hermies. But
a& more extensive withdrawal involving the abandon-
ment of the whole of the salient would probably have
been our wisest policy, since it would have forestalled
the enemy’s designs.

Warning orders, immediately sent out to brigades,
prevented Brig.-General Dawson from carrying out
an attempt, which he had in mind, to recapture
Gauche Wood. Instructions were also received for
the Ninth to take over the defences of Chapel Hill
from the Twenty-first Division ; this had actually been

1918] MORNING OF 22np 265

done, but parties of the Twenty-first still on Chapel
Hill and between it and Revelon Farm were relieved
by the South Africans during the night. In order that
the extra territory then taken over might be adequately
guarded, the 11th Royal Scots were sent up to reinforce
the South Africans, who established a continuous line
from Chapel Hill in front of Revelon Farm to Railton,
a trench being dug on it after dark by the Sappers and
9th Seaforths. With the approach of dusk the with-
drawal from the Forward Zone began and was carried
out without molestation, the night passing quietly
except for slight gas shelling of Dessart Wood.
Cheering news filtered through at midnight; the
Twenty-first Division had retaken the Yellow Line
from south of Chapel Hill to the Railton-—Peiziére
Railway, and the prospect at the close of the first
day’s fighting seemed distinctly good.

With the second day, trials and troubles for the
Ninth accumulated and grew in magnitude as the
enemy’s attack was pressed, and during the following
days only consummate leadership and indomitable
gallantry enabled the Division to extricate itself from
the dangers that threatened it on all sides.

When dawn came, gelid shadows of mist drifted over
the landscape, bringing poor comfort to men who, half-
numbed with cold, had passed a long, sleepless night.
There was no change in our dispositions, the Battle
Zone being held by the South African Brigade on the
right and the Highland Brigade on the left, each being
deployed in depth between the Yellow and Brown
Systems. At 7 a.m. General Tudor was informed by
the Corps Commander that as the weight of the enemy’s
assault was expected to be in the south, he must be
prepared to take over the front of the Twenty-first
Division as far as the Railton—Peiziére Railway by

266 CHAPEL HILL LOST ——[mancu 22

10 a.M., and orders for this relief were issued at
8.35 A.M. But before they could be carried out heavy
fighting had recommenced.

Enshrouded by fog, the Germans brought up un-
detected numerous trench mortars, with the fire of
which they hammered our positions from Chapel Hill
to Railton. Brig.-General Dawson, now established
at Sorel, had not the same control of communica-
tions as on the previous day, and was less able
to assist his infantry effectively with artillery - fire.
The persevering and tenacious Germans gradually
mastered the Hill, as the garrison became weakened
by fatigue and casualties. General Tudor, having
realised that there was little prospect of the Twenty-
first Division establishing any line in front of the
Brown System, which ran south from Railton Station,
instructed Brig.-General Dawson to hold the Reserve
Switch, which connected the front and rear lines of
the Yellow System along the line of the Revelon Farm-
Gouzeaucourt road. But our strained right flank was
still locked in conflict, and General Tudor contemplated
an attack by his reserves to relieve the pressure on
the South Africans, but he was instructed by the Corps
Commander, in view of the situation farther south, to
form a switch from the Yellow System on the left to
the Brown System on the right.

Scrupulous care and timely anticipation marked the
actions of the G.O.C. In the forenoon he had sent
one of his staff officers to acquaint the Forty-seventh
Division with the critical state of affairs on our front,
and at 12,15 p.m. he warned it by telephone that there
was a possibility of our being ordered to retire to
the Brown Line, and that as this withdrawal would
necessarily be in a south-westerly direction, the length
of the front of the Forty-seventh would be greatly |

1918] RETREAT TO BROWN LINE _ 267

extended. The situation on our right flank was pre-
carious enough in itself, and General Tudor was anxious
to assure his left. |

In the afternoon matters developed rapidly. The
policy of the Fifth Army was to fight a rearguard
action to delay the enemy, and the Ninth was instructed
to withdraw at once to the Brown Line; but before
this order was issued another message commanded a
retirement to the Green Line. The South African
and Highland Brigades were accordingly told to move
back to the Brown Line at 4.30 p.m., and from it to
the Green Line at 7.30 p.m. The 12th Royal Scots
already occupied the Green Line north of Nurlu, and
the Black Watch, the reserve battalion of the 26th
Brigade, were withdrawn at once, and taking up a
position on the left of the Royal Scots held the Green
Line as far north as the Fins-Equancourt Railway, with
the details of the 26th Brigade on their left. Brig.-
General Croft directed the K.O.S.B. to hold the high
ground between Sorel and Lieramont, and two com-
panies of the 11th Royal Scots were posted south-west
of Heudecourt. The 150th A.F.A. Brigade was with-
drawn and came into action south of Sorel. It was
hoped by these dispositions to secure the Green Line
and cover the southern flank of the South Africans and
Highlanders during their retirement, which in the case
of the former at least was bound to be of exceptional
difficulty, since by 4 p.m. the enemy in the south had
entered Guyencourt and threatened to cut across the
Division’s line of retreat.

The first stage of the retirement was accomplished
successfully. When the Germans noticed our move-
ment they advanced in dense formations past Revelon
Farm, until they were broken up in confusion by heavy
fire from the 2nd South African Regiment. The retreat

268 RETREAT TO GREEN LINE [MARCH 22

to the Green Line was one long struggle against frantic
odds and deadly perils. Farther south the plodding |
Germans, still making ground, had pierced before dark
the Brown Line south of Railton in the sector of the
Twenty-first Division, and, commencing to roll up our
line, burst into Heudecourt from the south-east at
6.30 p.m. This manceuvre threatened the right wing
of the Ninth with destruction, and all three battalions
of the South African Brigade were in imminent danger
of envelopment. Safety depended on the successful
checking of the enemy until the friendly mantle of night
gave the several units an opportunity to retire. General
control was impossible, but section and subordinate
leaders handled their men in a manner that must have
excited the admiration even of their skilful adversaries,
and the bulk of the South African forces succeeded in
reaching the Green Line.

While the retirement of the artillery was taking
place, throngs of hostile aeroplanes flitting above them
sprayed the teams with bullets and engaged our
infantry. In the dim light, the South Africans could
see in Sorel the sad evidences of an army in retreat ;
streams of wounded, guns, and details of departmental
units were hurrying through the streets, while the enemy -
was pressing on towards the village in large numbers.
It was imperative to stop him until our retiring troops
and guns had reached safety, and Brig.-General Dawson
manned the trenches west of Sorel with the personnel
of his staff. The K.O.S.B., already in position, were
engaged with the Germans, and with the help of Brig.-
General Dawson's staff brought them to‘a halt. Before
they had time to organise an attack the last guns had
left the village, and Brig.-General Dawson with his
H.Q. drew off into divisional reserve at Moislains.
‘The remnants of his three battalions withdrew north

1918] RETREAT TO GREEN LINE 269

. to Fins, which they left as the advance parties of the
enemy entered it, and thence they retired without
interference behind the Green Line. A few of the
South Africans missed their way in the darkness and
did not rejoin the Division until some days later.

The retirement of the Highlanders was attended
with many thrills. In the morning they had been
undisturbed and patrols had remained till noon in
Gouzeaucourt, which was spasmodically shelled by the
Germans, who seemed to be unaware that our men
had left the Forward Zone. Fortunately there was
no frontal pursuit; for the Germans advancing from
Gonnelieu walked into our anti-tank minefield and
exploding some of the bombs hurriedly retired. The
route of the Seaforths and Camerons ran through
Fins to Etricourt, but the enemy had already taken
possession of the former, and the Highlanders had
to make a wide detour to the north in order to
reach Etricourt, where they spent the night, part
holding the line with the Black Watch and part in
brigade reserve.

The flames of burning huts fired by the Sappers,
with the dark silhouettes of retiring troops, formed
an awesome and romantic spectacle. From Nurlu
ascended clouds of brick-dust, like the genie from the
brass bottle, and shell dumps belched forth volumes
of thick black smoke and glowing flames, while every
pow and then a heavy shell exploded with a deafening
crash, and green, red, white, and blue rockets soared
through the air like fairy fountains.

“That night, a child might understand,
The Deil had business on his hand.”

Amid such turmoil and desperate haste it was
inevitable that several parties should go astray, and
material should be lost. The South African company

270 THE BOUNDARY TROUBLE [MARCH

of Captain Green near Gauche Wood and a company of
the 11th Royal Scots at Revelon Farm had never a
chance of escape and were overwhelmed. A platoon
of the Seaforths under Lieut. Cameron had been left
in the Yellow System by mistake, but at 10 p.m. with
amazing coolness this young officer piloted his men
through groups of the foe and brought back 18
prisoners, including an officer. The guns, which had
covered the withdrawal up to the last moment, firing
over open sights, had caused dreadful havoc among the
hostile infantry, and were all brought out except
a forward anti-tank gun, one which was bogged, and
ten field-guns of the two batteries of the 150th A.F.A.
Brigade, the teams of which failed to turn up in time.
All the abandoned pieces were rendered useless.

During the night the K.O.S.B., the remaining three
companies of the 11th Royal Scots, and the 68rd and
90th Field Companies occupied Nurlu and the Green
Line, as far south as Epinette Wood. The 9th Seaforths
and the 64th Field Company moved into divisional
reserve in Vaux Woods, north of Moislains.

General Tudor, who had transferred his H.Q. to
Moislains at 3 p.m., had extricated his force from one
danger only to be confronted by another equally
critical, He had been most punctilious in his reports
to the Forty-seventh Division in order to avoid any
misunderstandings about his left flank, and to give
that division timely warning of the measures to be
adopted to maintain liaison. But in spite of his pre-
cautions complications arose. The staff officer he
had sent to inform it of our withdrawal to the Green
Line returned with the message that the Forty-seventh
was going to retire to the Brown Line only, and was
not prepared to accept responsibility for connecting
up its right on the Brown Line with our left on the

1918] THE BOUNDARY TROUBLE 271

Green Line. This was a most awkward contretemps,
and General Tudor at once informed the Corps
Commander, who promised to arrange matters with
the V. Corps, to which the Forty-seventh belonged.
Shortly before 7 P.M. the point was again referred
to, when the Ninth was advised that the Third
Army was also to withdraw to the Green Line.
Accordingly at 7.30 P.M. the exact position of our
troops was reported to the Forty-seventh Division,
which informed us that the 99th Brigade was at
Manancourt and Equancourt in reserve. This brigade
was placed under the orders of the Ninth at 9.10 p.m.,
and one of its battalions was ordered to extend from
the left of the 26th Brigade to a point about 1000
yards north of Fins. The stretch of front held by the
Division, with the 99th Brigade attached, on the night
of the 22nd/23rd amounted to 7500 yards. No touch
was established with the units on either flank, but the
V. Corps promised that its troops would link up with
the 99th Brigade at 5 a.m. on the 23rd, while the
Twenty-first Division stated that it was holding up
to the north-eastern end of Epinette Wood.

Thus the prospects on ‘the night of the 22nd were
uncertain and disquieting. The onus of anxiety had
hitherto come from the south, but from now onwards
the gate’ between the Fifth and Third Armies began
to be pressed open, and offered a glorious chance of
sweeping victory to the enemy. And the course of
events forced the Ninth to become the guardians of
the door, which it held by the gallantry of its men
and the skill of its leaders, until reinforcements were

1 Fora clear, full, and concise account of the boundary question between
the Fifth and Third Armies, see article in the April (1920) number of
the National Review, entitled, the “Epic of the Ninth Division,” by
W. 5. Sparrow.

T

272 RETREAT TO MOISLAINS [MARCH 23

available. On the evening of the 22nd the divisions
in the Flesquiéres salient had been violently attacked
at Villers-Plouich and Havrincourt, and though the
assaults had been beaten off with great slaughter
they hindered the retreat of the Third Army in a
south-westerly direction. The V. Corps, pushed
away from its boundary, failed to link up with the
Ninth at 5 a.m. on the 28rd as arranged, so that
a co-ordinated retirement by the two armies was
impossible.

It must be borne in mind that throughout the
retreat the men suffered constantly from want of sleep,
and supplies being inevitably irregular, they had to
endure frequently the pangs of hunger and thirst.

Unfriendly mist again bathed the battlefield at
dawn on the 23rd. Orders were received at 5.26 A.M.
to hold the Green Line with rearguards only, and
to withdraw the remainder to a line east of Moislains
and along the eastern edge of Vaux Woods, the
retirement of the rearguards to conform with that
of the troops on our right. The movement was
necessary owing to a breach in the Green Line farther |
south, but it added enormously to the territory of
the Ninth, which, being obliged to keep in touch with
the Forty-seventh Division west of Fins, now had
the vast frontage of 11,000 yards.

Before the ‘orders for retreat reached the front line
troops, the enemy launched a resolute assault against
the Green Line under an artillery and trench-mortar
barrage. On the left it was repulsed, but the right
of the Division was turned by Germans who swarmed
through Epinette Wood, and only a brilliant rear-
guard action by Captain Cockburn enabled the
K.O.8.B. to extricate themselves from a critical posi-
tion. The South Africans retired undisturbed to

1918] RETREAT TO MOISLAINS 273

divisional reserve on a ridge east of Bouchavesnes,
but the Highlanders and Lowlanders passed through
a fiery ordeal.

The retreat had to take place in broad daylight
under strong pressure and without the support of
the guns, which had to be conveyed across the Canal
du Nord, but it was slowly and skilfully carried out,
and appalling losses were inflicted on the pursuers.
The men behaved like veterans, and the Sappers
took their place with the infantry. Brig.-General
Kennedy never received the orders to retire, and his
Highlanders commenced to retreat only when the
enemy was in Nurlu and shared the same trenches.
Admirably covered by two companies of the Sea-
forths and two companies of the Camerons, the
brigade shook itself free. The covering force counter-
attacked the Germans, and the Seaforths meeting them
with the bayonet hurled them back into Nurlu. As
a result of this fine effort, the Highlanders successfully
effected their retirement to the ridge behind Equan-
court and Manancourt which extended from the Beet
Factory to Hennois Wood. For the 26th Brigade
there was only one bridge at Manancourt across the
Canal, which here was full of water, and some of
the Black Watch had to swim, but by 2 p.m. the
whole Division was safely behind the Canal du Nord
from Moislains to the Beet Factory north of Etricourt,
with the 99th Brigade, about 750 strong, continuing
the line to the north of Fins, where it was in touch
with the Forty-seventh Division. The position was a
strong one and had been reconnoitred the previous
evening by General Tudor, but the vast extent of
front could not be held as a continuous line, and
touch between the various units was at all times
precarious.

274 RETREAT TO BOUCHAVESNES _ [Makcn 23

The whole of the 99th Brigade and most of the
26th, the right of which was just east of Hennois
Wood, were in Third Army territory, and this was
pointed out to the VII. Corps. An attack on this
weak and far-stretched flank was to be dreaded, since
it might drive these brigades north and north-west
and break the front of the Division. Accordingly,
General Tudor, having obtained permission from the
V. Corps to order the right brigade of the Forty-
seventh Division to take over our front north of Fins
to north of Equancourt, delivered these instructions
to it at 11.15 am. Inthe afternoon the 99th Brigade
was transferred to the V. Corps, which was to extend
its right flank down to the boundary between the
Third and Fifth Armies, west of Manancourt.

In the afternoon the Germans launched a furious
attack against the 26th and 99th Brigades, and
succeeded in penetrating some distance between Brig.-
General Kennedy’s Highlanders and _ Brig.-General
Croft's Lowlanders. The Twenty-first Division fell
back to the south of Bouchavesnes, and the South
Africans took up a position on the ridge east of that
village to cover the right rear of the Ninth. Orders
were then received from the Corps to take up a line
from Bouchavesnes along the eastern edge of St Pierre
Vaast Wood to a point south-east of Saillisel on the
Third and Fifth Army boundary. This gave the Ninth
a span of 6000 yards, and all three “brigades were
required to hold it because casualties had been
numerous and the men were tired out by continual
marching and fighting. General Tudor thereupon
visited the South Africans, and gave orders to Brig.-
General Dawson to retire after dusk from the Epine de
Malassise to the ridge just west of Bouchavesnes,
requesting him to tell Brig.-General Croft to withdraw

1918] RETREAT TO BOUCHAVESNES 275

his men to the east of St Pierre Vaast Wood. The new
line was to be held at all costs. This message was never
received by Brig.-General Croft, and when the South
Africans commenced their retirement between 7 and
8 p.M. the right of the Lowland Brigade, thus left un-
protected, was heavily attacked. At the same time the
left wing of the Lowlanders was threatened by the
enemys advance from Manancourt, and was out of
touch with the Highlanders, whose right in the course
of fierce fighting had been compelled to give way, and
who, with their ammunition practically exhausted, were
now occupying a line extending from a mile south of
Mesnil-en-Arrouaise to a point 1000 yards west of the
Beet Factory.

On leaving the South Africans, General Tudor
hastened to see Brig.-General Kennedy, whose brigade
he found in a critical position. Envelopment of both
flanks appeared imminent, but as a withdrawal by
daylight meant destruction, he instructed Brig.-General
Kennedy to retire by 4 A.M. to a line in front of Saillisel.
Returning to H.Q., he reported his action to Fifth
Army H.Q., the VII. Corps then being on the move,
and pointed out that, unless the Third Army could take
over the front as far as its southern boundary according
to arrangement, a yap would exist between the two
armies after 4 A.M.

The crisis of the battle was swiftly approaching. The
whole line of the Fifth Army was in flux, for General
Gough, with weak and battered forces and no prospect
of reserves, dared not risk an engagement, and the
Germans seemed confident of victory, their infantry
onslaughts being heralded by many ‘“‘ Hochs!” and bugle
blasts. But our men showed marvellous control; time
after time the enemy was allowed within 50 yards of
our line, and then on the word of command a shower of

276 SITUATION AT CY.OSE OF 23rp [Marcu 24

well-aimed bullets abruptly halted him. During the
night, in compliance with orders, the Lowland Brigade,
with the 9th Seaforths attached since the 23rd, moved
back to St Pierre Vaast Wood, where it repulsed with
many losses several attacks before midnight. During
this conflict the K.O.S.B. lost their commander, Lieut.-
Colonel Smyth being wounded for the fifth time in the
war. The hazardous and complicated move of the
Highlanders was attended with wonderful fortune, and
they came into line on a position extending from the
northern corner of the wood across the ridge, on which
stood the village of Saillisel The Third and Fifth
Armies were now separated, there being a space of fully
3000 yards between them. Nothing had been heard of
the 99th Brigade since it had been attacked in the
afternoon, but after midnight it was learned that it had
been withdrawn to Rocquigny and Le Transloy. No
troops arrived to hold the ground between Mesnil and
the left of the Ninth, and fruitless efforts were made to
establish connection with a brigade of the Seventeenth
Division, which had been ordered by the V. Corps to
take up a position west of Saillisel.

The great activity of the enemy on the night of the
23rd utterly precluded sleep. About 2 a.m. the troops
of the Twenty-first Division on the right of the South
Africans reported to Brig.-General Dawson that Cléry
was in the hands of the enemy and that they were about
to make a further retirement. The South Africans were
on the right of the Ninth on the ridge west of Marri¢res
Wood, the Lowlanders at St Pierre Vaast Wood and
the Highlanders on the left. There was no reserve
except the details of the Divisional R.E., and our front
measured 9500 yards.

Before dawn the Highlanders, acting on a false
report that the Lowland Brigade had been withdrawn,

| 1918] RETREAT OF LOWLANDERS 217

retired to the line of the Bapaume-Péronne road in
order to secure touch with it. The message with this
news took five hours to reach D.H.Q., now at Maurepas.
Three tanks, which were at Combles, were ordered to
proceed to a point between Marriéres Wood and
Rancourt to prevent the enemy penetrating between
the South African and 27th Brigades. But it was
too late. |

At 8 a.M. vast hordes of Germans assailed the
Lowland Brigade in front and on both flanks. The
weight of attack was on the right wing, but the
K.O.S.B., in brigade reserve south of Rancourt, were
able to delay the enemy’s turning movement long
enough to allow the other battalions of the brigade to
be withdrawn from St Pierre Vaast Wood to a position
covering Combles. This position had been rapidly
taken up by details of the Divisional R.E. under the
orders of Brig.-General Croft, and these troops aided
by the three tanks helped to cover the retirement of the
Lowlanders, and held their ground for over an hour.
From there, greatly harassed by bombs and machine-
gun fire from aeroplanes flying low and bearing British
colours, the brigade withdrew first to Guillemont Ridge,
and then to a position between Maricourt and the
Somme, already occupied by the 9th Provisional
Battalion.

Meanwhile the enemy delivered a series of blows,
growing in fury, upon the South Africans from 9 4.M.,
and Brig.-General Dawson reported at 11.10 a.m. that
he was being heavily attacked from south and west,
but that his line was still intact. This was the last
message received from the brigade.

When the South Africans were posted near Marri¢res
Wood, they succeeded in gaining touch with the left
of the Twenty-first Division, but, except for a company

278 SOUTH AFRICANS’ LAST STAND _ [marcn 24

of the K.O.S.B., they failed to find the 27th Brigade.
Brig.-General Dawson’s last instructions were to hold
the position “at all costs,” and he explained to his
battalion commanders the full significance of these
words. The position. contained one good trench and
one or two poor ones, and there was a large number
of shell-holes, The ground sloped downwards towards
the east, and then rose to another ridge about 1000
yards from the front line. The men had each 200
rounds of ammunition and there was a fair supply
of Lewis Gun drums, but the four Vickers Guns had
only four belts, and three of these with their teams
were accordingly sent back to the Transport. The
strength of the brigade was only 500 all told, including
the personnel of H.Q. and a detachment of the Machine-
gun Battalion, while all ranks had been three nights
without sleep, and were in a state of extreme fatigue
from their physical exertions and the strain of the
previous days.

At 9 a.M., heralded by machine-gun and artillery-fire,
the enemy onsets began. At the first essay the hostile
infantry kept a respectful distance, and did not venture
to assault. But an hour later a dangerous attack
developed on the left front and flank from the north-east.
Under a smoke-screen, formed by setting fire to the
dry grass, the Germans skilfully picked their way up to
a point between 200 and 100 yards from our front line,
but further advance was baulked by unerring marksman-
ship, the South Africans husbanding their ammunition
and firing carefully. Foiled but persistent, the assailants
wheeling a field-gun forward by hand tried to bring it
into action, but a Lewis Gunner of the Ist Regiment
shot down the team before it could be fired. Some

hours later another gun was brought up at the gallop,
~ but, under the accurate fire of the same Lewis Gunner,

1918 | SOUTH AFRICANS’ LAST STAND 279

men and horses went down in a struggling mass, an
inspiring sight greeted by the South Africans with
jubilant cheers.

About noon the troops on the right and left of the
brigade retired, and the movement misled an officer and
about 30 men of the South Africans who, thinking
a withdrawal had been ordered, began to fall back, but
no difficulty was experienced in bringing them in. The
exposed left flank was protected by Major Ormiston
with 25 men. No wounded, except those who could
not handle a rifle, were allowed to quit the brigade area,
but none complained or gave the slightest evidence of
any desire to leave their comrades; the corporate
heroism of thé South Africans was beyond all praise.
Every round was collected from casualties, and men not
in the front line or not having occasion to use their
rifles passed their ammunition to those who required
it. By 2 p.m. the South Africans were completely
surrounded, and were being fired at from the west as
well as from the south and east.

Rescue was now impossible, and the South Africans
grimly set themselves to sell their lives at the highest
price. Between 2 and 3 p.m. German troops in the
north were seen to retire, and wild hope surged through
the men that the Thirty-fifth Division, which was
known to be coming up, was now within reach; but
the enemy had come under his own machine-gun fire
from the west and was merely withdrawing from the
danger zone. About 4 p.m. only 100 worn-out, dust-
covered men remained and the ammunition was all
but finished, while batteries of field-guns and several
trench mortars were now in action against them. The
faint chance of effecting an escape under cover of night
was extinguished when, half an hour later, the enemy in
great strength and dense formation surged down on the

280 SOUTH AFRICANS’ LAST STAND — [Marcu 24

survivors. Only a few scattered shots greeted this, the
final charge, and then the tiny groups were swallowed
up in a sea of Germans and Brig.-General Dawson and
his small band of heroes were prisoners.

The glorious stand of the South Africans was the
most dramatic and arresting episode of the retreat, and
has already achieved a prominent place in the annals
of the British Empire. Throughout all lands of the
British race it silenced craven panic and roused that
strong pride of race which is ever the parent of
valorous deeds. The story’ reported by Captain
Peirson, the B.M. of the 48th Brigade of the
Sixteenth Division, reveals the effect on the enemy,
which was not confined to moral results. As Brig.-
General Dawson was taken behind the German lines
he saw the roads blocked with a continuous double line
of transport and guns from west of Bouchavesnes to
Aizecourt le Haut; for over seven hours the South
Africans had kept back, in addition to the infantry, all
the artillery and transport which were to advance by
the Bouchavesnes-Combles road, and the delay was
of inestimable value to our troops in rear.

1 “After being captured at La Motte, near Corbie, I was taken to the
German Battalion H.Q. for examination by an intelligence officer. In the
course of this examination the officer asked me if I knew the Ninth
Division ; he said that the fight it put up was considered one of the best
on the whole front, and particularly the last stand of the South African
Brigade at (I think) Moislains, which, he said, was magnificent. Both
men and officers fonght to the last against overwhelming odds, the
brigadier himself being taken, firing a machine-gun whilst his brigade
major was killed beside him.

“ After this conversation I was sent to Le Cateau, and on the way many
German officers spoke to me and all mentioned the splendid fight put up
by the South Africans.

“On reaching Le Cateau, I met two officers (British), who said that
whilst their party was being marched to this place, they were stopped by
the Kaiser, who asked if anyone present belonged to the Ninth Division.
The Kaiser then said that had all divisions fought as well as the Ninth
Division he would have had no more troops to carry on his attack with.”

1918] RETREAT OF HIGHLANDERS 281

Meantime the 26th Brigade, which remained on
Sailly Saillisel Ridge, north-west of St Pierre Vaast
Wood until 11.30 a.m., retired through Guillemont and
Maricourt. A stand was made on the Morval—Combles
Ridge, where the enemy experienced a rough handling,
and later the brigade held the ridge behind Leuze
Wood to Combles for a considerable period until the
Lowlanders had established their position. During
the murderous combat that ensued here Brig.-General
Kennedy had his horse shot under him, and the stub-
born Highlanders were hard pressed to stem the savage
onrushes of the Germans. The most heroic assistance
was rendered by the Divisional Artillery, whose alter-
nate battery retirement was magnificent, and they killed
vast numbers of the enemy at point-blank range; in
numerous cases they remained in action until the
enemy's infantry were swarming on them. C/51 and
D/51 Batteries catching the Germans coming down the
slopes towards Combles, inflicted enormous casualties
and kept on firing till the last possible moment. All
the guns were safely withdrawn, though the last gun-
team of D/51 was slightly delayed by a direct hit from
a “dud” 4.2 shell, which went right through the wheel
horse. Skilfully, Brig.-General Kennedy withdrew his
men, but in the keen and close encounters the brigade
became split up into three parties. The bulk of the
Highlanders after a brief halt at Maricourt proceeded
to Montauban, where a position was taken up in sup-
port of the First Cavalry Division, which was then
maintaining a line in front of Bernafay Wood.

The second group, consisting of about 150 Camerons
on the left flank of their battalion, had been the last
to retire. These men drew off in the direction of
Les Boeufs and finding it occupied by Germans marched
to Flers, where they joined the 52nd Brigade of the

282 A BLACK DAY [MARCH 25

Seventeenth Division. They went with the 52nd
Brigade as far as Martinpuich, where they attached
themselves to the Sixty-third Division on the 26th,
but having received permission to go back to the Ninth,
succeeded in rejoining it later in the evening. Another
party of Camerons, about 100 in all, in attempting to
keep touch with the troops on its left became separated
from the rest of the brigade and attached itself to the
142nd Brigade, Forty-seventh Division, and on the
25th, after reaching Albert, formed a part of Lieut.-
Colonel Hadow’s force.

The third group, consisting of 300 Black Watch
under Lieut.-Colonel Hadow, remained on Morval
Ridge until its flank was turned, and it was compelled
to retreat northwards. This force, growing in numbers
as it collected stragglers from all units, was 2000
strong on the 26th; as “Hadow’s Force” it was
organised into two battalions and under the orders
of the VII. Corps, took up a. position from Mericourt
L’Abbé to Sailly le Sec. There it remained until
relieved by the 43rd and 38th Australian Brigades on
the 28th, after which the men of the 26th Brigade
rejoined their battalions.

Sunday, the 24th March, was one of the most
dismal days of the retreat. In the south General
Gough’s men did not fare so badly; for though the
Péronne bridgehead had been lost on the 23rd the
enemy did not make much progress between the
Somme and the Oise. But the terrific fighting along
the entire front all but shattered our defences. On the
Third Army front the enemy attacking on the right
flank of the V. Corps won Combles, Morval, and Les
Boeufs, compelled the Third Army to surrender the
whole of the old Somme battlefield, and threatened the
liaison between the Third and Fifth Armies. Fissures

1918] THE BOUNDARY TROUBLE 283

appeared between the units of the V. Corps, which
was forced away from its boundary, and when darkness
fell, its right flank, which should have been south of
Montauban, rested near Bazentin.

The Ninth now under General Blacklock, who had
returned from leave in the afternoon, and reinforced
by the 12th H.L.I. of the Thirty-fifth Division, remained
in ignorance of the misfortunes of the V. Corps until
after midnight. In accordance with instructions from
the VII. Corps it took up at 8.30 p.m. a position .
extending from an east and west line through Harde-
court to the Guillemont-Montauban road. The 12th
H.L.I. formed the outpost ; the main position was held
by the 27th Brigade and two composite battalions of
the VII. Corps Reinforcement Training Camp under
Lieut.-Colonel Hunt, the 18th H.L.L being in reserve.
The 26th Brigade was at Montauban and D.H.Q. were
at Billon Wood. The fragments of the South African
Brigade, consisting of the men who had been separated
from their brigade on the 22nd, were collected during
the night near Maricourt and formed into a battalion
under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Young, who had
been in charge of the South African details. A
dismounted cavalry brigade under General Legard,
composed of remnants of the First Cavalry Division,
occupied a position between Montauban and Bernafay
Wood. Persistent efforts were made to establish touch
with the left, and at 1.20 a.m. General Blacklock learned
that the right of the Forty-seventh Division was at
Bazentin. The Forty-seventh was now as far behind as
it had been in front of us in the morning, and there was
a gap of two and a half miles between the two armies.

The boundary question had obtruded itself in a
fashion that could not be neglected. At all costs the
breach between the armies had to be filled if Ludendorft’s

284 VII. CORPS UNDER THIRD ARMY = [Marcu 25

plans were to be thwarted. The first step of G.H.Q.
was to transfer all the troops north of the Somme
from the Fifth to the Third Army; in other words,
the smaller army holding the longer stretch of front
had to provide reinforcements for the stronger force
with the shorter front. Nothing can illustrate more
clearly than this the absurdity of the story, once widely
circulated and even yet largely credited, that the Third
Army would have had no need to retire at all had it
not been for the retreat of the Fifth. The territory of
the latter army was not curtailed in compensation for
the loss of these troops. Ifthe Third Army had been
able to keep to its southern boundary, General Gough
could have assisted the hard pressed XIX. Corps in
the south with units of the VII. Corps.

In accordance with this arrangement the Ninth along
with the rest of the VII. Corps now came under the
Third Army. The boundary between the V. and
VII. Corps was fixed as follows: the Railway south
of Montauban, thence along the road Montauban-
Mametz—Le Carcaillot, all inclusive to the former.

These measures did not and could not fill the gap,
but it was expected that if the V. and VII. Corps
were put under the same Army Commander, he would
succeed in securing better co-operation.

Early on the 25th the Lowland Brigade was relieved
by the 106th Brigade, 35th Division, and assembled at
Talus Boise, whence it marched to Etinehem to rest and
reorganise. After daybreak the 26th Brigade occupied
a position on the south-west of Montauban to protect
the left flank of the cavalry. On the withdrawal of
the Lowlanders the line was held by the 18th H.L.I.
and the 9th Provisional Battalion, along the western
edge of Faviére Wood to the southern margin of
Bernafay Wood, where the 106th Brigade was con-

a ee ———————

——_

1918] A WEAK LEFT FLANK 285

nected with the cavalry near Montauban. The 12th
H.L.I. were on outpost from the north of Harde-
court to the south of Trones Wood. On the right the
Thirty-fifth Division, to which the Ninth was now
attached, held from Hardecourt to Curlu, its H.Q.
being at Bray.

The transference of the VII. Corps to the Third
Army maintained liaison between General Gough and
General Byng, but there was still an awkward opening
between the VII. and V. Corps. In the morning of
the 25th the enemy launched repeated attacks against
the Ninth’s front, and a resolute effort was made to
turn its left flank, Bernafay Wood being lost and
recaptured in the course of the fighting. By 10 A.M.
the reserve consisted of only two companies, and still
no connection had been established on the left with
the Seventeenth Division, which was said to be moving
in on the right of the V. Corps. A welcome reinforce-
ment, a battalion of the 104th Brigade, arrived and was
sent to strengthen the 106th Brigade.

At 1 p.m. the VII. Corps reported that the Seven-
teenth Division was holding a lne from north of
Bernafay Wood to a point 700 yards south-east of
Bazentin-le-Grand, and that two of its brigades were
reorganising east of Fricourt, but attempts to establish
touch were still fruitless. Shortly afterwards, however,
information was received that the Twelfth Division
had been commanded by the VII. Corps to move as
rapidly as possible to the line Montauban-Bazentin,
and to link up with the Seventeenth Division.

About 2 p.m. the Germans in great strength de-
bouched from Ginchy and moved against Trones Wood,
and though our gunners swept their ranks with accurate
and withering fire, they drove the 12th and 18th H.L.I.
back to the line of the road running from west of

286 A FURTHER RETIREMENT [MARCH 26

Maricourt Wood to the Briqueterie south-west of
Bernafay Wood. By a fine counter-attack men of
the D.L.I., 106th Brigade, regained Faviére Wood.
More reinforcements came up, consisting of tired frag-
ments of the Twenty-first Division, and at 4 P.M. one
battalion was ordered to join the 104th Brigade at
Maricourt and the other two the 106th. Still the
enemy continued his onslaughts, but though he gained
a footing in the Briqueterie south-west of Bernafay
Wood he was summarily ejected.

Until about 6 p.m. there was comparative quietness,
but after that hour frequent reports were received
that hostile infantry had been seen north of Montauban,
and even as far west as Mametz Wood. In the evening
a withdrawal to the line of the Bray—Albert road was
ordered by the VII. Corps, the retirement to be covered
by rearguards, which were to maintain their position
until 2 a.m., while the retirement of the artillery was
to be accomplished gradually, harassing fire being kept
up all night to conceal the retreat, and to prevent as
long as possible any noticeable diminution in the volume
of fire. The new front of the Ninth extended from
east of Meaulte to Albert, and the 27th Brigade was
instructed to occupy it at once. This was a most fatigu-
ing day for the 26th Brigade. After fighting continuously
all day the men trekked to Etinehem, just in time to
receive orders to march by night on a compass-bearing
to Dernancourt. The South Africans, now formed into
one battalion, moved to Ribemont sur L’Ancre. The
last battery did not retire until 3.30 a.m. on the 26th.

After a night march the Lowland Brigade garrisoned
the Ninth’s sector with the 11th and 12th Royal Scots
in line, the 9th Seaforths in support, and the K.O.S.B.
in reserve. The dispositions had scarcely been com-
pleted when the vanguards of the Germans approached

1918] RETREAT ACROSS THE ANCRE 287

from Fricourt, but were checked by our outposts. At
1 pM. an attack in force was delivered against the
right of the line, a hostile battery coming into action
on a ridge in front of it. The assault withered away
before the careful, well-controlled fire of the 12th Royal
Scots, and the enemy’s battery was quickly compelled
to withdraw. The co-operation between our artillery
and infantry was wonderfully good, and the Germans
in Becourt Valley, where an attempt to concentrate
was crushed by our fire, suffered innumerable losses.
This repulse quietened the enemy on our front, but
farther south where troops had retired he gained the
high ground between our right flank and Bray, and
brought up machine-guns, with which he enfiladed our
line. To meet this danger Brig.-General Croft formed a
defensive flank with the 9th Seaforths, but no sooner was
this wing guarded than the left was jeopardised by the
retreat of the Twelfth Division across the Ancre during
the afternoon. This made it necessary for the 27th
Brigade to conform, and the retirement over the river
was carried out in perfect manner, although the 12th
Royal Scots lost heavily in passing through Meaulte.
Meanwhile the 26th Brigade, with the South African
composite battalion attached, after a few hours’ rest
occupied about 1 P.M. a position behind the Ancre
between Dernancourt and Moulin du Vivier, the South
Africans holding the former, still apparently a thriving
village. The 9th Machine-gun Battalion, which had
been withdrawn during the night of the 25th/26th to
Mericourt L’ Abbé, where it was reorganised into two
groups with 10 guns each, covered our line west of the
Ancre.. After crossing the river, the Lowland Brigade
was posted along the line of the Railway between the
left of the 26th Brigade and the Albert-Amiens road,
where it was in close touch with the Twelfth Division.
U

288 EVENTS, 271TH [MARCH

The enemy on noticing our retirement advanced
towards the river in considerable force, but was caught
by our barrage when moving down the slopes, and
the few who succeeded in crossing were easily dealt
with. |

At the commencement of the 26th, the fighting
strength of the Division was approximately as follows :
Highland Brigade 300, Lowland Brigade 800, South
African Battalion 320, Sappers 120, two Machine-gun
groups with 10 guns each, a total of 1340 rifles and 20
machine-guns. Brig.-General Croft’s men had _ lost
cruelly during the day, and it was doubtful if the line
now occupied, over 3000 yards in length, could be
defended next day against a strong attack.

During the night of the 26th/27th alarming reports
of a break through on the Albert-Amiens road came
in, but nothing serious had actually happened, and the
few troops who had given way were quickly rallied.
A machine-gun on the left of the Lowland Brigade was
a source of much annoyance to the 11th Royal Scots
until a smart counter-attack organised by Major A. C.
Campbell put it out of action. Unfortunately Major
Campbell, who had led the 11th Royal Scots with great
skill and sterling courage during the retreat, received
wounds which proved fatal.

The 27th was a critical day for General Gough’s
army; for the Germans forced the line of the Somme
from Chipilly to Cérisy, and took Lamotte on the great
Amiens road, about 9000 yards behind the fighting line
of the Fifth Army. There was more stability on our
front, though some of our troops were reported to be
retiring near Albert. This was due to furious shelling,
and to bombing by aeroplanes with British colours, but
the retrograde movement was stopped and an outpost
line established along the Railway with Lewis Gun

1918] RELIEF OF DIVISION 289

posts in front. During the day there was a violent
artillery and trench- mortar bombardment of our
positions, and at 10.30 a.m. German infantry were seen
entering the valley north-west of Meaulte. Later, great
clusters of the enemy coming down the slopes of the
Ancre were hotly engaged by our artillery and machine-
guns, and did not venture to assault. Here and there
clefts appeared in our thin line, but were promptly
closed by swift and skilful local counter-attacks. Un-
doubtedly the most disturbing factor was the persistent
bombing of our positions by large numbers of aero-
planes, British by their marking.

With the close of the day the long travail of the
Ninth terminated. The infantry were relieved by the
4th Australian Division, and after moving to the
neighbourhood of Baizieux, ultimately concentrated in
the Bertangles area on the 29th. For two days more
the artillery remained in action with the Australians
and were then withdrawn.

The retreat imposed a heavy burden on the
R.A.M.C., but Colonel Elsner’s staff met their diffi-
culties with untiring devotion and conspicuous success.
Many wounded among the forward troops inevitably
fell into the hands of the enemy, but stretcher-bearers
and motor parties often ventured up to the fighting
line in their search for casualties. The selection of
routes for the evacuation of the wounded called for
careful consideration, in order to avoid congestion on
roads blocked with transport and guns, but Colonel
Elsner was eminently successful in making the best
working arrangements possible. Gallantry and resource
among the R.A.M.C. were too common to be remarked
on, and motor-drivers as usual braved all the difficulties
of the roads with the air of phlegmatic boredom that
seemed to be their natural expression. Every means of

290 COMMENTS ON THE ACTION [MARCH

conveyance was requisitioned, and the whole of the work
during the retreat strikingly revealed the efficiency of
the R.A.M.C.

Equally difficult and important was the task of
keeping the men supplied with rations and ammunition.
The regular transmission of stores was naturally affected
by the constant movement, but our organisation with-
stood the strain, and the A.S.C. performed its duties
in a manner worthy of its high traditions.

Never perhaps did the Ninth render such vital
services to the Empire as during the Somme retreat.
It had covered not merely its own territory, but had
extended its line far beyond its northern boundary, and
in the arduous and critical fighting till the 24th March,
its success in blunting the deadly German thrust
between the Third and Fifth Armies did much to
save the British forces from what might have been an
irretrievable disaster. Adroit leadership and dogged
pluck were the qualities that steered it through the
labyrinth of dangers that beset it at every turn. Officers
of all ranks had shown throughout the conflict surprising
resource and initiative; the coolness and foresight. of
General Tudor during the most critical days led one
writer’ to declare that his name “should be as well
known as are Wellington’s best generals, Crauford,
Colborne, and Picton.”

Ably led, the men had brilliantly performed the
most difficult operation in war—a withdrawal in face
of the enemy. Men who after rough buffetings can at
the end of a retreat turn round and confront the foe
with unshaken nerve and steadfast courage have proved
their manhood indeed, and this, the acid test of the
true soldier, had been accomplished by the men of the
Ninth. In a general sense, it is true that the gain or

1 W. 5S. Sparrow in “The Epic of the Ninth Division.”

‘

1918] ~ COMMENTS ON THE ACTION 291

loss of ground is insignificant in comparison with the
destruction of an army, but for the individual the
surrender of many miles of territory, painfully won
after more than three years of costly strife, cannot fail
to rouse the most sombre reflections, and only the best
of troops can overcome the leaden despondency caused
by a continuous backward movement. Valour alone
would not have availed to stem the enemy’s advance ;
discipline was required to direct and control it, and
disciplined valour was, in fact, the characteristic of the
Division during the retreat. The six weeks of training
in February had helped to make the Division more than
a match for the pick of Ludendorff’s storm-troops.
Since the time of the Cambrai operations in 1917,
G.H.Q. had renewed the custom, abandoned after
Loos, of mentioning by name the divisions that had
particularly distinguished themselves, The retreat was
the first operation in which the Division had participated
since the resumption of this practice, and it earned the
proud honour of a special mention’ by Sir Douglas Haig.

1 “Great gallantry has been shown by the troops engaged in the fighting
in this area and to the south of it. The Nineteenth and Ninth Divisions
have distinguished themselves by the valour of their defence.”

(£xtract from Communiqué published by the Press on the 25th March.)

CHAPTER XITI

THE GERMAN OFFENSIVE IN FLANDERS
Aprit 1918

In spite of their success in forcing the passage of the
Somme on the 27th March, the Germans had shot
their bolt, and though they had secured the most
extensive acreage ever taken in any one offensive
since trench warfare began, they had failed in their
strategical design—the capture of Amiens and the
severance of the French and British forces. Their
front had been worn to a fine point by the 27th, and
an attempt to widen it by a stroke against Arras was
shattered by the glorious defence of the northern
wing of the Third Army on the 28th March. No
effort on their part could prevent our thin line in
front of Amiens gaining in strength and _ stability.
Throughout the retreat General Gough had shown
sound generalship and admirable control, but the
strain on him and his staff had been so constant
and severe, that Sir Douglas Haig replaced the Fifth
Army Staff by that of the Fourth under General
Rawlinson. This arrangement unfortunately appeared
to strengthen the impression created by the Prime
Minister’s unjust remarks in the House of Commons
on the 9th April, implying that General Gough was

responsible for our disasters at the Somme. These were
292

arriL 1918] THE NINTH NEAR WYTSCHAETE 293

primarily due to the failure of the home authorities
to keep our line in France adequately supplied with
men. About this time, the conference at Doullens
arrived at the vastly important decision which led
to the appointment of Marshal Foch on the 26th
March as the Generalissimo of all the forces on the
Western Front.

After the relief of the Ninth, General Blacklock
was transferred to another division, and he was suc-
ceeded by Major-General H. H. Tudor. There could
have been no more popular promotion. The new com-
mander, since he joined the Division in February 1916,
had exercised an important influence in its councils,
and his conduct of the operations from the 21st to
the 24th March had marked him as a leader of out-
standing skill. Brig.-General H. R. Wainwright
succeeded General Tudor as C.R.A.

During the retreat from Gouzeaucourt to the
Ancre, our losses exceeded 50 per cent. of the infantry,
but the rest were in good heart. In the fighting
of the last few days there had been an element of
sport which appealed to the men, and though they
were the hunted they had killed an enormous number
of the pursuers. Consequently the Division was
exhilarated rather than disheartened by its recent
experiences, and its moral was all that could be
desired, when, on the 1st April, it entrained for the
north, where it expected to take over a quiet sector
on the front of the IX. Corps in the Second Army.
On the 2nd and 3rd April it detrained at Abeele and
Hopoutre, D.H.Q. being established at Scherpenberg.

On the night of the 3rd/4th April, the Highland
and Lowland Brigades relieved the 8rd Brigade of
the 1st Australian Division in the area extending from
Hollebeke (inclusive) across the Ypres—Comines Canal

294 NEW DRAFTS [ APRIL

to the south end of Bulgar Wood, a stretch of some
3000 yards. Here there were no indications of an
impending attack, and General Tudor was told that his
first duty was to prepare his command as speedily as
possible for the “second round of the Third Somme
Battle,” which, it was generally believed, would be
continued. This involved a great deal of preparation.
Although individual soldiers recovered remarkably
quickly from exhaustion, units could not recover with
equal rapidity, as there was a lamentable dearth of
trained leaders and instructors. Very large drafts, con-
sisting chiefly of youths of eighteen and nineteen years
of age, were received almost daily by the 26th and 27th
Brigades, but they could not be brought speedily to the
same level of efficiency as that exhibited by the veterans
of the Somme, while the process of absorbing so
many new Officers and men, which would have been
slow at any time, was rendered even more difficult
by the fact that both brigades were in the line. The
physique of the drafts that joined the Division at this
time was excellent. They were largely composed of
lads who had been taken at the age of seventeen, and
were splendid examples of the beneficial effect of
good feeding, regular exercise, and military discipline
on young Scotsmen. The South African Brigade’
about 1300 strong, and now under the command of
Brig.-General Tanner, appeared to have no immediate
prospects of obtaining reinforcements, and while the
several regiments meanwhile maintained their identity
the question of forming it into one battalion was under
consideration. Too weak to man a brigade front, it
was stationed in divisional reserve in the vicinity of
Ridge Wood, 1000 yards north of Vierstraat.

1 The lst Regiment was commanded by Lieut.-Colonel Young; the
2nd Regiment by Captain Jacobs ; and the 4th Regiment by Captain Reid.

1918] A TROUBLESOME RELIEF 295

In order to hasten reorganisation as much as
possible General Tudor decided to hold the whole
of his line with the 27th Brigade, while the 26th was
withdrawn to absorb its numerous reinforcements.
This arrangement however was upset by Corps orders
to take over from the Nineteenth Division 500 yards
of line to the south of Hollebeke on the night of the
10th/11th. The Highland Brigade was instructed to
do this, but on the morning of the 9th, the enemy
made his surprise attack against the XV. and
' Portuguese Corps, which for some time jeopardised
our grip on the Channel Ports, and the Division was
required to carry out the relief on the night of the
9th/10th, and take over the remainder of the Nineteenth
_ Division front on the night of the 10th/11th. Accord-
ingly, the Lowland Brigade was ordered to relieve the
26th and garrison also the 500 yards of front in the
Nineteenth Division’s sector on the night of the
9th/10th. The new area was a featureless and desolate
waste of shell-holes, where it was hard enough to
loeate one’s position in broad daylight and with the
aid of a map, and was therefore all but impossible in
darkness. Yet in spite of the impossibility of recon-
naissance through lack of time, and a heavy bombard-
ment of the trench system and battery area with H.E.
and gas, the relief was duly carried out, though it
- was after daybreak on the 10th before our outposts
were in position. The satisfactory accomplishment of
this relief was a very fine feat on the part of the
27th Brigade. To move in the dark over the most
barren country in Europe under a really heavy
bombardment, without losing cohesion, was an achieve-
ment that would have done credit to the finest soldiers
of ‘‘ The Contemptibles.”

Brig.-General Croft’s Brigade had a span of 4000

296 THE NINTH’S SECTOR [APRIL 10

yards astride the Ypres—Comines Canal, with its right
about 800 yards south-west of Hollebeke, and its left
approximately 1200 yards east of Klein Zillebeke.
As this sector formed the extreme right flank of
the Passchendaele salient, the general direction of
the lines of defence ran from south-west to north-
east. The whole front was covered by a line of
posts, some of which were in “ Pill-boxes,” and 300
to 800 yards behind this and overlooking it was a con-
tinuous trench from the northern divisional boundary
to 500 yards from the Canal, where the ground was
swampy. From 300 yards south of the Canal another
continuous trench ran as far as the Hollebeke road.
In the part taken over from the Nineteenth Division
there were no defences immediately in rear of the
posts, except some 100 yards of trench leaning in a
northerly direction.

Our position north of the Canal appeared the part
most likely to be attacked, since it formed the hinge
of the Passchendaele salient, while the Klein Zillebeke
Spur and Hill 60 offered tempting objectives to the
enemy, who could make his arrangements and concen-
trate his forces under cover of the Zandvoorde Ridge.
South of the Canal the reserve line defences consisted
of a strongly-wired line of posts stretching in a
south-westerly direction to the Stables, and supported
by the defences of White Chateau, a former residence
of Leopold of Belgium, which, as it occupied a
commanding position, was now tunnelled with dug-
outs and held a permanent garrison. From the Stables
two massive belts of wire extended south-south-east
and south-west. Behind these were a few posts which
it was impossible to man adequately, owing to the
length of the brigade front and the necessity of holding
in strength Hill 60, The Bluff, and White Chateau.

——

1918] 27TH BRIGADE ATTACKED 297

No switch protected the right flank of the Division,
but a section of machine-guns covered the space
between the right of the support line and _ the
Stables.

The front was covered by the 50th and 51st
Brigades R.F.A. In divisional reserve were the
26th Brigade, south-west and north-west of Vierstraat,
the South African Brigade between La Clytte and
Scherpenberg, and the 9th Machine-gun Battalion (less
two companies) about 1000 yards east of Ridge Wood.

The heavy cannonade, which had commenced at
1 a.M., slackened about two hours later. On this
morning the tide of battle flowed north, and the
right flank of the TX. Corps being hotly engaged, the
South Africans were sent by the Corps to positions
of assembly south of Neuve Eglise, there to be in
Corps reserve. Brig.-General Kennedy was instructed
to be ready to move his brigade at thirty minutes’
notice, and the line along the eastern slopes of the
Messines—Wytschaete Ridge was to be held at all costs.
Early in the afternoon the situation near Wytschaete,
which was held by the Nineteenth Division, was very
obscure, and Brig.-General Kennedy sent a patrol of
Camerons to ascertain the relative positions of the
enemy and of our troops.

Between 1 and 2 p.m. the Ninth entered the battle.
After a terrific bombardment the Germans rushed our
outpost positions south of the Canal held by the 11th
Royal Scots, and attacked the support position, but the
enemy's ranks were swept away by rifle and machine-
gun fire, and by the accurate fire put down by the 27th
L.T.M.B. under the direction of Captain Drummond
Shiels. Unfortunately success farther south enabled
the Germans to threaten our flank, and the next assault,
developing from the south and extending as far west as

298 THE GERMANS REPULSED [aprit 10

the Stables, would have broken our defences but for the
timely arrival of two companies of the 12th Royal Scots,
who prolonged the defensive flank formed by the 11th
Royal Scots. Considering the exceptionally fatiguing
relief, the fine resistance of the 27th Brigade was a
magnificent effort. Nevertheless the situation was
decidedly alarming. All touch with the troops to the
south had been lost, and as the Highland Brigade had
been placed under the Nineteenth Division, the 9th
Seaforths, now the only infantry General Tudor had
in reserve, were despatched to reinforce the Lowland
Brigade and were posted on the Dammstrasse, echeloned
in rear of the right flank of the Lowlanders.

About 3 p.m. the order placing the 26th Brigade
under the Nineteenth Division was cancelled, and the
58th Brigade (the left of the Nineteenth Division)
together with its front was transferred to the Ninth.
It was uncertain what ground was held by that
brigade, but some of its troops were believed to be
in Wytschaete, which was also occupied by the Cameron
patrol, and so the Highland Brigade was sent up to
establish a line between the left of the 58th and the
right of the 27th Brigade. At 5.30 P.M. the situation
was believed to be as follows: The 58th Brigade was
holding the line L’Enfer-Pick House-Torreken Corner ;
the Black Watch were in Grand Bois, the Seaforths
moving on Dammstrasse, and the Camerons in reserve
south-west of Vierstraat, while the 9th Seaforths and a
detachment of Sappers were in the Dammstrasse; the
27th Brigade was holding the line from the Stables
to Hollebeke, thence along the support position to the
Canal and its original line north of the Canal.

At 8 p.m. the 26th Brigade, which had established
itself on the line Stables-Delbske Farm—Ravine Wood-
southern edge of Denys Wood-Guedezeune Farm,

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1918] SOUTH AFRICANS AT’ MESSINES 299

reported that Wytschaete had been evacuated by our
‘troops. Having received as reinforcements the 62nd
Brigade (less one battalion but with one battalion of
the 146th Brigade attached), General Tudor sent two
battalions to strengthen his line, and these passing
through the Cameron detachment, which had already
reoccupied the village, established a line east and
south-east of Wytschaete. The Black Watch also
advanced and held a line along the eastern edge of
Onraet and the western margin of Oosttaverne Wood,
connecting the left of the 62nd Brigade with the right
of the 7th Seaforths’ and the 9th Seaforths in the
Dammstrasse. The 4th and 11th M.M.G. Batteries,
being sent to the Ninth, were retained in reserve near
Scherpenberg. |

South of our positions the Germans made dis-
quieting progress during the day; they compelled our
troops to evacuate Armenti¢res, and crossing the Lys
in strength occupied Estaires, Steenwerck, and Ploeg-
steert, and threatened the Messines Ridge. So very
grave was the crisis that the weak South African
Brigade was thrown hurriedly into the battle. On
the front of the Nineteenth Division the Germans had
penetrated our defences between Messines and Pick
House on the Wytschaete road, and the South Africans
along with the 57th and 58th Brigades of the Nine-
teenth Division were ordered to retake this portion
of the ridge. With the 1st and 2nd Regiments leading
and the 4th in support, the South Africans moved
forward to the attack at 5.45 p.m. On their right was
the 57th Brigade. Only two F.A. Brigades were
available for artillery support, and the enemy’s riflemen
and machine-gunneis in shell-holes and ‘“ Pill-boxes”

1 Commanded since the 7th April by Lieut.-Colonel the Honourable
David Bruce.

300 THE ENEMY CHECKED [APRIL 11

were able to inflict numerous casualties on the assailing
troops, but in spite of the difficulty of keeping touch
in the mist, the South Africans pressed on, expelled
the enemy from his shell-holes and “ Pill-boxes,” and
established a line along the western outskirts of
Messines—Middle Farm—Four Huns Farm—Lumm Farm,
with a defensive flank thrown back to L’Enfer. The
1st Regiment, dashing through Messines, by a fine
bayonet charge drove the enemy down the eastern
slopes of the ridge, but the village was an awkward
place to hold, and though in a series of stubborn hand-
to-hand combats the Ist Regiment kept its ground,
the village was eventually abandoned and a line was
established just west of it.

In the small hours of the 11th the Germans resumed
their efforts, and strong forces attempted to break
through our defences on the Dammstrasse and the
right flank of the Lowland Brigade from the Stables
to the southern end of the support position, but the
hostile concentration had been observed and our rifle,
machine-gun, and artillery-fire, cutting deep lanes in the
dense field-grey hordes, beat back the foe in tumultuous
and terror-stricken disorder. The Seaforths, taking full
advantage of the panic, counter-attacked with a small
party under Sergeants Tait and Jeffries, and rounded
up 17 Germans and 3 machine-guns, The young
soldiers who had joined the Division behaved with
admirable courage and coolness, and our gunners earned
the gratitude of the infantry by the rapidity and
precision with which they engaged every favourable
target.

On the front of the Ninth the enemy had been too
severely punished to risk another enterprise, and no
incident interrupted the rest of the day. A counter-
attack was even contemplated with a view to clearing

1918] _ MESSINES RIDGE LOST, 11rx 301

the high ground west and north of Oosttaverne, but
the project was given up on account of German
inroads farther south. Advantage of the lull was taken
to reorganise the line, the 62nd Brigade now holding
from Pick House to Somer Farm, the 26th to the
Hollebeke-St Eloi road, and the 27th in its original
sector, the total frontage amounting to nearly 9000
yards. During the evening the. Division and its sector
were transferred from the IX. to the XXJI. Corps.

On the same day Messines Ridge was wrested from
our grasp. During the night of the 10th/llth the
South Africans tried to gain touch with the Ninth
near Pick House, but this place consisting of three
“Pill-boxes” was found to be strongly manned by the
enemy and defied every attempt to overpower it. At
daybreak the 108th Brigade moved up in support of
the South Africans, and the forenoon passed without
event. Early in the afternoon, however, the Germans,
attacking the left wing of the South Africans in great
strength, expelled the 2nd Regiment from the crest,
and though a resolute counter-stroke, led by Captain L.
Greene, regained the lost ground, the enemy's turning
movement on our left flank forced the South Africans
to retire to a line some 200 yards east of Hell Farm.
This position was maintained in face of heavy losses
and incessant attacks throughout the remaining hours
of daylight.

Owing to German penetration in the south the right
flank of the Second Army, pivoting on Wytschaete, was
obliged to withdraw in the night to a line passing
through Kruisstraat Cabaret and a point east of
Wulverghem. When this movement was completed
the right wing of the 62nd Brigade rested on the
Bogaert Farm-Pick Wood Spur, and a defensive flank
was formed along the Wytschaete-Peckham road.

302 : EVENTS, 127ru tro 157x [APRIL 12

The retirement was naturally more pronounced in
the case of the Nineteenth Division, and in conformity
with the rest of that formation the South Africans were
drawn back to a line N. Midland Farm—Kruisstraat
Cabaret-Spanbroekmolen—Maedelstede Farm.

From the 12th to the 15th there was a lull in the
fighting on the front of the Ninth, but merciless artillery-
fire caused many casualties. During this period of
comparative peacefulness General Tudor made several
rearrangements. The 64th Brigade (less one battalion)
took over the front from Somer Farm to Dome
House in relief of the 26th, which continued to hold
the Dammstrasse, and the 9th Seaforths and the 58th
Brigade were withdrawn from the front trenches,
the latter rejoining its own ‘Division on the 13th.
Meantime reinforcements were gathering in the rear;
the South Africans returned to the Ninth on the night
of the 13th/14th and two battalions of the 39th
Composite Brigade (late Thirty-ninth Division) were
moved by the Twenty-first Division to Ridge Wood
to be available if required. All our defences were
strengthened and the Sappers and 9th Seaforths
laboured steadily on the Vierstraat line, which the
62nd and 26th Brigades were ordered to garrison, each
with a battalion. A prolongation of front on the
evening of the 15th obliged the 62nd Brigade to take
over the front of the Nineteenth Division as far as
Spanbroekmolen. The success of the enemy also
forced us to surrender our dearly-bought gains of the
Passchendaele campaign, and in conformity with the
withdrawal round Ypres, the left flank of the Ninth
from the north-east end of the Dammstrasse to the
northern divisional boundary was brought back to the
Corps line.

This line, leaving the Dammstrasse, east of Eikhof

1918] RETREAT TO THE CORPS LINE 303

Farm, crossed the Canal just east of The Bluff, where,
turning east- north-east, it passed over the Klein
Zillebeke Spur, 500 yards north-west of the hamlet of
the same name. The White Chateau and Klein
Zillebeke were thus given up, but The Bluff and Hill
60 were retained. With a view to shortening our front,
and so economising troops, a more extensive retirement
—to the Vierstraat line—was contemplated; but on
General Tudor urging that this position, besides
offering inadequate protection against artillery - fire,
was completely overlooked from the Spanbroekmolen-—
Wytschaete Ridge, and was a poor substitute for the
valuable observation afforded by our present position,
the idea was abandoned.

The stretch, for which the Ninth with its attached
troops was responsible, amounted to 9000 yards. The
portion of the Corps line, occupied by the Lowland
Brigade, consisted of a string of cleverly camouflaged
posts protected by heavy and continuous belts of wire,
and had previously been reconnoitred by Brig.-General
Croft and Captain Duke, his brigade major. The
retreat was skilfully carried out on the night of the
15th/16th under cover of patrols, which, going out as
usual after dusk, were so enterprising that the enemy
failed to realise that a withdrawal was in progress.
All next day the Germans violently shelled the vicinity
of the Corps line, but the posts were so well concealed
that little damage was done, and even low flying
aeroplanes were unable to detect our new positions.
Our far-reaching observation served us handsomely ;
the enemy frequently presented excellent targets as
he advanced, and the accurate and galling fire of our
Stokes mortars and machine-guns stationed on The
Bluff shattered a hostile concentration near the Canal.

On the 16th a huge enemy effort was directed

X

304 WYTSCHAETE LOST [ APRIL 16

avainst Wytschaete. About 5 a.M., after a hurricane
bombardment which broke down all communications
in the sector, the Germans, screened by a mist, carried
the battered site on which had stood Spanbroekmolen
Mill, the 64th Brigade being forced to throw out a
defensive flank 500 yards north of the former on the
line Somer Farm-—North House—Black Cot, whence it
was continued to the Vierstraat line by two companies
of the Black Watch. The South Africans were hastily
brought up, and manned the southern sector of the
Vierstraat from La Polka to Desinet Farm, while the
Lowland Brigade occupied the northern sector from the
Vierstraat—Wytschaete road to Snipers’ Barn.

About noon a furious attack developed against the
Camerons in the Dammstrasse, but was repulsed by
rifle and machine-gun fire, and the Germans withdrew
to Pheasant Wood, leaving their wounded where they
fell An hour later an attempt of the enemy to
debouch from the wood was easily frustrated.

The loss of Wytschaete was no light matter, and
an operation for its recapture was quickly planned.
French reserves having been sent up, one division was
to attack with its left flank parallel to and 500 yards
north of the Kemmel-Spanbroekmolen road, and the
Ninth was to co-operate by retaking Wytschaete. Our
available forces consisted of two battalions of the 62nd
Brigade, the 7th Seaforths, and two companies of the
39th Composite Brigade, and the objective was the line
Pick Wood-Bogaert Farm, the cutting 300 yards south
of Wytschacte-Staenyzer Cabaret-Somer Farm. The
French however were unable to complete their prepara-
tions, and at 7.30 p.m. the Ninth attacked alone under
cover of a creeping barrage. Just as the German
_ barrage began our troops moved forward. The dash of
the Seaforths was superb. An irresistible charge

1918] COUNTER-ATTACK BY SEAFORTHS ON 16rn = 305

carried them right through Wytschaete village, and
during a combat where many feats of valour were
performed, Captain Reid and C.S.M. Jeffries singled
themselves out by the daring with which they rushed
a “Pill-box” on the ridge and captured 14 prisoners
and 5 machine-guns. But the extreme left of the
attack was checked by machine-gun fire from North
House, and though on the right the men of the 62nd
Brigade reached the line Petit Bois - Maedelstede,
they failed to capture the craters at the two latter
places owing to machine-gun fire from Spanbroekmolen
and Peckham, which the French were to have attacked.
The result of the operation was that success on the left
had been gained on a narrow front, while on the right a
line had been established which could not be held by
daylight unless Spanbroekmolen were taken.

The French therefore agreed to assault the village
at 5 A.M. on the 17th, when the 62nd Brigade was to
co-operate by attacking Wytschaete Wood. To support
the Seaforths in Wytschaete village the South Africans
were placed under the orders of Brig.-General Kennedy,
and the 4th Regiment, followed by the Ist, moved up
to the village. By dawn the line occupied ran from
Somer Farm through North House and the Hospice to
Black Cot. The French effort against Spanbroekmolen
was unexpectedly feeble, only one company being used,
and nothing was achieved, with the result that the 62nd
Brigade had to withdraw to the line La Gache Farm-
eastern edge of Petit Bois.

From the 17th to the 24th no infantry attacks took
place, but relentless artillery-fire persistently swept our
trench system and back areas. On the 18th an unlucky
shell struck the 26th Brigade H.Q., causing the deaths
of Lieut.-Colonel Horn, on his way to rejoin the Sea-
forths, Major Rose, the B.M. of the artillery, Captain

306 EVENTS, 17rxu to 24TH [APRIL

Somers Cocks, the Staff Captain, and the Rev. C. G.
Meister. The German advance, which had given the
enemy possession of Wytschaete, Wulverghem, Neuve
Fglise, Bailleul, and Meteren, had now brought him
close to the Kemmel—Mont des Cats Ridge, the reten-
tion of which was vital to the security of our grip on
Ypres and Poperinghe. A weighty blow had been dealt
against the British forces, whose organisation had been
gravely affected by the necessity of throwing piecemeal
all available reserves into the battle line, and Ludendorff
might have realised his dreams if he had returned to
the main strategical design with which he began the
year. But his gains at the Lys had so far exceeded his
expectations that he was tempted to carry on in the
north in the hope of securing the Channel Ports, and the
two schemes, by offering conflicting prizes, began to lose
all measure of co-ordination in the German plans.
During this period the French, relieving the Nine-
teenth Division, joined up with the Ninth on the right,
and on the night of the 19th/20th our front north of
Kikhof Farm was handed over to the Twenty-first
Division. This included the whole of the front originally
held by the Ninth Division, and, although the portion
south of the Canal had been heavily attacked time after
time, no part of the ground had been lost, except that
portion in front of the Corps line which was evacuated
in conformity with the army plan. On the 19th the
62nd Brigade was relieved and joined its own division,
while the H.Q. and two half battalions of the 146th
brigade came under the orders of General Tudor. The
remaining two halves arrived on the 21st and 22nd, and
two battalions of the 39th Composite Brigade were
transferred to the Twenty-first Division. Other rein-
forcements arrived; the 4th Tank Brigade (less one
battalion and without tanks), consisting of the 5th

1918 | DISPOSITIONS OF THE NINTH 307

Battalion, with 30 Lewis Gun detachments, and the
13th Battalion with 47. On the 22nd the South African _
Brigade, for lack of drafts, became a battalion styled the
South African Composite Battalion,’ and the remaining
units of the brigade, which retained its distinctive name
under Brig.-General Tanner, were made up of the 9th
Scottish Rifles and the 2nd Royal Scots Fusiliers. The
former battalion was thus retransferred to its old division
from the Fourteenth, while the latter, a Regular battalion
originally in the famous Seventh Division, came from
the Thirtieth Division, in which it had served since
December 1915.

Another stroke against Wytschaete in co-operation
with the French was planned for the 26th, but was
anticipated by a great German thrust on the 25th. As
was not unusual with the Ninth, its line formed a
pronounced salient, and on the evening of the 24th was
held from right to left by the 27th Brigade from La
Gache Farm to Black Cot, by the 146th Brigade to
North House, and the 64th to Dome House, and
thence by the 26th (with the ‘“ Rifles” attached) to the
northern divisional boundary at Eikhof Farm. The
27th Brigade was practically facing south. The Vier-
straat line and another from 800 to 1000 yards in
rear of it, known as “The Cheapside line,” had been
assiduously strengthened, and they were divided into
three sectors, of which the right was allotted to the
27th, the centre to the 146th, and the left to the 26th
Brigade. Each sector was held by one _ battalion,
deployed in depth in and between the two lines, two
companies of each battalion being earmarked as garrison,
and the remaining two being at the disposal of brigade
commanders for counter-attack. On the right the 12th

' Under the command of Lieut.-Colonel H. W. M. Bamford of the
2nd Regiment.

308 DISPOSITIONS OF THE NINTH [ APRIL 25

Royal Scots held the line with the K.O.S.B.' in close
support and the 11th Royal Scots in reserve. Thirteen
Lewis Gun detachments of the 5th Battalion (Tank
Brigade) were stationed by Brig.-General Croft on
supporting positions on Vandamme Hill. The South
African Brigade, now in process of reorganisation, and
the remainder of the 4th Tank Brigade were in divisional
reserve, the former about Hopoutre and the latter
half-way between Reninghelst and Poperinghe. The
XXII. Corps H.Q. company, also under General Tudor,
was composed mostly of men unfit for active operations,
and was in reserve.

Our boundary on the south gave to the French the
low ridge running east from Mount Kemmel to Span-
broekmolen, without leaving to them sufficient space in
which to deploy troops for its defence. It was unfor-
tunate that this ridge was not in the area of the Ninth ;
for while it was of little account as regards the defence
of Kemmel, it was essential for the protection of our
right flank. During the week 18th to 26th, although
no serious attack developed, the troops were subjected
to great strain owing to incessant and severe shell-fire,
and the casualties amongst those in and behind the
Vierstraat line were numerous.

Between midnight and 1 A.M. on the 25th a prisoner —
captured by the French stated that a big onslaught was
imminent and would probably take place on the 25th.
Before daybreak a thick mist straddled the ground, and
at 2.30 A.M. a violent hostile bombardment of gas and
H.E. opened along the whole front. Telephonic com-
munication between General Tudor and Brig.-General
Croft was sundered at the outset, and the 8.0.8. was

The K.O.8.B. had been commanded by Major Innes Browne since the

24th March ; he was killed at Hill 60 on the 10th April, and was succeeded
first by Lieut.-Colonel Chamberlain, and then by Major H. J. Wilkie,

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1918] - GREAT GERMAN ATTACK 309

seen to go up on the French front. At 3.20 a.m. the
4th Tank Brigade was ordered to send up immediately
two companies to the Cheapside line, and the South
Africans were instructed to be ready to move at fifteen
minutes’ notice.

At 4.50 a.m. news came from the French that
the enemy’s infantry were attacking, and half an hour
later the 8.O.S. signal was reported from the front
of Wytschaete. Kemmel was wreathed in smoke and
large numbers of enemy aircraft circled over both
it and Wytschaete, but no definite information reached
D.H.Q. until 6.40 a.m. when a_ belated message
arrived from the 64th Brigade to the effect that up
to 5.15 a.m. no infantry attack had developed on its
front. A few minutes later the C.R.A. reported that
the enemy’s barrage had moved forward considerably,
and that one of our aeroplanes had dropped word
that it extended along the whole front from Luden-
hoek to the south-west end of the Dammstrasse. At
7.15 A.M. another message from the C.R.A. stated
that the Germans were within 300 yards of Siege
Farm, about 2000 yards north-west of our right flank
troops at La Gache Farm. This information came
as a complete surprise, since no news of an infantry
attack on our front had yet reached D.H.Q.

The enemy's onset in the first instance was directed
about 3 A.M. against the Twenty-eighth French Division,
and the right of the Ninth held by the 12th Royal
Scots. At 5a.M. there was a determined frontal assault
on the 12th Royal Scots, and at one time a lodgment
was effected between the centre and right companies,
but after bitter fighting the Royal Scots drove off
the assailants. About 7 a.m. the K.O.S.B. in the
Vierstraat line received word from the Royal Scots
that their front was intact, and this information was

310 12th ROYAL SCOTS CUT OFF [apRIL 25

the more amazing in as much as the K.O.S.B. were
themselves hotly engaged with the enemy, while French
prisoners under escort were observed in their rear.
The Germans had been foiled in their frontal attack,
but their onrush had pierced the French on our right
and enabled them to turn our flank from the south.

The 12th Royal Scots were entirely cut off, and
about 8.30 a.m. the battalion fighting desperately to
the end was engulfed by a flood of Germans, here and
there a whirling eddy testifying to the fury of a last
stand. Only a few isolated groups escaped the clutch
of the foe and fought their way through many perils
to the Cheapside line. On the left of the Royal
Scots, the Ist East Yorks Regiment (64th Brigade)
was forced back to Grand Bois, where, encircled by
hordes of Germans, it put up a gallant fight. The
K.O.S.B. also suffered seriously from the enemy’s
turning movement; the two forward companies were
virtually annihilated after a fierce resistance, and the
battalion H.Q. were surrounded and captured. The
remainder of the battalion took up a position on the
Cheapside line, which was also held by the 9th
K.O.Y.L.I. (64th Brigade), and by Lewis Gun detach-
ments of the 4th Tank Brigade. Two companies of the
11th Royal Scots, the Black Watch, and the 9th D.L.L.
were sent up in succession to support and continue this
line back towards La Clytte.

In this manner the dangerous thrust was parried.
The Black Watch, moving up from Ouderdom, crossed
the Cheapside line, and engaging the enemy captured
67 prisoners at small cost to themselves. The K.O.S.B.
in a brilliant counter-attack directed by Captain Cundle,
now in command of the battalion, inflicted severe
losses and secured 58 prisoners.

Throughout the action our machine-gunners earned

1918] GALLANT MACHINE-GUNNERS 311

noteworthy distinction by the doggedness with which
they kept their guns in action till the last possible
moment. Most of the company with the 27th Brigade
shared the fate of the 12th Royal Scots, but made
the enemy pay a heavy price for his victory. One gun
directed on the Steenbeek valley, fired 1500 rounds
before it was put out of action; other two were silent
until the Germans reached the wire in front of them,
when the crews suddenly opened fire and mowed them
down. Only after one gun was knocked out, and
the other withdrawn through lack of ammunition, did
the enemy succeed in penetrating the wire. Of the
teams at Vandamme no man returned ; at Vandenberghe
the guns were kept in action until the last belt was fired
and were then destroyed, since it was impossible to
withdraw them. In the Vierstraat line, a whole
section became casualties. Two sections of another
machine-gun company supporting the Ist East Yorks
opened fire on the valley of the Wytschaete Beck with
three guns between 5 and 6 a.M., and continued firing
at intervals, until 9 a.M., when two of the guns were
withdrawn to cover the right flank of the infantry,
and remained in action for two hours without tripods.
Of these sections there were only six unwounded men
at the end of the day.

On the left of our line the storm beat violently
against the Dammstrasse, but failed to break the
defence of the Highlanders, who held the position
with the Camerons and the Seaforths. Up to half
an hour before noon all hostile attacks were repulsed,
our infantry, machine-gunners and the personnel of
the 26th L.T.M.B. co-operating most effectively.
When ammunition began to run short, several of the
men dashed forward to deserted dumps in full view
of the enemy, and brought back bandoliers of cart-

312 THE HIGHLANDERS IN ACTION _ [aprir. 29

ridges. Between 11.30 and 1.30 p.m. shells fell with-
out ceasing, and the Camerons in the forward posts
were practically wiped out, but our position through
Piccadilly Farm-The Mound proved invulnerable to
every attack for the remaining part of the day. Under
Captain H. E. Bennet the men of the 26th L.T.M.B.
fired off all their Stokes ammunition into the dense
masses of the Germans, and after destroying the mortars
used their rifles with deadly effect against the hostile
infantry and transport. The machine- gunners with
the Highlanders handled their weapons with such skill
and enterprise that the infantry voluntarily collected
ammunition and kept up the supply, while parties of
the “Rifles” in the Vierstraat—Snipers’ Barn line were
organised for belt filling.

After darkness fell, a line in rear of the Highlanders
having been established and manned by fresh troops of the
Twenty-first Division, the Camerons and Seaforths with
the other detachments extricated themselves and were
drawn back toa camp 700 yards north-east of Ouderdom.
The stone-wall defence of the Highlanders had put
a final stop to the enemy’s northern onrush, which
had rolled up the front and immediate supports of
three brigades, and threatened our hold on Ypres. °

The shattered fragments of the Ninth, with the
exception of the South African Brigade and_ the
artillery, were relieved by the Forty-ninth Division at
11 am. on the 26th. The brigade remained in the
sector until the night of the 5th/6th May, and all
three battalions, though constantly harassed by artillery-
fire, inflicted enormous casualties on the enemy when on
the 29th he strove to take advantage of his possession
of Mount Kemmel. Rarely has heavier artillery-fire
heralded an attack. On that day, the Royal Scots
Fusiliers signally distinguished themselves. They

1918] GERMAN SCHEME FRUSTRATED 313

were deployed in, in front of, and behind the Cheap-
side line, and suffered horribly from the bombard-
ment; but of their eight Lewis Guns, which were out
in front of their position, only one was knocked out, so
that when the enemy's infantry advanced they were
immediately checked, and then our barrage came
down on the top of them. First a few rose up and
bolted, and then the remainder fled in panic, where-
upon the Royal Scots Fusiliers fairly took toll of them
with their rifles and Lewis Guns. The enemy’s attack
was utterly defeated. |

That date marks the failure of the German designs
in Flanders. The value of Kemmel proved to be less
vital than had been anticipated; the enemy failed to
carry the valleys that separated it from Scherpenberg,
and here, as in front of Amiens, the battle line became
stabilised. The diversion had caused anxious tremors
at G.H.Q., and for some time our organisation showed
signs of giving way. The situation was too critical to
be glossed over by misleading communiqués, and Sir
Douglas Haig’s famous ‘“ Backs to the Wall” Order,’

1 “Three weeks ago to-day the enemy began his terrific attack against
us on a fifty-mile front. His objects are to separate us from the French, to
take the Channel Ports, and destroy the British Army. In spite of throw-
ing already 106 diVisions into the battle and enduring the most. reckless
sacrifice of human life, he has as yet made little progress towards his goals.

“We owe this to the determined fighting and self-sacrifice of our troops,
Words fail me to express the admiration which I feel for the splendid
resistance offered by all ranks of our Army under the most trying
circumstances.

“ Many amongst us now are tired. To those I would say, that victory
will belong to the eide which holds out the longest. The French Army
is moving rapidly and in great force to our support. There is no other
course open to us but to fight it out.

“Every position must be held to the last man. There must be no
retirement. With our backs to the wall and believing in the justice of
our cause, each one of us must fight to the end, The safety of our homes
and the freedom of mankind depend alike upon the conduct of each one
of us at this critical moment.”

(Special Order issued by field-Marshal Sir Douglas Havg on 12th April.)

314 WORK OF THE DIVISION [ APRIT.

issued to all ranks on the 12th April, was a bracing
and salutary warning to the British Army of what
had to be done to deprive the Germans of victory.
But Ludendorff, by using too much strength to exploit
his initial success, had converted the diversion into a
major operation, and had been unable to turn it
into account in front of Amiens. The Flanders
offensive instead of supplementing had supplanted the
enemys main scheme of the year, and from this
moment the projects of the German Higher Command
show both uncertainty and nervousness.

Considering how sadly the Ninth had been depleted
as a result of the Somme retreat, the unwavering
resistance it offered in April is little short of marvellous.
Since the 21st March it had enjoyed virtually no rest,
and yet it had retained all its high fighting qualities
unimpaired; this was largely due to the excellent
spirit shown by the young boys who formed a large
proportion of each unit. The Ninth’s protracted defence
of Wytschaete had not merely added another glorious
record to its lengthy list, but had helped almost as
much as the retention of Givenchy by the Fifty-fifth
Division to set a limit to the German gains in Flanders,
and earned for it another “mention”? from G.H.Q. It

1 “Farther north a heavy attack launched by the enemy this morning
against our lines in the neighbourhood of Wytschaete and Hollebeke (the
Messines Ridge) was completely repulsed by the Ninth Division with great
loss to the enemy.”

(Extract from the oficial Communiqué of the 11th April.)

Before this appeared the Corps Commander informed the G.O.C. that
Sir Douglas Haig and Marshal Foch fully appreciated the valuable work
performed by the Division. This was communicated to units in the
following message :—

“The Corps Commander wishes it to be known that the Commander-in-

Chief, in course of conversation with him, said that it was mainly due to the
stubborn resistance of the Ninth Division that the Army was now in a

1918] WORK OF THE DIVISION 315

is worth noting that here, as during the Somme retreat,
the enemy never succeeded in wresting any ground
from the Ninth by a frontal attack, and it was only
when its flanks were turned that any territory was
surrendered. The infantry had shown throughout in-
comparable tenacity and endurance, and the work
of the trench-mortar batteries and the machine-gun
battalion was invaluable. It is doubtful if the 26th
L.T.M.B. ever did finer work than on the 25th April,
while no reputation was more thoroughly established
than that of the 9th Machine-gun Battalion, and the
prestige won in these turbulent April days gave a
tremendous stimulus to the esprit of this recently
formed unit.

The successful resistance of the Ninth was due to
sound generalship as well as the valour of its troops.
On the critical 25th April the Highland Brigade being
on the inner flank had time to send two companies
up from the reserve to form a defensive flank facing
south, and it was this measure that stopped the spread
northward of the German turning movement until the
troops along the Dammstrasse could be withdrawn to
the Piccadilly Farm—Mound position, and then at night
behind the Vierstraat-Snipers’ Barn line. In holding
up the onslaught on the Cheapside line and eventually
in consolidating themselves in it, when Mount Kemmel,
which looked right along it, was in the hands of the
enemy, the men of the Ninth accomplished an almost
incredible performance. The action is a conspicuous
example of the value of defence deployed in depth ;
for the fact that the Germans never broke through the

position to hold on to the present line. If the Ninth Division had not
held on there would have been no alternative but to retire a long way
back. He also stated that General Foch fully appreciated what had been
done by the Ninth Division.”—No. A. 9837/12, 17/4/18,

316 ANOTHER “ MENTION” [APRIL 1918

Division, although their first attack completely out-
flanked the front and support lines and even the front
reserve line (Vierstraat line), was due, apart from the
courage of the troops, to the great depth of the original
deployment of the Division.

By its prowess in March and April the Ninth
thoroughly earned the flattering message’ received
later from Sir Douglas Haig. It was now widely
known even beyond Scotland, and shared with the
Fifty-first Highland Territorial Division, the rare dis-
tinction of appearing in a leading article of Zhe Times.
This publicity was the theme of an amusing conver-
sation between the popular Padre Brown and a Padre
of another division.

“Oh, you belong to the Ninth Division, do you?”

“T do.”

“You seem to have a very good Press.” (This,
of course, nettled Padre Brown.)

‘Yes, we have.”

“How do you manage it; have you got a special
correspondent ?”

“Oh yes.”

“Really ; and he seems to accompany you wherever
you go.”

‘““Yes, he does.”

‘“‘T say, do tell me who he is.”

“Oh, his name is Haig!”

1 “Please convey to General Tudor and to all ranks of the Ninth
Division my deepest appreciation of the great gallantry displayed by them
during many days of severe fighting north of the Lys. In the stubborn
struggle for the Ridge at Wytschaete, with which their name will always
be associated, as well as on many other occasions, they have shown the same
high qualities which distinguished them throughout the Battle south of
Arras, and have most worthily upheld the traditions of the British Army.”

(Vinth Division, No. A. 9827/28.)

CHAPTER XIV
METEREN AND HOEGENACKER RIDGE

May ‘ro Sepremper 1918

THE moral of our troops was a subject of frequent
notice in the Press during March and April, and it
was so persistently stated that it had not been affected
by reverses and disasters that suspicions were aroused
about the value of a moral which required so much
loquacity to convince people of its soundness. As a
matter of fact the men in France were calmer and less
nervous than our ‘‘Home Front,” as the Germans would
call it. It is true that both in March and April there
had been instances of unseemly panic, but this was
inevitable in an army numbering many thousands.
But though here and there a few weaklings succumbing
to exhaustion and despair lost heart, the vast majority
of the men of the Fifth, Third, and Second Armies
never faltered; they fully realised that on their devotion
and sacrifice depended the fate of civilisation. Greater
nervousness was in fact apparent after the crisis had
passed, and during the summer of 1918 there was a
regular epidemic of self-inflicted wounds, but it was
very noticeable that practically all the culprits were
fresh soldiers who had never been in any fighting, and
a few weeks’ careful training in the trenches led to a

rapid diminution of this feeble-hearted device.
817

318 MISLEADING PRESS ACCOUNTS [may

A clear gain early in 1918 was the greater reliability
of our official communiqués. The garbled and mis-
leading accounts of the battles since the time of Loos
were not calculated to elevate the moral of those
fighting in France, and men who had taken part in
such an action as the “3rd May” 1917 were exasperated
to find it reported in the Press as a great British
victory. ‘British official,” formerly the hall-mark of
truth, became a dubious phrase, and the practice of
soothing the timid by toning down reverses was more
than counterbalanced by a loss of faith in the veracity
of the British Government. The method now adopted
of publishing full accounts of events was as whole-
some as it was Satisfactory, and undoubtedly helped
to improve the moral of the Army.

The Germans in two offensives had seized a vast
extent of territory, and made huge captures in prisoners
and material, but they had failed to overwhelin the
British forces and to break our liaison with the French.
During the panic in March and April the British
Government extended the scope of the Mailitary
Service Act, and sought, without adequate considera-
tion, to introduce conscription into Ireland. From -
these measures no real gain was to be expected; for
the men in Britain now drawn into the Army were
more necessary for the upkeep of industry at home,
and were too old to be of much service as soldiers,
while the attempt to bring Ireland under conscription
delivered the country to the Sinn Feiners, and com-
pelled the Government to divert to that island large
forces which could have found more useful employment
on the Western Front. A more solid compensation
was derived from the energy and celerity with which
America came to the assistance of the Entente, and
the rapid and continuous transportation of its soldiers

1918] SITUATION AT END OF APRIL 319

across the Atlantic to France was the most signal
illustration of the failure of the German submarine
campaign. Unless Germany could intercept American
reinforcements her position was hopeless; and her
capacity for interference was at least curtailed by the
dashing naval operations which blocked the harbours
of Ostend and Zeebrugge.

Even success on land added to her embarrassments ;
for her length of front had been greatly augmented
and portions of her line, especially in the north, were
difficult and costly positions to defend. Moreover, the
attack had taxed her strength to the utmost, and it
was not till the end of May that she was able to strike
a fresh blow. The new offensive directed against the
Chemin des Dames with the object of widening the
German front towards Paris, marked the final abandon-
ment of the strategical conception with which Ludendorff
had commenced the campaign, though our front near
Amiens probably remained for the enemy the most
profitable point of attack. The rush on the 27th May,
which chiefly affected the French, at first swept every-
thing before it, and by the end of the month the enemy
‘ had reached the Marne between Chateau Thierry and
Dormans. Near that point the line became stabilised,
and the resistance of the French was supported by
British and American troops.

During the greater part of May, the Ninth after
leaving Poperinghe was resting and reorganising near
St Omer. D.H.Q. were at Blarinzhem, and the brigades
were in neighbouring villages except the 27th, which
was in a camp at Lumbres. After three weeks of
constant training and good weather, the Division, now
largely composed of youths httle more than eighteen
years of age, was ready to return to the line, and on
the night of the 25th May the 26th Brigade with the

Y

320 THE METEREN SECTOR [JUNE

9th Scottish Rifles attached, relieved the Thirty-first
Division near Meteren. On the following day the
South African Brigade took over the right sector from
the 26th.

The position held by the Ninth was essential for the
safety of the important railway centres of Hazebrouck
and St Omer, and had therefore to be maintained at
all costs. The main feature was the narrow isolated
ridge of the Meteren Hill running north and south
from Fontaine Hoek towards Meteren; on the east it
overlooked the French and German lines towards
St Jans Cappel and Bailleul, and on the west the
valley of the Meteren Becque as far as the Flétre-
- Roukloshille Ridge which lay behind the Hill. The
enemy was in possession of the village, which, standing
on high ground, afforded him observation of all
approaches to the west of Meteren Hill and almost all
the ground in our area east of the Flétre—-Roukloshille
Ridge, thus preventing any movement on the part of
our men in daylight.

In the early summer the initiative still remained
with the enemy, and there was anxious speculation as
to the place where his next blow would fall. Prince
Rupprecht was known to have large forces in reserve
and the Mont des Cats and Hazebrouck seemed to offer
tempting prizes. Our aeroplane observation showed
that extensive preparations for an attack had already
been made, and throughout May and June our vigilance
was never suffered to relax. Rows of trenches were
dug back to St Omer; in the forward area a
continuous front trench was excavated, covered by
isolated advance posts, while there was a strong
support line hinging on Phineboom and a reserve
position near Flétre. On the 27th May the “Rifles”
secured a wounded prisoner, who informed us that

1918] RAIDS 321

the enemy was going to make a big attack on the
29th, but that day passed without any untoward occur-
rence. The German operations near the Chemin des
Dames were now in full swing, but the foe on our front
continued to form dumps and depots, and not until the
end of June was it clear that his projected offensive
on the Mont des Cats and Hazebrouck had been
given up.

On the whole, the Ninth found the sector a very
pleasant one to hold and our casualties from the
enemy’s artillery-fire were not very high. The land-
scape was typically agricultural and consisted of wide
fields of long waving corn, coloured in patches by the
bright red of the poppy, with a few substantial farm-
houses interspersed here and there. So hurried had
been the flight of the civilians from the district that
at many of the farms some live-stock had been left, and
in one portion of the line two cows were regularly
handed over on reliefs as part of the trench stores.

The attitude of the Division was one of active
defence. Patrolling was assiduous; screened by the
tall corn, small parties left our lines every day to
examine the enemy's positions. Raids for the purpose
of securing identifications were constantly carried out,
and as the youngsters of the Division gained experience
and learned the lie of the country they became adepts
in the art of surprising posts. Abortive attempts to
take prisoners were made by the K.O.S.B.’ on the
night of the 2nd/8rd June, the 12th Royal Scots? on
the 10th, and the Black Watch on the night of the

1 After the fighting near Kemmel Lieut.-Colonel J. Colchester Wemyss

commanded the battalion until Lieut.-Colonel Smyth returned at the end
of May.

2 In June Lieut.-Colonel Ritson left for England and the battalion from
the time 1t went into the line near the end of May was commanded by
Lieut.-Colonel J. Murray. ;

322 A MINOR OPERATION [sUNE

14th/15th, but during these forays several Germans
were killed and wounded. On the 15th, however, the
“Rifles” captured a prisoner, and on the 20th a
party of the 11th Royal Scots under Lieutenant Keen
took three Germans of the 81st Reserve Division.
Two days later, a smart piece of stalking by Sergeant
Smith of the K.O.S.B. realised a bag of three prisoners
belonging to the same division.

In June alarm was caused by a distressing outbreak
of trench fever which affected the whole Division;
numerous officers and men were removed to hospital,
but the attack proved to be as short as it was sharp,
and in the majority of cases the patients were able to
rejoin their units after a fortnight’s absence. In the
same month several officers and N.C.Os. from the
American forces were attached to the Ninth for
Instruction in trench warfare; they were agreeable
companions and enthusiastic workers and _ willingly
joined in enterprises carried out by the units to which
they were attached.

Our neighbours at this time were the French on the
left and the Australians (First Australian Division) on
the right. The latter had won a big reputation by
their success in stalking Germans, and there was
scarcely a Corps Intelligence Summary which did not
record some Australian captures. On the night of
the 2nd June a minor operation surprised the enemy
in the middle of a relief and the Australian haul
consisted of 5 officers and 250 other ranks. At
12.30 a.m. on the 24th a joint enterprise by two
companies of the South Africans and two companies
of the 1st Australian Brigade advanced our line on
a front of 2000 yards to a maximum depth of 500
yards. The attack took place astride the Meteren
Becque under cover of an artillery and trench-mortar

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1918] ARRANGEMENTS FOR ATTACK 323

barrage, and the South African share of the spoils
amounted to 29 prisoners and 4 machine-guns.

From the end of June the Germans were daily ©
harassed by Scotsmen, South Africans, and Australians.
The captures on the front of the Ninth were smaller.
than on the right, but our difficulties were greater, the
country in our sector being thickly streaked with dense
hedges often profusely wired. On the night of the
11th/12th July three successful raids bringing in 7
prisoners were made by the 12th Royal Scots to the
north-east of Meteren, and by the Royal Scots Fusiliers
and the South Africans to the south of the village.
Two nights later, a German N.C.O. was surprised and
surrendered to the K.O.S.B.

On the 19th July Meteren was attacked. The
commanding ground on which the village stood and
its proximity to the line, for the protection of which
the Ninth was responsible, rendered it desirable that
our front should be advanced beyond the village.
During May and June when the enemy was expected
to strike, it was inadvisable to attempt the operation
but preparations for it were made. Our experience
of Longueval suggested the necessity of thoroughly
demolishing Meteren; it was therefore systematically
bombarded to prevent the consolidation of the position
by the enemy and to level the walls and so allow a
creeping barrage to go through the village without
danger to the assailants. For a fortnight previous to
the attack, ‘“‘heavies,” field-guns, and trench mortars
poured a never-ending stream of missiles into Meteren
and completely flattened it.

As it had been decided that the infantry would
attack under a smoke-barrage, bombardments with
H.E. and smoke, accompanied by the discharge of
gas from projectors, took place from time to time with

324 ARRANGEMENTS FOR ATTACK (suty 19

a view to leading the enemy to associate our use of
smoke with gas. It was originally intended to wait
for a wind favourable for smoke, but later it seemed
politic to carry the operation into effect as soon as
possible in order to ascertain the enemy’s designs and
to delay his preparations for an offensive if one was
contemplated. Arrangements had therefore to be
made to attack without too much dependence on a
favourable wind, and batteries were moved into
positions more directly in rear of their tasks. In
calculating the amount of smoke and the placing of it
on or beyond the barrage line, the velocity and direction
of the wind were to be taken into account. The
artillery barrage was to be reinforced by the action
of trench mortars and machine-guns.

Zero was arranged for 7.55 a.M., as that was an
unusually late hour for an attack and the enemy might
therefore be expected to be off his guard. The assault
was entrusted to the South African and 26th Brigades,
the former attacking with the South Africans and the
Royal Scots Fusiliers, and the latter with the Camerons
and Black Watch. The “Rifles” and Seaforths were
in support. The infantry were in their assembly posi-
tions before dawn, and in order to avoid detection
before zero, the trenches were covered with cocoanut
fibre matting, along which a black streak eighteen inches
wide had been painted so as to simulate the appearance
from the air of an empty trench. As the enemy’s
centre formed a prominent salient, the men in our
centre were to advance at zero, but those in the wings
had to remain in their trenches for a few minutes until
the middle portion of the barrage came on an alignment
with the flanks.

The assault began under the most inauspicious
circumstances. On the previous day the battle stores

1918] CAPTURE OF METEREN 325

of the South African Brigade were destroyed when
the farm in which they had been dumped was burned
to the ground, and fresh stores were obtained only in
time to be issued to the men when in their assembly
positions. Then a Stokes mortar detachment moving
to the left brigade sector strayed into the enemy’s lines
five hours before zero, and one man was captured.
The wind was unsteady and unfavourable for smoke.
Finally, some guns on both flanks opened five minutes
too soon, and while this mistake proved to have no bad
consequences on the right flank, it probably served to
put the enemy on the alert on our left.

In spite of these mishaps the operation met with
almost complete success. The South African Brigade
easily subdued all opposition except on its extreme left,
where a pocket of Germans in a shallow trench behind
a wired hedge offered a stout resistance, but this was
adroitly overcome by the Royal Scots Fusiliers. The
whole objective on the right was secured to time,
numerous losses being inflicted on the enemy, especially
behind the hedges running north and south on the west
side of Meteren. Fortunately the course of the advance
took the hedges in flank and discounted the protection
which the Germans hoped to obtain from these obstacles.
When the protective barrage ceased a company of South
Africans advanced and captured an enemy trench
running north-east from the Meteren Becque towards
Alwyn Farm.

The Highland Brigade had a more strenuous time.
The Camerons clearing the German front passed on
through the ruins of Meteren, where the enemy was
found holding a hedge in considerable force. After a
brisk combat they seized the hedge and reached
their objective in time. But the Black Watch on the
left were not so happy. A portion of the right company

326 CAPTURE OF METEREN [suLy

won its objective along with the Camerons, but the
remainder of the battalion was at once checked by a
thick hedge on the left flank. Previously a successful
raid had been effected at this place, but the enemy had
since then appreciably strengthened the defences, and
now there was a belt of wire behind as well as in front
of the hedge covering the hostile infantry and machine-
guns. Lying too near our lines to be bombarded by .
the gunners, it had been dealt with by Stokes mortars,
but these had failed to cut the wire. Dogged pluck
- and persistent efforts were of no avail against this
strong point, and after serious losses the left half of
the Black Watch retired sullenly to their original
trenches. The gap between the two portions of the
Black Watch was filled by two platoons of the Seaforths,
who on the following day turned the enemy’s defences
by advancing from the west and drove him from the
hedge.

After the capture of the objective, patrols moved
forward as soon as the protective barrage ceased. Near
Alwyn Farm and the hedges north and east of it there
was some spasmodic resistance, but our patrols during
the 19th and 20th succeeded in establishing a line on
a slight ridge south of the Brahmin Bridge-Gaza Cross
Roads. The battlefield was rapidly cleared, but the
stretcher-bearers had great difficulty in finding the
wounded, who were hidden by the corn. In the days
following the attack, the 26th Brigade gained all its
objectives, and came into line with the advanced troops
of the South African Brigade.

The operation of the 19th July was a brilliant
triumph, and increased immensely the enthusiasm and
confidence of the young soldiers, to whose dashing
fearlessness the victory was mainly due. Our losses,
with the exception of the Black Watch, were small

1918] BRIG.-GENERAL KENNEDY 327

compared with our gains; many of the enemy had been
killed, while 6 officers and 348 men, with a considerable
amount of material,’ fell into our hands. The Germans
had been taken entirely by surprise. They had become
so accustomed to bombardments of H.E. and smoke
accompanied by gas that they regarded our barrage of
the 19th July as another of the same, and a great many
of the prisoners were wearing their gas-masks when
captured. The unusual hour of zero was another factor
in the surprise, and prisoners stated that all expecta-
tion of an attack that day had been abandoned after
‘“‘stand-to.” Our enterprise apparently anticipated a
hostile offensive on our front ; the enormous quantity of
trench-mortar ammunition which was found close in
rear of the enemy's front positions clearly indicated that
the Germans were preparing to deliver an attack in
this sector.

The capture of Meteren was the last operation of
the Highland Brigade conducted by Brig.-General
Kennedy. He had led the brigade through some of
the stormiest and most critical fighting of the war,
and of his many fine achievements perhaps the most
outstanding was his daring and skilful handling of his
men during the very trying days of the Somme retreat.
After three years of continuous strife he had well earned
the rest which an appointment in England now secured
for him. His successor was Brig.-General the Hon.
A. G. A. Hore Ruthven, V.C., who came from the
Staff of the VII. Corps with a reputation already
established, and assumed command on the 27th July.

The right sector was now taken over by the Lowland
Brigade. Before daybreak on the 25th the enemy

1} field-gun, captured at Gaza Cross Roads ; 6 heavy trench mortars ;
6 light trench mortars ; 11 heavy machine-guns ; 36 light machine-guns ;
1 stick-bomb thrower.

328 RAID AND COUNTER-RAID [auGcusT

sought to gain some compensation for his recent re-
verse by raiding our lines. At 2 A.M., under cover of a
trench-mortar and artillery bombardment, hostile parties
attacked trenches held by the K.O.S.B. and 11th Royal
Scots. The raid was utterly repulsed, and the enemy
left behind two corpses and two unwounded prisoners.
From the identifications we learned that the Germans
had relieved the battered and demoralised 81st Reserve
by the 12th Division, which had a good fighting
record. An even more formidable raid was made in
the early hours of the 26th. But the Germans were
driven off by the K.O.S.B., and though on the right
they succeeded in entering a trench held by the 11th
Royal Scots, they were expelled by an immediate
counter-attack, nine prisoners being taken.

The period from the 26th July till the 18th August
was marked by raid and counter-raid. On the 30th July
the Australians took Merris. On the 31st a raid by
the K.O.S.B. just failed to secure prisoners, but Lieut.
C. Campbell and Sergeant Smith killed nearly a dozen
of the enemy in a fierce hand-to-hand encounter. Next
day the Germans made a strong effort to seize a post
held by the 12th Royal Scots, but were easily repulsed.
On the 3rd August Captain Grant and a party of
Camerons rushed a hostile post, and after killing six
and wounding one other, returned without loss to our
lines, On the 5th and 14th other raids made by the
Germans were driven off.

Since the fear of a hostile offensive was fading away
battalions out of the line enjoyed quite a comfortable
time. Training, especially of officers, carried on
diligently and uninterruptedly, produced a marked
improvement in efficiency and discipline. Occasionally,
however, the ordinary routine was broken. On Sunday
the 4th August, the fifth anniversary of the entry of

1918] HOEGENACKER RIDGE 329

Britain into the war, a Parade Service, attended by
detachments of all divisions in the Second Army, was
held at Terdeghem, the detachments of the XV. Corps
being under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Smyth of
the 6th K.O.8.B. At this time the Ninth adopted
the practice, generally followed by most divisions in
France, of distinguishing its personnel by a special
mark. This consisted of a white metal thistle on a
small circular disc of royal blue cloth worn on the
upper part of both arms, and the first unit to be
completed with the sign was the 6th K.O.8.B., who
had the honour of marching past His Majesty the King
near La Brearde on the 6th August. Most fortunately
this ceremony saved the Lowland Brigade some
casualties; for while a company of the 12th Royal
Scots lined the road a shell passed through its vacant
billets.

Hoegenacker Ridge, lying beyond Meteren, was
clearly the next task of the Division, and instructions
for its seizure were received from the XV. Corps on the
10th August. A general plan of attack had been
drawn up previously, and was in fact being practised
by the Lowland Brigade then in reserve. Since the
Meteren Becque was an awkward obstacle to an
advance from the west it was decided, while simulating
preparations for an attack from this direction, to make
the assault from the north. The Ninth was to take the
ridge and all the ground east of the Becque as far south
as Terrapin House; but as this would give it a frontage
of 3000 yards on the objective, while the space for
forming-up amounted to only 1500 yards, two com-
panies of the Twenty-ninth Division were to follow
in rear of the right flank of the Ninth and take over
the front from the Becque to Terrapin House as soon
as it had been captured. The Twenty-ninth Division by

330 CAPTURE OF HOEGENACKER [aucusT 18

means of patrols was to follow up any success gained,
and if possible secure the village of Outtersteene.

The attack was to be supported by machine-guns
and trench mortars and was to be covered by the
favourite Ninth barrage. A German document had
been captured in which the enemy, attributing our
success at Meteren to the use of smoke, instructed
his machine-gunners to open fire at once on our
parapets when a smoke-barrage came down. It was
therefore necessary to give the foe as little time as
possible to bring his machine-guns into action, and
our barrage was to be put down at one minute after
instead of one minute before zero, as_ originally
intended, while the infantry were to count ten after
the barrage came down before leaving their trenches.

The assault was to be carried out by the Lowland
Brigade with the K.O.S.B., 11th Royal Scots, and
“Rifles,” each attacking on a two-company front, the
first wave in skirmishing order and all succeeding
waves in file. In the hope of effecting a tactical sur-
prise, 11 A.M. on the 18th was fixed as zero, and the
camouflage device so successfully employed at Meteren
was adopted to screen the assembled troops. To
ensure that none of the enemy were lurking within
our barrage line the 12th Royal Scots established
four new posts in six days, and held them against
all efforts of the Germans to eject them. These posts
were withdrawn before dawn on the morning of the
attack.

The operation met with gratifying success. On the
right the K.O.S.B. suffered losses from a heavy counter-
barrage put down by the enemy between his outposts
and his line on the ridge; near the Becque, too, there
were some obstinate encounters in which a German
machine-gun was knocked out by a Lewis Gun fired

1918] IMPORTANCE OF THE CAPTURE 331

from the hip. On the left little opposition was
experienced, the enemy being utterly surprised. In
their impetuous eagerness our men more than once
overran the barrage, some casualties being incurred in
consequence. The whole objective of the Division was
gained in fine style, and one company of the K.O.S.B.
pressing on as far as Outtersteene returned with two
heavy machine-guns.

So demoralised was the enemy that a great deal
more ground could have been won, but though the
men were impatiently anxious to go on, it was not
considered advisable to leave the ridge for the low
swampy ground beyond. The enterprise had been
exceedingly satisfactory, no hitch having occurred at
all. Ten officers and 287 other ranks had been
captured along with a quantity of material.’ The
ground secured was of real importance as it dominated
the whole sector, and unless the enemy had abandoned
all hope of an offensive in this district he was bound to
counter-attack. But nothing happened; the Germans
had their hands too full with our counter-offensive in
front of Amiens to contemplate ambitious projects in
other parts of the war zone. Four days after the
capture of Hoegenacker Ridge the Germans commenced
a retreat on this front which did not close until they
had abandoned the whole of the Lys salient. This step
was probably chiefly due to events farther south, but
the loss of the ridge, which afforded wonderful facilities
for observation, undoubtedly precipitated the enemy's
retirement,

The Ninth remained in the line until the 24th.
Terrapin Farm was not taken over by the troops of
the Twenty-ninth Division until the 19th, probably
because the amount of ground gained by exploitation

1 20 heavy machine-guns, 22 light machine-guns, 342 rifles.

332 SOUTH AFRICANS DEPART [ aucusT

was greater than had been expected. On the 22nd the
Black Watch, in conjunction with a brigade of the
Thirty-sixth Division which was now on our left,
advanced their line about 150 yards without opposition.
On the same date a patrol of the Camerons encountered
a hostile post, which it summarily wiped out; it was
then attacked from different directions and retired after
shooting two officers who were leading enemy parties.
On the 24th and 25th Hoegenacker Ridge was taken
over by the Thirty-first Division and the Ninth was
withdrawn to rest near Wardrecques.

At the end of August the South African Composite
Battalion moved to the Lumbres area preparatory to
leaving the Division, its connection with which officially
ceased on the 18th September. Heavily engaged
throughout 1918 it had once been practically de-
molished, and it was clear that there was no chance
of bringing it up to the strength of a brigade until it
was withdrawn from the line. It was only fitting that
the Union of South Africa should be represented in
France by a force stronger than a battalion; but the
severance of the connection thus rendered necessary
was a great blow to everyone in the Ninth. The trials
and hardships borne by Scots and South Africans at
the Somme, Arras, Passchendaele, and the fierce ordeal
of the German offensives in March and April had
forged a bond, consecrated by common sufferings and
triumphs, that will ever link in sympathy such distant
parts of the Empire as the misty land of Scotland and the
Dominion that extends from the Cape of Good Hope
to the Zambesi. The departure took place without fuss
or ceremony in the same fashion as tried friends say
farewell when duty bids them part. The final greeting’

1“T wish to express to you and to your officers, warrant officers,
N.C.Os. and men of the brigade under your command my great regret

1918] FAILURE OF GERMAN DESIGNS . 333

of General Tudor to the men who had played such an
eminent and distinguished réle in the Division reflected
the sincere feelings of the Scots.

There was some consolation in the report that the
place of the South Africans was to be filled by Ian
Hay’s battalion, the 10th Argylls; but it was not
immediately available, and another battalion of Colonial
troops, the Newfoundlanders, tough fighters and good
comrades, joined the Ninth under the command of
Lieut.-Colonel T. G. Matthias. The 28th Brigade
thus reconstituted was placed under the command
of Brig.-General J. L. Jack. |

Before the end of August the war had taken a
turn that was as unexpected as it was gratifying.
The German offensive in May and June towards
Paris had been foiled by the doughty resistance of
French and American troops, and Ludendorff, seeking
an easier quest, dealt on the 15th July his final and
hazardous blow against Rheims. Marshal Foch’s
skilfully excogitated tactics were more than a match
for the storm-troops who, lying in a sharp salient
near Soissons, Chateau Thierry, Epernay, and Rheims,
experienced a jarring shock when attacked on the

that the exigencies of the Service prevented me seeing you all personally
before you were transferred from the Ninth Division in order to say
good-bye. For two and a half ycars your brigade has shared the fortunes
of the Ninth Division. At Delville Wood, at Arras, at Ypres, in the
Somme retreat, and finally at Meteren, it has fully contributed in
establishing and maintaining the glorious record of this Division. The
South African Brigade bore the brunt of the attack on the divisional front
in March 1918, and its final stand at Bouchavesnes on 24th March, when
it held out all day until all ammunition was exhausted, will live as one of
the bravest feats of arms in the war. The cheery keenness and comrade-
ship with which the South African Brigade has always worked and fought
will be very much missed by me personally and by all the Ninth Division.
We wish you and your brigade the best of fortune, and know that you
will always fully maintain the splendid name you have earned,”
(General T'udor’s Letter to Brig.-General Tanner.)

334 THE “TURN OF THE TIDE” [may To srrt.

18th July by a French force under General Mangin
who had collected it under cover of the forests of
Compiégne and Villers-Cotteréts. The Germans were
driven from the salient, Soissons was recaptured by
the French, and on the 3rd August the enemy was
pushed back across the River Vesle.

General Mangin’s stroke on the 18th July was
the turning-point in the campaign. Ludendorff’s hope
of victory was broken, and the ultimate triumph of the
Entente was definitely assured. But few people were
prepared for the sequence of brilliant victories that
attended the Allies’ arms, and the autumn of glorious
hope that succeeded the gloomiest spring of the war.
On the 8th August the British Fourth Army struck
so shrewd a blow that it disengaved the city of Amiens,
and reduced Ludendorff to despair. The resistance
of Germany began to crumble, and her forces were
driven back in a retreat, which was rapidly develop-
ing into a rout, when the Armistice put an end to
hostilities. The line of battle extended to the north
when, on the 21st August, the British Third Army
attacked between Albert and Arras. On the 29th
Bapaume fell to the Third, and on the 31st Péronne
to the Fourth Army. The First Army, joining in,
stormed the formidable Drocourt—Queant line. These
events emasculated opposition farther north, and °
Bailleul, Mount Kemmel, Ploegsteert Wood, and Lens
were evacuated. Before the end of September the
Germans had lost: all their conquests of the spring,
and were endeavouring to gain time behind the
entrenchments of the Hindenburg Line.

With Germany in the toils all pith and_ sting
dropped from her allies. In the Balkans, General
Franchet d’Espercy, now in command of the Entente
forces in that area, commenced on the 15th September

1918] THE “TURN OF THE TIDE” 335

anvattack which in ten days forced the Bulgarians to
sue for peace. With the collapse of Bulgaria the
Central Powers lost their grasp on the Balkans, and
there was no force of any consequence to make even
a fight for Serbia. Turkey was now isolated, and
suffered a series of catastrophic reverses from the
armies of General Allenby, whose cavalry campaign
mopped up the greater part of the Turkish soldiery,
and eventually with the co-operation of General
Marshall from Mesopotamia compelled the Sultan
to accept our Armistice terms on the 30th October.

In France the admirable discipline of the enemy’s
troops had so far prevented anything like a rout, but
every day increased the embarrassments of the German
General Staff. Reserves had to be thrown in hastily
to stem our advance with no time to consider how
they might be employed most usefully. Within
Germany itself the rigours of our naval blockade caused
acute discomfort, and the failure of the military effort
raised murmurs ominous of the Revolution that was to
sweep the Hohenzollerns from the Imperial Throne.

Thus the general situation towards the end of
September was full of promise for the Allies, and
Marshal Foch and Sir Douglas Haig, realising that
a continuation of our pressure was bound to over-
whelm the armies of the adversary, arranged for four
simultaneous and convergent attacks against his
sagging line.

The first was to be delivered by the Americans,
who had already flattened out the St Mihiel salient,
and was to be in the Woeuvre in the general direction
of Meziéres; the second by the French west of the
Argonne with the same general goal as the Americans;
the third on the Cambrai-St Quentin front by the
Fourth, Third, and First British Armies in the direction

Z

336 THE NINTH AT YPRES [SEPT.

of Maubeuge; and the fourth on the 28th September
by the Belgian and Second British Armies in the
direction of Ghent.

The Ninth, being in the Second Army, was thus to
take part in the Flanders campaign. In billets, first
near Wardrecques and later in the neighbourhood of
Esquelbec, the men for over three weeks were resting
and training, but the elation caused by their triumphs
near Metern and the daily reports of fresh victories
made them burn to join in the final onset. On the
11th September the Division was transferred from the
XV. to the II. Corps, and the 26th Brigade took
over the front between the Ypres—Menin and Ypres-—
Zonnebeke roads from the Fourteenth Division on the
20th September.

Our front line ran approximately from Hell-fire
Corner on the right to Mill Cot, rather more than a mile
east of Ypres. East of this line the ground was low-
lying and marshy, but rose gradually on the right
to Bellewarde Ridge, and thence to the Westhoek-
Frezenberg Ridge, which extended across the divisional
front from south to north. From Stirling Castle, a mile
south of Westhoek, the main Passchendaele Ridge ran
north of Broodseinde to the village of Passchendaele.
Between the Frezenberg Ridge and the Noordemdhoek-
Broodseinde sector of the main ridge, two small but
important underfeatures ran north-west; these were
known as Anzac Ridge and Glasgow Spur, the former
being separated from the Frezenberg Ridge by the tiny
stream of the Hanebeek in a very boggy valley, which
had been heavily wired. Since the desperate battles
of 1917, the sector had experienced unusual repose,
and the wilderness of shell-holes was now covered
by long rank grass.

The Ninth being on the left flank of the Second

1918] OBJECTIVES OF DIVISION 337

Army was in close liaison with the Belgians. The
co-ordination of artillery arrangements naturally pre-
sented complications, but ultimately it was decided
that while the Belgians should open with a three
hours’ preliminary bombardment before zero, the Ninth
would attack under cover of its customary creeping
barrage, commencing at zero. There was less difficulty
as regards the Twenty-ninth Division on our right,
though a pause of fifteen minutes after the capture
of Bellewarde Ridge was necessary to allow that
division after passing through Sanctuary Wood to
reorganise, preparatory to storming Stirling Castle.

The final objective of the Ninth for the first day
extended from the southern end of Polygone de
Zonnebeke to a point about 500 yards south of
Broodseinde. Before this line was reached a series
of ridges had to be secured, Frezenberg, Anzac, and
Glasgow Spur. Batteries of artillery were to move
forward as each height was taken, so that an effective
barrage might be maintained throughout the advance.
The assailing troops were the 28th Brigade on the right
and the 26th on the left, the former with the “ Rifles ”
and the Royal Scots Fusiliers in line, and the latter with
the Seaforths and Black Watch'; the Newfoundlanders
and Camerons were in reserve. Lieut.-Colonel Lumsden
of the “Rifles” was ill and had a very high tempera-
ture on the eve of the battle, but this officer, who had
never missed an action since he crossed to France with
the Division in 1915, refused to go sick. The 27th
Brigade was to follow in support, and its role was to
depend on the situation at the close of the day. Each
brigade had a company of the Ninth Machine-Gun
Battalion attached to it, the remaining company being
in divisional reserve. Zero was at 5.25 a.m.

1 Commanded by Lieut.-Colonel French since August.

338 MISHAP TO THE CAMERONS [sEpr. 1918

A big victory was expected and with good reason.
Defeats in the south had caused the enemy to thin
the garrison in front of Ypres, but the nature of the
ground with frequent “ Pill-boxes” and scattered belts
of wire was likely to retard our advance. The Germans
who opposed us were the 11th and 12th Bavarian
and the 10th Saxon Divisions; they were alert but
nervous, and numerous low flying aircraft carried out
reconnaissances over our front system. There was a
regrettable mishap on the 26th. A stray shell hit
the H.Q. of the Camerons; Lieut.-Colonel Inglis was
wounded, and Major Cameron, Captain Fraser, the
adjutant, and six others of Battalion H.Q. were killed.
Lieut.-Colonel A. W. Angus then joined the Division,
and was sent up to command the Camerons. Since the
9th April 1917 our men had never been in better
spirit, and when the troops assembled for the attack
on the night of the 27th/28th September, they were
full of confidence.

CHAPTER XV

FROM YPRES TO LEDEGHEM

28TH SerremBer To 14TH October 1918

Taree hours before zero on the 28th September the
Belgians commenced their preliminary bombardment,
which on our front provoked little retaliation. Heavy
rain was falling and it was the dark hour before dawn,
when at 5.25 a.m. our leading infantry advanced to
the attack over the slippery and shell-pitted ground.
The 28th Brigade was on a front of 700' yards and the
26th on one of 1200.

The whole operation went like clockwork, although
at the start progress was somewhat impeded by the
darkness and the churned-up soil, now rendered more
unstable by the continuous rain. A smoke-barrage’
was at first unnecessary owing to the very early zero*
hour, but as dawn broke and a south-west breeze
sprang up, its great value became apparent and the
tunnelled dug-outs and “ Pill-boxes,” which strewed the

' The 28th Brigade was given a narrower front in the advance to the
first objective in order to ensure that a sufficient force would still be in
hand, after Frezenberg Ridge was reached, to press home the attack along
the main ridge, most of which lay within the right brigade sector.

2 Owing to the small number of field-guns per yard (one gun to about
45 yards) the Division had to depend chiefly on smoke for the barrage, and
the guns fired two rounds of smoke to one of H.E.

3 A great deal of trouble had been taken to arrange the right hour for
zero, but all the calculations of the Divisional Staff were completely upset

by the fact that the morning was cloudy with drizzling rain.
839

340 PASSCHENDAELE RIDGE TAKEN [sEpr. 28

Bellewarde and Frezenberg Ridges, were isolated and
captured with greater ease. than might have been
-expected. By 6.45 a.m. the northern end of the
Frezenberg Ridge was taken; by 8 a.m. the whole of
it was in our hands, and patrols from the Highland
Brigade had pushed on towards the Hanebeek, in
conjunction with the Eighth Belgian Division.

The Sappers and Pioneers, who had bridged the
stream at Potijze during the night of the 27th/28th,
followed immediately behind the infantry, and set to work
without delay on the Ypres—Zonnebeke and Hell-fire
Corner-Zonnebeke roads. Their rapid improvements
rewarded all the forethought and labour which had
been expended in the accumulation of suitable material,
and enabled the forward movement of the divisional
artillery to begin at 8 a.m. By 8.30 a.m. our first
howitzer battery came into action in its new position,
but the Ypres-Zonnebeke road soon became congested
with Belgian artillery and the progress of our remaining
batteries was slow.

Advance from the Frezenberg Ridge was resumed
at 8.35 a.m. The dispositions of the 28th Brigade
remained unaltered, but in the 26th the Camerons
passed through the Seaforths and Black Watch. The
plan now entailed a partial wheel to the left, in order
that the high ground might be secured before the low
ground farther north was crossed. This manceuvre
was accomplished with the aid of a H.E. barrage, into
which the Field Artillery joined, battery by battery,
as they reached their new position west of Frezenberg
Ridge. The first real opposition encountered by the
infantry was near Anzac Ridge, where dense strands
of wire and groups of “Pill-boxes” enhanced the
natural strength of the position, but nothing could
arrest the momentum of our men, and half an hour

1918] BECELAERE CAPTURED 341

before noon all the main ridge from the Polygone de
Zonnebeke to Broodseinde was in our possession.

Thus our final objective was won with surprising
ease and at trifling cost; the only matter now to be
settled was the part to be played by the 27th Brigade.

This brigade had moved up from camps west of
Ypres early on the 28th, and proceeded steadily over
the heavy ground to the Polygone Butt. Brig.-General
Croft had been ordered to be prepared for any one of
three courses; to assist either of our assaulting brigades
during the advance to Broodseinde Ridge, or to advance
north from Broodseinde in the event of the Belgians
finding the low and boggy ground on their front
impassable, or to exploit success by an advance towards
Becelaere. |

Accordingly General Tudor and Brig.-General Croft
went forward to the Broodseinde Ridge, and by 12.30 P.M.
had ascertained beyond doubt that it was firmly held by
the Belgians as well as by our own men. The resistance
of the German infantry was feeble, and their artillery-
fire practically negligible. Gheluvelt had already fallen
tothe Twenty-ninth Division, and the Highland Brigade
and the Eighth Belgian Division were in close touch
several hundred yards east of Broodseinde Cross
Roads.

The Lowland Brigade was therefore instructed to
advance against Becelaere. Owing to a breakdown of
the visual signalling arrangements there was a delay
in the transmission of the orders, and the two assaulting
battalions, the 12th and 11th Royal Scots, did not leave
their position of deployment near Polygone Butt until
2.30 P.M. Stern opposition was encountered at once,
chiefly on the left of the 11th Royal Scots, and
increased perceptibly as our men approached Becelaere.
Just north of the village three hostile batteries came

342 SITUATION, NIGHT OF 28Tn [sEPT. 28

into action in the open, and it was only after a strenuous
combat that the 11th Royal Scots, assisted by a section
of “B” Company of the Machine-gun Battalion, took
possession of one of these batteries and silenced the
others. The enemy’s machine-gunners were still full
of fight, but all virtue had gone out of the infantry,
who, though present in large numbers, took no part
in the operation. The 11th Royal Scots mastered
the Molenhoek Ridge, and the high ground north of
the village of Becelaere was taken by the 12th Royal
Scots about 4 P.M.

The seizure of the village set a limit to our advance
that day. At nightfall the situation was as follows:
the Twenty-ninth Division was believed to be holding
the line Nieuwe Kruiseecke Cross Roads—Poezelhoek,
but no connection had yet been secured with it; the
27th Brigade, holding Becelaere, was in touch at Judge
Cross Roads with the 26th, which was linked up
with the Belgians east of Broodseinde Cross Roads,
each brigade having two battalions in line and one
in brigade reserve; the 28th Brigade lay in divisional
reserve near Polygone Butt with one battalion pushed
forward to protect the right rear of the 27th. Our
casualties had been slight, and in that one day consider-
ably more ground had been won than during months
of furious fighting in 1917. Nothing could have
revealed in a stronger light the unmistakable change
that had come over the character of the war.

Our greatest trouble was the opening up of decent
roads from Ypres to the ridge. The one route of any
consequence—the Ypres-Zonnebeke road—was ready
for wheeled traffic us far as Zonnebeke by 1 P.M.,
and by dusk all three’ artillery brigades were in
action behind the Broodseinde Ridge. But it was

1 The 28th Brigade A.F.A. was attached to the Division.

1918] ATTACK OF 28Tx BRIGADE 343

the one highway fit for use, and during the hours of
darkness it was thronged with Belgian and British -
limbers, some of which remained out on the road
all night. These difficulties had been foreseen by
Lieut.-Colonel Jeffcoat, who had organised a small
column of pack animals for each brigade, and under
the personal supervision of the brigade staff captains
the rations for the men were brought up on the night
of the 28th.

Early in the afternoon of that day General Tudor
was informed that the Thirty-sixth Division, in Corps
reserve, was to come into line between the Ninth and
Twenty-ninth Divisions, and the 153rd A.F.A. Brigade
was to be under its command. About midnight orders
were received to continue the push next day by
daylight. The Thirty-sixth Division, which was to
take over Becelaere from the 27th Brigade, was to
advance on Terhand while the Twenty-ninth Division
was to carry Gheluwe. The Ninth, covering the left
flank of the Thirty-sixth Division, was to conform on
its left to the Belgian Army, by moving in close touch
with it to the vicinity of Keiberg Spur.

The brigadiers received their orders in person from
General Tudor. The 28th Brigade was to lead the
attack; the 27th and 26th, following in rear of the
right and left of the 28th respectively, were to reinforce
and carry on the assault without waiting for orders in
the event of progress being checked. To give the men
as much rest as possible and to allow the Thirty-sixth
Division to come up into line, 9 a.m. was the hour. fixed
for the resumption of the forward movement.

The steady downpour under which the attack had
begun was still falling at 9 a.M. on the 29th. The
autumn night had been not only wet but very cold, and
as practically no shelter was available great discomfort

344 ATTACK OF 28Tx BRIGADE [sePr. 29

was endured by the men. Fortunately the sky showed
signs of clearing when the 28th Brigade, with the
“Rifles” and Newfoundlanders in line, and the Royal
Scots Fusiliers in reserve, passed through the outposts
of the 26th Brigade and began its advance on the
Keiberg Spur. There was no creeping barrage, but
our guns fired smoke to cover the movement of the
troops across the shallow valley separating Keiberg
from Broodseinde Ridge. Amid desultory shell and
considerable machine-gun fire Brig.-General Jack’s men
pressed on, and by 10 a.m. the Newfoundlanders with
the Belgians on their left had captured the Keiberg and
had broken through the Passchendaele—Terhand line ;
by 11.25 a.m. they were reported to be entering
Waterdamhoek. One section of the 50th Brigade
R.F.A. reached the Spur and was soon followed by
the remainder of the battery.

From the outset the “Rifles” met firm opposition
and were constantly enfiladed by machine-gun fire
from the south, though the Thirty-sixth Division had
gone through the outposts of the 27th Brigade about
9.30 a.m. For a brief space our men were checked
by the Passchendaele-Terhand line, but this was
quickly carried, and about 1 p.m. both the “Rifles”
and Newfoundlanders were facing a strongly - wired
line running east of Moorslede and Waterdamhoek,
and west of Strooiboomhoek and Dadizeele, called
the Flanders I. Stellung. Here they suffered grievously
through machine-gun fire from the front and from the
right wing, where Terhand had not yet been captured.
There was now a gap between the 28th Brigade and
the Belgians, and the Highland Brigade was ordered
to send a battalion to fill it.

The Camerons accordingly moved forward, but
after they had passed well over the Keiberg Spur,

1918] 26TH AND 27TH BRIGADES JOIN IN 345

the Belgians, who were experiencing obstinate resist-
ance near Moorslede asked for assistance, and General
Tudor commanded Brig.-General Hore Ruthven to use
his whole brigade if necessary, and press on south of
Moorslede with the utmost speed.

Meanwhile Brig.-General Croft had instructed his
battalion commanders to follow close behind the “ Rifles”
and to join in the attack if the advance showed any
sign of being checked. Finding that the leading troops
had been brought to a standstill, Lieut.-Colonel Smyth,
who had been reconnoitring well ahead of the brigade,
consulted with Lieut.-Colonel Sir J. Campbell, and
they sent forward two companies each of the K.O.S.B.
and the 11th Royal Scots. The additional momentum
thus thrown into the onset carried the whole line
forward about 2.30 p.m. On a front of nearly 4000
yards men of the 27th and 28th Brigades broke through
the Flanders I. Stellung position and entered Dadizeele
about 4 P.M., just as the enemy was hurriedly evacuating
it. Pushing forward, they established themselves on
the Menin—Roulers road as dusk was falling. North of
them the Highlanders, whose dash had materially
assisted the Belgians to carry Moorslede, took up a
position about 300 yards west of the Menin—Roulers
road, extending north almost to St Pieter, which the
Belgians wrongly reported as being in their hands,
The latter did not forget the assistance given them by
the Highlanders on this day, and it was referred to in
terms of great appreciation by the King of the Belgians
when he reviewed the Division on the 5th November.

This concluded the operations for the day. On
our right the Thirty-sixth Division, encountering stiff
opposition, did not secure Terhand until 3.45 p.o.,
and at night the enemy was still holding Wijfwegen
and Hill 41, a very important tactical feature, which

346 SITUATION, NIGHT OF 291x [sEPr. 29

dominated our right flank. On our left the Belgian
line ran back for fully 1000 yards parallel to and south
of the St Pieter-Moorslede road, north of which they
had failed to penetrate a thick belt of wire.

The line of the Ninth was thus well ahead of that
held by the divisions on both wings, our frontage
being about 3500 yards, 1500 of which were south of
the divisional boundary. Owing largely to the skilful
leading of regimental officers casualties had on the
whole been few, the “ Rifles” being hardest hit. Lieut.-
Colonel Kelso of the Royal Scots Fusiliers was blown
up by a shell, but though severely shaken refused to
leave his battalion. In the evening the 28th Brigade was
withdrawn into divisional reserve about Potterijebrug,
with the exception of three and a half companies which
were left in the line until the following night to rein-
force the 27th Brigade.

After a dry spell, rain commenced again at 6 P.M.
and continuing to fall throughout the night added
enormously to the difficulties of keeping open the
Ypres-Zonnebeke road, where traffic was constantly
blocked by huge Belgian drays, slowly hauled along
by one or two miserable horses.

Orders were received from Corps to resume the
advance on the 30th, but in view of the fact that the
Ninth was already holding a difficult salient, General
Tudor decided to await news of the attack by the
divisions on our wings before giving any orders.
Brigades, however, were instructed to be ready to
move at 9 A.M.

At 8 a.m. General Tudor presided over a conference
of brigadiers at Waterdamhoek. Our patrols had
reported strong opposition east of the Menin—Roulers
road, and he therefore ordered his brigade commanders,
pending news from the divisions on our flanks, to look

1918] EVENTS ON THE 3011 347

for weak parts in the hostile line and to push on if
opportunity offered. |

Neither the Thirty-sixth nor the Eighth Belgian
Division attacked in force on the 30th. The former,
under a smoke-screen put down by the 50th Brigade
R.F.A., captured Hill 41 about 4.30 P.m., but was almost
immediately expelled by a counter-attack. During the
day it took over the line up to Klephoek Cross Roads
from the 27th Brigade, which even after this adjustment
was still holding 1000 yards south of the divisional ,
boundary. The Belgians failed to secure St Pieter,
and the Black Watch who co-operated were also
stopped by severe machine-gun fire; thus by night
the situation was unaltered, the Ninth continuing to
occupy a sharp salient.

During the morning the artillery brigades sent
forward one or two guns to give close support to the
infantry, and one gun of B/51 Battery near Slypshoek
was almost up to the front line. Between noon and
2 P.M. the 50th and 51st Brigades R.F.A. were in action
in the area Strooiboomhoek-—Sly pskappelle—Spriethoek.
The route taken by the 50th Brigade to reach its
position was in full view of the enemy’s lines, but the
movement was carried out without much interference.
Constant and heavy rain fell throughout the day, and
consequently there was complete dislocation of traffic
on the Ypres-Zonnebeke road, with the result that
no artillery ammunition could be brought up, and the
ration wagons of some units remained on the road
-all night.

The troubles that beset us were now becoming
formidable, and it was also clear that the enemy was
rushing up fresh troops to dispute our further progress.
General Tudor, convinced that isolated attacks were
a mistake, as the experience of the Thirty-sixth Division

348 OPERATIONS FOR list OCTOBER [sErr. 30

and the Belgians on the 30th showed, rode over to see
General Detail, G.O.C. of the Eighth Belgian Division,
who agreed that if an attack was to be made it should
be along the whole line. At the same time, General
Detail declared that his division would not be able to
make an assault for some days. Shortly afterwards
orders arrived for a general onset at 6.15 am., the
Ninth Division having as objective Ledeghem, thence
due east to Cuerne and Harlebeke. The first objective
of the Corps consisted of the villages of Ledeghem and
Menin, and the line of the Railway between them. The
frontage allotted to the Division was from Klephoek,
east of Dadizeele, to St Pieter. The Ninth was ready,
but, as shown above, the Belgians were unable to attack
so soon. This was represented to the Corps, but
communications were defective and very slow, speaking
on the telephone was impossible, and time did not permit
of a complete report of the situation reaching Corps
H.Q. in time to postpone the operation. Knowing
that the Belgians could not attack, though, as always,
they were eager to help us in any way in their power,
General Tudor acquainted them with the situation, and
they agreed to safeguard our flank by conforming later
if our efforts were successful. He also instructed Brig.-
General Hore Ruthven, who was very anxious about
his northern wing, to seize and consolidate the line of
the Railway, but to go no farther unless the Belgians
joined in the battle.

The position on our right also caused great uneasi-
ness; so long as Hill 41 remained in German hands
our advance on this flank was bound to be a precarious
business, but it was understood that the Thirty-sixth
Division would storm the Hill at 5.45 a.m.

The weather was still very disagreeable when at
6.15 a.M. on the 1st October, the assault was launched

1918] CAPTURE OF LEDEGHEM 349

under cover of a smoke-barrage. It was delivered by
the 27th Brigade, with the K.O.8.B., the 12th Royal
Scots and a company of the 11th Royal Scots, and
by the 26th Brigade with the Seaforths and Black
Watch. On our right the enemy put down a heavy
bombardment, but fortunately it fell principally behind
the 27th Brigade. A few field-guns had been brought
up to within 400 or 500 yards of the front line to engage
Ledeghem and some scattered farms close to our front.
The fire of these guns at short range, combined with
the smoke-barrage, proved of immense value in helping
the infantry to overpower the stout resistance which
was at first encountered in and around the farm
buildings. When that had been quelled, progress was
continued with great rapidity, and for a time all opposi-
tion collapsed. The Lowland Brigade carried the whole
of Ledeghem and speedily arrived at the line of the
light railway 500 yards east of the village. On the
left the Highland Brigade captured what turned out to
be one of the last groups of German “ Pill-boxes,” and
also reached the light railway, while the Black Watch
advancing as far as Rolleghem Cappelle penetrated the
village and engaged hostile guns caught in the act of
limbering up.

The opposition in front was insignificant, but the
enemy, who had brought up fresh troops,’ was quick to
detect and take advantage of the weakness on our
wings. On the right the K.O.S.B. had been harassed
continuously from the start of the battle by machine-
gun fire from Hill 41, which increased in volume as the
Menin-Roulers Railway was approached. The Thirty-

1 The 6th and 7th Cavalry Divisions, consisting of men of fine physique,
who, according to their own statements, were known as the “ War-
prolongers” because they remained full of fight while the resisting power
of other German troops was diminishing.

350 EXPOSED FLANKS | [ocr. 1

sixth Division had postponed its attack on the Hill,
with fatal consequences to our right wing, and
Dadizeelehoek, less than 1000 yards south of Ledeghem,
appeared to be bristling with machine-guns. Lieut.-
Colonel Smyth with admirable promptitude swung two
of his companies to the right, with the intention of
clearing Hill 41 from the north. But the manceuvre
was foiled by an almost solid flow of lead from hostile
machine-guns, and Lieut.-Colonel Smyth was obliged
to use the greater part of his battalion in forming a
defensive flank, ‘while a field-gun, with bullets pattering
against its shield, was brought up ready to fire at point-
blank range as soon as the enemy counter-attacked.

On the left, as the Belgian forces had not yet
advanced, Brig.-General Hore Ruthven had to employ
his reserve battalion, the Camerons, in forming a
defensive flank under scourging machine-gun fire.

At the outset of the battle the situation appeared
to offer a distinct opportunity for cavalry’ exploitation
to widen the breach that had been made in the enemy’s
line, but no force was available to move up immediately
and the chance was lost. Very anxious about his left,
General Tudor sent messages to the French Cavalry
leader and the commander of the Eighth Belgian
Division, requesting the former to send up without
delay a regiment to Brig.-General Hore Ruthven’s
H.Q. at Slypskappelle, and the latter to fill the gap
that now existed between our left and its right. Word
was also despatched to the Corps suggesting that any
available troops should be sent up behind the Ninth
to follow up success, and protect its flanks. At the
same time General Tudor commanded the 28th Brigade,
which since the 28th September had been out of the

1 The cavalry in reserve consisted of the 3rd French Cavalry Brigade,
which, however, was not under the orders of the G.O.C. Ninth Division.

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1918] GERMAN COUNTER-STROKE | 351

fighting line for little more than twenty-four hours,
to be ready to guard the right flank.

The hostile pressure on our exposed flanks was
steadily augmented. By 11 a.m. the Highlanders after
suffering severe losses were obliged to withdraw to
the main Menin-Roulers Railway, which they held fora
distance of 1000 yards north of Ledeghem, whence
their line ran back to a point about 500 yards south
of St Pieter. This difficult retirement was carried out
with the utmost coolness. Lieut.-Colonel French of
the Black Watch, with great personal courage formed
a defensive flank with his men and prevented the
Germans from breaking our line. The French Cavalry
Regiment arrived later, but the opportunity for its
profitable employment had passed. The Belgians
attacking at 11 a.m. took St Pieter, but failed to
advance more than 100 yards east of it. Farther
north their assault did not succeed, and their line
ran in a north-west or west -north-west direction
from the village. The machine-gun company in
divisional reserve was moved up to reinforce the 26th
Brigade, which had gained about 1000 yards on its
right, while its left sloped back to the southern end
of St Pieter.

On our right at 10.30 a.m. a hostile counter-attack
from the south-east, gallantly led by mounted officers,
withered away before the fire of four Lewis Guns in
Ledeghem Cemetery, but two hours later a second
attempt from the north-east as well as from the south-
east expelled our troops from most of Ledeghem. An
immediate counter-thrust by the 11th and 12th Royal
Scots retook the northern end of the village, west of
which the K.O.S.B. established a line along the Railway
with their right flank thrown back to Manhattan Farm.

From an observation post about 100 yards behind his
2A

352 A GALLANT GUNNER [ocr.

front line, Lieut.- Colonel Smyth saw the Germans
collecting troops for a great counter-stroke, and the
K.O.S.B. were bracing themselves for a desperate
resistance at Manhattan Farm, when the timely arrival
of the 1st Inniskilling Fusiliers) who made a most
heroic attack on Hill 41 from the north, scared the
enemy and turned his efforts solely to defence. Though
the Inniskillings failed to capture the Hill, their plucky
effort probably saved the K.O.S.B., and so great was
the admiration of the latter and the troops of the Ninth
Division who witnessed the attack, that the G.O.C. at
their request wrote at once to the Thirty-sixth Division
expressing the admiration and thanks of the officers and
men of the Ninth.

Throughout the whole of that trying time when
the Division was fighting single-handed, the close
and fearless support of the infantry by our gunners
proved of inestimable value in breaking up counter-
attacks. In spite of the continuous rattle of bullets
on the shields, Lieut. Gorle of the 50th Brigade R.F.A.
led two guns up to Ledeghem, and on four separate
occasions under a veritable hail of lead brought single
guns into action within a few hundred yards of the
enemy. Providentially, though his tunic was combed
with bullets, he escaped the death that seemed inevit-
able, and for his most opportune heroism he was
worthily awarded the V.C.

Our gains on the 1st October were insignificant
compared with those on the 28th and the 29th
September, but in the old days of trench warfare
they would have represented a very creditable achieve-
ment. And there is little doubt that they would
have been much more remarkable but for the lack
of co-operation which prevented a simultancous attack
along the whole front, for the Ninth had been stopped

1918] END OF FIRST PHASE 353

only by the want of support on its wings. Neverthe-
less, since the 28th September the Division’ had crossed
the tragic Passchendaele Ridge, left behind it the
blighted wilderness created by more than four years
of grisly strife, and established itself on the fringe of
a landscape yet unscarred by war. In all, ten miles
had been traversed since the beginning of the battle,
and many prisoners and countless trophies had fallen
into our hands.

The operations of the Ist October mark the end
of the first phase of the Flanders offensive. It was
clear that the enemy had strengthened his front, and
that time would be saved and success more assured if
the advance was resumed under cover of a thoroughly
organised artillery-barrage. This involved a certain
amount of delay, as our advance had outstripped our
facilities for sending forward stores and supplies, and
roads and routes had to be constructed through the

1 A tribute greatly cherished by the Division was received from General
C. W. Jacobs in a Special Order issued on the 3rd October :—

“As the first phase of the operations which began on the 28th
September 1918 is over, I wish to express to you and all ranks of the
Ninth Division my gratitude and thanks for the splendid work which has
been achieved. ,

“The Ninth Division was specially selected to carry out the attack on
the left flank of the British Second Army and to cover the right flank of
the Belgian Army attack. The objectives given were rather more distant
than those we have attempted hitherto in Flanders, but, owing to the
splendid leading of yourself and the officers of all units, not only were all
those objectives gained, but you broke right through the enemy’s line to
a depth of 9} miles. In 1917 it took our Army over three months to get
only half that distance, and at great cost. The Ninth Division has done it,
and a great deal more, in twenty-four hours. What further evidence is
required of the magnificence of this exploit 4

“The Ninth Division has done splendidly all through the war, but
these last operations will be considered by history to have eclipsed all
their previous performances. In the last few days the conditions have
been trying and you have had to beat off many counter-attacks. The
weather has been bad and shelter has been very scanty. Yet the spirit of
all ranks has always kept at a hich level and you have upheld the splendid
traditions of the British Army and of the Division in particular.”

354 GERMAN REVERSES [ocr.

trackless jungle of the desolated region before heavy
guns and ammunition could be brought up. Fortun-
“ately the line held by us was so well furnished with
“ Pill-boxes,” that during the lull our troops were more
comfortably housed and protected than could have been
anticipated.

Reverses in Flanders formed only a portion of the
humiliations that were crowding on Germany. Before
September had closed the Hindenburg Line, and with
it all the hopes of the Fatherland, was broken by
British forces, and the German armies were drawn
back to the Selle. This success, together with the |
advance in Flanders, compelled the enemy to evacuate
the Lys salient and draw back his front towards Lille
and Douai. In the Woeuvre and Argonne, American
and French forces were waging a grim struggle; for
here the foe’s resistance was necessarily desperate,
since the collapse of this flank was bound to involve
the utter destruction of the German forces in France.
But steady progress was made, though the Americans
were hampered by commissariat difficulties, and it
became exceedingly doubtful if the enemy could maintain
the line of the Meuse, upon which his last chance of
safety rested.

The result of the fighting till the 14th October was
that deep dents had been made in the opposing line,
which was left with inconvenient salients in the north
round Lille and Douai, and farther south between the
Oise and the Aisne. With a view to saving Lille and
its industrial environs from the ravages of war, the
policy of the Allies was to encircle the city and so
cause its abandonment. To this end a further attack
by the Belgian and British forces was planned for the
14th October.

In this operation the task assigned by the II. Corps

1918] BATTLE PREPARATIONS 355

to the Ninth was the Courtrai-Lendelede Railway,
after reaching which, the Division was to make good
the crossings over the Lys between Courtrai and
Harlebeke. The railway was 9000 and the river
14,000 yards from our line. Since the 1st October the
Division had experienced a fairly quiet time, but the
Royal Scots Fusiliers had the bad luck to lose their
C.O., Lieut.-Colonel Kelso being badly wounded by
a shell; the command of the battalion was taken
over by Major A. King.

On the 3rd the Germans counter-attacked under
cover of a heavy bombardment, but were repulsed
mainly through the agency of the Newfoundlanders,
who, in their anxiety not to miss a fight, left their
positions in the support line and hurrying forward to
the front used their rifles and Lewis Guns with such
effect that the attack lost all its sting. The New-
foundlanders had already proved their mettle on the
first two days of the battle, and their prowess on the
3rd won them the sincere homage which good soldiers
always pay to a brave feat of arms. The clannish Scots
were proud to have them as brothers-in-arms,

While preparations for attack were steadily pushed
on, each brigade was drawn back in succession for a
short rest in the camps west of Ypres. The 104th
Battalion of the Machine-Gun Corps, which had been
attached to the Ninth since the 28th September, was
reorganised into three companies, two of which were
attached to the Twenty-ninth and Thirty-sixth Divisions
respectively. Various minor changes were made on
our front, which on the night of the 13th/14th extended
from the north end of Ledeghem to a hundred yards
south of the cross roads in St Pieter, the Twenty-ninth
Division having again come into line on our right and
taken over the position facing the village. Our chief

356 BATTLE PREPARATIONS [ocr.

annoyances during the period were caused by hostile area
“shoots” and aerial bombing which did much damage
in the transport lines, seventy-six artillery horses being
killed in a single night. There were suspicions that the
Germans were withdrawing, but constant and daring
patrol work proved our fears to be groundless.

The boundaries within which the Ninth was to
advance consisted of two parallel lines running slightly
south-east from the flanks of our sector, and giving us
a frontage of 1500 yards; but as our left wing was
bent back and faced north-east, the jumping-off line
measured nearly 2000 yards. It was therefore advis-
able to straighten the line and this could best be done
by bringing our left up to the Menin—Roulers Railway,
along which our right already ran. But to eliminate
the risk of the right being barraged by the enemy while
waiting for the left to come up, it was arranged that
the whole line should advance simultaneously, and
that thé right would pause for thirty minutes on the
light railway, 1000 yards east of the main railway, to
enable the left to come into line and to give the
Twenty-ninth Division time to clear the village of
Ledeghem.

Apart from the enemy, the greatest obstacles seemed
likely to be the Wulfdambeek stream, the village of
Rolleghem Cappelle and dense masses of wire. Infor-
mation about the width and depth of the stream was
conflicting and scanty, but in order to run no risks
eight light foot-bridges were prepared and carried by
infantry parties, but, as it happened, they were not
required, all the bridges having been left intact.
The German wire was intensely strong; close in front
of the left flank a belt over 100 yards in depth
protected Mogg Farm and one or two “ Pill-boxes”
near it, and behind Rolleghem Cappelle four continuous

1918] BATTLE PREPARATIONS 357

bands stretched across our front from south-west to
north-east. A similar barrier of equal depth extended
along the reverse slope of a low but prominent ridge
4000 yards from our right flank. This ridge could be
clearly seen from our line, and was at the extreme
range at which the infantry could be covered by the
gunners from their original positions ; for this reason it
was given as the first objective of the Ninth. Whether
further progress could be made without artillery support
would depend upon the tactical situation after the ridge
was won. The advance to the objective was to be
covered by the Ninth’s usual barrage. A forward
section of 18-pounders was detailed to work with each
of the two assaulting battalions, and two 6-inch trench
mortars, mounted for the first time on wheels, were to
operate in conjunction with the infantry.

The attack was entrusted to the 28th Brigade, with
the Newfoundlanders and Royal Scots Fusiliers in line,
and for the purpose of maintaining liaison with the
Belgians, a company of the Black Watch was to operate
on the left of the 28th Brigade. The 27th Brigade was
in reserve. One company of the 9th Machine-Gun
Battalion was attached to each infantry brigade, the
remaining one and a company of the 104th Battalion
’ being detailed to barrage certain points to cover the
infantry advance, and then to form part of the divisional
reserve. The assault was to be delivered at 5.35 a.m.

On the night of the 12th/13th the 28th Brigade A.F.A.
and four guns of each battery of the 50th and 5lst
Brigades moved up to forward positions, the rest of the
sections following on the night of the 13th/14th. All the
battery positions were within about 1500 yards of the
front line, and forward guns of the 51st Brigade were
to deal with ‘Pill-boxes” and farms at a range of
700 yards. Supplementary to the two mobile 6-inch

358 THE ASSEMBLY [ocr. 1918

trench mortars, five others were placed in position. The
27th Brigade moved up by battalions from the rest
area near Ypres to Keiberg Spur on the 13th, and that
night the 28th took over the line except the portion
held by the liaison company of the Black Watch.
There was great artillery activity during the relief, the
enemy sending over a good deal of gas, and the New-
foundlanders and the Royal Scots Fusiliers had over fifty
casualties on the way up to their assembly positions.

CHAPTER XVI

FROM LEDEGHEM TO THE SCHELDT

414TH OcrosBer To 27TH Octosrr 1918

THE barrage opened at 5.32 a.m. on the 14th October
and three minutes later the infantry moved forward.
The Black Watch company and the left of the Royal
Scots Fusiliers experienced sharp fighting from the
beginning. Mogg Farm, wire-bound, was obstinately
defended, but regardless of losses the Black Watch
pressed on and ejected the enemy from this stronghold.
The wind was light and from the south-east, and the
smoke of the barrage, adding density to the haze of
a fine autumn morning produced an impenetrable fog
about 500 yards from our line. As a result our troops
found it difficult to keep direction, and some confusion
arose but was speedily rectified. Though our troops
lost the barrage it had a most salutary effect upon the
enemy, and after the first resistance had been overcome
the infantry made rapid progress. Rolleghem Cappelle,
the first belt of wire, Neerhof, and the Wulfdambeek
were carried with much less trouble than had been
expected, and the abject failure of the Germans to offer
any opposition worth the name behind such defences
was a convincing proof of their loss of moral.

At the conclusion of the initial barrage the 28th
Brigade A.F.A. reverted to Corps reserve, while the

859

360 PROGRESS OF THE INFANTRY [ocr, 14

50th and 51st Brigades moved forward to give further
support to the infantry. Owing to difficulties of
observation and communication they were not able
at first to take much part, but the mobile trench
mortars dealt effectively with a single field-gun and
machine-guns which were opposing our troops on the
east bank of the Wulfdambeek. No sooner were the
infantry checked on the ridge south-west of Steenen
Stampkot than the 50th Brigade came into action and
helped them to capture the ridge by 9.30 a.., and all
the field-guns were moved up behind it.

On our left the 26th Brigade gradually became
involved in the battle, partly by reason of the vigorous
‘resistance offered by the German garrison of Mogg
Farm, and partly owing to a gap developing between
the 28th Brigade and the Belgians. North-east of
Rolleghem Cappelle the Highlanders had a stiff time
and during their advance several field-guns, firing over
open sights, were enveloped and taken. Shortly after
the capture of the ridge by the 28th Brigade, which
was in touch with the Twenty-ninth Division, the
Highlanders and Belgians entered Winkel St Eloi.
By this time the Camerons as well as the Black
Watch were in the fighting line.

About noon the infantry resumed their advance,
supported at close range by the 50th and 51st Brigades
R.F.A., but the enemy had rushed up a reserve division
(6th Cavalry) to hold Laaga Cappelle Wood and Steen-
beek and a desperate combat ensued. Forward patrols
of the Newfoundlanders pressed the enemy so closely
that they came under our own rifle - fire — luckily
escaping casualties—and forced the Germans to con-
tinue their retirement. Hostile groups could be seen
retreating through Laaga Cappelle Wood, and towards
the north a solitary German, mounted and towing a

1918] ' A NEWFOUNDLANDER V.C. 361

machine-gun cart behind him, helped to fill in the
landscape. The Highlanders, passing partially through
the left of the 28th Brigade, which, after its long advance
of the morning, was naturally somewhat exhausted,
fought their way forward, with all three battalions in
line, gained a footing in the wood and established
a line on the western slope of a low hill to the north
of it, but beyond this point progress was barred by
fire from Hill 40, 500 yards east of the wood. Near
the village of Steenbeek, amply furnished with machine-
guns, the enemy managed to stem the advance of the
28th Brigade, the right flank of which was now ahead
of the Twenty-ninth Division and was exposed.

During the severe fighting experienced by the
Newfoundlanders one of their number won the V.C.
Early in the push, when the attack was temporarily
checked by the fire of a German battery at point-blank
range, Private T. Ricketts went forward with his
section commander and a Lewis Gun, with a view to
outflanking the battery ; but when they were still 300
yards away from the enemy they ran short of ammuni-
tion, and the Germans, hoping to save their guns,
brought up the teams. Thereupon Private Ricketts
darted back under a fierce fire from machine-guns with
the battery, procured more ammunition, and returned
at the double to the Lewis Gun, which he fired with -
such accuracy that the Germans with their gun teams
were compelled to take refuge in a farm. The rest of
the platoon was now able to press on without casualties,
and 4 field-guns, 4 machine-guns, and 8 prisoners were
taken. Subsequently a fifth field-gun was intercepted
by our fire and captured.

The artillery supported the infantry with magnifi-
cent dash, and Brig.-General Wainwright must have
been very proud of the work accomplished by his

362 DASH OF THE GUNNERS [ocr. 14

gunners. Our batteries going into action presented
the most sensational and picturesque spectacle of the
advance, and introduced into the war a tinge of the
glamour and romance that seemed for ever to have
departed from it. Tearing along at full gallop, C/50
Battery under Major Hoggart plunged almost into the
infantry firing line, quickly unlimbered and at 800
yards’ range turned its guns against the foe in Steen-
beek with a rapidity and precision that amazed and
thrilled the infantry. The disgruntled Germans bringing
up a field-gun had the great fortune to wipe out one
team. A/50 Battery, coming up in gallant style, joined
C/50 and their combined fire forced the enemy out
of the village, but owing to the low trajectory our
guns could not touch him in his cleverly chosen
position at the eastern edge of Laaga Cappelle Wood.
Two batteries of the 51st Brigade dashed over the
ridge just in rear of our infantry, but were unable
to come into action because of the hostile shelling of
Steenen Stampkot.

By 3 p.m. the 27th Brigade was concentrated behind
the ridge west of Steenen Stampkot, and the 12th
Royal Scots were sent forward to support the 28th;
but since it was clear that the Germans were occupying
in force a naturally strong position, and that nothing
but a properly organised assault was likely to succeed,
it was decided to postpone the attack until next day,
when the troops would be fresher and more artillery
ammunition available. In the evening, the 28th Brigade
took over a part of the line held by the 26th, thus
making a front of 1200 yards, while the Highlanders
continued to hold the remaining 300 and fully 700
yards of line in Belgian territory. The Third Belgian
Division, under General Joostens, on our left had
fought with admirable courage and élan, and at the end

1918] THE ROYAL SCOTS ATTACK 363

of the day had its right ahead of our left. Ever since
the 28th September the co-operation with King Albert’s
army had been excellent, and the Ninth never desired
on its flanks better troops than the Belgians proved
themselves to be.

Every preparation was now made for the renewal of
the attack. The 28th Brigade A.F.A., which was
again attached to the Division, joined the 50th and
51st Brigades in the line, and two 60-pounder batteries
and three sections of 6-inch howitzers came into
position. “B” and ‘‘C” Companies of the Ninth
Machine-Gun Battalion took up barrage positions on
the ridge south-west of Steenen Stampkot. Zero was
arranged for 9 a.M., because it was impossible to bring
up an adequate supply of ammunition before that hour
and it was essential that the men should have a good
night’s rest. The objective was the same as on the
previous day, and after its capture the Division was
to exploit towards the Lys. The operation was to be
carried out by the 11th and 12th Royal Scots, who were
to pass through the two brigades in the line.

Punctually at 9 a.m. on the 15th the 11th Royal Scots
advanced at the double under a smoke-screen against
Hill 40 to the north, but owing to the exact position
of our forward posts being uncertain the barrage was
placed beyond this hill. The comparatively late hour
of attack and the wonderfully heavy barrage which
the artillery and machine-guns were able to provide,
took the enemy unawares. Nevertheless the 11th
Royal Scots suffered an unexpected jar at the start ;
raking machine-gun fire was opened on them from
the hill behind Laaga Cappelle Wood. But the assail-
ants, adroitly and boldly led, after clearing the wood,
advanced towards Hill 40. The slight delay gave two
machine-gun groups on the Hill time to prepare, and

364 THE OBJECTIVE GAINED ocr, 15

their fire drove the Royal Scots to earth. At this
juncture Corporal Elcock, valiantly braving death,
rushed forward with a Lewis Gun and killed the two
men manning one of the guns, then diving into their
shelter he turned his gun against the other group and
knocked it out. A V.C. was awarded for this heroic
and timely feat, which allowed the whole line to press
on and capture the Hill. On the heels of the 11th
followed Lieut.-Colonel Murray with the 12th Royal
Scots who, after passing the wood, swung south and
ejected the enemy from Steenbeek village and Hill 40
to the south.

The line was then reformed under cover of a
protective barrage put down by our guns on Heule
Wood and Gemeenhof. Resuming the pursuit, the
12th Royal Scots mopped up the enemy posts in Heule
Wood and reached the Snephoek—Heule road, where
a shght pause was made until touch was obtained with
the divisions on the wings, both of which were making
good progress. By 11.30 a.m. the Royal Scot battalions
had won the objective on the Heule—Ingelmunster
Railway, all opposition from trench mortars and machine-
guns having been overcome by the infantry with the
assistance of our forward guns. For a short time our
men on the Railway were harried by two hostile field-
guns, but Captain Brock of the 12th Royal Scots after
a fine piece of stalking shot the crews and captured
the guns.

Behind the 27th Brigade came the 1/Ist Yorks
Cyclists, commanded by Lieut.-Colonel Thomson, and
the 11th Motor Machine-Gun Battery; under the orders
of Brig.-General Croft they now passed through the
infantry. The cyclists displayed extraordinary pluck
and daring, and their close pursuit prevented all chance
of German reorganisation. One company stormed

1918 | WORK OF THE CYCLISTS 365

Stokerij and then pushed on to the Chapel north of
Abeelhoek, where it was finally stopped by machine-
gun fire from the ridge between Abeelhoek and the
Lys. Other cyclists, after occupying Le Chat, dashed
into Cuerne about 2.45 p.m., just as the Germans were
hurriedly evacuating it. There were several skirmishes,
and amongst the victims were two Uhlan officers.
Making for the river, the cyclists came under heavy
machine-gun fire from the east bank of the Lys, and
took up positions covering the southern and eastern
outskirts of Cuerne. A stream of hostile transport was
moving in panic haste along the Courtrai-Harlebeke
road, and the cyclists and the men of the motor
machine - gun battery enjoyed effective shooting at
targets it was almost impossible to miss.

The infantry followed the more mobile groups. A
short distance from the Railway the 27th Brigade had
some trouble on the left, because our immediate
neighbours, the Third Belgian Division, did not advance
at first beyond the objective, as Ingelmunster farther
north had been retaken by a German counter-attack.
Consequently the 11th Royal Scots were enfiladed from
Heetje, and were obliged to attack the village. It was
captured only after a severe fight, and the Royal Scots
were so far delayed that they did not reach the ridge
between Abeelhoek and the Lys till dusk. Their
attempt to storm this position was unsuccessful, but
the Germans withdrew in the course of the night.
Eventually Heetje was taken over from the 27th Brigade
by the Third Belgian Division, whose left wing was
thrown back to the Railway. The aggressiveness of
the enemy near Ingelmunster seemed to point to
a counter-attack from the north-east, so the 28th
Brigade, which had advanced to Cappelle St Catherine
was ordered to be ready to protect our left wing.

366 27TH BRIGADE AT THE LYS [ocr. 16

The situation on this flank improved greatly during the
night, when the Belgians, pressing on, seized Bavichove
and Hulste.

On our right there was not the same anxiety, and
the 12th Royal Scots and 6th K.O.S.B. moved steadily
forward, the leading troops of the former entering
Cuerne between 3 and 4 p.M., and the latter relieving
the cyclists about 6.30 p.m. Cuerne was not in the
Ninth area, but the Twenty-ninth Division had tough
work to clear Heule, and was slightly in rear. It
was known to be moving forward, but the Ninth was
prevented from securing the crossings over the river
that day by the fact that until after dark the situation
on our left was unsatisfactory and on our right uncertain.
The 6th K.O.S.B. and the 11th Royal Scots held the
divisional front during the night.

From the hour in which Ledeghem was captured,
every village disgorged a number of Belgian civilians,
and Cuerne was filled with them. They were warned
that it was dangerous to remain, but stating that the
Germans had promised not to shell Cuerne, the great
majority of them refused to leave their abodes. During
the night the village was heavily gas-shelled by the
enemy, and the sufferings of many of these poor people
must have been dreadful. Posts were pushed close to
the river after dark, but all the bridges had been
destroyed by the enemy.

On the 16th Brig.-General Croft drew up his plans
for forcing the passage of the Lys. Guns, both field
and heavy, were moved into position to cover this
operation, and arrangements were made for the con-
struction of bridges. The 51st Brigade R.F.A. took up
positions on the general line of the Heule-Stokerij
road, each brigade sending forward two guns in close
support, while four howitzers of the 50th Brigade went

1918] CROSSING OF THE K.OS.B. 367

into action in Cuerne. The 28th Brigade A.F.A. was
active in rear of the 50th and 5lst, and twelve 60-
pounders and eight 6-inch howitzers of the 59th R.G.A.
had opened fire by the evening. At 2 P.M. and again at
5 pM. all the Field Artillery Brigades shelled the
Courtrai-Harlebeke road where the K.O.S.B. had
observed numerous parties of Germans, and excellent
work was accomplished by our forward guns in silencing
machine-guns firing from houses in Harlebeke, a large
and substantial village.

Brig.-General Croft’s plan arranged that the river,
about seventy feet wide, should be crossed at two places
simultaneously ; on the left, the 11th Royal Scots with
the aid of the 90th Field Coy. R.E. were to throw
a bridge over the ruins of the Hoogebrug Bridge on
the Harlebeke-Stokerij road and attack the village of
Harlebeke ; on the right, the K.O.S.B. were to pass over
by boats and improvised bridges in the loop of the river
south-east of Cuerne, secure the Courtrai-Harlebeke
Railway with the high ground east of it, and effect
a junction with the 11th Royal Scots at the level-
crossing in Harlebeke.

The attempt was made at 8 p.m. On the left, it was
completely repulsed in spite of the gallant and costly
efforts of the Royal Scots and sappers of the 90th
Field Company, who were swept away by machine-gun
fire at close range. On the right, Lieut.-Colonel Ker
sent three companies across a boat bridge erected by the
sappers of the 64th Field Company. Under a powerful
barrage of H.E. and smoke, the K.O.S.B. scrambled
up the marshy slope of the east bank, and reaching
the Courtrai-Harlebeke road where several Germans
were captured, pushed out towards the Railway.
The left company then moved north towards Harlebeke

but met with obstinate resistance, and the battalion was
2B

368 CROSSING OF THE K.O.S.B. [ocr. 17

ordered to maintain the ground it had won, holding the
loop of the river with an outpost line on the Railway.

A half-hearted counter-stroke during the night
against the right flank garrison of the bridgehead was
easily defeated. Before dawn the Sappers had con-
structed a relief bridge close to the first, and by these
two bridges, two sections of the 9th Machine-gun
Battalion and two platoons of the 2nd Hampshire
Regiment (Twenty-ninth Division) crossed. The left
company of the K.O.S.B., which had suffered severely
in the attempt to force Harlebeke, was relieved by
the reserve company and drawn back to the west of
the Lys.

Owing to the failure on the left the operation had
fallen short of complete success. It was suggested that
the rest of the brigade should be taken over the river
during the hours of darkness by the K.O.S.B. bridges,
and an assault made on Harlebeke at dawn with a view
to extending the bridgehead, but it was ultimately
decided to consolidate the ground that had been gained.
Our position on the east of the river could hardly be
considered satisfactory, and it was doubtful if under
the conditions of modern war it could be regarded as
a bridgehead in the true sense of the term, since the
enemy's guns in Harlebeke commanded the river and
were in a position to demolish the bridges when daylight
came; in fact, if the Germans had possessed a tithe
of the spirit that animated them before April there
would have been good reason to dread the utter
destruction of our forces on the east of the Lys. The
attempt was made because it was evident that the
enemy's moral was on the wane.

The 17th October was a day of acute anxiety.
At 5.10 a.m. the Germans barraged the Courtrai-
Harlebeke road and a few minutes later their infantry

1918] COUNTER-ATTACK DEFEATED 369

advanced to the attack. The centre of the K.O.S.B.
was pierced and four machine-guns were knocked
out, but the flanks held firm and a timely bayonet
charge by the reserve of the right company under
Captain White put the enemy to flight. At the same
time the centre company was rallied by Major
McDiarmid of the 9th Machine-gun Battalion, who
had swum the river under heavy fire, and it reoccupied
its position. On the first news of the attack two
companies of the 12th Royal Scots, who had been
warned to be ready to reinforce, crossed the river
with fine steadiness under intense artillery-fire which
speedily sank both bridges. This addition to the
garrison now made our position on the east bank
reasonably secure ; for the dismal failure of the enemy’s
counter-stroke showed clearly that he was losing heart.
Over thirty dead Germans were counted after the
bayonet charge, and of those who fled many were
shot down by our riflemen and Lewis Gunners.

But though the attack had been brilliantly repulsed
and was not renewed, the position of the K.O.8.B. and
the Royal Scots caused Brig.-General Croft the keenest
concern. The slightest movement provoked machine-
gun fire, and as both bridges had been sunk the men
could be neither reinforced nor withdrawn during day-
light without enormous losses and the risk of virtual
annihilation. Nevertheless it was necessary to keep the
garrison supplied with ammunition and rations, and two
platoons of the 12th Royal Scots, in single file, work-
ing their way along the wreckage of the bridges and
wading over their waists in water under a constant
fusilade of bullets, crossed the river with supplies
of ammunition. In similar fashion, runners succeeded
in maintaining communication between the troops on
both sides of the Lys. Aeroplanes were also employed

370 THE BRIDGEHEAD ABANDONED [ocr.

and carried over abundant rations and ammunition,
which they dropped by means of parachutes. Thus
with ample provisions the men on the east bank were
in good heart, and later when they were withdrawn
they declared that they had never been so well fed
in all their previous war experience.

About noon instructions were received from the
II. Corps to make no further attempt to establish
bridgeheads across the Lys. Our efforts were to be
devoted to the reconnaissance of suitable crossing
places and to the collection of bridging material. If
it were practicable the K.O.S.B. bridgehead was to
be maintained, and this matter was left to the discre-
tion of the G.O.C. But since the Ninth was now to
take over the front north of Hoogebrug as far as the
junction of the Vaarneuykbeek with the Lys north-
east of Bavichove, the decision as to the bridgehead
was left to the Twenty-ninth Division, which relieved
our troops on the east bank after dusk by means of
boats and bridges constructed by the Sappers of the
63rd Field Company. Brig.-General Freyburg, who
went over in person, decided to abandon the bridge-
head, and the 27th Brigade on being drawn back was
concentrated in the vicinity of Laaga Cappelle Wood.

_ The operations’ in Flanders had fully realised the
expectations of Marshal Foch and Sir Douglas Haig.
The enemy was obliged to relinquish his grip on the
Flanders coast and to withdraw his forces to the
neighbourhood of Ghent, and farther south he was
compelled to abandon Lille on the 17th October and
soon after the industrial centres of Tourcoing and

1 These earned another “mention” for the Division. ‘In these success-
ful operations the Ninth Division, forming part of the command of General
Jacobs’ II. Corps, has again fought with great distinction.”

(Extract from official Communiqué, 16th October.)

1918] ARRANGEMENTS FOR CROSSING 371

Roubaix. It was necessary to follow up our successes
and to press our advantage. Accordingly preparations
were made on the 18th and 19th for crossing the
Lys on a large scale, and the night of the 19th/20th
was fixed for the attempt. New gun positions were
selected and ammunition brought up, and the 26th
and 28th Brigades with the Sappers reconnoitred all
possible crossings.

The boundary between the Ninth and the Twenty-
ninth Division stretched from Hoogebrug-south of
Ingoyghem—to the Scheldt south of Trappelstraat.
On our left was the Thirty-sixth, which had relieved
the Third Belgian Division, and the boundary on this
flank ran from the junction of the Plaatsbeek and the
Lys — south of Beveren — north of Vichte and Ingoyghem
—to the Scheldt north-west of Berchem. Our first
objective was the line running north-east and south-
west about 500 yards east of the Lys, and the attack
was to be carried out by the 26th and 28th Brigades.
Divisions were allowed to choose their own time for
crossing the river and securing this objective, but all
had to be ready to take part in a general advance from
it ab 6 A.M. on the 20th. The objective for the next
advance was the St Louis— Vichte road, but, if the
army on our left did not move forward, then the line
St Louis—Belgiek about four miles from the Lys.

The Sappers of the 63rd and 64th Field Companies,
assisted by two companies of the Pioneers, were re-
sponsible for the bridging and ferrying arrangements
on the front of the Ninth. Each field company was
to throw two single duckboard barrel bridges suffi-
ciently strong to take infantry in file, and to launch
and navigate two half pontoons and three rafts, each
capable of taking eight men. Lieut.-Colonel Hickling’s
task was far from enviable; all the pontoons of the

372 ARRANGEMENTS FOR CROSSING [ocr. 20

Division were at the bottom of the Lys and all the
material to make bridges had to be collected without
delay. Since on our front the left bank of the river
was exposed for a distance of several hundreds of
yards, it was impossible to place the bridging material
in position before dark. As it was calculated that our
preparations would not be completed till 11 p.M., this
was the hour arranged for the launching of the pontoons
and rafts. The Ninth and Twenty-ninth Divisions
agreed to go over simultaneously, but the Thirty-sixth
decided to cross earlier. The first troops were to be
ferried over, and it was hoped that the light bridges
would be ready by 11.15 P.M.

In effecting the passage of the leading troops,
surprise’ was of course aimed at, and for that reason no
artillery-fire was to open until 11.15 p.m., though forward
guns were to be prepared to fire at point-blank range
at two farms, which being near the crossings might
be troublesome. From 11.15 p.m. to 11.45 P.M. an
artillery barrage, thickened by machine-guns, was to
be put down to cover the forming-up of the infantry
on the line of the Harlebeke—Beveren road, after which
it was to move forward to a line in front of the first
objective. In order to avoid close range machine-
gun fire from the houses in Harlebeke, no passage was
to be attempted south of the junction of the Vaarneuyk-
beek and the Lys, and an enfilade smoke - barrage was
to blind the northern end of the village while the cross-
ing was being effected. In the afternoon the various
(dlivisions were ordered by the Corps to accelerate the
passage of the river; in the case of the Ninth this
was impossible, but the Twenty-ninth and Thirty-sixth
both went over before the hour originally fixed.

' This however was practically impossible when the crossing was not to
be carried out simultaneously by the attacking divisions.

1918] THE LYS CROSSED 373

The enemy’s bombing planes and artillery were
uncommonly active during the evening and Stokerij
and Heetje, important centres of communication, were
subjected to concentrations of gas-shell at intervals
and to steady harassing fire from 9 to 11.30 p.m. There
was also considerable shelling of our forward areas,
due probably to the alarm caused by the crossing of
the divisions on our flanks, The enemy was thoroughly
roused, and with his guns and trench mortars fired
vigorously but somewhat aimlessly on our bank of
the river.

On our right the Camerons were the first to go
over, two companies passing on to the first objective
while the remainder mopped up MHarlebeke. The
Seaforths followed, coming up on the left of the
Camerons. On the sector of the 28th Brigade the
enemy's fire was heavy and accurate; one bridge was
broken and the other badly damaged, while both
pontoons were holed and the launching of the rafts
was delayed. The casualties sustained and the con- —
fusion caused were undoubtedly due to the fact that a
simultaneous crossing by all the attacking divisions had
not been arranged. Nevertheless the “Rifles” and Royal
Scots Fusiliers were concentrated on the right bank
of the river half an hour after midnight. This very
creditable achievement under continuous fire was a
convincing demonstration of the fine discipline and
resource of the infantry and sappers concerned. By
1 a.m. the Thirty-sixth Division had two battalions over
the Lys and the Twenty-ninth one, a second having
been stayed by machine-gun fire. Though the two
attacking battalions of the 28th Brigade had crossed,
they experienced so much difficulty in securing con-
nection with each other and with the Thirty-sixth
Division that for several hours it was uncertain

374 PROGRESS OF THE ATTACK [ocr.

if it would be possible to continue the advance at
6 a.M.; but by 5.15 a.m. all four of our front line
battalions were in touch with one another on the
first objective except on the left, where our line was
about 300 yards behind, owing to the resistance of
Beveren.

Both brigades moved forward at 6 A.M. on the 20th
under cover of a barrage of H.E. and smoke. The Royal
Scots Fusiliers had a brisk engagement at Beveren,
which they helped the men of the Thirty-sixth Division
to master, but apart from this there was little opposition
at the start. By 8 a.m. Deerlyck fell into our hands,
and as soon as the barrage ceased, the 7th Motor
Machine-gun Brigade and the 1/1st Yorks Cyclists,
who had been ferried across on rafts, passed through the
infantry. The machine-gun brigade and two companies
of the cyclists moving straight down the Deerlyck—
Vichte road entered Belgiek, but were brought to a
standstill a short distance beyond it by machine-gun
fire. Another cyclist company, taking the road running
south-east from Vichte, captured 4 field-guns, 40
prisoners and much material, knocked out the team
of another ficld-gun who were attempting to escape,
and finally took up a position on the St Louis-Vichte
road. Other cyclists on our left wing compelled the
enemy to abandon a heavy howitzer near Knock and
drove him into the village; four more heavy howitzers
were afterwards found abandoned just south of Belgiek
cross roads.

It was on the wings that the infantry had most
trouble. The country over which the Highlanders had
to progress was marshy and in parts flooded, but by
9.30 a.m. they had reached the Railway where a German
field-cun engaged them at close range. Two guns how-
ever of the machine-gun hattery went to their assist-

1918] PROGRESS OF THE ATTACK 375

ance, and a steady advance was maintained despite
ever-increasing opposition. Meantime the Sappers had
completed a pontoon bridge south-east of Bavichove,
and by 9.50 a.m. one battery of the 50th Brigade
R.F.A., followed by the mobile medium trench mortars
and later by the rest of the divisional artillery, had
crossed the Lys. At 10.30 a.m. both the 26th and 28th
Brigades were believed to be on their objective and a
further advance was ordered to be made at 12.30 P.M.
By that time German resistance had stiffened. St
Louis was in our hands, but the 26th Brigade was
being subjected to flanking fire from the Wolfsberg,
which our gunners dared not shell as they did not
know the exact position of the troops of the Twenty-
ninth Division, in whose area it was. In the centre,
Vichte Station was captured after stubborn fighting
by the Newfoundlanders, and this gave rise to an
erroneous report that the village, which lay 1000 yards
to the east of it, was also in our possession. As a
matter of fact a company and a half of the Royal Scots
Fusiliers’ did force their way into that village but were
surrounded, and it is significant of the moral of the
enemy,that he did not venture to press his advantage.
Some of our men broke through the German cordon
after dark; others sheltered in cellars with the Belgian
civilians until the village was taken two days later,
when they rejoined their battalion. A French force
was now on the left of the Second Army, but on this
day it made such slow progress that the Thirty-sixth
Division was compelled to hold a very extended line,
stretching from Straate to the Gaverbeek north-west
of Belgiek, and this strain on the Thirty-sixth inevitably

1 Major King who was commanding the Royal Scots Fusiliers was
wounded near Belgiek, and the command of the battalion was taken over
by Captain J. S. Glass.

-

376 ATTACK OF 27th BRIGADE ON 22nn __[ocr. 22

reacted on our left wing, which was much exposed. On
our right the Twenty-ninth Division, being held up,
was consolidating on the line St Louis—Krote—Pont
Levis No. 2, while the division on its right was some
distance behind it.

To allow the units on the flanks to come up in
line with them, the Ninth and Twenty-ninth Divisions
undertook no operations on the 21st. The sector
occupied by the Ninth was a very unpleasant one as
it was overlooked by the enemy, who shelled one farm
after another, devoting, it seemed, particular attention
to those occupied by Brigade and Battalion H.Q. The
12th Royal Scots were unlucky enough to lose their
popular and gallant adjutant, Captain McKinley, who
was hit by three successive shells. On the night of
the 2ist/22nd the Twenty-ninth Division took over
St Louis from the 26th Brigade, which was now able
to hold its reduced front with the Black Watch alone.
On the same night the 27th relieved the 28th Brigade
with the 12th Royal Scots.

The objectives of the Ninth for the 22nd were
Vichte, Hill 50, and Ingoyghem, and the assault was to
be delivered by the 11th Royal Scots and 6th K.O.S.B.
at 9 a.M. The former were to clear Vichte and Hill 50,
at which point the latter were to pass through and
exploit in the direction of Ingoyghem. The Highland
Brigade was ordered to be ready to support the attack
and was concentrated north-east of the St Louis—Vichte
road.

There was delay at the start, and some confusion
was caused by a dense fog produced by hostile gas-
shelling and by the smoke of our barrage drifting
back on the infantry. The fog however blinded the
Germans in Vichte, and the 11th Royal Scots entering
the village surprised the garrison and then moved on

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pepouar and gallant adjatant, Captain Meclaudey, whe
wits Int by three sueces-ive shells. On the nicht of
the 2ist/22nd the Poaecary-eninth Division took over
St Louts from the {oc Bricade, which was now aide
to hold its reduced fropt witb the Black Wateh alone.
On the same night the 27th relieved the 2sth Brigade
with the Tzth Peyal Seots.

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Viehte, Piet oc) and Tngoyehem, and the assault was to
bedoken ony the Lith Roval Seots and 6th KOS.
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1918] HILL 50 CAPTURED 377

towards Hill 50; a few posts were missed but these
were accounted for by the K.O.S.B. On leaving
the village the Royal Scots came under heavy fire
from Klijtberg and Hill 50 and were checked. For
a time the situation was very obscure, and Lieut.-
Colonel Ker, who had led his battalion along the rail-
way to the bridge south-east of Vichte, had the greatest
difficulty in ascertaining the whereabouts of the leading
Royal Scots. Our gunners exhibited once more the
daring that had characterised their efforts throughout
the advance, and the guns of B/50 Battery were already
in action east of the village. Boldly reconnoitring on
horseback Captain Andrews located a farm near Hill
50 from which the enemy was firing, and suggested
to Lieut.-Colonel Ker, who had already ascertained
that Hill 50 was firmly held by the Germans, that
covered by the fire of the gunners his battalion should
assault the Hill. This was done, and shortly after noon
the K.O.S.B. stormed Hill 50. But any movement
towards Ingoyghem was out of the question; losses
had been heavy and the hostile machine-gun fire from
the village and buildings near it was accurate and
severe.

The Black Watch, who were now temporarily
attached to the 27th Brigade, filled a gap of 1000
yards between its right and the left of the Twenty-ninth
Division at the end of the day’s fighting. By nightfall
our line ran from the road junction a mile east of
St Louis to Hill 50, and thence to the south-east of
the Klijtberg, and the troops were in touch with the
divisions on both flanks. There were rumours of a
German retirement in the north, but on our front the
enemy showed great activity and bombarded our area
savagely from time to time with gas. The Twenty-
ninth Division was now relieved by the Forty-first, and

378 THE LAST OPERATION ON 25TH [ocr.

the 27th Brigade by the 26th ~~ 28th Brigades on the
night of the 24th/25th.

At 9 A.M. on the 25th the 26th and 28th Brigades
with the Camerons, Seaforths, Royal Scots Fusiliers,’
and the ‘“Rifles’’ in line, resumed the operations
against the Ooteghem-Ingoyghem Ridge in conjunction
with the Forty-first and Thirty-sixth Divisions. The
attack was made under cover of a creeping barrage
of smoke and H.E., which was more intense than usual
because our artillery had been augmented by the 17th
Brigade R.F.A. (Twenty-ninth Division) ; two companies
of the 9th Machine-gun Battalion and one company
of the 104th Machine-gun Battalion also supported the
infantry by firing concentrations on certain points and
by barraging roads in rear of the enemy’s position.
The German artillery-fire had been so violent during
the evening that four gun teams of a company of the
9th Battalion were completely wiped out before the
attack commenced.

On the fall of the barrage our infantry immediately
dashed forward but met with most stubborn opposition.
The enemy seemed resolved to dispute every inch of
ground, and shortly after zero he put down a fierce
counter-barrage on our leading troops and swept the
ranks of the 28th Brigade with gusts of machine-gun
fire; but in spite of grave losses the infantry made
headway and by 10.30 a.M. some of them were on the
objective from Klein Ronsse Hill to the Chapel near
Ingoyghem. But all the ground had not been cleared ;
every farm with its steading was a centre of resistance
and furious conflicts were being waged in rear of
the objective. The leadership was excellent. Brig.-

1 On the 23rd Lieut.-Colonel R. Campbell, D.8.O., who had seen a
great deal of service with the Fifty-first Division, took over the command
of the battalion.

1918] A PATROL AT THE SCHELDT 379

General Hore Ruthven and Brig.-General Jack were
constantly in the stormiest parts of their sectors.
Lieut.-Colonel Campbell of the Royal Scots Fusiliers
was ubiquitous; clad in his jerkin, since the day was
warm though the night had been cold, he was perspiring
profusely from the kit he carried, his rapid pace, the
distance he had covered, and the discomfort of one or
two nasty crawls, but he seemed to be absolutely
tireless. On our left the Thirty-sixth Division had
failed to carry the slopes of Kleineberg, and word was
received that the right division had also been checked.
It was therefore inadvisable to press on from the ridge
and the infantry were commanded to consolidate the
ground which they had won at no slight cost.

Our gains had been substantial ; they comprised the
entire Ooteghem—Ingoyghem Ridge, the last command-
ing position in the Ninth’s area of operations. During
the afternoon and evening our position was subjected
to galling artillery and machine-gun fire from the east
and north-east. The enemy clung tenaciously to the
Kleineberg, from which an attack by the Thirty-sixth
Division at 5 p.m. failed to dislodge him. During the
night of the 25th/26th the Germans surrendered their
last hold on Ooteghem and a patrol of the Camerons
pushing past Klooster Hoek and Langestraat gained
the banks of the Scheldt at Waermaerde; on its return
it met and attacked a party of the enemy, driving it out
of Okkerwijk. On the left patrols of the 28th Brigade
went out but could not make much progress since the
enemy still occupied Meulewijk and Bergwijk, which
dominated all the country east of Ingoyghem.

The men were keen to follow up their victory, but
they had now reached the limit of physical endurance.
Our losses, though insignificant compared with the
results achieved, had been serious, for practically no

380 WORK OF THE DIVISION [ocr. 25

reinforcements had arrived to fill up gaps. There had
been no contraction of front to balance our diminishing
numbers and consequently each successive advance
entailed increasing effort. On the 25th October
battalions could muster scarcely 200 bayonets, and
daily it was becoming more doubtful if the Division
would have sufficient weight to carry it forward against
anything like a resolute defence. Hence the weakness
of the units and the exhaustion of the men rendered
it desirable, if not necessary, to withdraw the whole
Division for a rest; and its relief by the Thirty-first
Division took place on the nights of the 26th/27th and
27th/28th, when it went back to the area near Harle-
beke and Cuerne.

This was the last operation of the Division in the
war. Since the 28th September it had covered over
twenty-six miles of ground and advanced from Ypres
to the banks of the Scheldt. It had captured over
2600 prisoners and many guns,’ but the trophies gained
were more numerous than were recorded; the advance
was so rapid that there was no opportunity of making
a proper search of the battlefield. And our losses
suffered during this amazing march, involving constant
fighting, amounted to only 188 officers and 3604 other
ranks, just 1000 more than the number of prisoners
captured. It was certainly the most spectacular of
the Ninth’s many successes. Throughout the advance
the admirable co-operation of all branches of the
Division had been the principal factor in contributing to
this glorious result. The spirit of the Division was
nowhere more typified than in the personal example
of General Tudor and his staff, Lieut.-Colonel Mudie,
the G.S.O.I., with his thoughtful, cool head, and
Lieut.-Colonel Jeffcoat, the A.A. & Q.M.G., with his

1 Prisoners captured, 54 officers, 2555 other ranks ; guns captured, 64.

1918] - WORK OF THE DIVISION 381

typically exact ‘“Q” arrangements. The G.O.C. during
the battles was invariably in or very near the front
line, at the top of imsecure church spires survey-
ing the landscape, or on horseback in shelled areas,
and could always decide with personal knowledge.
Incorrigibly dapper, he was invariably calm, quiet,
human, and entirely regardless of his own safety; it
was no wonder that the Division trusted him implicitly.
In similar fashion Brig.-Generals Hore Ruthven, Croft,
and Jack were never far from the hottest encounters
and the ready judgment of these experienced officers
was of the utmost value to the G.O.C. The leading
of the infantry had been daring and skilful, while
the men responded to every demand of their officers
with unfailing cheerfulness and determination. As had
always been the case in the Ninth, infantry and gunners ~
worked splendidly together, and the former will never
forget the intrepid dash of the latter who assisted them
with such admirable and dexterous promptitude. Nor
must the assiduous though less showy efforts of the
Sappers, the Pioneers, the R.A.M.C., and A.S.C. go
unmentioned ; its very best work was freely given by
each branch and was necessary for the common success.

CHAPTER XVII

CONCLUSION

281tn Ocroser 1918 to 15TH Marcu 1919

AT the beginning of November 1918 Germany stood
alone against her enemies. The tottering empire of
Austria soon shared the fate of Bulgaria and Turkey.
The Italian armies, which during the critical summer
months had remained inactive, in the late autumn
hastened to join in the general onslaught against the
crumbling resistance of the Central European States.
On the 23rd October the offensive began, and four
days later the Piave was crossed by British and Italian
forces. As a result of this blow the mouldering edifice
of the Hapsburg dominions immediately collapsed, and
on the 38rd November Austria’ accepted the armistice
terms of General Diaz.

The military position of Germany was utterly hope-
less. While maintaining for a time her grasp on the
Meuse against the Americans, she was wholly unable
to arrest the progress of the British armies on the
northern wing of the far-flung battle front. In the
Battles of the Selle, 17th to 25th October, the British

1 Near the end of October a staff officer of the Ninth went to the
Divisional Signals Office to tind out if there was any news. The answer
was “Yes, sir, Austria has thrown in her ‘mit.’” It was thus that a
phlegmatic Scottish soldier announced the fall of the ancient Empire of
the Hapsburgs, the oldest reigning family in Europe and heirs of the

Holy Roman Empire!
882

Nov. 1918] A REVIEW BY KING ALBERT 383

forced the passage of the river, and advanced to the
line of the Sambre. Bankrupt of hope and device |
Ludendorff surrendered to the logic of events, and
resigned on the 26th October. Surmounting their com-
missariat difficulties the Americans broke the enemy
line on the southern flank of the battle, and this disaster
destroyed all chance of the German army being safely
withdrawn behind the Rhine for the protection of the
Fatherland. The Allied forces were rapidly converging
on the hostile lines of communication, and after the
great British victory of the 4th November, when the
Sambre was crossed and large numbers of prisoners
were captured, the retreat developed into a rout.
Though the pursuit was retarded by difficulties of
transport owing to roads and railways having been
mined by the enemy, it was beyond doubt that but
for the Armistice on the 11th November the German
forces would have been compelled ignominiously to
lay down their arms. The Armistice was in fact a
capitulation.

During these fateful days the Ninth was reorganis-
ing near Harlebeke. After a short spell of rest the
troops recovered their wonted vigour and the drawn,
haggard look disappeared from the faces of officers
and men. On the 5th November the whole Division
was reviewed by H.M. the King of the Belgians. After
the ceremony H.M. the Queen of the Belgians requested
General Tudor to cut from his sleeve the divisional sign
(a silver thistle on a blue background); he did so, and
then she pinned it on her breast. Ever after the G.O.C.
wore only one badge. Every preparation was made
for the Division to return to the front line, but as
the days passed it became increasingly doubtful if it
would see any more fighting; for it was known that
the Germans were negotiating for terms, and even the

2c

384 THE ARMISTICE [Nov.

consistent pessimists of all ranks admitted that there was
a chance of the war being finished before Christmas.
The spread of social agitation within the Fatherland
and the flight of the Kaiser to Holland on the 9th
November made it impossible for the enemy to do
anything but surrender. On the evening of the 10th
the news filtered through to the men that Germany
had accepted the Armistice terms and that hostilities
were to cease on the next day at 11 a.m. The event
occasioned the wildest rejoicings and all units in the
Division celebrated it by a special divine service on
the 11th.

During the following days camp gossip was chiefly
concerned with the question as to which British divisions
would have the honour of marching through Germany
to the bridgehead, which in accordance with the terms
of the Armistice was to be formed across the Rhine.
There was great jubilation when it became known
that the Ninth had been chosen as the left division
of the Army of Occupation. It was the only division
of the New Armies to take part in the triumphal
march.

The march began on the 14th November. Until
the 4th December our route lay through the occupied
portion of Belgium, and the troops received an
exuberant welcome from the officials and inhabitants
of the villages and towns through which they passed.
Usually the main streets were spanned by arches
gaudily decorated with streamers and the flags of the
Allies. Here and there effigies clad in the familiar
field-grey and suspended from gibbets, revealed clearly
the intense hatred of the Belgians for the vanquished
foe. The liberated people frequently evinced a childish
delight in displaying the ornaments, goods and wines
which they had succeeded. in concealing from the

1918] THE TRIUMPHAL MARCH 385

invaders during the four years of war. Every place
gave evidence of the universal respect and affection of
the people for their heroic monarch, and there were
tremendous rejoicings when on the 22nd November
King Albert made his formal entry into the capital.
On that occasion the Division was represented by
the massed pipers of the Highland Brigade and a
company of the same brigade, with platoons from
each of the three battalions and the 9th Seaforths.
Officers and men were also given an opportunity of
visiting the city, and so overwhelming was the welcome
of the citizens that they had the greatest difficulty
in tearing themselves away from the attractions of
Brussels.

On the 4th December the Ninth left the friendly
soil of Belgium and entered the unravaged territory
of the enemy, most of the battalions passing the
boundary post to the tune of “ A’ the Blue Bonnets
are over the Border.” The atmosphere here was icy
compared with that of Belgium. A few of the German
civilians, well versed in military customs, tested the
temper of the men by attempting to break through the
ranks, but so rough and unpleasant were their experi-
ences that they found few imitators. Apart from this
show of bravado there was no expression of hostility.
Several of the inhabitants showed signs of terror,
evidently anticipating reprisals for the outrages which
their soldiers had committed in Belgium and in
France, but they were soon reassured when it became
apparent that our men were neither vindictive nor
malicious. Some of our wilder spirits regarded German
shops and cafés as places that might be legitimately
looted, but that practice was peremptorily repressed,
and as a whole the troops showed the same scrupulous
regard for the property of the enemy as for that of

386 CROSSING OF THE RHINE [DEc.

their allies." Owing to the Revolution in Germany
and the consequent collapse of regular government,
riots broke out in the large towns, and in order to
save Cologne the 28th Brigade was sent up there by
rail at the request of the German authorities. The
stately city of the Rhine was reached by the remainder
of the Division on the 9th and J0th December.

Here three days were spent in cleaning up kit and
polishing brass; then on the 13th December the Ninth
crossed the Rhine by the boat bridge at Mulheim.
Several of the units had to march a long way to reach
the starting-point, and there was slight confusion which
was regrettable, as it was the intention of our authorities
to impress’ the enemy with our discipline and organisa-
tion. The salute was taken by the British Military
Governor, Sir Charles Fergusson, but the ceremony
was spoiled by the torrents of rain which descended
all day. By the 15th the Division had taken up its
position on the perimeter of the bridgehead near
Solingen, Wald, and Haan, D.H.Q. being established
at Ohligs.

Thirty-two days had been spent in proceeding from
Harlebeke to the perimeter. On fifteen of them no
advance was made in order to allow the Supply Services
to bring up rations and stores which had to be conveyed
by motor lorries since all the railways had been
damaged. During the other days, an average of 114
miles per day was covered; the total distance was
193 miles.

It was eminently desirable that the men should

1 The fact that some Germans were relieved of their watches may have
been due to a custom that had sprung up during four years of war, or to
some confusion of mind about the “ Watch on the Rhine ”!

2 The sight of a ficld ambulance racing through the streets of Cologne,
with the R.A.M.C. men running breathlessly behind it, in order to reach
its position in time is believed to have enormously impressed the citizens.

1918] BRIDGEHEAD DUTIES 387

realise in some tangible form that they had won the
war. Only first-rate billets were accepted, and burgo-
masters and their staffs were badgered until these
buildings were satisfactorily equipped with beds, cook-
ing ranges, and up-to-date sanitary arrangements.
Halls were taken over for concerts and reading-rooms,
and cinematographs were run for the entertainment
of the men. Parties were granted permission to visit
Cologne, and every unit was given an allotment of
tickets for the Opera House; but the boon most
cherished by the men was the liberty to travel by
tram or rail without payment. If there was little
friendliness between the troops and the inhabitants,
there was practically no friction, and the discipline of
the soldiers and the fairness of their behaviour were
gratefully acknowledged by the townspeople. The
first great difficulty of ‘“Q” was the provision of the
Christmas dinner. Germany had barely sufficient food
to feed her own people, and supplies had to be drawn
from the rear areas. Unfortunately as the railway
system over the devastated regions required a great
deal of repair to put it in good working order, the
provisions were delayed, but luckily they turned up
in time for the 1st January, an appropriate date for
a Scottish Division.

Bridgehead duties were not onerous. The troops
certainly enjoyed the power of being able to subject
the Germans to restrictions which they themselves
had for more than four years imposed on Belgian
and French people. The inhabitants were forbidden
to be out of doors between 9 p.m. and 6 A.M. without
a pass. In the small hours of the Ist January, a
Royal Scot officer was proceeding to his billet after
the Hogmanay celebrations when he met a civilian
in the streets of Haan. This open disregard of our

388 BRIDGEHEAD DUTIES [pFc. 1918-

regulations was not to be tolerated, and the officer
curtly asked the German for his pass; he was com-
pletely nonplussed by the bland query—‘“Is it not
that we are permitted to circulate after 6 a.M.?”

Certain specified goods were not allowed to be
taken across our frontier, and our most exacting task
was the repression of smuggling. All sorts of ingenious
devices were resorted to, but they were quickly
detected as our men gained experience. The craft of
Teutonic and Jewish traders in exploiting the innate
chivalry of the British soldier by using their women-
folk to convey prohibited goods, the British authorities
countered by sending up officers of the W.A.A.C. and
soon it became as difficult to smuggle goods past our
posts as it is to deceive the Customs officials at Dover.
Periodic raids were made upon trains, and while
W.A.A.C. officers searched the German women
the troops searched the men and explered the engine
and compartments; usually a surprising amount of
contraband was brought to light, on one occasion
several cases of whisky being found under the coals
in an engine tender.

The defect of the Teuton is that as a rule he has
no sense of humour, but he had one good score against
us. A report from a German source reached our
authorities to the effect that a certain citizen of Wald
was manufacturing air bombs. The secret manufacture
of munitions within our area was of course forbidden,
and a party of soldiers of the 27th Brigade raided the
offender’s house. He was found to be a paralytic
old gentleman, unable to move about, and a thorough
search of his premises failed to disclose any sign of
the bombs. Ultimately the officer in charge asked
him where he stored his weapons. At first the old
man looked puzzled, then light seemed to dawn on

MARCH 1919] DEMOBILISATION 389

him and he directed the party to a small cabinet in a
drawer of which lay the air bombs. The feelings of
the officer on picking one up can be better imagined
than described; it consisted of a tiny pole with a
paper flag attached to a small leaden contrivance which,
when fitted with a cap of the sort used to discharge
toy pistols and dropped on the ground, caused the flag
to rise gently into the air to a height of over ten feet.
Those who infringed our regulations were tried by
a summary court presided over by an officer of field
rank. The maximum fine which such a court could
impose was 7000 marks, and the maximum period of
imprisonment was six months. All accused had the
right of appeal to the Military Governor, and the
more serious cases were tried by a special court
equivalent to a court-martial. The fines and penalties
depended upon the gravity which the officer ascribed
to a particular offence, and naturally throughout the area
of occupation there was for a time considerable dis-
crepancy between the penalties imposed for the’ same
kind of offence. Gradually only officers with legal
training were placed over these courts, and a regulated
scale for each particular type of offence was laid down.
Demobilisation was the question of greatest moment
for one and all. Having viewed the enemy’s country,
officers and men were eager to return as soon as
possible to their civilian occupations. There would
have been practically no trouble if a definite scheme
had been issued, and a date assigned for the com-
mencement of demobilisation. But demobilisation was
begun at once, with the result that many soldiers who
had seen little or no active service were demobilised
either because they happened to be at home on leave at
the time, or because they were classified as “ pivotal.”
The “pivotal” clause was grossly abused, and under this

390 EDUCATION [MARCH 15

pretext mere youths of eighteen years of age, who
had never heard a gun fired in anger, were allowed to
go home. Such anomalies created much restiveness
and irritation among the older men, and not until
they were removed and a smooth-working system
devised was the general discontent allayed.

The military authorities acted with tact and
sympathy. Training was mostly recreational with a
view to keeping the men interested and in good health.
After a time those waiting for demobilisation were
collected in special camps and separated from those
who were to form part of the Army of Occupation.
Education was a useful safety-valve during the period
of irritation; it kept the men employed and was
probably more congenial to them than ceremonial
drill. Owing to lack of trained teachers and constant
changes of personnel it could scarcely be said that the
standard of instruction within units was very high,
but all who were really anxious to study were taken
from the various units and concentrated in the Ninth
Divisional College, where the best teaching ability
at the disposal of the Division was available. This
College was opened at Ohligs before the end of
December 1918, and there much excellent work was
carried out.

In the month of February Colours were presented to
the various Service Battalions; to those of the 26th
Brigade at Solingen by General Plumer, to the 27th
at Wald, and to the 28th at Benrath by General Jacob.
The Division preserved its identity till the 15th March
1919, but long before that date the vast majority of the
officers and men who had fought with it had been
demobilised. After the 15th, divisions were reformed
under different designations. When the well-tried and
trusted leaders of the Ninth were transferred to other

1919] THE “NINTH” DISSOLVED 391

posts and new and unfamiliar officers took command it
was Clear that a new era had begun. The units of the
Highland Brigade were transferred to another division
and battalions who had not shared in the Ninth’s
brotherhood of arms took their place.

The history of the Ninth Division ends with the
formal disappearance of its title on the 15th March.
In the chronicle of its achievements attention is
inevitably focussed mainly on the doings of the
infantry and the gunners. But just as a _ good
Quartermaster is a blessing to his battalion, though
his name rarely occurs in the story of its battles,
a division cannot expect to be successful without
efficient “Q” and administrative work. The Ninth
had good reason to be proud of its special branches,
the Sappers, Pioneers, R.A.M.C., A.S.C., and Ord-
nance; their skilled help, generously given, was a factor
of first-rate importance in giving the Division its
prominent name among the British forces in France.
Their work was assiduous and unremitting and was
often carried on under conditions of great strain and
extreme peril, particularly in the case of the Sappers,
Pioneers, and R.A.M.C. A more trying ordeal can
scarcely be imagined than that of digging under a
heavy bombardment. The preparations for every battle
involved an enormous amount of toil on the part of the
Pioneers and the Sappers, and a slight idea of it may
be gathered from the summary of their preparations
prior to the 9th April 1917 given in Appendix VI.

The Ninth was exceptionally fortunate in its “Q”
Branch ; no division could have had more efficient or
painstaking officers than Lieut.-Colonel McHardy and
Lieut.-Colonel Jeffcoat. Details were worked out with
a precision and care that ensured success, and a promise
of ‘“Q” was equivalent to a fulfilment. Even when the

392 “Q” AND ORDNANCE

Division was encamped in the most desolate regions
“*Q” was able in a surprisingly short space of time to
furnish baths, laundries, changes of clothing, and all the
other comforts that helped to make the war endurable,
and its arrangements for the transference of the troops
from one spot to another were such as to cause the
minimum of discomfort and inconvenience to the men.
Ever since the time of Lieut.-Colonel McHardy, “Q”
showed the same concern for the welfare of units
attached to the Ninth as for its own troops. This
system was carried on and expanded by Lieut.-Colonel
Jeffcoat, and the most convincing testimony of its value
was that A.F.A. Brigades liked to be attached to the
Division.

The unit that had perhaps most reason to complain
that the worth of its labours was never fully appreciated
by the infantry was the Ordnance Department, which,
consisting of an officer and 13 men, had to satisfy the
needs of 16,000 men, 3750 horses and mules, and
numerous vehicles and bicycles, in everything except
food, light, and fuel. The excellence of the work
performed by this Branch was largely the explanation
why it was so much taken for granted ; if it had proved
less competent in furnishing and repairing munitions it
would have been better though less favourably known
to the infantry. The Ordnance people averred that
they toiled harder than any other section in the
Division; when units were in the line they were
busy meeting their fighting needs and when they
were out they were busier still re-equipping them.
Undoubtedly a vast amount of very useful work was
done by the Ordnance and some idea of it may be
gleaned from the list quoted in Appendix VII.

In a more subtle and impalpable fashion the Padres
contributed to the efficiency of the Division by keeping

THE PADRES 393

before the men the lofty principles for which they were
fighting, and by emphasising the moral basis of the
war. Those attached to battalions were of enormous
assistance to C.Os. in organising services, concerts and
entertainments for the men, and never did they withhold
comfort and advice from those who sought their help.
Many men who took part in the Longueval fighting
had cause to bless Padre Johnston and his coffee stall.
Padre Oddie was one of the personalities of the Division
and be was noted for the assiduity with which he
cultivated his “parish” both in and out of the trenches.
All rendered yeoman service in the sad task of burying
the dead, and Padre Smith MacIntosh treasures as one
of his most cherished possessions a letter he received
from Brig. - General Maxwell thanking him for his
labours in this respect near the Chemical Works.

The popular Padre Brown was best known from his
connection with “The Thistles” concert troupe, whose
entertainments were as beneficial as a tonic to men
just drawn from battle. The members of this troupe
performed these duties in addition to their ordinary
army work. But death made sad havoc among their
ranks; the loss of Sergeant Peart of the 28th Field
Ambulance at Passchendaele in 1917 was a great blow;
he was the most charming lady impersonator that the
Ninth ever possessed, and his death was mourned by
the whole Division.

The battle record of the Ninth in the war is one to
be proud of. It was engaged at Loos, at the Somme
twice, four times at Arras, and twice at Passchendaele :
it played a conspicuous part in breaking up the German
offensives in March and April, and after two minor
actions at Meteren took part in the final operations
from the 28th September to the 27th October. On the

1 See Appendix VIII.

394 THE CO-OPERATIVE SPIRIT

few occasions on which it failed, as at the Butte de
Warlencourt on the 12th October 1916 and at St
Julien in 1917, the power to win success was beyond
human means.

A soldier prizes no praise more highly than that of
another soldier, and such praise is most practically
shown when a division is frequently employed in
important engagements. During its service in France
the Ninth missed only two major actions—Messines
and Cambrai. Although on neither occasion was it fit
for action, there was a murmur of regret amongst all
ranks because it had no share in these conflicts. For
while individually officers and men realised the awful
tragedy and pain of battle, their intense pride in their
Division made them fiercely jealous lest the omission
to employ it sprang from a poor appraisement of its
worth.

The Division had the great fortune to be commanded
by a succession of leaders outstanding for character as
well as knowledge, who with their fingers ever on its
pulse, knew well how to direct and control it to the best
advantage. But the true value of the Ninth depended
not upon the pre-eminence of a few individuals, but upon
the co-operative ability shown by all ranks and depart-
ments to work together. Each officer and each man
contributed to a common stock, and while he might pass
away his spirit was absorbed by the Division. The
group is always stronger than the individual. While

“Tis that repeated shocks, again, again,
Exhaust the energy of strongest souls,
And numb the elastic powers,”
after each devastating battle the Ninth rose Phoenix-
like from its ashes, and at the end of the long struggle
exhibited the same keenness and purposeful vigour it
had ever shown since its formation.

[London Portraft Co.

H. TUDOR, -C.B.,. C.M.G.

MAJOR-GENERAL HII.

[Face page 894.

Digitized by Google

VALUE OF ATTRITION BATTLES 395

The splendid arrogance of the Division, its well-
founded faith in its own prowess, rested on the sure
foundation of the fervent belief of each man in the
righteousness of the cause for which he was fighting.
To die for it if need be was the simple duty that
animated all. The qualities that created the Empire
are equally necessary to maintain it, and the security
of a heritage depends essentially on the sense of duty
of those who hold it. War still remains the supreme
test of a nation’s efficiency, and it is the glory of
democracy that it did not shirk that test when
challenged. In keeping with the national spirit the
Ninth Division had ever before it the injunction
received from H.M. King George V. on the 10th May
1915, and its greatest honour is that from beginning
to end it faithfully and loyally carried it out.

“ Officit fructus sit ipsum officium.”

As the war recedes into the past and as the emotions
roused by it subside, the tendency is to linger on the
splendid and spectacular advances of the latter part
of 1918, and to exalt them at the expense of the
previous battles. If the war is to be viewed from
the proper angle, it should never be forgotten that after
August 1918 the Germans were men without hope, and
to deduce our lessons of the war from the last four
months of fighting would be the height of folly. None
knew better than those who fought at Loos, the Somme,
Arras, and Passchendaele, and who also took part in
the victorious advance, that in the last months we were
able with confidence to take risks which it would have
been rash to take in 1915, 1916, and 1917. Those
whose active service was confined to the fighting after
August 1918 never experienced the same deadly nerve-
rack and the fierce acuities of emotion that sprang from

396 THE GLORIOUS DEAD

the pitiless shelling and desperate strife of the previous
campaigns. The wearing-out battles, when the foe was
encountered at the zenith of his strength, with all their
disappointments and mistakes alone made possible the
gigantic advances at the end. A glance at the Divi-
sion’s casualty list’ shows clearly that the heat and
burden of the day fell principally upon those who faced
the enemy during the campaigns fought between Sep-
tember 1915 and the close of 1917. And the dead of
the Ninth in the long chain of battles from Loos to the
Lys had by their valour and sacrifice paved the way
for the triumphal onset that carried the Division from
Ypres to the Scheldt. The countless graves that strew
the battle-line of France and Flanders contain the
flower of the British race, and furnish silent but
eloquent evidence of the robust qualities and manly
faith without which the British Empire and all that
it stands for must have passed away.
“Qut procul hinc—the legend’s writ,
The fronticr grave is far away ;

Quz ante diem perirt,
Sed miles, sed pro putrid.”

1 See Appendix IV.

APPENDIX I

TABLE stiowinae Orper or BaTTLe oF THE NINTH (ScortTisn)
Division

CAVALRY

« B” Squadron, Queen’s Own Royal Glasgow Yeomanry.
Transferred to Corps, May 1916.

CYCLISTS
9th Division Company. Transferred to Corps, May 1916.

ROYAL ARTILLERY
R.F.A. Bricaprs

r 9th Heavy
L. Lb LI. LII1. BATTERY.
Became (Howitzer). Transferred
A.F.A. Bde. One battery sent to Corps, June
8/1/17. to the 7th Div, 1915.

9/6/15. Reconsti-
In April 1916 D/L., D/LLI., tuted April 1916,
and D/LII. were taken away the three batteries
from their own Bdes. and exchanging with
formed into the LIII. Bde. D/L., D/LI., and
R.F.A. The first three Bdes. D/LII. Bde.broken
had thus one Howitzer and up 11/9/16 to com-

three 18-pounder batteries. plete L. and LI.

All batteries were then on to 6-gun batteries.

a 4-gun basis.

| ROYAL ENGINEERS
63rd, 64th, and 90th Field Companies. 9th Signal Company.

897

398 APPENDIX I

INFANTRY
26TH HIGHLAND BRIGADE

8th Bn. Black Watch (Royal Highlanders), —

7th Bn. Seaforth Highlanders (Ross-shire Buffs, The Duke of Albany’s).

8th Bn. The Gordon Highlanders. Transferred to 15th Div. 7/5/16.

5th Bn. The Queen’s Own Cameron Highlanders.

10th Bn. Princess Louise’s (Argyll and Sutherland) Highlanders.
From 27th Bde. 3/5/16. Transferred to 32nd Div. 15/2/18.

27TH (Low.anpD) BriGADE

11th Bn. The Royal Scots. 12th Bn. The Royal Scots.

6th Bn. The Royal Scots Fusiliers. Transferred to 15th Div. 8/5/16.
10th Bn. Princess Louise’s (Argyll and Sutherland) Highlanders.

To 26th Bde. 3/5/16.
6th Bn. King’s Own Scottish Borderers. From 28th Bde. 6/5/16.
9th Bn. The Scottish Rifles (Cameronians). From 28th Bde. 6/5/16.
Transferred to 14th Div. 5/2/18.

28TH BricaDE
6th Bn. The King’s Own Scottish Borderers. | Transferred to 27th
9th Bn. The Scottish Rifles (Cameronians). Bde. 6/5/16.
10th Bn. Highland Light Infantry. ) Transferred to 15th Div.
llth Bn. Highland Light Infantry. 14/5/16.

The 28th Bde. was broken up 6/5/16, and replaced by the

SouTH AFRICAN BriGADE
Ist Regt. 2nd Regt. 3rd Regt. 4th Regt. South African Infantry.
Disbanded (South African Scottish).
3/2/18.

On 24/4/18 the Ist, 2nd, and 4th Regiments were amalgamated,
and formed the South African Composite Battalion; and the brigade,
composed of this battalion, the 2nd Bn. The Royal Scots Fusiliers
from the 30th Div. 25/4/18, and the 9th Scottish Rifles from the 14th
Div. 13/4/18, was known as the 28th (South African) Brigade. The
South African Brigade left the 9th Division in September 1918 and
its place was taken by the

28TH BricapE (reorganised September 1918)
2nd Bn. The Royal Scots Fusiliers.
9th Bn. The Scottish Rifles.
Ist Bn. The Royal Newfoundland Regiment. From L. of C. 13/9/18.
Previously with the 29th Division.

APPENDIX I 399

PIONEERS |
9th Bn. Seaforth Highlanders (Ross-shire Buffs, the Duke of Albany’s).

MACHINE-GUN CORPS

26th Company, 27th Company, 28th Company, 197th Company,

formed 1/1/16. formed 22/12/15. formed 1/1/16. joined from
England 13/12/16.

9th Battalion, formed 1/3/18.

ROYAL ARMY SERVICE CORPS!
104th, 105th, 106th, and 107th Companies.

ROYAL ARMY MEDICAL CORPS
27th 28th 29th Field Ambulances.

Replaced April 1916 by the South African
Field Ambulance, which in September 1918
was replaced, first by the 76th (25th Div.),
and then by the 2/lst (East Lanes.) Field
Ambulance. |

1 The A.S.C. became R.A.S.C. 25/11/18. A.O. (362/1918.)

APPENDIX II

TABLE sHowiNnG THE PERIODS SPENT IN THE LINE FROM THE
9TH May 1915 TILL THE 1lltTH NovemsBer 1918

1915
May.

June.

July.
Aug.
Sept.
Oct.

Nov.
Dec.

1916
Jan.
Feb.
Mar.
Apr.
May.
June.

July.

Sept.

Landed in France (9th to
13th).

Out.

In line at Festubert.
or », (till 18th).
» N.E. of Vermelles.
» S.ofZillebeke(from
the 5th).

In line E. of Zillebeke.

5 (till the

20th).

Out till the 26th.
In line at Ploegsteert.

3) 39

Out.

Attacked on 3rd at Berna-
fay; then in line at
Montauban. Attacked
on 14th (Longueval and
Delville Wood); en-
gaged till 20th; then

out.

. In line at Vimy Ridge

(from the 15th).

In line at Vimy Ridge
(till the 26th).
400

1916
Oct.

Nov.
Dec.

1917

In line near Butte de
Warlencourt (from the
9th). Attacked on 12th,
18th, and 19th; out
from 26th.

Out.

In line E. and N.E. of
Arras (from 4th).

Jan. Inline E.and N.E.of Arras.

Feb.
Mar.
Apr.
May.

June.

July.
Aug.

Sept.

33 33 33
39 3) 2?

33

Attacked on 9th and
] 2th, reaching Fampoux
and Roeux; out from
16th to 28th.

In line E. of Arras. At-

tacked on 3rd; _ out
from 12th.
In line near Roeux. At-

tacked on 5th; out from
14th.

Out till 25th.

In line, Trescault-Havrin-
court - Hermies (till
30th).

Out till 15th. In line
N.W. of Zonnebeke.

APPENDIX II

Attacked on 20th; out
from 26th.

In line near St Julien
from 10th; attacked
on 12th; out 25th to
28th.

In line at Coast till 17th;
then out.

In line at Gouzeaucourt
(from 6th).

In line at Gouzeaucourt.

Out from 3rd.

In line at Gouzeaucourt
(from 12th); engaged
in Somme Retreat 21st
to 27th.

1918
Apr.

May.
June.

. In line at Meteren.

401

In line near Hollebeke
(from 4th); fighting
10th and 11th, 16th and
25th ; out from 26th.

Out till 24th.

In line at Meteren.

Meteren captured 19th.

At-

tacked on 18th; out from

26th.

. In line E. of Ypres (from

20th). Attacked 28th
to 30th.

Attacked Ist, 14th, 20th,
22nd, and 25th; then

out.

APPENDIX III

LIST sHowine (4) Commanders and Staff of the Ninth (Scottish)
Division; (B) Battalion Commanders; (C) Artillery Brigade
Commanders; (D) Field Company Commanders; (£) Field
Ambulance Commanders from Formation in September 1914
to the Armistice, 1lth November 1918.

Notes.—(1) The dates given in these lists indicate the periods during which
Commanders were serving with the Division.
(2) Decorations mentioned are those held or awarded during service
with the Division.

(4) COMMANDERS AND STAFF

DivistonaL CoMMANDERS

Maj.-Gen. C. J. Mackenzie, C.B. to Oct. 1914
e Sir C. Fergusson, C.B., D.S.O., M. V. O. » March 1915
on H. J. S. Landon, CB. . ; . 5, Sept. 1915
. G. H. Thesiger, C.B.,C.M.G. . —._—,, Sept. 1915 (Loos)

. Sir W. T. Furse, K.C.B., D.S.O. ~ 7 Dec. 1916
os Sir H. T. Lukin, K.C.B., C.M.G.,

D.S.O. : . 5, 13th March 1918
3 C. A. Blacklock, C. M. G., D. S. O. . y 28th March 1918
Pa H. H. Tudor, C.B., C.M.G. : . yy Armistice
G.S.Os.I.
Lt.-Col. C. H. de Rougemont, D.S.O., M.V.O. . to July 1915
» F.A. Buzzard. : ; . 5, Sept. 1915
» 98. E. Hollond, D.S.O. . : ; . 5, March 1916
» P. A. V. Stewart, D.S.O. . . «+ yy Deo. 1917
» T.C. Mudie, D.S.O. . : . 5, Armistice
A.A. & Q.M.Gs.
Col. A. V. Payne ; : : : . to Feb. 1915
Lt.-Col. R. F. Uniacke - 9», May 1915
» <A. A. McHardy, C.M. G., D. S. O. . 5, Aug. 1916

» A.C. Jeffcoat, C.B., C.M. G., D.S. O. - », Armistice

APPENDIX III 403

C.R. As.
Brig.-Gen. E. H. Armitage, C.B. : . to Feb, 1916
oe H. H. Tudor, C.B.,C.M.G. __. . 95 Mareh 1918

as H. R. Wainwright, D.S.O. : . », Armistice

C.R.Es.
Lt.-Col. H. A. A. Livingstone, C.M.G. . to Sept. 1915 (Loos)
», ©. M. Carpenter, D.S.O. : : . 5, Jan. 1916
» E. Barnardiston . . 3 . », July 1916(Somme)
» G. R. Hearn, D.S.O. . . 5, Feb. 1918
» H.C. B. Hickling, D.S.O., M. Cc; . », Armistice
InrFantry BricapE CoMMANDERS
26th Brigade.—
Brig.-Gen. H. R. Kelham, C.B. . ; . to Nov. 1914
e E. St G. Grogan, C.B. _.. . yy May 1915
es A. B. Ritchie, C.M.G. : . » Dec. 1916

re J. Kennedy, C.M.G., D.S.O. . ,, July 1918
ms The Hon. A.G. A. Hore Ruthven,
V.C., C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O. . ,, Armistice

27th Brigade.—

Brig.-Gen. W. Scott Moncrieff. ; . to Jan. 1915
2 C. D. Bruce. F . yy Sept. 1915 (Loos)
ss W. H. Walshe . : . y> March 1916
re G. F. Trotter, C.M.G., D. S.0O.,
M.V.O._. . », May 1916
5 S. W. ScvacesDickine CB. . 5, Oct. 1916
4 F. A. Maxwell, V.C.,C.S.1,D.S.0. ,, Sept. 1917
(Passchendaele)

os W. D. Croft, C.M.G., D.S.O. . ,, to Armistice

28th Brigade.—
Brig.-Gen. S. W. Scrase-Dickins ; . to May 1916

South African Brigade.
Brig.-Gen. H. T. Lukin, C.M.G., D.S.O. Apr. 1916 to Dec. 1916
sf F. S. Dawson, C.M.G.,D.S.0O._ . : », Mar. 1918
5G W.E.C. Tanner, C.M.G., D.S.O. », Sept.1918

28th Brigade.—
Brig.-Gen. J. L. Jack, D.S.O. . . Sept. 1918 to Armistice

404 APPENDIX III

9Tn DrvisionaL TRAIN

Lt.-Col. R. P. Crawley, D.S.O., M.V.O. . . to Nov. 1917
» R. MacLear,!BS-O. . ‘ ; . 5, Armistice
PRON
A.D.MLS.
Col ree, C.M.G. , : . Apr. 1915 to Nov. 1915

.G.C
», F. A. Symons, C.M.G., D.S.O. ; . y Apr. 1917 (Arras)
O. W. A. Elsner, C.B.E., D.S.O. : . 5» Armistice

33

(B) BATTALION COMMANDERS

26TH BRIGADE
8th Black Watch—

Lt.-Col. John Lord Sempill : . to Sept. 1915 (Loos)

» G.B. Duff ' . Dec. 1915 ,, Mar. 1916
» G. W. E. Gordon, D.S.O. . yy Sept. 1916
» sir G. Abercromby, D.S.O. . ,, Sept. 1917
» R. W. Hadow, D.S.O. _. . 5, Aug. 1918
» W. French, D.S.O., M.C.. . 5, Armistice

7th Seaforth Highlanders—
Lt.-Col. W. T. Gaisford : . to Sept. 1915 (Loos)
» FF. J. Marshall . . Dec. 1915 ,, Apr. 1916
» J. Kennedy, D.S.O. May 1916 ,, Aug. 1916

» R. Horn, D.S.O., M.C. . . 3 Mar. 1918
», Hon. D. Bruce . Apr. 1918 ,, Armistice
8th Gordon Highlanders—
Lt.-Col. G. Staunton . : ; . to Feb. 1915
» H. Wright, C.M.G.,D.S.0. . ,, Sept. 1915 (Loos)
» A. D. Greenhill-Gardyne. . 5, Mar. 1916

» H. Pelham Burn, D.S.O., Apr. 1916 to May 1916

5th Cameron H wghlanders—

Lt.-Col. D. W. Cameron of Lochiel, C.M.G., to March 1916

» G.B. Duff, D.S.O. . : . to July 1916 (Somme)
,» H.R. Brown, D.S.O. ; . 5) May 1917
» StC.M.G. MacEwen . » 5, Oct. 1917

A. G. M. M. Crichton, D.S.O., M.C., to March 1918
J. Inglis, C.M.G., D.S.O., March 1918 to Sept. 1918
» A.W. Angus, D.S.O. . . to Armistice

APPENDIX III 405

10th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders—
Lt.-Col. W. J. B. Tweedie, C.M.G., May 1916 to July 1916
(Somme)

J. Kennedy, D.S.O. . : to Dec. 1916
H. G. Sotheby, D.S.O., M.V. O. » Feb. 1918

99

39

277TH BricaDEe
11th Royal Scots—

Lt.-Col. H. H. B. Dyson . to Oct. 1914

» KR. C. Dundas . ; » sept. 1915 (Loos)
W. D. Croft, D.S.O. Dec. 1915 5 sept. 1917
Sir J. B.S. Campbell, D.S.O. . ,, Oct. 1918

99

99

» E. Boyd, M.C... . ‘ . 5, Armistice
12th Royal Scots—

Lt.-Col. G. G. Loch, C.M.G. : . to Feb. 1916
» H.L. Budge . . yy July 1916 (Somme)
» N.H.S. Fargus, D.S.O. . 5, March 1917
» H.U.H. Thorne . ; . 5) Apr. 1917 (Arras)
» J. A.S. Ritson, D.S.O.,M.C. . ,, June 1918
» J. Murray, D.S.O. . : . 5, Armistice

6th Royal Scots Fusiliers—

Lt.-Col. H. H. Northey, C.M.G. . . to Sept. 1915 (Loos)
Kt. Hon. Winston Churchill, Jan. 1916 to May 1916

39

10th Argyll and: Sutherland Highlanders—

Lt.-Col. A. F. Mackenzie, C.M.G., M.V.O., to Sept. 1915 (Loos)
H. Pelham Burn, D S.O., Dec. 1915 to Apr. 1916
W. J. B. Tweedie, C.M.G. . to May 1916

33

33

6th King’s Own Scottish Borderers—
Lt.-Col. J. C. W. Connell, D.S.O., May 1916 to Oct. 1916
G. B. F. Smyth, D.S.O._ . . to May 1917
H. D. N. Maclean, D.S.O., Aug. 1917 to Oct. 1917
G. B. F. Smyth, D.S.O., March 1918 and May 1918 to
Oct. 1918
R. F. Ker, D.S.O., M.C. . : to Armistice

39

9th Scottish Rifles—

Lt.-Col. H. A. Fulton, D.S.O., May 1916 to July 1917
W. Lumsden, D.S.O., M.C. . ,, Feb. 1918

33

406 APPENDIX ITI
10th Highland Light Infantry—

Lt.-Col. J. C. Grahame, D.S.O. . to Sept. 1915 (Loos)
» H.C. Stuart, D.S.O. ‘ . 5, Jan. 1916
» J.C. Grahame, D.S.O. . - 5, May 1916

11th Highland Light Infantry—
Lt.-Col. H. C, Fergusson, C.M.G. . to Jan. 1916
‘ R, F. Forbes - - 5, May 1916

SoutH AFRICAN BRIGADE

Ist South African Infantry—
Lt.-Col. F. S. Dawson, C.M.G., Apr. 1916 to Dec. 1916
» F. H. Heal, D.S.O. . . . . to March 1918

2nd South African Infantry—

Lt.-Col. W. E. C. Tanner, C.M.G., D.S.O., Apr. 1916 to Oct. 1917
» £. Christian, D.S.O. : . to March 1918

3rd South African Infantry—
Lt.-Col. E. F. Thackeray, C.M.G., D.S.O., Apr. 1916 to Feb. 1918

4th South African Infantry—
Lt.-Col. F. A. Jones, C.M.G., D.S.O., May 1916 to July 1916

(Somme)
» D.R. Hunt. : . . to Dec. 1916
» E. Christian, D.S.O.. : . yy Apr. 1917
» D.M. MacLeod, D.S.O. . . 5, March 1918

South African (Composite) Battalion—
Lt.-Col. H. W. M. Bamford, O.B.E., M.C., Apr. 1918 to Sept. 1918

28TH BricapEe
2nd Royal Scots Fusiliers—
Lt.-Col. J. Utterson-Kelso, D.S.O., M.C., Apr. 1918 to Oct. 1918

» R. Campbell, D.S.O. ; . to Nov. 1918
» C.S. Nairne . : j . 5, Armistice

9th Scottish Rifles—
Lt.-Col. W. Lumsden, D.S.O., M.C. . Apr. 1918 to Armistice

lst Bn. Royal Newfoundland Regiment—
Lt.-Col. T. G. Matthias, D.S.O. . Sept. 1918 to Armistice

APPENDIX III 407

PIONEERS
9th Seaforth Highlanders—
Lt.-Col. T. Fetherstonhaugh, D.S.O. . : . to March 1917
» W. Petty, D.S.O. . , : : . » Aug. 1918
» 9. F. Sharp, M.C.. ; : ; . 5, Armistice

9th Machine-gun Batialion—
Lt.-Col. F. G. Chalmers, M.C. . March 1918 to June 1918
» H.J. W. Davis, D.S.O. : ; . 5, Armistice
(C) ARTILLERY BRIGADE COMMANDERS

50TH BricaDe

Lt.-Col. A. C. Bailward . : ; . to Jan. 1915
» C. E. D. Budworth, M.V.O. ; , . yy March 1915
» ©. C. Van Straubenzee ; 3 : . 5, Aug. 1915
» E. W.S. Brooke, D.S.O.. . ; . 5, Aug. 1917
» CC. W. W. McLean, C.M.G., D.S. O. : . 5) March 1918
», J. de B. Cowan, D.S.O. : ; . 5, May 1918
» ©. W. W. McLean, C.M.G., D.S. O. : . 4, Armistice
5lst BricaDE
Lt.-Col. A. H. Carter. : . to Aug. 1916
» G.A.S. Cape, D.S.0. , : : » 3, Oct. 1917 .
» M. Muirhead, D.S.O. : . 4, Armistice
52ND BRIGADE
Lt.-Col. F. W. Boteler. ra , ‘ . to March 1915
» A.M. Perreau, C.M. G. , ; . 5, June 1916
+» H.M. Ballingall . . . 5, June 1916
» H.T. Belcher, D.S.O.. : : 5 . 5, Jan, 1917
53rD Bricape
Lt.-Col. C. N. Simpson. . to Feb. 1915
» K.K. Knapp, C.M.G. ; ; ' . yy Nov. 1915
» H. T. Belcher, D.S. O.. : : . 5, Sept. 1916

408 APPENDIX III

(D) FIELD COMPANY COMMANDERS

63rpD ComMPANY
Capt. C. Doucet _.. :
Major L. W. S. Oldham .
» A. W. Reid, M.C. :
» R.E. Bruce Fielding, D.S.0.

64TH ComMPANY
Capt. W. E. Francis ; : ;
Major G. R. Hearn, D.S.O.
» €. G. Woolner, M.C.
» N. Clavering, M.C. :
Capt. T. F. Young, D.S.O., M.C.

90TH ComMPANY
Major C. S. Montefiore
» C. D. Munro :
» G. B. F. Smyth, D.S.0.
,» §. W.S. Hamilton, D.S.O.
» I. G. Bird, D.S.O.

to Nov. 1914
» July 1915
», Apr. 1917
», Armistice

to Nov. 1914
» Aug. 1916
» Oct. 1917
» July 1918
» Oct. 1918

to May 1915
Sept. 1915 (Loos)
Oct. 1916
Sept. 1917
Armistice

we
=

“Ne
‘eo

w
~~

‘oe
we

(EK) FIELD AMBULANCE COMMANDERS

27TH Fietp AMBULANCE

Lt.-Col. O. W. A. Elsner, D.S.O.
» J. M. A. Costello, M.C.

to Apr. 1917
», Armistice

28TH Fretp AMBULANCE

Lt.-Col, W. E. Hardy
» H.C. R. Hine
Capt. G. P. Taylor .
» Darling, M.C. : ;
Lt.-Col. T. E. Harty, D.S.O.

to June 1915
» Aug. 1915
», Jan. 1916
» Aug. 1916

», Armistice

29TH Fietp AMBULANCE

Lt.-Col. F. R. Buswell
Major R. P. Lewis .

to Oct. 1915
» May 1916

S. A. Fretp AMBULANCE

Lt.-Col. G. H. Usmar .. F :
» R.N. Pringle, D.S.O., M.C.

May 1916 to Aug. 1916
» Sept. 1918

2nD/Ist (East Lancs.) Fie.>D AMBULANCE

Lt.-Col. J. Bruce

Sept. 1918 to Armistice

CASUALTIES OF THE NINTH DIVISION

APPENDIX IV

(A). Approximate Number of Casualties suffered by the Division

Loos—
25th to 28th Sept. 1915

Somme—

Longueval and Del-
ville Wood, Ist to
20th July 1916

Butte de Warlencourt—
12th to 24th Oct. 1916

Arras—
9th April 1917 . ‘
12th April ,, ;
8rd May ,,
5th June ,,

Passchendaele —
20th Sept. 1917...
12th to 25th Oct. 1917

Somme Retreat —
21st to 28th Mar. 1918

The Lys—
9th to 26th April 1918

Meteren—
| 19th July 1918

Hoegenacker—
18th August 1918

Final Advance—
28th Sept. to 27th

Oct.
1918. ‘ ‘ :

409

in Battle.
Officers. Other Ranks. Total.

k.| w. | M. |] Kg. | Ww. | M. [Ofticers.| Other
63 100| 27 798 | 3,087 | 2,082; 190) 5,867
82 214; 18 | 1,148 | 5,091 964 814 | 7,203
28 74} 16 460 | 2,131 546 118 | 3,137
26 91 382 | 1,481 68 117 | 1,931

7 55 3 122 987 189 65 | 1,298
13 52| 23 161 | 1,150 459 88 | 1,770

4 8 1 36 141 19 13 196
22 64 411 | 1,754 124 86 | 2,289
28 69 5 387 | 1,982 225 102 | 2,544
26 113 | 105 304| 1,799 | 2,760| 244) 4,863
35 95 39 401 | 1,832 | 1,646 169 | 3,879
13 20 2 186 537 45 35 768

4 16 1 65 324 23 21 412
44 139 5 470 | 2,858 | 276 188 | 3,604

9,376 | 1,750 |39,761

895 | 1,110 | 245 | 5,331

to November 1918.

25,054

(B). Approximate Number of Casualties from May 1915

—

474 | 1744 [275 | 7,425 34,559 hors | 2,493 52,122

APPENDIX V

VICTORIA CROSSES Won sy Orricers AND MEN OF THE
NINTH DivisioN DURING THE War

CorporaL James Da.GLeisH Potiock, 5th Bn. The Cameron
Highlanders

For most conspicuous bravery near the Hohenzollern Redoubt on
the 27th September 1915.

At about 12 noon when the enemy’s bombers in superior numbers
were working up “Little Willie” towards the Redoubt, Corporal
Pollock, after obtaining permission from his company officer, got out
of the trench alone, walked along the top edge with the utmost
coolness and disregard of danger and compelled the enemy's
bombers to retire by bombing them from above. He was under
heavy machine-gun fire the whole time, but continued to hold up the
progress of the Germans for an hour, when he was at length wounded.

Private WituraM Freperick Fautps, lst Regiment, South African
Infantry

At Delville Wood, on 18th July 1916. For most conspicuous
bravery and devotion to duty. A bombing party under Lieutenant
Craig attempted to rush across forty yards of ground which lay
between the British and enemy trenches. Coming under very
heavy rifle and machine-gun fire, the officer and the majority of
the party were killed or wounded. Unable to move, Lieutenant
Craig lay midway between the two lines of trenches, the ground
being quite open. In full daylight Private Faulds, accompanied by
two other men, climbed the parapet, ran out, picked up the officer
and carried him back, one man being severely wounded in so doing.

Two days later Private Faulds again showed most conspicuous
bravery in going out alone to bring in a wounded man, and carrying
him nearly half a mile to a dressing-station, subsequently rejoining
his platoon. ‘The artillery fire was at the time so intense that
stretcher-bearers and others considered that any attempt to bring in
the wounded men meant certain death. This risk Private Faulds
faced unflinchingly, and his bravery was crowned with success.

410

APPENDIX V 411
Captain Henry Reynotps, M.C., 12th Bn. The Royal Scots

For most conspicuous bravery. When his company, in attack
and approaching their final objective, suffered heavy casualties from
enemy machine-guns and from an enemy “ Pill-box,”” which had been
passed by the first wave, Captain Reynolds reorganised his men, who
were scattered, and then proceeded alone by rushes from shell-hole
to shell-hole, all the time being under heavy machine-gun fire.
When near the “ Pill-box” he threw a grenade, intending that it
should go inside, but the enemy had blocked the entrance. He then
crawled to the entrance and forced a phosphorous grenade inside.
This set the place on fire and caused the death of three of the
enemy, while the remaining seven or eight surrendered with two
machine-guns.

Afterwards, though wounded, he continued to lead his company
against another objective and captured it, taking seventy prisoners
and two more machine-guns.

During the whole attack the company was under heavy machine-
gun fire from the flanks, but despite this Captain Reynolds kept
complete control of his men.

Lance-CorporaL WituraM Henry Hewitt, 2nd Regiment, South
African Infantry

~~ At east of Ypres on 20th September 1917, for most conspicuous
bravery during operations. Lance-Corporal Hewitt attacked a
Pill-box”’ with his section, and tried to rush the doorway. The
garrison however proved very stubborn, and in the attempt this
N.C.O. received a severe wound. Nevertheless, he proceeded to the
loophole of the “ Pill-box”’ where, in his attempts to put a bomb into
it, he was again wounded in the arm. Undeterred, however, he
eventually managed to get a bomb inside which caused the occupants
to dislodge, and they were successfully and speedily dealt with by
the remainder of the section.

LizuTENANT RospertT VauGHaNn Gor te, “A” Battery,
5th Brigade R.F.A.

For most conspicuous bravery, initiative, and devotion to duty
during the attack at Ledeghem on Ist October 1918, when in
command of an 18-pounder gun working in close conjunction with
the infantry. He brought his gun into action in the most exposed
positions on four separate occasions, and disposed of enemy machine-
guns by firing over open sighls under direct machine-gun fire at 500
to 600 yards’ range.

412 APPENDIX V

Later, seeing that the infantry were being driven back by intense
hostile fire, he without hesitation galloped his gun in front of the
leading infantry, and on two occasions knocked out enemy machine-
guns which were causing the trouble. His dash and disregard of
personal safety were a magnificent example to the wavering line,
which rallied and retook the northern end of the village.

Private Tuomas Ricketts, The Royal Newfoundland Regiment

For most conspicuous bravery and devotion to duty on the 14th
October 1918. During the advance from Ledeghem, when the
attack was temporarily held up by heavy hostile fire, and the platoon
to which he belonged suffered severe casualties from the fire of
a battery at point-blank range, Private Ricketts at once volunteered
to go forward with his section commander and a Lewis Gun to attempt
to outflank the battery. Advancing by short rushes under heavy fire
from machine-guns with the hostile battery, their ammunition was ex-
hausted when they were still 300 yards from the battery. The enemy,
seeing an opportunity to get their field-guns away, began to bring
up their gun teams. Private Ricketts, at once realising the situation,
doubled back 100 yards under the heaviest machine-gun fire, procured
further ammunition, and dashed back again to the Lewis Gun, and
by very accurate fire drove the enemy and the gun teams into
a farm. His platoon then advanced without casualties and captured
four field-guns, four machine-guns, and eight prisoners. A _ fifth
field-gun was subsequently intercepted by fire and captured. By
his presence of mind in anticipating the enemy intention and his
utter disregard of personal safety, Private Ricketts secured the
further supply of ammunition which directly resulted in these
important captures and undoubtedly saved many lives.

Corporat Rotanp Epwarp Excock, M.M., llth Bn. The Royal Scots

For most conspicuous bravery and initiative south-east of Cappelle
St Catherine on 15th October 1918, when in charge of a Lewis Gun
team. Entirely on his own initiative, Corporal Elcock rushed his
gun up to within ten yards of enemy guns, which were causing
heavy casualties and holding up the advance. He put both guns
out of action, captured five prisoners and undoubtedly saved the
whole attack from being held up. Later, near the river Lys, this
N.C.Q. again attacked an enemy machine-gun and captured the
crew. His behaviour throughout the day was absolutely fearless.

APPENDIX VI

SUMMARY OF WORK pone sy Sapprers aND PIoNEeERS IN
PREPARATION FoR THE BaTtTLe or Arras, 9TH APRIL 1917

1. 3500 yards of new communication trenches.

2. New artillery trench (1600 yards) dug for advanced positions of
three brigades.

3. 4300 yards of old communications cleared at least once; trench
boards raised in part on “ A” frames, and berms cleared back.

4. 2800 yards of tramway cleared and track raised 18 feet in
places; a very successful job, enabling large quantities of
ammunition for trench mortars, etc., to be run up. 1000 yards
of new tramway laid, including tramways to gun positions.

3). 10 heavy trench mortar emplacements with at least 10 feet
overhead cover, and mined magazines holding 260 rounds;
these proved very successful and saved many casualties.

6. 38 medium emplacements proof against 4:2 H.E. shells.

7. 7 artillery observation posts in Arras and 7 trench observation
posts with mined dug-outs; also telephone exchange at sewer
exit in Arras.

8. 1500 yards of roads cleared and repaired, and 3 subways made
for passage under roads.

9. 4500 yards of infantry tracks made, with a small amount of
assistance from infantry of the Fourth Division. 3000 artillery
tracks made, including 35 bridges. Overland tracks made
along 4500 yards of communication trenches. Pontoon bridge
over the Scarpe repaired for pack transport.

10. Additional water storage for 1500 gallons, and about 2000 yards
of piped supply to battery positions.
11. 74 cellars and a cave in St Nicholas strutted, and 15 dug-outs
extended or improved. 3 brigade H.Q. made, one of which
was made sufficiently large for advanced D.H.Q.
418

414 APPENDIX VI

12. 4013 bunks erected in Etrun, Laresset, and Haute Avesnes.
518 bunks repaired, 8 Nissen huts and 13 cookhouse shelters
erected. A billet for 44 officers made in a French Adrian
hut. Brigade H.Q. made in St Catherine for the Thirty-
fourth Division, also dug-outs for the 50th Brigade R.F.A.
and signals in St Nicholas.

13. The large quantity of articles turned out by divisional workshops
included :—

70 camouflaged targets for marking of objectives when
captured. |
143 water-carriers for pack transport.
350 infantry track posts.
138 trench bridges.
260 printed notice boards.
30 direction posts.
100 artillery track posts.
20 stretchers.
In addition, the Sappers made entrances for the 27th Brigade
to the craters in its front line, and exploded craters (for
assembly purposes) in front of the South African sector.

All this work took about two months.

APPENDIX VII

LIST sHowinac Materia. IssuED AND SALVED BY THE ORDNANCE
DgpaRTMENT IN 1918

Original Issues

én Actually Actually
Mobilisation. issued 1918. salved 1918.
Boots, ankle, pairs. : 32,000 24,160 23,520
Greatcoats. ;. ‘ ‘ 16,000 7,440 8,160
Trousers . 2 ; : 13,000 21,840 18,160
Jackets . 16,000 28,520 22,960
Pantaloons, cord 3,000 8,701 9,183
Puttees, pairs. ; 2 16,000 24,120 23,200
Ground sheets : ; 16,000 7,248 7,248
Socks, pairs . ; 48,000 41,282 42,000
Shoes, horse and mule . age 64,748 #140
Bottles, water ; ‘: ; 16,000 5,782 5,000
Haversacks . : ; ; 16,000 1,184 1,100
Vests ‘ ‘ ‘ ‘ : 16,000 25,056 25,056
Caps ; ‘ 16,000 14,560 14,000
Drawers, woollen or cotton $2,000 87,264 87,000
Shirts . ‘ ; E ‘ 82,000 10,800 10,800
Tins, mess. : F 16,000 11,520 11,000
Flannelette, yards . 8,500 111,672 m
Bags, nose. . 4,000 29,244 29,000
Ropeshead. 4,000 3,200 8,000
Chains, collar. 2,000 5,892 oe
Ropes, hel . .. 4,000 1,992 1,500
novos Ps Peers ; , 70 1,800 a8
Dubbin, , ; , : 500 9,600
Soap, an Ibs. ; ‘ . 500 21,120 ;
Soap, yellow, bars . ; : 4,004 40,820 3
Grease, ee eaune: Ibs. : 500 10,188 :
Buckets, water 5,000 7,882
Oil, lubricating, G S.,; galls. 100 3,216
Brushes, dandy. . 2,000 9,096
Brushes, horse ; ; ‘ 3,000 4,812 és
Blankets, saddle . ; 8,750 1,800 1,800
Blankets,G.S. ‘ 32,000 48,000 48,000
Soda, crystals, lbs. . F ; 336 $4,560 ish
Pullthroughs. . . . 16,000 19,200 -
Machine-guns ; 454 700 750
Rifles . ‘ - 16,000 85,000 50,000
Vehicles (various) . F : 963 400 400
Bicycles . ; : ; 441 300 800

415

* Weight in tons.

APPENDIX VIII
DIVISIONAL INSTITUTES AND CANTEENS

CANTEENS were instituted in the Ninth Division during September
1915 because of the exorbitant prices charged to soldiers by the
private owners of cafés and estaminets. The difficult work of
organisation was carried out by Captain, now Major J. R. King,
D.S.O., and he was ably assisted by Padre J. Johnston, Presbyterian
Chaplain. Two caravans, kindly sent out by some friends at home,
and named “Rob Roy” and “ Wee Macgregor,” were well known
to all who served with the Ninth; they traversed the front line
many times from the sea to the Somme, and “Jock”’ was always
delighted to see them, for they meant hot coffee and a packet of
biscuits or cigarettes. When at the beginning of 1918 Major King
was transferred to the 46th Reserve Park, the control of the Canteen
arrangements devolved principally upon Captain Carmichael. The
duties of the O.C. Canteens were by no means light, as the annual
overturn amounted to more than a million francs.

Another venture taken up by the Canteen department was the
establishment of a Soda-Water Factory. This factory not only
swelled the divisional funds but was an inestimable boon to the
men, who were provided with an excellent beverage at very small
cost.

Some of the profits were devoted to the purchase of a divisional
cinema at the beginning of 1916, and all kinds of places behind the
lines—a pantechnicon waggon, barns, wall of houses in the open air,
sheets under trees by the roadside—were used for performances ;
it is needless to mention that the film most in request from one end
of the line to the other was “ Charlie Chaplin.”

During the German offensive in 1918 some of the divisional
treasures were lost. The cinema and ‘‘ Wee Macgregor” had to
be abandoned. The soda-water plant was saved by Major King
who, moving back with his transport, remembered his old division

416

APPENDIX VIII 417

in its trouble, seized the plant at Péronne, and in spite of all obstacles
got it safely away.

The Canteens carried on to the end, and after the Armistice were
the only places where the troops could procure supplies.

With the development of the Canteens there arose demands for all
sorts of specialists, such as cinema operators, grocers, law assistants,
elc., and “Q” often asked brigades to furnish them. On one
occasion a brigade which as a rule took no notice of these requests,
sent in the following reply: “We regret we have no grocer
specialist, soda-water specialist, or law specialist in our ranks, but
we have a contortionist, if his services could be made use of.’’ But
“Q” scored (whether consciously or not is a matter of doubt) by
wiring, “ Please tell contortionist to report at H.Q. at once for duty
with the Concert Party.” This unexpected demand nonplussed the
brigade, which after deliberation concocted the following reply:
*‘ Regret contortionist became a casualty last evening and is being
evacuated.”

Digitized by Google

INDEX

ABEELE, 293

Abeelhoek, 365

Abercromby, Lieut.-Colonel Sir George,
commanding 8th Black Watch, 63,
162 note, 404

Achiet le Grand, 223

Achiet le Petit, 226 :

Adamson, Captain J. E., commanding
“C” Coy. 8th Gordons, 46

Adler Farm captured. 240

‘** Aerial darts,” trench mortars, 177

Aeroplanes, British, use of, 94 ; German,
188, 208, 218; bomb British troops,
268, 288

Aisne, the, 223, 354

Aizecourt le Haut, 280

Albert, 178, 286, 334

Albert, King of the Belgians, reviews
the Nioth Division, 383

Allenby, General Sir E., commanding
Third Army, 169; presents decora-
tions, 213; Campaign in Egypt,
248, 335

Allied Forces, plan of attack, 20, 181-183

Allwright, C.S.M.,. hergism, 127

Alwyn Farm, 325, 326

American Army, attack in the Woeuvre,
335, 354

Amiens, 334; failure of the Germans to
capture, 292

Ancre, the, 181, 287, 289; Valley, 153

Anderson, Major P. C., commanding
7th Seaforths, 256 note

Andrews, Captain, 377

Angus, Lieut.-Colonel A. W., command-
ing 5th Camerons, 338, 404

Annequin Fosse, 27

Anzac Redoubt, Ridge,
captured, 340

Argonne, attack on, 335, 354

Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, the
10th, 6, 395, 405; at the Battle of
Loos, 44; at Fosse Alley, 45; retire
to Dump Trench, 54; casualties,
67, 208 ; failure of a raiding scheme,

419

227; 336 ;

78 ; at the Battle of Longueval, 109;
attack on the Butte de Warlencourt,
156; at the Battle of Arras, 19),
197, 208; raids, 222; at the Battle
of Passchendaele, 239-242; in the
Thirty-second Division, 251
Armagh Wood, 68
Armenti¢éres, 13; evacuated, 299
Armin, General Sixt von, 180, 225
Armistice, 334, 3838, 384
Armitage, Brig.-General E. H.,C.R.A.,
7, 80, 403; letter from Maj.-General
Bulfin, 56
Army, British, the First Hundred
Thousand, 5; use of gas, 21, 28;
strength, 91 note; tactical expedi-
ents, 104; moral, 188, 317; relations
with the French Army, 183 ; ‘‘Backs
to the Wall” Order, 318; attack on
Cambrai, 335
Army, the First, 144, 334; at the Battle
of Arras, 206
Army, the Second, 224, 293, 301; Parade |
service, 329
Army, the Third, 169, 181, 2538, 264,
271, 275, 284, 834; surrenders the
Somme, 282
Army, the Fourth, 84 note, 150, 334
Army, the Fifth, 181, 225, 253, 271, 275,
284; at the Battle of Arras, 206
Army, British, I. Corps, 20
II. Corps, 336, 370
III. Corps, 150, 249
IV. Corps, 20, 144; at Bapaume, 220
V. Corps, 223, 253, 259, 264, 271,
281; retreat, 272
VII. Corps, 250, 258, 284; trans-
ferred to the Third Army, 285
VIII. Corps, 249
IX. Corps, 297, 301
X. Corps, 249
XIII. Corps, 84, 86; attack on
Longueval, 102
XV. Corps, 249, 336
XVII. Corps, 181; plan of attack
at Arras, 184

420

Army, British, XVIII. Corps, 238;
Cyclist Battalion, 245
XIX. Corps, 284
XXII. Corps, 301, 308
Corps Cavalry, at the Battle of the
Somme, 96

Army Service Corps, 9th Divisional
Train, 7; 104th Company, 7, 399;
105th, 7, 399; 106th, 7, 899; 107th,
7, 399; work of the, 71, 381, 391;
duties, 187, 290

Arneke, 238

Arras, 92, 172, 384; Battles of, 22, 193-
199, 203-205, 207-211, 214-218, 398;
condition, 173; gas bombardment,
180; bombing of, 213

Artillery Division, 281, 407

Athies, 184, 194

Auchy, 21 note, 41, 58

Australian Brigades, the 8rd, 293; the
38th, 282 ; the 43rd, 282

Australian Division, the 1st, 293; cap-
tures Germans, 322: the 2nd,
attack on Passchendaele, 228 ; the
4th, 289

Austria-Hungary, relations with Serbia,
3; collapse, 382

Austria, Archduke Francis Ferdinand
assassinated, 3

Austrian Army, attack in the Trentino,

Baapap captured, 224

Bailleul, 12, 320;
evacuated, 334

Bailward, Lieut.-Colonel A. C., com-
manding 50th Bde. R.F.A., 7, 407

Baizieux, 289

Balkan States, 334

Ballingall, Lieut.-Colonel H. M., com-
meaaine the 52nd Bde. R.F.A.,
40

Bamford, Lieut.-Colonel H. W. M.,
commanding South African Com-
posite Battalion, 307, 406

Bangalore torpedoes, 78

Bapaume, 89, 220; fall of, 152, 334

Barly, 150

Barnardiston, Lieut.-Colonel E.,C.R.E.,
403; wounded, 137

Barrage, ** box,” 178; ‘** creeping,” 107,
186

Bavarian Regiments, the 6th, 10th, and
16th, 102 note; Reserve Divisions,
the lst and 24th, 192 note

Bavichove, 370, 375; captured, 366

Bazentin, 2%3

Bazentin-le-Grand, 97, 102, 108, 285

Beauchamp Ridge, 254

Beaumetz, 264

Beaumont Hamel, 96

captured, 306;

INDEX

Becelaere, advance on, 341; captured,
342

Beck House, 228, 2384

Becourt Valley, 287

Beet Factory, 273

Belcher, Lieut.-Colonel H. T., command-
ing 52nd Bde. R.F.A., 407

Belgian Army, attack on Ghent, 336 ;
captures Moorslede, 345 ; St Pieter,
ee ; Bavichove, 366; _ relieved,
371

Belgians, Queen of the, 383

Belgiek, 371, 374

Belgium, invasion of, 3; rejoicings at
peace, 384

Bellamy, 2nd Lieut., of the 11th Royal
Scots, captures a patrol, 17

Bellewarde Ridge, 336 ; captured, 340

Bennet, Captain H. E., 312

Benrath, 390

Berchem, 871

Bergwijk, 379

Bernafay Wood, 97, 281; captured, 98 ;
bombarded, 99; attack on, 285

Bertangles, 289

Berthonval, 145

Bethune, 32, 56

Bethune bombs, 14, 46

Beugin, 145

Beveren, 371, 374

Beviss, Lieut., 261

Big and Little Willie Trenches, attack
on, 33

Billon Valley, 96, 100; Wood, 283

Bird. Major T. G., commanding 90th
Field Coy. R.E., 408

‘s Birdcage,” 76; blown up, 70

Black Cot, 304, 305, 307

Blacklock, Maj.-General C. A., com-
manding Ninth Division, 258, 402;
on leave, 258; return to the Front,
283

Black Watch, the 8th, 6, 63, 398; at the
Battle of Loos, 39, 41; capture
Germans, 42, 310; check the
German advance, 53; casualties,
62 note ; at the Battle of Longueval,
109, 112; attack on Snag Trench,
162; raid, 179; at the Battle of
Arras, 191, 194, 206, 208; of Pass-
chendaele, 239-242; retreat, 282;
at Grand Bois, 298; attack on
Meteren, 325; at Ypres, 337;
capture Rolleghem Cappelle, 349;
attack on Mogg Farm, 359

Blaringhem, 319

Bluff, The, 64, 69

Boer War, results, 8

Bogaert Farm, 301, 304

Bomb, Bethune, 14; Mills No. 5, 14;
depots, 30

INDEX

Bombs, phosphorous, 229; smoke, 27;
use of, 172

Bomy, 84

Bordon, 12

Borry Farm, 228, 234

Boteler, Lieut.-Colonel F. W., com-
manding 52nd Bde. R.F.A., 7, 407

Bouchavesnes, 278, 274

Bourlon Wood, 221

‘‘ Box” barrage, 178

Boyd, Lieut.-Colonel E., commanding
11th Royal Scots, 405

Brahmin Bridge, 326

Brake Camp, 238

Bray, 143, 252

Bremen Redoubt, 235

Briques, Les, 23; shelled, 51

Briqueterie, 99, 101, 286

Britain, agreement with France and
Russia, 3; war with Germany, 4;
administration arrangements, 85

British Army, 5. See Army

Brock, Captain S. E., 364

Brogden, Major J. S., D.A.D.O.S.,
Ninth Division, 8

Broodseinde, 336, 837; captured, 341

Brooke, Lieut. - Colonel E. W. S.,
eee 50th Bde. R.F.A.,
40

Brown, Lieut.-Colonel H. R., command-
ing 5th Camerons, 144, 404

Brown, Padre, 393

Browne, Major A. R. Innes, command-
ing 6th K.O.S.B., 217 note, 241;
killed, 308 note

Bruay, 144

Bruce, Brig.-General C. D., command-
ing 27th Infantry Brigade, 8, 403;
decides against attack on Haisnes,
45; H.Q. in the Quarries, 47;
taken prisoner, 50

Bruce, Lieut.-Colonel the Hon. David,
commanding 7th Seaforths, 299,
404

Bruce, Lieut.-Colonel J., command-
ing 2nd/lIst East Lancs. Field
Ambulance, 408

Brussilov, General, successes, 88

Buchan, Captain, killed, 50

Buchanan Street, 112, 132, 134

Budge, Lieut.-Colonel H. L., command-
ing 12th Royal Scots, 80,405 ; killed,
111, 114

Budworth, Lieut.-Colonel C. E. D.,
commanding 50th Bde. R.F.A., 407

Bulfin, Maj.-General, letter from, 56

Bulgar Wood, 294

Bulgaria, treachery, 86; sues for peace,
335

Burn, Major C. P. M., commanding
7th Seaforths, 63

421

Burn, Lieut. -Colonel Pelham, command-
ing 8th Gordons, 80, 404; 10th
A. & S.H., 638, 405

Busnes, 15, 18

Buswell, Lieut.-Colonel F. R., com-
manding 29th Field Ambulance,
7, 408

Butte de Warlencourt, 153; attack on,
154-157; Battle of, 394

Buzzard, Lieut.-Colonel F. A.,G.S.O.I.,
402

Byng, General Sir Julian, 222, 254, 264

CaBarkeEtT Roveoe_, 146

Camblain L’Abbé, 145

Cambrai, 89, 182; Battle of, 222;
military operations at, 246, 247

Cameron of Lochiel, Lieut.-Colonel
D. W., commanding 5th Camerons,
6, 63, 404; health breaks down, 80

Cameron, Lieut., captures Germans,
270

Cameron, Major, killed, 338

Cameron Highlanders, the 5th, 6, 398,
404; at the Battle of Loos, 39-41;
casualties, 41, 62 note, 68; check
the German's advance, 53; attack
on Waterlot Farm, 118; on Snag
Trench, 158; at the Battle of Arras,
191, 197, 206, 208; of Passchen-
daele, 239; retreat, 281; in reserve
at Vierstraat, 298; repulse, the
Germans at Dammstrasse, ~3804;
attack on Meteren, 325; advance
on Frezenberg Ridge, 340; on
Keiberg Spur, 344; cross the Lys,

. 373

Campbell, Major A. C., commanding
11th Royal Scots, 256 note ; death,
288

Campbell, Lieut. C., 328

Campbell, Lieut.-Colonel Sir J. B. S.,
commanding 11th Royal Scots, 231
note, 405; attack on Roeux, 204
note; on leave, 256 note

Campbell, Lieut.-Colonel R., command- |
ing 2nd Royal Scots Fusiliers. 378-
note, 406; attack on Ingoyghem
Ridge, 379

Canadian Division, the Third, at Arras,
181

Candle Factory, 191

Candles, smoke, 29

Canteens, institution of, 416

Cape, Lieut.-Colonel, G. A. S., com-
manding 51st Bde. R.F.A., 407

Cappelle St Catherine, 365

Caporetto, defeat of the Italians at, 247

Carency, 22, 145

Carmichael, Captain, in control of the
Canteens, 416

422

Carnoy, 135

Carpenter, Lieut.-Colonel C. M.,C.R.E.,
64, 403

Carter, Lieut.-Colonel A. H., command-
ing 51st Bde. R.F.A., 7, 407

Carvin, 21

Caterpillar Valley, 109

Cavalry Trench, 262

Celestins Wood, 96

Cemetery Alley, 43; shelled, 51, 53

Chalmers, Lieut.-Colonel F. G., com-
manding 9th Machine-gun Battn.,
252, 407

Chamberlain, Lieut.-Colonel, command-
ing 6th K.O.S.B., 308 note

Chapel Crossing, 249

Chapel Hill, 258, 254; captured, 263,
266

Chateau Thierry, 319, 333

Chemin des Dames, 319, 321

Chérisy, 212, 288

Chimney Trench, 98

‘* Chinese Attack,” 154; barrages, 193

Chipilly, 288

Christian, Lieut.-Colonel E., command-
ing 2nd South African Infantry,
144, 256 note, 406; the 4th, 172,

406

Churchill, Lieut.-Colonel the Right
Hon. W., commanding the 6th
Royal Scots Fusiliers, 63, 75, 405

Cité St Elie, 24, 32

Clarfes Street, 103, 118, 117

Clavering, Major N., commanding 64th
Field Coy. R.E., 408

Cléry captured, 276

Cochran, Major, in temporary com-
mand of the 2nd South African
Regiment, 228 note

Cockburn, Captain, rearguard action,
272

Cocks, Captain Somers, killed, 306

Cologne, 386

Combles, 89, 152, 277; captured, 282

Comines Canal, 64, 296

Compiégne, 334

Congreve, General Sir W. H., com-
manding XIII. Corps, 85; tribute
to the Ninth Division, 111; in
command of VII. Corps, 250

Connell, Lieut.-Colonel J. C. W., com-
manding 6th K.O.S.B., 64, 99, 165,
405; invalided to England, 171

Copse Valley, 96

Corbie, 93

Corons de Marons, 23

Corons de Pekin, 28

Costello, Lieut.-Colonel J. M. A.,
commanding 27th Field Ambulance,
408

Courtraj, 355

INDEX

Cowan, Lieut.-Colonel J. de B., com-
manding 50th Bde. R.F.A., 407
Crawley, Lieut.-Colonel R. P., com-
manding 9th Divisional Train, 7,
404

Cree, Colonel G., A.D.M.S., 7, 404

m rig a ba e, 107, 186

Crichton, Lieut.-Colonel A. G. M. M.,
commanding Sth Camerons, 239,
404; leaves, 256 note

Croft, Brig.-General W. D., command-
ing 11th Royal Scots, 68, 405; at
the Battle of Longueval, 113;
Director of the Divisional School
at Givenchy, 174; Three Years with
the Ninth Division, 174 note; attack
on the Germans, 190; in command
of the 27th Infantry Brigade, 231
note, 238, 403; at Sorel, 261;
reconnoitres the Corps line, 808;
advance on Becelaere, 341, plans
for crossing the Lys, 366; tribute
to, 381

Croisilles, 258

Crowden, Lieut. H. commanding ‘‘D™
Coy. 12th Royal Scots, 99

Cuerne, 848, 365, 366, 380; gas-shelled,
366

Cundle, Captain, 310

Cupid Trench, 214, 216

Curly Trench, 216

Cuthbert Trench, 209

‘* Cuthbert,” the prince of snipers, 148

Cyclist Battalion, at the Battle of the
Somme, 96

DabDIzEELE, 344; captured, 345

Dadizeelehoek, 350

Dammstrasse, 298, 302, 309; attack on,
804, 311

Dardanelles expedition, failure, 86

Darling, Captain, commanding 28th
Field Ambulance, 408

Daun, Marshal, tactics, 91

Davis, Lieut.-Colonel H. J. W., com-
manding 9th Machine-gun Battn.,
407

Dawson, Brig.-General F. S., 117, 131,
134, 262; commanding Ist South
African Regiment, 82, 406; attack
on the * Nose,” 160 ; commanding
S.A. Brigade, 171, 403; at Sorel,
266; retires to Moislains, 268;
ordered to retreat to Bouchavesnes,
274; taken prisoner, 280

Deerlyck captured, 374

Delbske Farm, 298

Delville Wood, 97, 102; attack on, 120,
126, 182, 188; captured, 121, 125,
140 note, bombarded, 125, 127,
100

INDEX

Demobilisation, system of, 889

Denys Wood, 298

Dernancourt, 286

Desinet Farm, 304

Dessart Wood, 256; shelled, 260, 285

Detail, General, commanding Eighth
Belgian Division, 348

Deule Canal, 22

* Devil's Wood,” 134

Diaz, General, 382

Dickebusch, rest hut, 65, 66

Divisional Artillery, 80, 147; Tactical
School at Givenchy, 174

Doignies, loss of, 264

Dome House, 302, 307

Douai, 89, 173. 354; plains, 182

Doucet, Captain C.; commanding 68rd
Field Coy. R.E., 7, 408

Doullens, Conference at, 293

Douvrin, 24

Drew, Major,
Camerons, 66

Drocourt, attack on, 334

Duff, Lieut.-Colonel G. B., command-
ing 8th Black Watch, 68, 404; 5th
Camerons, 80, 404; at the attack on
Delville Wood, 132; wounded, 133

Dugmore, Major, commanding 9th
Divisional Supply Column, M.T., 7

Duisans, 174

Duke, Captain, R.N., 303

Duke Street, 103, 114, 117, 123

Dump Trench, 33, 54; attack on,
23; captured, 48; reoccupied, 51

Dundas, Lieut.-Colonel R.C., command-
ing 11th Royal Scots, 8, 405

Duokirk bombed by the Germans, 249

Durham Light Infantry, the 19th, at
the attack on Longueval, 135

Dutton, Major J. H., commanding 6th
Royal Scots Fusiliers, 63

Dyson, Lieut.-Colonel H. H. B., com-
manding 11th Royal Scots, 6, 405

109; adjutant, 5th

East Yorxs Reoimen'r, the lst, 310

Eastern Question, 2

Eaucourt L’Abbaye, 150, 153; trenches
at, 164

Ecluses, Les, 79

Egypt, military operations in, 248

Eighteenth Division, 86; at Bernafay
Wood, 106; capture Trones Wood,
119; at the Battle of Passchendaele,

242

Eikhof Farm, 302, 306, 307

Elcock, Corporal Roland Edward,
awarded the V.C., 364, 412

Elsner, Lieut.-Colonel O. W. A., com-
manding 27th Field Ambulance, 7,
408 ; appointed A.D.M.S., 206, 404 ;
retreat, 289

423

Epernay, 333

Epine de Malassise, 274

Epinette Wood, 255, 272

Equancourt, 255, 27), 273

Espercy, General Franchet d’, 334

Esquelbec, 336

Essex Regiment, the 2nd, at the Battle
of Arras, 208

Estaires occupied, 299 .

Etinehem, 93, 284

Etricourt, 269

Etrun, 205 note

European War, outbreak, 1

Fatxennayrw, General Von, 152

Fampoux, 184, 202

Fanshawe, Lieut.-General Sir E. A.,
commanding V. Corps, 223 note

Fargus, Lieut.-Colonel N. S., com-
manding 12th Royal Scots, 144,
405; return to England, 172

Faulds, Private William Frederick,
awarded the V.C., 127, 410

Faviére Wood, 284, 286

Ferguson, Captain K. P., Brigade
Major, REA.. 7

Fergusson, Major-General] Sir Charies,
commanding Ninth Division, 8, 402 :
II. Corps, 8; XVII. Corps, 181;
takes the salute, 386

Fergusson, Lieut.-Colonel H. C., com-
manding 11th H.L.I., 6, 63, 406

Festubert, engagement at, 15

Fetherstonhaugh, Lieut.-Colonel T.,
commanding 9th Seaforths, 7, 407

Feuchy, 184

Field Service Regulations, 9, 176

Fielding, Major R. E. Bruce, command-
ing 63rd Field Coy. R.E., 408

Fifteen Ravine, 254, 256

Fifteenth (Scottish) Division, 82, 154;
capture the Railway Triangle, 197,
199

Fifth Division, 135

Fiftieth Division, attack on the Butte,
167 note

Fifty-first Division at Arras,
relieved, 213

Fifty-fifth Division, attack on Hill 37,
235

Fins, 255, 267, 269

** Fish-tails,” trench mortars, 177

Flammenwerfer, use of, 162

Flanders, condition, 65, result of the
military operations, 370

Flander I. Stellung, 344, 345

Fleming, Lieut., 113

Flers, 102, 153, 281

Flesqui¢res, 223, 259

Flétre-Roukloshille Ridge, 320

Flying Corps, 95

181;

424

‘** Flying Pig” mortar, 81
Foch, Marshal, appointed General-

issimo, 298; tribute to the Ninth.

Division, 314 note; tactics, 333;
arranges four attacks, 335

Fontaine Hoek, 820

Football Matches, 75

Forbes, Lieut.-Colonel R. F., command-
ing 11th H.L.I., 64, 406

Forsyth, Major M. N., 178

Forty-first Division, 83,
relieved, 249

Forty-seventh Division, 153, 262, 264,
271, 282

Forty-eighth Division, 238

Forty-ninth Division, 312

Fosse 8, 32; captured, 41; Alley, 46,
47,49; Trench, 33; attack on, 23

Fountain Alley, 44

Four Huns Farm, 300

Fourteenth Division, 251

Fourth Division, attack on Greenland
Hill, 201; at the Battle of Arras,
206

France, agreement with Britain and
Russia, 8

Francis Joseph, Emperor of Austria, 3

Francis, Captain W. E., commanding
64th Field Coy. R.E., 7, 408

Fraser, Captain, killed, 338

French, Field-Marshal Sir J. D. P.,
inspects the 27th and 28th Brigades,
15

French, Lieut.-Colonel W., command-
ing 8th Black Watch, 337, 351, 404;
defensive flank, 351

French Army, advance on Valenciennes,
20 ; relations with the British Army,
183; attack on Spanbroekmolen,
305; relieve the Nineteenth Divi-
sion, 306; recapture Soissons, 334 ;
attack on Argonne, 335, 354

French Cavalry Brigade, the 8rd, 350

French Corps, XX XVI., 249

Fresnoy, 212

Frevillers, 148

Freyburg, Brig.-General, 370

Frezenberg Ridge, 227, 336, 339 note ;
captured, 340

Fricourt, 285 ; Wood, 151

Fruges, 249

Fulton, Lieut.-Colonel H. A., command-
ing 9th Scottish Rifles, 113, 405;
at the Battle of Arras, 210

Furse, General Sir W. T., command-
ing Ninth Division, 62, 402; ** Re-
taliation Tariff,” 70; efforts to de-
velop the offensive spirit, 77;
tribute to the Division, 111 note;
at Montauban, 181; plans for a
counter-attack, 184; appointed

377, 378;

INDEX

Master-General of the Ordnance,
170; K:C.B. conferred, 170 note ;
characteristics, 171

GarsFrorD, Lieut.-Colonel W. T., com-
manding 7th Seaforths, 6, 404;
killed, 42

Gas, use of, 21, 28; discharged, 28 ;
result, 38, 59; attacks of the
Germans, 78, 180, 258, 260, 366,
876, 377

Gauche Wood, 249, 254; attack on,
261

Gaverbeek, 375

Gavrelle, 210

Gaza, 224, 248; Cross Roads, 326

Gemeenhof, 364

Genin Well Copse, 263

George V., King, exhortation to the
Ninth Division, 11, 395; at Fre-
villers, 148; La Brearde, 329

German Army, at Festubert, 15;
‘sMinnies,” or Trench Mortars,
16; gas attacks, 28 note, 73, 180,
258, 260, 366, 376, 877; at the
Battle of Loos, 383-56; reinforce-
ments, 46 note; counter-attacks,
48, 60, 129, 139, 351; capture the
Quarries, 50; losses, 57; sniping,
78; at the Battle of the Somme,
92; occupy Montauban Alley, 97;
taken prisoners, 113, 318, 380, 383 ;
position at Delville Wood, 121;
bombardment of it, 18) ; casualties,
142, 281, 287; defeated at Snag
Trench, 159; assault onthe** Nose,”
162; use of flammenwerfer, 162;
defeated at Arras, 189, 197, 207,
217; moral, 200; the 16th Division,
240 note; attack at Gouzeaucourt,
250; training, 251; 18th Division,
relieved, 257 note; 107th Division,
at Villers, 257 note; preparations
for an attack on Gonnelieu, 257-
259: attack on Gauche Wood, 261;
capture Chapel Hill, 266; advance
on Heudecourt, 268; attack on
the South Africans, 277-280; on
Bernafay Wood, 285 ; Trones Wood,
285; capture Lamotte, 288; at the
Battle of Wytschaete, 297, 308-313;
beaten back, 300; flight, 313;
defeated at Meteren, 324-327;
raids, 328; defeated at Hoegen-
acker Ridge, 331; retreat, 331,
334, 388; characteristics, 388; the
‘‘ War-prolongers,” 349 note; re-
verses, 353; withdraw to the Selle,
854; loss of moral, 359; retreat
from Laaga Cappelle Wood, 860 ;
evacuate Cuerne, 365

INDEX

German Fleet, creation, 3; blockade,
335

Germany, hostile policy, 3; invasion
of Belgium, 3; military operations
in Roumania, 152; submarine war-
fare, 247

Gheluvelt captured, 341

Gheluwe, attack on, 343

Ghent, 370

Gibson, 2nd Lieut., 162

Ginchy, 102, 285

Gird Trench, 159

Givenchy captured, 21 note ; Divisional
Tactical School at, 174

Glasfurd, Captain A. I. R., Brig.-Major,
of the 27th Infantry Brigade, 6

Glasgow Spur, 336

Glass, Captain J. S., commanding
Royal Scots Fusiliers, 375 note

Gonnelieu, 247, 253, 256 :

Gordon, Lieut.-Colonel G. W. E., com-
manding 8th Black Watch, 63, 404;

ersonality, 182; attack on Delville
ood, 132; promotion, 162 note

Gordon Highlanders, the 8th, 6, 63,
398; at the Battle of Loos, 39, 41,
46; advance on Haisnes, 42; retire
to Fosse Alley, 46; casualties, 62
note; join the Fifteenth Division,
82

Gorle, Lieut. Robert Vaughan, heroism,
352; awarded the V.C., 352, 411

Gough, General, Commander of I.Corps,
tribute to the Ninth Division, 61,
245 note ; forces, 253; criticisms on,
292

Gouzeaucourt, 247, 250, 254; shelled,
289

Grahame, Lieut.-Colonel J. C., com-
manding 10th H.L.I., 6, 64, 406;
gassed at the Battle of Loos, 37

Grand Bois, 298, 310

Grant, Captain, 328

Green, Captain, commanding 2nd South
African Regiment at Gauche Wood,
261

Greenhill-Gardyne, Lieut.-Colonel A.
D., commanding 8th Gordons, 63,
404

Greenland Hill, 207; attack on, 201

Grenadier Regiment, the 89th, 222

Grogan, Brig.-General E. St G., com-
manding 26th (Highland) Brigade,
8, 403; return to England, 15

Grovetown, 93, 95

Guedezeune Farm, 298

Guillemont, 102, 103, 277

Guyencourt, 267

H.E. shell, use of, 106, 229, 237;
barrage, 139, 154

425

Haan, 886
Hadow, Lieut.-Colonel R. W., com-
manding 8th Black Watch, 239
note, 404; force, 282
Haig, Sir Douglas, inspects the South
African Brigade, 83; Commander-
in-Chief, 88; result of his policy of
attrition, 89-92 ; message from, 179
note; plan of a great offensive, 181 ;
lan of attack, 223; tributes to the
inth Division, 291, 314 note, 316;
‘* Backs to the Wall” Order, 313
Haisnes, 20, 21 note, 24; attack on, 42,

44

Hamilton, Major S. W. S., command-
ing 90th Field Coy. R.E., 408; at
the Battle of Arras, 210

Hampshire Regiment, the 2nd, 368

Hanebeek, the, 227, 336, 340; Wood,
227, 234

Happy Valley, 135

Hardecourt, 283, 285

Hardy, Lieut.-Colonel W. E., command-
ing 28th Field Ambulance, 7, 408

Harlebeke, 848, 380, 383; attack, 367

‘* Harp, The,” 180

Harty, Lieut.-Colonel T. E., command-
ing 28th Field Ambulance, 408

Havrincourt, 221, 264; Wood, 220

Hawthorn, Sergeant C., 210

Hay, Captain C. J. B., Brig.-Major,
28th Brigade, 6; at the Battle of
Arras, 194

Hay, Ian, 333; The First Hundred
Thousand, 8 note, 16 note

Hazebrouck, 320

Heal, Lieut.-Colonel F. H., command-
ing Ist South African Regiment,
172, 406

Heal, Major, in temporary command of
the 2nd South African Regiment,
144

Hearn, Lieut.-Colonel G. R., command-
ing 64th Field Coy. R.E., 8, 137,
243, 403

Heetje, 365, 373

Hell Farm, 301

‘*« Hell-fire’’ Corner, 336

Helmet, the steel, 79

Hennois Wood, 273

Henry, Captain, 77

Hermaville, 205

Hermies, 264

Heudecourt, 255, 256, 268; shelled, 260

Heule Wood, 364; captured, 366

Hewitt, Lance-Corporal W. H., awarded
the V.C., 236, 411

Hickling, Lieut.-Colonel H. C. B., com-
manding Royal Engineers, 371, 403

High Wood, 102, 115, 168

426

Highland Brigade, the 26th, 6, 63,
$98; at Bailleul, 12; Nieppe, 13;
Festubert, 15; inspection of, 18;
objectives of attack, 23; attack on
the Hohenzollern Redoubt, 26; on
Big -and Little Willie Trenches,
33; at the Battle of Loos, 37, 43,
47; capturethe Dump, 48; relieved,
49; reorganised, 49; attack on
Fosse 8, 55; at Bethune, 56; at
the Battle of the Somme, 96; attack
on Longueval, 108; at Caterpillar
Valley, 109; attack on Waterlot
Farm, 120, 124; capture it, 129;
attack on Delville Wood, 132-134,
139; at Vimy Ridge, 145; in the
trenches at Arras, 174; Battle of
Arras, 195, 206 210; capture Mount
Pleasant, 202; raids, 221; Battle
of Passchendaele, 239, 244; at
Nieuport, 249; Gonnelieu, 256;
retreat, 267, 269, 2738, 281; attack
on, 274; at Saillisel, 276; Montau-
ban, 284; march to Dernancourt,
286; strength, 288; defence of
Dammstrasse, 311; form a defen-
sive flank, 315; attack on Meteren,
324; at Ypres, 336; attack on
Broodseinde, 337, 339-341; assist
the Belgians to capture Moorslede,
345; withdraw to Menin, 351;
attack on Ooteghem, 378; Colours
presented to, 390

Highland Light Infantry, the 10th, 6,
64, 398; at the Battle of Loos, 35,
36 ; casualties, 37, 62 nole; join the
Fifteenth Division, 82

the llth, 6, 64, 398; at the Battle of
Loos, 38; casualties, 62 note;
join the Fifteenth Division, 82

the 12th, at Hardecourt, 288, 285

the 18th, at Faviere Wood, 284

Highland Division. See Fifty-first
Division

Hill 40, attack on, 363; 41, attack on,
347, 350, 352; 50, attack on, 376;
captured, 377 ; 60, 64 ; battles at, 20

Hindenburg Line, 182

Hine, Lieut.-Colonel H. C. R., com-
manding 28th Field Ambulance, 408

Hinges, 18

Hoegenacker Ridge, 329; attack on,
330; captured, 331

Hoggart, Major, 362

Hohenzollern Redoubt, attack on, 21
note, 23, 26, 33, 40; captured, 41

Hollebeke, 293, 295, 296

Hollond, Lieut.-Colonel S. E.,G.S.O.1.,.

of the Ninth Division, 31, 402
Hoogebrug, 370, 371; Bridge, 367
Hooggraaf, 64

INDEX

Hopoutre, 293, 308

Horn, Lieut.-Colonel R., commanding
7th Seaforths, 144, 404; the Army
Musketry Camp, 256 note ; killed,
305

Horses, artillery, number killed, 356

Hosley, Major, at Loos, 35 ; wounded, 35

Hulluch, 21

Hulste captured, 366

Hunt, Lieut.-Colonel D. R., 283; com-
manding 4th South African Regi-
ment, 144, 406

Hutcheson, Captain C. de M., A.S.C., 7

InpirEcT Fire, practice of, 79

Infantry, relations with the Sappers, 69

Infantry Brigade, the 27th. See Low-
land Brigade

Infantry Brigade, the 28th, 6, 64, 398;
at Outtersteene, 12; objectives of
attack, 23; attack on Madagascar
Trench, 26; at the Battle of Loos,
37; casualties, 38; moral, 56; at
Bethune, 56; broken up, 82; attack
on Broodseinde, 337, 339-341; ad-
vance on Keiberg Spur, 344; cross
the Lys, 373; attack on Ooteghem,
378; Colours presented to, 390

Ingelmunster, 364, 865 ,

Inglis, Lieut.-Colonel J., commanding
5th Camerons, 256 note, 404;
wounded, 338

Ingoyghem, 371; attack on, 376

Inniskilling Fusiliers, the Ist, attack on
Hill 41, 352

Ireland, conscription in, 318

Italian Army, defeated at Caporetto,
247; cross the Piave, 382

Italy, entry into the War, 87; military
operations, 224

Jack, Brig.-General J. L., commanding
28th Brigade, 333, 344, 403; attack
on Ingoyghem Ridge, 379; tribute
to, 381

Jacobs, General C. W., tribute to the
Ninth Division, 353 note; presents
Colours, 390

Jacobs, Captain, 2nd South African
Regiment, 294 note

Jameson Raid, $

Jeffcoat, Lieut.-Colonel A. C., A.A. &
Q.M.G., 348, 380, 391, 402

Jeffries, Sergeant, captures Germans,
300, 305

Jerusalem, 248

Johnson, 2nd Lieut., 166

Johnston, Padre J.. 393, 418

Jones, Lieut.-Colonel F. A., command-
ing 4th South African Regiment,
83, 406; killed, 101

INDEX

Joostens, General, commanding 8rd
Belgian Division, 362

Judge Cross Roads, 342

Jutland, Battle of, 247

Keen, Lieut., 322

Keiberg Spur, advance on, 348; cap-
tured, 344

Keith, Captain, killed, 35

Kelham, Brig.-General H. R., com-
manding 26th Brigade, 6, 408

Kelso, Lieut.-Colonel J. Utterson, com-
manding 2nd Royal Scots Fusiliers,
406; blown up, 346; wounded, 355

Kemmel, Mount, 304, 308; evacuated,
334

Kennedy, Brig. -General J., commanding
7th Seaforths, 63, 118, 404; at the
attack on Delville Wood, 132, com-
manding 10th A. & S.H., 144, 405;
the 26th (Highland) Brigade, 170,
403; policy, 197; notes on the
Battle of Arras, 212; retreat, 273,
275; horse shot under, 281; return
to England, 327

Ker, Lieut.-Colonel R. F., commanding
6th K.O.S.B., 367, 377, 405

King, Major A., commanding Royal
Scots Fusiliers, 355; wounded, 375
note

King, Captain J. R., 105th Coy.

A.S.C., 7; organisation of Can-
teens, 416

King’s Own Scottish Borderers, the 6th,
6, 64, 398; at the Battle of Loos,
35; casualties, 36, 62 note, 99, 101;
at the Battle of the Somme, 97;
capture Bernafay Wood, 98; at the
Battle of Longueval, 105; march in
the mud, 164; raid. 180; at the
Battle of Arras, 191, 195, 209;
attack on Passchendaele, 228, 232,
241; at Sorel, 256 ; capture Germans,
319 ; surrounded and captured, 310;
march past the King, 329; attack
on Hoegenacker Ridge, 330; on
Ledeghem, 349 ; cross the Lys, 367 ;
attack on Hill 50, 376

Kitchener, Lord, personality, 4; appeal
for troops, 5; inspects the 26th
(Highland) Brigade, 18

Klein Ronsse Hill, 378

Klein Zillebeke, 296, 303

Kleinberg, attack on, 379

Klephoek, 348; Cross Roads, 347

Klijtberg, 377

Klooster Hoek, 879

Knapp, Lieut.-Colonel K. K., com-

manding 53rd Bde. R.F.A., 8, 407

Knock, 374

Krote, 376

427

Kruisstraat Cabaret, 301
Kut, surrender of a British force at, 87

Laaca CaprELLtE Woop, 360, 362, 370

La Bassée, 32

La Brearde, 329

La Clytte, 297, 310

La Gache Farm, 305, 807, 309

La Motte, 280 note ; captured, 288

Landon, Maj.-General H. J. S., com-
manding Ninth Division, 8, 402;
conference, 23; return to England,
$1

Langestraat, 379

La Polka, 304

Lavieville, 151

‘* Leap Frog” system, 228

Le Cateau, 280 note

Le Chat, 365

Ledeghem, attack on, 348; captured,
349

Legard, General, 288

Lekkerboterbeek stream, 239, 241

L’Enfer, 298, 300

Lens, 22, 89, 173, 182; evacuated, 334

Le Sars, 154

Les Boeufs, 281 ; captured, 282

Le Transloy, 276

Leuze Wood, 281

Lewis, Major R. P., commanding 29th
Field Ambulance, 408

Lewis Guns, 72, 93, 113, 188, 252, 818;
carriage of, 150

Lieramont, 267

Lille, 354; withdrawal of the Germans,
370

Livingstone, Lieut.-Colonel H. A. A.,
C.R.E., 7, 403; wounded, 64

Loch, Lieut.-Colonel G. G., command-
ing 12th Royal Scots, 6, 63, 405;
commands 27th Brigade, 50; Com-
mandant of the School at Poper-
inghe, 66; promotion, 80

Locon, 18

London Division, casualties, 161

Lone Farm, 43; shelled, 53

Longueval, 97, 100, 102 ; attack on, 125,
128, 130, 138, 140 note

Loos, Battle of, plan of attack, 20;
preparations, 20-31; preliminary
bombardment, 33; Battle, 33-56,
393; results, 59

Lowland Brigade, the 27th, 6, 63, 238,
398 ; at Noote Boom, 12; Festubert,
15; in reserve, 24; at the Battle of
Loos, 43; hold Fosse Alley, 48;
withdrawal, 50; reoccupy Dump
Trench, 51; repulse attack on Fosse
Alley, 54; at Bethune, 56; reputa-
tion, 57; at the Battle of the
Somme, 96; at Montauban, 97;

428

Billon Valley, 100; attack on
Longueval, 103, 110, 120; casualties,
138; at Bruay, 144; Vimy Ridge,
145; march to Mametz, 151; at
High Wood, 168; in the trenches
at Arras, 174; at the Battle of Arras,
195, 196, 208-210; of Roeux, 202,
205; attack on Passchendaele,
228, 275, 277; at the Battle of
Passchendaele, 239; retreat, 277,
303; relieved, 284; strength, 288;
casualties, 288; relieves the 26th
at Hollebeke, 295; at the Battle of
Wytschaete, 298; beat back the
Germans, 300; advance on Bece-
laere, 341; attack on Ledeghem,
349; at Keiberg Spur, 358 ; Colours
presented to, 390

Ludendorff, General, 201, 251, 309;
Meine Kriegserinnerungen,
plans to secure the Channel Ports,
306; operations against Rheims,
333; resignation, 383

Lukin, General Sir H. T., commanding
South African Brigade, 82, 403;
plan of attack, 154; commanding
Ninth Division, 171, 402; appointed
to a command in England, 252;
awarded the K.C.B., 252 note

Lumbres, 819

Lumm Farm, 300

Lumsden, Lieut.-Colonel W., com-
manding 9th Scottish Rifles, 228
note, 244, 337, 405, 406

Lys, the, 299, 355, 363, 365; crossing,
367-371

MacDoveat, Major H., 104th Coy.,
Army Service Corps, 7

MacEwen, Lieut.-Colonel St C. M. G.,
commanding 5th Camerons, 404

Machine-Gun Battalion, the 9th, 252,
315, 337, 368; at Ridge Wood, 297 ;
attack on Ooteghem, 378

the 104th reorganised, 355; attack on
Ooteghem, 378

Machine-Gun Companies, the 26th and
27th, at the Battle of Passchen-
daele, 242; the 28th, at the Battle
of the Somme, 96; the 197th, 188

Machine-Guns, bombardment, 27; value
of, 72

Machine-Gunners, gallantry, 311

MacIntosh, Padre Smith, 393

Mackensen, General von, 86, 152

Mackenzie, Lieut.-Colonel A. F., com-
manding 10th A. & S.H., 6, 405;
wounded, 55

Mackenzie, Maj.-General C. J., com-
manding Ninth Division, 6, 402;
in France, 8

258 .

INDEX

Maclean, Lieut.-Colonel H. D. N., com-
manding 6th K.O.S.B., 6, 35, 228
note, 405 ; leaves, 256 note

MacLear, Lieut.-Colonel R., command-
ing 9th Divisional Train, 404

MacLeod, Lieut.-Colonel D. M., com-
manding 4th South African Regi-
ment, 101, 406; wounded, 144

MacNamara, Major, 130

MacPherson, Major J. E., 12th Royal
Scots, 111, 204 note; wounded, 214
note

Madagascar Trench, attack on, 26, 34;
chelled, 51, 53

Mad Point shelled, 53

Maedelstede, 305; Farm, 302

Magdeburg Corps, the 7th and 8th
Divisions, bombardment of Delville
Wood, 130

Maison Blanche Wood, 196, 198

Maltz Horn Ridge, 100

Mametz Wood, 151, 1538, 286

Manancourt, 271, 273

Mangin, General, defeats the Germans,
334

Manhattan Farm, 351

Mariecourt, 277

Marne, the, 319; victory of, 86

Marricres Wood, 276, 277

Marshall, Lieut.-Colonel F. J. com-
manding 7th Seaforths, 63, 404

Marshall, General, Campaign in Meso-
potamia, 248, 335

Martinpuich, 282

Matthews, Lieut., 190; missing, 191

Matthias, Lieut.-Colonel T. G., com-
manding Newfoundland Regiment,
333, 406

Maubeuge, 20

Maude, General, 224

Maurepas, 277

Maxse, Genera] Sir Ivor, commanding
XVIII. Corps, 238

Maxwell, Brig.-General F. A., V.C.,
commanding 27th Brigade, 170,
203, 403; killed, 236; character-
istics, 236

McDiarmid, Major, 369

M'‘Fadyen, Private, gallantry, 55

McHardy, Lieut.-Colonel A. A.; A.A.
& Q.M.G., Ninth Division, 31,
391, 402

McHardy, Sergeant J., kilt blows away,
17

/
McKinley, Captain S., killed, 376
McLean, Lieut.-Colonel C. W. W., com-
manding 50th Bde. R.F.A., 407;
at the Battle of Loos, 43

Meaulte, 135, 286, 289

Medical Aid Posts, 30

Meister, Rev. C. G., killed, 306

INDEX

Menin, 348

Mericourt L’Abbé, 287

Merris, 74; captured, 328

Mesnil-en-Arrouaise, 275

Mesopotamia, military operations in,
87, 248

Messines Ridge, 299; captured, 224,
301

Meteren, 820; captured, 306; attack
on, 323-326

Meulewijk, 379

Meurchin, 21

Meuse, the, 354, 382

Middle Farm, 300

Middlesex Regiment, 218 note

Military Service Act, extension, 318

Mill Cot, 336

Mills No. 5 Bomb, 14

Mines, explosion of, 67, 148

Mining, method of, 71

‘* Minnies,” or German Trench Mortars,
16

Mitchell’s Farm, 235

Moeuvres, 258

Mogg Farm, 356; attack on, 359

Moislains, 268, 270, 272

Molenhoek Ridge captured, 342

Monastir recaptured, 152

Monchy Breton, 189, 213

Moncrieff, Brig.-General W. Scott,
commanding 27th Brigade, 6, 403

Monro, General Sir C., commanding
First Army, 144 note

Montauban, 284 ; captured, 96

Mont des Cats, 306, 320

Montefiore, Major C. S., commanding
90th Field Coy. R.E., 7, 408

Moorslede, 344; captured, 345

Morchies, 264

Morrison, Corporal, 6th Royal Scots
Fusiliers, 17

Morval, 153, 281, 282; captured, 282

Mosscrop, 2nd Lieut., 222

Motor Machine-Gun Battery, the 11th,
364; the 19th, 96

ad Machine-Gun Brigade, the 7th,
374

Moulin du Vivier, 287

Mount Pleasant Wood captured, 202

Mountain Battery, No. 7, action at
Fosse 8, 47

Mudie, Lieut.-Colonel T. C., G.S.O.L,
Ninth Division, 253, 380, 402

Muirhead, Lieut.-Colonel M., com-
manding 51st Bde. R.F.A., 407

Mulheim, 386

Munro, Major C. D., commanding 90th
Field Coy. R.E., 408

Murray, Lieut.-Colonel J., commanding
12th Royal Scots, 321 note; 405;
captures Steenbeek village, 364

429

Murray, 2nd Lieut., 12th Royal Scots,
stalks a patrol, 17

Narang, Lieut.-Colonel C. S., command-
ing 2nd Royal Scots Fusiliers, 406

Napoleon, Emperor, defeat of, 1

National Review, article in, 271 note

Nationalism, development of, 2

Neerhof captured, 359

Neuve Eglise, 297 ; captured, 306

*s Never-ending Road,” 146

Newfoundland Regiment, the, join the
Ninth Division, 333; advance on
Keiberg Spur, 344; repulse the
Germans, 355; capture Vichte, 375

New Zealand Division, at the Battle of
Passchendaele, 239, 242

Nicol, Major W. H., A.D.V.S., Ninth
Division, 8

Nieppe, 75; factory blown up, 14;

hateau le, 12
Nieuport, 224, 249
Nieuwe Kruiseecke Cross Roads, 342

' Nineteenth Division, at Wrytschaete,

297, 298; relieved, 306
Ninety-ninth Brigade, the, 271, 274;
attack on, 274; at Rocquigny, 276
Ninth Division, composition, 6-8;
changes in Command, 8; training,
8-11, 18, 74, 84, 172, 219, 251;
message from King George V., 11,
895; at St Omer, 12, 319; in-
struction in bombing, 13; at Bus-
nes, 15,18; Vermelles, 19, 24; pre-
parations for the Battle of Loos,
21-31; frontage, 23; equipment
for battle, 31; mistakes, 58; at
Bethune, 61; casualties, 61, 62,
125, 136, 138, 139, 218, 302, 3880,
396, 409 ; tributes to, 61, 111 note,
140, 245 note, 280 note, 291, 314
note, 316, 853 note, 370 note; re-
organisation, 62, 81, 251; esprit de
corps, 62; ordered to the Salient,
64; School at Poperinghe, 66; at
Zillebeke, 67; relieved, 73, 74, 135,
166, 213, 218, 228, 238, 251, 289,
312, 380; at Merris, 74; football
matches, 75; at Ploegsteert Wood,
75; development of the offensive
spirit, 77; sniping, 78; at Bomy,
84; at the Battle of the Somme,
95; of Longueval, 103, 105; night
attack, 104, 109-111; artillery
arrangements, 106-108; use of the
‘‘creeping ” barrage, 107; position,
119; at Pont Remy, 144; trans-
ferred to the IV. Corps, 144, 220;
join the III. Corps, 150; trans-
ferred to the Third Army, 169; at
St Pol, 169; Arras, 172 ; transferred

430

to the XVII. Corps, 181; plan of
attack on Arras, 184; atthe Battles
of Arras, 193-199, 202-205, 207-211,
214-218 ; at Hermaville, 205 ; Ruelle-
court, 218, 218 ; Canal du Nord, 220;
attack on Passchendaele, 228, 239-
248; at Arneke, 238, Brake Camp,
238; Ypres, 245; spirit of the men,
246, 314, 380, 394-396; at Nieuport,
249; Péronne, 249; transferred to
the VII. Corps, 250; at Villers,
253; Chapel Hill, 264; retreat,
267 ; reinforcements, 283, 294; at
Meaulte, 286; strength, 288; dis-
ciplined valour of the retreat, 290 ;
at Wytschaete, 293; the Comines
Canal, 296 ; attack on Wytschaete,
297, 304; dispositions, 807; de-
fence of Wytschaete, 308-314; at
Meteren, 820; raids, 821-328, 328 ;
outbreak of trench fever, 322; pre-
parations for the attack on Meteren,
328-325; Parade Service, 329;
white metal thistle, 329; attack on
Hoegenacker Ridge, 329-831; at
Wardrecques, 332; in the Flanders
camp, 336; transferred to the II.
Corps, 336; ordered to attack
Keiberg Spur, 843; attack on
Ledeghem, 348; on Courtrai, 355;
reorganises at Harlebeke, 383; re-
viewed by King Albert, 883; march
to Cologne, 384-386; bridgehead
duties, 387; Colours presented to,
390 ; demobilised, 390; work of the
various Branches, 391; Ordnance
Department, 392; the Padres, 393 ;
record of Battles, 393; Canteens,
416

Nivelle, General, in command of the
French armies, 182; failure in the
Aisne, 223

Noble, 2nd Lieut. A., 115

Noordemdhoek, 336

Noote Boom, 12

Nord, Canal du, 220, 273

Norman, Captain F. K., commanding
106th A.S.C., 7

North House, 304, 305, 307

North Street, 103, 117

Northamptons, the, at the defence of
the Fosse, 49

Northey, Lieut.-Colonel A. C., com-
manding 9th Scottish Rifles, 6,

63

Northey, Lieut.-Colonel H. H., com-
manding 6th Royal Scots Fusiliers,
6, 405

**Nose,” the, 157; attack on, 160, 163,
165; captured, 166

Nurlu, 255, 267, 269, 273; shelled, 260

INDEX

OsERMAYER TRENCH, 185

Oddie, Padre, 393

Ohligs, 386; Ninth Divisional College
at, 390

Oise, the, 258, 282, 354

Okkerwijk, 379

** Old German Line” trench, 16

Oldham, Major L. W. S., commanding
63rd Field Coy. R.E., 8, 408

Onraet, 299

Oosthoek, 64

Oosttaverne Wood, 299, 301

Ooteghem, attack on, 378; captured,
379 ;

Oppy, 210

“Orchard,” the, 16

Ordnance Department, work of the,
392, 415

Ormiston, Major, 163, 279

Ostend harbour blocked, 319

Ouderdom, 310, 812

Outtersteene, 12, 330

Oxford Copse, 99

Patt Mau Roap, 102 note

Pardy, 2nd Lieut., 179

Paris, Conference in, 224

Passchendaele, 336, 353; Battles of,
223, 231-235, 239-243, 398; prepara-
tions for the attack on, 224-231;
criticisms on, 243

Patrolling, 17

Payne, Colonel A. V., A.A. &
Q.M.G., Ninth Division, 6, 402

Peart, Sergeant, death, 393

Peirson, Captain, taken prisoner, 280

Pekin Trench, attack on, 23, 26, 42;
evacuated, 46

Péronne, 249; fall of, 334

Perreau, Lieut.-Colonel A. M., com-
manding 52nd Bde. R.F.A., 8, 407 ;
at Loos, 47

Pétain, General, 88

Petit Bois, 305

Petty, Lieut.-Colonel W., commanding
9th Seaforths, 407

Pheasant Wood, 304

Phineboom, 320

Phosphorous Bombs, 229

Piave, the, 382

Picardy, 88, 148

Piccadilly, 103, 114, 117; Farm, 312

Pick House, 299, 301; Wood, 304

** Pill-boxes,” 225; attack on, 232

** Pimple,” the, captured, 157

** Pine-apples ” trench mortars, 177

Pioneers, the, 7, 899; work of the, 137,
381, 391, 413

Plaatsbeek, 371

Ploegsteert Wood, 75, 76; occupied,
299; evacuated, 334

: INDEX

Plumer, General, presents Colours, 390

Poelcapelle, 238

Poezelhoek, 342

Point du Jour, 184, 199

Pollard, Prof., 4 Short History of the
Great War, 200

Pollock, Corporal James Dalgleish,
awarded the V.C., 53, 410

Polyyone de Zonnebeke, 337 ; captured,
341

Pont Levis No. 2, 376

Pont Remy, 144

Pont Street, 103

Pont a Vendin, 21

Poperinghe, 64, 223, 308; School at,
66

Portuguese Corps, attack on, 295

Potijze, the, 340

Potsdam, 228; attack on, 233, 235

Potterijebrug, 346

Princes Street, 103, 120

Princess Louise’s (Argyll and Suther-
land) Highlanders, the 10th, 6,
398

Pringle, Lieut.-Colonel R. N., com-
manding South African Field
Ambulance, 408

Prisoners, German, captured, 149, 177,
179, 195, 233, 237, 305, 310, 322,
327, 331

Proudfoot, 2nd Lieut., 179

Pulteney, Lieut.-General Sir W., com-
manding III. Corps, 150

Quarrirs, the, captured, 50; attack
on, 51; repulsed, 52
Quentin Ridge, 254

Ratps, number of, 177-180

Railton, 255, 265

Railway Alley, 43

Railway Triangle, 196, 197

Rancourt, 277

Ravine Wood, 298

Rawlinson, General Sir H., command-
ing Fourth Army, 84 note, 292;
orders from, 128; tribute to the
Ninth Division, 140

** Red Belly ” aeroplane, 188

Reid, Major A. W., commanding 63rd
Field Coy. R.E., 408

Reid, Captain, 4th South African
Regiment, 294 note; captures
Germans, 305

Reninghelst, 308

Respirator, the ‘* box,” 172

Rest huts, 65

‘* Retaliation Tariff,” 70

Revelon Farm, 262 ; Ridge, 255

Reynolds, Captain Henry,
awarded the V.C., 235, 411

233 ;

431

Rheims, 833

Rhine, the, 384

Ribemont sur L’Ancre, 286

Richtofen’s, Von, ‘‘ Circus,” 188

Ricketts, Private Thomas, awarded the
V.C., 361, 412

Ridge Wood, 294, 297, 802

Rifle-grenades, use of, 217, 219

Rifles, practice in the use of, 172, 174

Ritchie, Brig.-General A. B., command-
ing 26th (Highland) Brigade, 15,
403; at Loos, 89; uses divisional
mounted troops, 53; at Longueval,
105; plan of attack, 154; com-
manding Sixteenth Division, 170

Ritson, Lieut.-Colonel J. A. S., com-
manding 12th Royal Scots, 214 note,
232, 405; leaves for England, 371
note

Roclincourt, 174, 175

Rocquigny, 276 .

Roeux, 201; Chemical Works of, 202 ;
Battle of, 202-204 ; captured, 212

Rolleghem Cappelle, 356; captured,
349, 359

Rose, Major, killed, 305

ouba: withdrawal of the Germans,
371

Rougemont, Lieut.-Colonel C. H. de,
G.S.O.1., Ninth Division, 6, 402
Roumania, entry into the war, 151;
position, 224

Royal Army Medical Corps, the 27th,
28th and 29th Field Ambulances, 7,
399; work of the, 136, 167, 237,
244, 289, 290, 881, 391

ole Army Service Corps, 899. See

rmy
Royal Engineers, the 63rd Field Coy.,
7, 370, 371, 397; at the Battle of
Loos, 35; the 64th, 7, 371, 397;
at the Battle of the Somme, 96;
the 90th, 7, 397; endurance, 47; at
the Battle of the Somme, 96;
bridge over the Lys, 367
Royal Field Artillery, the 17th Brigade,
attack on Ooteghem, 378
the 50th Brigade, 7, 297, 347, 397;
attack on Cuerne, 366 ; cross the

Lys, 375

the 51st Brigade, 7, 297, 397; at
Heule, 366

the 52nd Brigade, 7, 397; at the
Battle of Loos, 47

the 53rd Brigade, 7, 80, 397
A.F.A. Brigades, 28th at Cuerne, 367 ;
65th and 180th near Gonnelieu,
257; 150th at Sorel, 267; 153rd,

343
Royal Flying Corps, air photographs,
189, 227
2F

432

Royal Scots, The, 11th Battalion, 6,
68, 398; at the Battle of Loos, 44;
retire to Fosse Alley, 47 ; casualties,
62 note, 77; expel the Germans,
77; at Montauban, 97; at the
Battle of Longueval, 105, 111, 114;
attack on Delville Wood, 126; re-
connaissance, 190; at the Battle of
Arras, 191, 214; attack on Roeux,
204 ; at Ypres, 231; at the Battle of
Passchendaele, 239; quartered at
Heudecourt, 256; at Chapel Hill,
265 ; at the Battle of Wytschaete,
298; advance on Becelaere, 341;
capture the Molenhoek Ridge,
842; advance on Hill 40, 363;
cross the Lys, 367; attack on
Vichte, 376

12th Battalion, 6, 398; at the Battle
of Loos, 44 ; retire to Fosse Alley,
47; casualties, 62 note; at the
Battle of the Somme, 96:
capture Bernafay Wood, 98; at
the Battle of Longueval, 105, 111,
114, 123; capture Germans, 149,
323; march in the mud, 164; at
the Battle of Arras, 191, 214,
216; attack on Roeux, 204; on
Passchendaele, 228, 239; on the
*s Pill-boxes,” 282, at Dessart
Wood, 256; Nurlu, 267; at the
Battle of Wytschaete, 298;
attack on, 309; surrounded, 310 ;
establish posts, 330; advance on
Becelaere, 341; capture it, 342;
attack on Ledeghem, 349;
capture Steenbeek, 364; Cuerne,
366 ; cross the Lys, 369

Royal Scots Fusiliers, the 2nd, 307,
312, 398; attack on Meteren, 324 ;
on Broodseinde, 337; advance on
Keiberg Spur, 344; cross the Lys,
373 ; action at Beveren, 374

the 6th, 6, 63, 398; at the Battle of
Loos, 44; attack on Fosse Alley,
51, 52; bomb fight, 54; retire
to Dump Trench, 54; casualties,
62 note; join the Fifteenth
Division, 82

Royal West Kent Regiment, 218 nute

Royal West Surrey Regiment, 218
note

Roye, 182

Ruellecourt, 213, 218

** Rum-jar ” shell, 147

Rupprecht, Prince, 320

Russia, agreement with Britain and
France, 3; policy, 151; revolution,
183, 224

Russian Army, retreat, 19; defeated
in Poland, 86; collapse, 246

INDEX

Ruthven, Brig.-General Hon. A. G. A.
Hore, V.C., commanding 26th
(Highland) Brigade, 327, 408;
advance on Moorslede, 345; de-
fensive flank, 350; attack on
Ooteghem, 879 ; tribute to, 381

S.S. 135 pamphlet, 10, 175, 176, 185;
oe 148 pamphlet, 10, 175,

Saillisel, 274, 276

Sailly Saillisel Ridge, 281

St Jans Cappel, 320

St Julien recaptured by the Germans,
225; Battle of, 394

St Laurent-Blangy, 185

St Louis, 871, 8374, 876

St Nicholas, 205 note

St Omer, 12, 319, 320

St Pierre Vaast Wood, 274, 276, 281

St Pieter, 345, 346 ; captured, 351

St Pol, 169

Salisbury Plain, training camps, 6

Salonica, 224, 247 ; expedition, 86

Sambre, the, 383

Sanctuary Wood, 68, 69, 337

Sappers, the, bomb factories, 14; in-
valuable aid, 47; relations with
the Infantry, 69; work of the, 1387,
244, 381, 391, 412

Sarrail, General, 152

Sawder, Major, 263

Scarpe River, 178, 181, 196, 202

Scheidt, the, 871, 379, 880, 396

Scherpenberg, 293, 297

Scott, Major, 12th Royal Scots, 239

Scottish Rifles, the 9th, 6, 307, 398;
at the Battle of Loos, 35, 38:
casualties, 62 note, 346; operations
against the Germans, 78; at

ontauban, 97; at the Battle of

Longueval, 105, 111; raid, 178;
at the Battle of Arras, 191, 208;
attack on Roeux, 204; on Passchen-
daele, 228, 232, 212; in the Four-
teenth Division, 251; at Meteren,
320; attack on Broodseinde, 337 ;
Keiberg Spur, 844; cross the Lys,
373

Scrase-Dickins, Brig.-General S. W.,
commanding 28th Infantry Brigade,
6, 82, 165, 403; at the Battle of
Loos, 35; of Longueval, 105, 115.
116; commanding Thirty-seventh
Division, 169; characteristics, 169;
invalided to England, 170 note

Seaforth Highlanders, the 7th, 6, 68.
398; attack on the Hohengzollern
Redoubt, 21 nutes, 40; at the Battle
of Loos, 89; casualties, 62 note;
attack on Waterlot Farm, 118; on

INDEX

the Butte de Warlencourt, 155; at
the Battle of Arras, 191; attack on
Wytschaete, 804; at Ypres, 3837;
cross the Lys, 878

Seaforth Highlanders, the 9th (Pioneers),
7,399; at the Battle of Loos, 85;
heroism, 48; at the Battle of the
Somme, 96; of Arras, 216; bar-
rage, 216; at the Battle of Passchen-
daele, 239-242; reorganised, 251;
at Sorel, 256

Selle, the, 854; Battles of, 382

Sempill, Lieut.-Colonel Lord, com-
manding 8th Black Watch, 6, 404;
wounded, 41

Serajevo murder, 8

Serbia, relations with Austria, 3

Serbs, the, defeat of, 86

Serre, 96

Seven Years’ War, 91

Seventeenth Division, 213, 281, 285

Sharp, Lieut.-Colonel S. F., command-
ing 9th Seaforth Highlanders, 407

Shiels, Captain Drummond, 297

Shrapnel shell, use of, 107 note, 229

Siege Farm, 309

Simpson, Lieut.-Colonel C. N. com-
manding 58rd Bde. R.F.A., 7, 407

Sixty-first Division, at Péronne, 249

Sixty-third (Naval) Division, at
Passchendaele, 245, 282; at
Péronne, 250

Slag ened 51

Slypshoek, 347

Slypskappelle, 847

Smith, Sergeant, 322, 328

Smoke-bombs, 27 ; candles, 29 ; screen,
186, 197; shells, 187

Smuggling, repression of, 388

Smyth, Lieut.-Colonel G. B. F., com-
manding 6th K.O.S.B., 171, 256
note, 829, 405; at the Battle of
Arras, 209; murdered, 209 nofe ;
wounded, 210, 276; attempt to
clear Hill 41, 350; commanding
90th Field Coy. R.E., 408

Snag Trench, 154, 156, 158

Snephoek, 364

Sniping, 78, 148

Soda-Water Factory, 416

Soissons, 338 ; recaptured, 334

Solingen, 386, 390

Somer Farm, 301, 302, 805

Somme, 85, 89, 282; preparations for
the Battle of, 92-94; preliminary
bombardment, 94; Battle, 95, 107,
note, 393

Sorel, 255, 256, 267; shelled, 260

_ Sotheby, Lieut.-Colonel H. G., com-
manding 10th A. & S.H., 171, 405

Soucher, 22, 145

433

Source Farm, 242; Trench, 241, 242

South African Brigade, 82, 898; at the
Battle of the Somme, 96; at
Montauban, 99; occupy Bernafay
Wood, 101; casualties, 181 ; in the
trenches at Arras, 174; raids, 180;
at the Battle of Roeux, 202-204;
lack of reinforcements, 206; fresh
battalions, 218 ; attack on Passchen-
daele, 228, 234; at Gonnelieu, 256 ;
ordered to retreat, 267-269; attacks
on, 277-279, 801; survivors taken

prisoners, 280; strength, 294;
attack on Messines, 299; on
Meteren, 824; leave the Ninth

Division, 332 ; tribute to, 838 note
South African Regiment, the lst, at the
Battle of Longueval, 117, 123; attack
on Delville Wood, 126; on Snag
Trench, 158; expelled by flammen-
werfer, 168; at the Battle of Arras,
191; attack on Wytschaete, 805
the 2nd, attack on Delville Wood,
121; casualties, 122; capture
- Germans, 149; attack on the
Butte de Warlencourt, 155 ; at the
Battle of Arras, 191; at Gauche
Wood, 261
the 8rd, attack on the ‘ Nose,” 161;
at the Battle of Arras, 191;
broken up, 251
the 4th, attack on Waterlot Farm,
124; atthe Battle of Arras, 191;
recapture Cha Hill, 268;
attack on Wytschaete, 305
South African Composite Battalion, 288,
a 302, 304, 307, 398; strength,
8
South Street, 112
Spanbroekmolen, 302, 304, 308
Sparrow, W. S.. ‘* Epic of the Ninth
(Scottish) Division,” 271 note, 290

note
Sprenger, Captain L. F., 235; wounded,
157

Spriethock, 347

Springfield, 243

Square Wood, 210 ,

Staenyzer Cabaret, 304

Staff Officer, duties, 22; A. Branch,
22; G. Branch, 23

Staunton, Lieut.-Colonel G., command-
ing 8th Gordons, 6, 404

Steenbeek, 361; captured, 364

Steenen Stampkot, 360, 363

Steenwerck, 75, 83; occupied, 299

Stevenson, Private J., plucky exploit,
100

Stewart, Lieut.-Colonel. P. A... V.,
G.S.O.I., 258, 402

Stirling Castle, 336, 337

434

Stokerij, 365, 378

Stokes Mortars, 27, 81

Storey, 2nd Lieut., 191

Straate, 375

Straubenzee, Lieut.-Colonel C. C. Van,
commanding 50th Bde. R.F.A., 8,
407

Strooiboomhoek, 344, 347

Stuart, Lieut.-Colonel H. C., com-
manding 10th H.L.I., 64, 406

Submarine warfare, 247

Sussex Regiment, at the defence of the
Fosse, 49

Symons, Colonel F. A., A.D.M.S.,
404; killed, 206

Taat Trencn, 154; bombardment of,
165

Tait, Sergeant, 300

Talus Boise, 129, 185, 284

Tank Brigade, the 4th, 806, 309

Tanks, the, 191, 196, 222, 247

Tanner, Brig.-General W. E. C., com-
manding 2nd South African Regi-
ment, 82, 172, 406; attack on
Delville Wood, 120; wounded,
129; commands 8th Brigade (Third
Division), 256 note, commands
South African pa cai 294, 403;
letter from Brig.-General Tudor,
333 note

Taylor, Captain G. P., 162; command-
ing 28th Field Ambulance, 408

Teacher, Brig.-Major, at Longueval,
110

Terdeghem, Parade Service at, 329

Terhand, advance on, 343; captured,
245

Terrapin House, 329, 331

Thackeray, Lieut.-Colonel E. F., com-
manding 8rd South African Regi-
ment, 83, 406; at Waterlot Farm,
129, 181, 139; at Happy Valley,
135; wounded, 144

Thesiger, Maj.-General G. H., com-
manding Ninth Division, 31, 402;
at Loos, 37, 44; killed, 53

Thiepval, 89, 96, 152

Third Division, 76th Brigade, relieved,
106; attack on Longueval, 129, 130

Thirtieth Division, 86, 154, 158; re
lieved, 99

Thirty-first Division, at the Battle of
Arras, 206, 210; relieved, 320

Thirty-second Division, 251

Thirty-fourth Division, at Arras, 181

Thirty-fifth Division, 176, 283, 284

Thirty-sixth Division, 223, 371, 375,
378; ordered to advance on Ter-
hand, 343; capture it, 345;
capture Hill 41, 347

INDEX

Thirty-seventh Division, relieved, 206

Thirty-ninth Division, 251; relieved,
253

‘¢ Thistles, The,” concert troupe, 393

Thomson, Lieut.-Colonel, commanding
1/1st Yorks Cyclists, 364

Thomson, 2nd Lieut. K. D., killed,

138
Thorne, Lieut.-Colonel H. U. H., com-
manding 12th Royal Scots, 172,
405; killed, 194
Thorp, Captain H. W. B., Brigade-
Major of the 26th Highland Brigade,

6
Three Cabarets, 23; attack on, 89,
40
Tones es gh in, 316
orpedo, the Bangalore, 78
Torreken Corner, 08
Tourcoing, 370
Train Alley, 23
Transylvania, invasion of, 151
Trappelstraat, 371
Trench feet, 68; cases of, 167; remedy
for, 176; fever, outbreak, 322
Trench Mortar Brigade, 81, 311; work
of the, 315
Trench Mortars, 14, 27, 81, 147; war-
fare, 18
Trenches, 146, 174; siting of. 10; for
the wounded, 25, 30; condition,
68
Trentino, attack in the, 88
Triangle Post, 97
Trigger Wood Valley, 96
Trones Wood, 97; attack on, 100, 101,
285; captured, 119
Trotter, Brig.-General G. F., command-
ing 27th Brigade, 63, 403 ; accident,
82
Tudor, Maj.-General H. H., C.R.A.
Ninth Division, 80, 106, 139, 205
note ; and General Furse, 154 note,
403; Police Adviser in Ireland,
209 note; plan of attack, 222;
commands inth Division, 258,
298, 402; at Nurlu, 260; ordered
to withdraw, 264; at Moislains,
2703; trouble with the 47th Division,
270; coolness and foresight, 290;
tribute to the South African Brigade,
333 note; Orders to Brigadiers, 343 ;
Conference at Waterdamhoek, 346 ;
characteristics, 381
Tulip Cottages, 235
Turkey, reverses, 335
Turner, 2nd _ Lieut., 113;
127
Tweedie, Lieut.-Colonel W. J. B., com-
manding 10th A. & S.H., &0, 405;
wounded, 1438

heroism,

INDEX

Twelfth Division, 285; retreat across
the Ancre, 287

Twenty-first Division, 253, 306; at Pér-
onne, 249; hold Cavalry Trench,
262; retreat, 274, 276

Twenty-fourth Division, the 72nd Brig-
ade, at Zillebeke, 67; the 73rd
Briyade, at the defence of the
Fosse, 49; inexperience, 50, 58
note; unsteadiness, 52; withdraws
from the Fosse, 54

Twenty-eighth Division, the 85th Brig-
ade, attack on Fosse, 8, 55

Twenty-ninth Division, 337, 842, 370,
876; ordered to advance on
Gheluwe, 343; captures Heule,
366 ; relieved, 377

Untacxr, Lieut.-Colonel R. F., A.A.
and Q.M.G., 402; killed, 14

United States, entry into the war, 248;

ids gubervaa of soldiers, 318

Usmar, Lieut.-Colonel G. H., com-
manding the South African Field
Ambulance, 408

VAARNEUYKBEEE, the, 370, 372

Valenciennes, 20

Vandamme Hill, 308

Vandenberghe, 311

Vaucellette Farm, 262

Vaux Woods, 270, 272

Vaux-en-Amienolis, 85

Verdun, Battle of, 87

Vermelles, 19, 24, 32

Vesle River, 334

Vichte, 371; captured, 375

Vickers Guns, 72, 188

Vienna Congress, result, 1

Vierstraat, 294, 297, 298

Villers, 253, 256, 334

Villers-Plouich, attack on, 272

Vimy Ridge, 145, 149, 182; captured,
200

W.A.A.C., the, 388

- Waermaerde, 379

Wainwright, Brig.-General H. R.,
appointed C.R.A., 293, 261, 403

Wald, 386, 390

Wales, H.R.H. Edward, Prince of, at
Festubert, 17

Wallemolen, 24]

Walshe, Brig.-General W. H., com-
manding 27th Brigade, 63, 403

War, European, outbreak, 1

Wardrecques, 332, 336

Warsaw captured, 19

Waterdamhoek, 344;
Brigadiers at, 346

Waterend House, 235

Conference of

435

Waterlot Farm, 102, 103; attack on,
108, 113, 115, 118, 124; captured,
129

Watten, Artillery Training Camp at, 74

Webber, Major, 213

Weed and Weak Trenches, 207

Weller, Lieut. W. R., killed, 138

Wemyss, Lieut.-Colonel J. Colchester,
commanding 6th K.O.S.B., 321
note

Westhoek, 336; recaptured, 225

Westroosebeke, 238, 239

West Spring Gun, 14

White, Captain, 369

Wijfwegen, 345

Wilkie, Major H. J., commanding 6th
K.O.S.B., 308 note

William II., Emperor of Germany,
tribute to the Ninth Division, 280
note; flight to Holland, 384

Wilson, Lieut.-General Sir H., com-
manding 1V. Corps, 144 note

Winchester, Lieut., 118

Winkel St Eloi captured, 360

Wish Trench, 210

Wit Trench, 210; attack on, 211

Woeuvre, attack on, 335, 354

Wolfsberg, 375

Woolner, Major C. G., commanding
64th Field Coy. R.E., 408

Wormhoudt, 249

Wounded, the, trenches for, 25, 30;
breakdown of the arrangements,
59; rescue of, 136, 289

Wright, Lieut.-Colonel H., commanding
8th Gordons, 8, 404

Wright, Lieut., killed, 99

Wulfdambeek stream, 356; captured,
359

Wulverghem, 301; captured, 306

Wytschaete, Battle of, 297; evacuated,
299 ; captured, 304, 306; attack on,
309

Yorks Cycrists, the 1/Ist, 364, 374

Young, Lieut.-Colonel, commanding Ist
South African Regiment, 283, 294
note

Young, Captain T. F., commanding
6ith Field Coy. R.E., 408

Ypres, 20, 64, 223, 225, 227, 248, 336;
ruins of, 67 ; bombed by aeroplanes,
238

Yser, the, 224

ZANDVOORNE RinceE, 296

Zeebrugge harbour blocked, 319

Zevencote, 235

Lillebeke, 64, 67, 70

Zonnebeke, 227, 228, 235, 342; attack
on, 234 :

PRINTED BY OLIVER AND BOYD, EDINBURGH, SCOTLAND

MAPS

Loos.

. The Somme, Longueval, and Delville Wood. °

. The Butte de Warlencourt, October 1916.

. Arras: Action of 9th April 1917.

. Arras: Actions of 12th April to 5th June 1917.

. Passchendaele: Action near Frezenberg, 20th September 1917.
. Passchendaele: Action near St Julien, 12th October 1917,

. The Retreat on the Somme, March 1918.

. Wytschaete and Kemmel, April 1918.

10.
ll.

Meteren and Hoegenacker, July to August 1918.
The Final Advance, September to October 1918.

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History of the

9th (Scottish)

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